GIURATI. – So called from the oath by which they bind themselves to the proper fulfillment of their office, the g. are a body of citizens belonging to categories listed by law, possessing special cultural and moral qualities, called upon to judge, in criminal proceedings, whether or not the accused is guilty and consequently to cooperate in the administration of criminal justice.
The characteristic proper to the body of the g. is that it is composed of elements drawn from every class of citizens, in deference to the principle upheld by penalists that, whereas skill and dexterity are required in seeking the proofs of a crime, in judging the result what is required is simply ordinary common sense, which is at times less fallible than the knowledge of a judge accustomed to a forma mentis that is the fruit only of abstract studies.
The institution of the g. is of English origin, was adopted by the French Constituent Assembly, and subsequently spread throughout Europe. Canonical legislation has never admitted the institution of the g., in order not to divide the task of judging. In Italy, by the law of 13 Nov. 1859, the Courts of Assizes with the jury were established.
The g. therefore form part of the judging panel, but without the juridical power to pronounce the sentence or impose the penalty. They can only rule on the existence of the fact and on the guilt of the accused. This is the task imposed upon them by positive law. In carrying it out, they must bear in mind other principles of a moral order.
First of all, the answers to the questions must be given by the g. on the basis of an intimate and conscientious conviction, and therefore the g. cannot and must not condemn an innocent person even if all appearances accuse him. On the contrary, in conscience they may answer in favor of the truly guilty person when his guilt has not been legitimately and suitably demonstrated. An exception is made when the public good should demand the condemnation of some criminal; in that case, however, the g. should testify in court not as such, but as witnesses (cf. A. Ballerini-D. Palmieri, Opus theologicum morale, IV, 3rd ed., Prato 1900, no. 592).
Similarly, if a person who enjoys the privilege of forum (cf. CIC, cann. 120, 614, 680) were improperly summoned before a secular tribunal, the g., should they be unable to withdraw from judging, may always cast their vote in favor of the accused, insofar as he has been brought before an incompetent tribunal (cf. A. Ballerini-D. Palmieri, op. cit., no. 591).
If, having been called to the office of g., a citizen remained hesitant because of a consciousness of his own ignorance in matters of law, moral doctrine does not absolutely require him to excuse himself, provided, however, that he intends not to condemn anyone unless the guilt is clearly established. Natural law, in fact, does not require that all delinquents be punished, but it does require that no innocent person be condemned (cf. A. Ballerini-D. Palmieri, op. cit., no. 591).
The institution of the g., which had been abolished in Italy by the penal and criminal-procedure codes of 1931, was partly restored by legislative lieutenant decrees of 6 Aug. 1944, no. 170, and 5 Dec. 1944, no. 290, through the establishment of lay judges. The definitive organization of the Courts of Assizes is currently under discussion before Parliament.