False

FALSO. — I. F. IN GENERAL. — F. (Latin: falsum) in the broadest sense indicates every alteration of the truth. This alteration may be made either orally or in writing, and through an act of counterfeiting; thus there is monetary, documentary, personal falsification, falsification of emblems, distinctions, etc.

In the first case there is lying, calumny, false testimony, or perjury. In the second case there may be an alteration or suppression of the text or document, or its fabrication ex novo. In the third case f. may assume various forms, ranging from a substantial alteration of the object to alterations of slight extent and wholly extrinsic.

In the second and third cases there is f., or falsification properly so called, which entails the immutatio veri, directed toward the imitatio veri.

For there to be the culpability and crime of f., a new, subjective element is required, namely, malicious intent. Here malicious intent consists in the will and awareness to carry out the falsification, whatever the purpose inspiring the culprit, even if he acted through thoughtlessness or frivolity. It is not necessary for the culprit to conceive of the possibility of harm as an effect of his falsification, since it is sufficient that he acted consciously and voluntarily for illicit purposes.

The crime of f. may therefore be defined as the malicious counterfeiting or suppression of the truth, carried out to the detriment of another. The objective of this crime is to deceive public confidence. This, at least, is the classification used by Filangeri and Raffaelli onward in almost all legislation. It is therefore necessary that public confidence be capable of being injured by that act. When falsification descends to such a degree of crudeness and obviousness that it absolutely cannot entice anyone, there may be the sin or crime of attempted or consummated fraud, but not the crime of f.

From this the difference between fraud (v.) and the crime of f. becomes clear. In fraud, one disregards the immutatio veri (proper to f.) and aims directly at deception to the detriment of others; moreover, the direct object of this crime is the violation of individual confidence, whereas in f. it is the violation of social trust. Likewise, the crime of f. differs from the crime of plagiarism, where another’s work is imitated and presented as one’s own, here too disregarding the immutatio veri or, if there is an alteration, it concerns the author’s name and not the nature of the composition. The crime of f. is also distinguished from perjury, which is a false assertion confirmed by oath, where, in addition, there is an invocation of the divinity as witness to the falsehood.

To conclude, there are two conditions necessary for the existence of f., whether it is a crime or merely a sin:

1) the alteration of the truth (immutatio veri), which constitutes the corpus peccati or delicti of all acts or facts classified as f. A record containing deliberately false assertions by a witness may be considered f., even if the proceedings themselves have not been altered;

2) fraudulent intent, that is, the intention to harm another. If the evil will is lacking, there can be no imputation.

The principle applies to every person in every ethical relationship with rational creatures: it is in clear opposition to every f., poetically expressed by Manzoni: « Il santo vero mai non tradir » (A. Manzoni, In morte di C. Imbonati, 213–14).

The worst kind of falsehood occurs in the alteration of our relationship with God: offering the worship due to God alone to false gods, or offering it to God himself in a false or superstitious manner (v. SUPERSTIZIONE).

But the principal field of application lies in our relations with our neighbor, or even with ourselves. The vice is fundamental when falsity affects the proximate norm of morality, the conscience. conscience (v.) has repercussions throughout life and, naturally, if recognized at the moment of its formation, even if subsequently no longer perceptible, is culpable in causa, at least until the moment of a formal retraction.

In relations with one’s neighbor, the use of f. is unjust whenever one’s neighbor has the right to know the truth. Therefore, the deceptions used by people, even savages, in hunting animals are neither sin nor crime of f., given the ordering of animals to the service of humankind and the existence of rights only between human beings. Likewise, the so-called « finte », the « tranelli » in fencing, in football, chess, etc., are permitted; there apparent f. is nothing other than a test of intelligence, which must not offend the opponent, who should expect such a manner of acting, consenting to the game within the limits of a certain legality.

Simulation, likewise so deeply incorporated into the technique of warfare, falls outside any injustice, because, as s. Agostino says, « cum aliquis iustum bellum susceperit utrum aperta pugna, utrum insidit vincat, nihil ad iustitium intercat » (Quaestiones in Heptateuchium, I, VI, q. 10). Quite different, however, is the elevation of f. into a system in individual civic or private relations (contractual relations, obligations of a legal nature, etc.) and in international relations. Here one enters fully into the violation of the ethical and juridical sphere, where the general rule of respect due to the truth is the norm.

Moralists proceed here to specifications in detailed casuistry and speak of the falsification of merchandise, currency, documents such as wills, etc.; of false declarations in insurance contracts and tax returns; of false testimony or defamatory denunciations, whether made anonymously or not.

Recourse to f., in all these cases and others that may arise, is not only condemned as a grave or venial sin, depending on the gravity of the matter or its repercussions, but sometimes also gives rise to the rescission of the contract or the duty of reparation.

Some more serious forms of falsification constitute crimes in canon and civil law.
II. THE CRIME OF F. IN THE CIC. — The CIC, leaving to civil law the punishment of the falsification of coins, weights, and goods, deals only with the falsification of sacred relics, ecclesiastical documents, and the false denunciation of solicitation to immoral acts.

1. Falsification of the Sacred Relics for Use as False Relics

Whoever fabricates false relics or knowingly sells, distributes, or exposes them for public veneration is immediately (ipso facto) subject to excommunication reserved to the Ordinary (can. 2326). A person is said to expose something for public veneration when he has some authority in the matter, either by virtue of his office (e.g., the sacristan) or by virtue of the sacred Order he has received (e.g., the parish priest, the cleric, etc.).

