**ECclesiastical Judge.** — In a very broad sense, an ecclesiastical judge (g. e.) could be said to be anyone who exercises, on behalf of the Church, the power of judging which belongs to it in the exercise of its jurisdictional authority (v.). Jurisdictional authority is then understood in its full sense, embracing both the external forum and the internal forum, that is, whether it is directed primarily to the common good by regulating the social relations of members and producing public juridical effects, or whether it is directed primarily to the private good by regulating the relations of consciences with God and producing predominantly moral effects.
However, such a broad notion of ecclesiastical judge — even if in itself accurately adhering to the structure of the Church, in whose order, as is well known, there is no effective separation of powers, and it is then particularly difficult to establish an exact criterion for distinguishing between administrative and judicial functions — on account of its very breadth and the variety and heterogeneity of the elements it embraces, could obviously not be the subject of a unified treatment. Indeed, the functions it calls to mind, even if fundamentally reducible to a single expression — that of rendering a judgment on given elements or situations — assume characteristics, scope, and forms that are entirely peculiar and different according to the manifold aspects under which the jurisdictional authority of the Church is exercised and divided.
Taking instead the expression in a more technical sense — by analogy with state systems in which a judge is the person or body of persons called to conclude a trial by means of a decision having juridical force — an ecclesiastical judge will be said to be the organ (a single person or a collegiate body) to which, in the order of the Church, is entrusted the exercise of judicial power, or jurisdiction in the strict sense, which belongs to the Church itself as a perfect, independent, and sovereign society, both in the authentic decision of contentious cases — that is, controversies arising among subjects regarding a right or the existence of a juridical fact — and in the application, in criminal or penal matters, of sanctions against transgressors of the laws.
It has already been noted that it is difficult in the Church to distinguish between different functions, particularly between administrative and jurisdictional functions, inasmuch as these functions and their respective powers are for the most part concentrated in the same organs. Nevertheless — while maintaining the fundamental criterion inherent in the divine organic constitution of the Church, according to which every public power of the Church, including that of jurisdiction, resides in the Pope and the bishops, so that all others participate in it only insofar as these communicate such power to them, and any original separation of functions is excluded — the Church has established offices and tribunals with divided attributions for their exercise. And even if such a distribution of attributions does not always imply an absolute distinction of the organs to which they are entrusted (thus, for example — to say nothing of the faculty reserved to the Pope, the bishops, and the superiors of exempt religious institutes to judge personally — in the case of the Congregation of the Holy Office, which is also a true tribunal, or of the Congregation of Religious, which is competent to confirm, so that they may be executed, the sentences of dismissal pronounced by the tribunal, etc.) — it nonetheless permits the identification in the Church of a complete judicial organization in view of its ends, with a complex of well-defined norms regulating the juridical procedural relationship, that is, the relationship that is established through the trial between the parties and the judge (v. PROCESS; ECCLESIASTICAL TRIBUNALS).
The competence and hierarchy of ecclesiastical judges are defined by the CIC (I. IV De processibus, I, sect. I). It is premised that no one can judge the first See (can. 1556) — a logical consequence of the primacy of the Pope (can. 218-21) — and it is established that only the Pope can judge heads of state, their children and immediate successors to government, cardinals, legates, and, in criminal matters, all bishops, even titular ones. The tribunals of the Holy See are reserved the jurisdiction to judge in contentious cases the residential bishops, dioceses, and moral persons whose immediate superior is the Pope. Causes brought before the Pope for his judgment will be examined by the judge designated by him. In the aforementioned causes, the incompetence of any other judge is absolute (can. 1557-1558). Independently of this special competence, and of the fact that anyone may always have recourse to the Holy See, though this does not thereby suspend the judgment in progress before the competent judge, except by appeal or avocation to the Holy See (can. 1569), the judge by office in every diocese and for all causes which the Holy See does not reserve to itself is the bishop or the Ordinary. The latter may judge personally, with the exception of controversies concerning the temporal goods of the episcopal curia’s table, in which the bishop is a party to the suit; but even for all other matters, he is ordinarily invited to remit the cause, especially if it is criminal or a grave contentious case, to the ordinary diocesan tribunal (can. 1572-78). This is directed by an official whom the bishop is obliged to appoint, with ordinary power to judge, in a person distinct from the vicar general (except in small dioceses or those with few causes), and to whom vice-officials may be appointed as assistants or substitutes. The official and vice-officials must be priests of unblemished reputation, doctors or experts in canon law, and at least thirty years of age. They are removable *ad nutum episcopi*, but do not cease from their functions nor may they be removed during a sede vacante. In every diocese, moreover, judges are to be elected, in a number not exceeding twelve, who may also be laymen, called synodal or pro-synodal judges according to whether they are designated in the synod or appointed directly by the bishop with the prior advice of the Chapter, and who have delegated power (can. 1573-74).
Synodal judges may be called as assessors by the single judge; they then form, together with the official or vice-official, the collegiate tribunals in cases in which these are required by law. Indeed, collegiate tribunals of three judges are prescribed for cases concerning the bond of sacred orders, for matrimonial cases, for those concerning the rights and goods of the cathedral church, and likewise for criminal cases concerning the deprivation of an inamovible benefice or of excommunication; a collegiate tribunal of five judges is required for cases concerning delicts punishable by deposition, perpetual deprivation of the ecclesiastical habit, or degradation. The Ordinary may entrust to a collegiate tribunal of three or five judges other cases as well, especially if they are of particular importance or difficulty. The judges, who together with the president constitute the collegiate tribunal, are appointed by the Ordinary himself for individual cases, normally in turn. The collegiate tribunal must proceed collegially under the presidency of the official or vice-official who directs the trial, and it renders judgment by majority vote (can. 1576-77).
Cases for which a collegiate tribunal is not prescribed are to be decided by a single judge, ordinarily the official.
For exempt clerical religious, the judge is the provincial; for a monastery, its abbot; between two provinces, in first instance, the superior general; between two monasteries, the superior of the monastic congregation; however, between persons of different religious institutes, or between religious of the same non-exempt or lay institute, or between religious and secular clerics or lay persons, the judge is the local Ordinary (can. 1576).
The rules thus far stated regarding the members of the diocesan tribunal (as indeed those in general concerning the composition or functioning of it as a single or collegiate judge in the first instance) also apply to the constitution of appellate tribunals at metropolitan or suffragan sees with appellate functions (can. 1595-1596).
As for the Apostolic See, having established the general principle that the pope is the supreme judge for the entire Catholic order, and that he can pronounce judgments both personally and through the tribunals he has constituted or the judges he has delegated (can. 1597), and without prejudice to the special norms that determine the cases of exclusive competence of the pope himself (can. 1557) and of other special bodies designated by him from time to time (can. 1961) or by the law itself (such as the Congregations for certain matters: can. 666, 247, etc.), the ordinary judicial functions pertaining to it are exercised by two collegial bodies: Rota (v.) and the Apostolic Signatura (v.). The former is composed of magistrates, called auditors, chosen by the pope himself from among priests at least graduated in both laws; the latter is composed of cardinals, one of whom is the prefect, and among other duties, it judges violations of secrecy and damages caused by the auditors of the Rota, as well as exceptions of suspicion against them.
The conditions and forms in which the judges of the various degrees exercise their functions are governed by the norms of procedural law contained in the CIC (v. can. 1608 ff) and in the special laws enacted for certain types of judgments or for certain bodies. Here it will suffice to recall the fundamental common rule according to which no one can be a judge in his own cause, that is, exercise judicial power, whether ordinary or delegated, for his own benefit (can. 202 s. 2), as well as the other rule according to which a judge who has heard a case in one degree of judgment cannot judge the same case in another degree (can. 1571).
Regarding the extent and titles of the competence of the ecclesiastical judge in canon law, as well as the recognition or non-recognition of the same in the legal systems of States, or the relations between ecclesiastical and civil jurisdiction, see the entries JURISDICTION; ECCLESIASTICAL TRIBUNALS.