To sell the Sacred Relics, moreover, is an act of simony (can. 1280 § 1), and consequently the guilty party is also subject to the penalties proper to this crime.

2. Fabrication or Falsification of Apostolic Letters

Against this form of the crime of f. there is a whole development of penal legislation in the ancient canon law (2, 34, X, II, 19). In the present law, all those who fabricate or falsify letters, decrees, or rescripts of the Apostolic See, or those who knowingly use such letters, decrees, or rescripts, incur immediately (ipso facto) excommunication specially reserved to the Holy See (can. 2360 § 1).

Clerics who are guilty of this crime are also punished with other penalties, which may extend to deprivation of a benefice, office, dignity, or ecclesiastical pension. Religious, finally, must be deprived of all the offices they held in their religious institute and of both active and passive voice, in addition to the penalties established in their own constitutions (can. 2360 § 2).

The fabrication or complete composition of letters, their falsification, or any alteration of a substantial part thereof is punished with excommunication; so too is their use or presentation in order to obtain the desired effect, even if, once the falsification has in fact been discovered—for example, the falsification—they do not obtain the desired effect. By the name of letter, decree, or rescript of the Apostolic See are understood, for this purpose, all individual public acts, in the form of a letter, decree, or rescript, issued by the Holy See, whether by the Roman Pontiff or by the Roman dicasteries. It is necessary, however, that they be used knowingly.

Falsifiers who use these false or falsified documents incur these censures on two counts.

3. Obreption or Subreption in Applications for Rescripts

If anyone, in a petition submitted to the Holy See or to the Ordinary of the place in order to obtain a rescript, fraudulently or deceitfully fails to tell the truth or sets forth the f., he may be punished by his own Ordinary according to the gravity of the offense (can. 2361). Nevertheless, if the obreption or subreption is not manifest, the rescript may be acted upon when it is in the hands of a necessary executor, whereas, if the executor is voluntary, the matter is left entirely to his prudence (can. 54). In impediments of lesser degree (can. 1042 § 2), however, the dispensation for marriage remains valid notwithstanding any obreption or subreption (can. 1054).

4. Falsification of Other Ecclesiastical Documents

Those who fabricate or falsify ecclesiastical letters or acts, whether public or private, or those who knowingly make use of such documents, may be punished according to the gravity of the crime (can. 2502). If the falsifier is someone entrusted with the compilation, writing, or preservation of the documents and books in question, he must be deprived of his office, and other penalties may be added (can. 2406 § 1). If the crime of f. is perpetrated to the detriment of the diocesan Curia in documents of considerable importance, and concerns a substantial falsification, the falsifier is subject to excommunication simply reserved to the Holy See, not excluding the vicar capitular and the canons, in addition to other penalties that may be applied by the Ordinary (can. 2405).

These canons include acts of any ecclesiastical authority inferior to the Apostolic See, such as acts of bishops, parish documents, etc.

5. False Denunciation of Solicitation

If anyone, either personally or through others, falsely denounces to superiors a solicitation (v.), he immediately (ipso facto) incurs excommunication specially reserved to the Apostolic See, from which he can in no case be absolved unless he has formally retracted the false denunciation, has repaired the damages, according to his ability (pro viribus), if any have occurred, and has been subjected to a grave and lengthy penance (can. 2503).

Moreover, here not only is the censure reserved, but the sin itself is reserved as such (ratione sui) to the Holy See: indeed, it is the only one of its kind in the present legislation (can. 894). This is readily understood, given the gravity of the act which the legislator intends to punish.

As regards the penalties against false witnesses and the crime of collusion, V. TEMISTIO.

III. FALSEHOOD IN ITALIAN LAW

The State, too, must protect itself against the consequences of falsehood, which undermines the foundations of public faith, that is, of the juridical order in which organized society, for its very existence, needs to believe.

The Italian Penal Code establishes penalties for falsehood in Title VII of Book II, under the heading of offenses against public faith. It represses the various forms that falsehood may assume and distinguishes them into four fundamental categories: 1) the falsification of coins, public credit paper, and stamp values, comprising the falsification, alteration, and circulation of counterfeit coins and stamp values; the counterfeiting of watermarked paper; the manufacture and possession of instruments intended for the falsification of coins and stamp values; the falsification and use of tickets of public transportation enterprises, etc. (arts. 453–66); 2) falsehood in seals, instruments, or signs of authentication, certification, or recognition, comprising the counterfeiting of the State seal or of other marks of public authentication and the use of such counterfeit seals; the abusive use of genuine seals; the use or possession of measures or weights bearing a false imprint; the counterfeiting and use of distinctive marks of intellectual works or industrial products; and the introduction into the territory of the State of products bearing false marks (arts. 467–75); 3) falsehood in documents, comprising cases of material and ideological falsehood committed by a public official or by a person entrusted with a public service; material and ideological falsehoods committed by private individuals; the use of false documents; and the suppression or concealment of genuine documents (arts. 476–93); 4) personal falsehood, comprising impersonation; false certification or declaration concerning one’s own or another’s identity and personal qualities; fraud in obtaining the issuance of criminal-record certificates; the improper use of such certificates; and the usurpation of titles or honors (arts. 494–98).

BBL.: G. Maggiore, Principi di diritto penale, II, Bologna 1934, p. 237 et seq.; Womz-Vidal, VII, nos. 496–500; V. Manzini, Trattato di diritto penale italiano, VI, Torino 1946, p. 431 et seq.; J. Brys, Juris Canon. compendium, Bruges 1949, pp. 520–30.
Pietro Palazzini-Rodolfo Danieli