The Fathers found in Holy Scripture the essential elements for constructing a theology of grace (G.), which is in fact a supernatural anthropology. The Apostolic Fathers, having no theological preoccupations, are content merely to echo the concepts of St Paul and St John, emphasizing rather the fruits of divine grace in man. A passage from St Clement of Rome (Ep. ad Cor., 35) may serve for all: «How blessed, beloved, and wonderful are the gifts of God! Life in immortality, splendor in justice, truth in freedom, faith in confidence, continence in holiness... There is one God, and one Christ, and one Spirit of grace, which is poured out upon us» (ibid., 46); yet it demands our cooperation, even though we are justified by faith (ibid., 33-37).
From the end of the second century, however, the doctrine of grace becomes in the hands of the Fathers, especially the Eastern Fathers, a weapon against Gnostic and Manichaean pessimism. Starting from the idea of participation in the divine nature (cf. St Peter) or of rebirth through the Holy Spirit (cf. St John) or of the new creation in Christ and divine adoption (cf. St Paul), they express in synthesis the whole economy of grace with the term «defixation» (ἐξόρυσή), which becomes common in their writings. St Irenaeus repeatedly insists on the efficacy of the redemption wrought by Christ, who saves men by making them reborn to God (Adv. haer., II, 22, 4); the Incarnation aims at divinizing men: «By his boundless love he became what we are, that he might make us become what he is» (ibid., pref. to bk. V). The Alexandrians (Clement, Origen) speak even more vividly in this sense. In the fourth and fifth centuries, in the controversies concerning the mysteries of the Most Holy Trinity and the Hypostatic Union, the Fathers develop the doctrine of grace in the light of these two supreme truths of faith. St Athanasius, in his struggle with the Arians, to vindicate the consubstantiality of the Word with the Father, willingly employs this argument: Christ the Redeemer makes us (through his grace) partakers of the divine nature, therefore he is truly God (Ep. de synodis, 51). He adds: «For this reason the Son of God became the Son of man, that the sons of men, that is, of Adam, might become sons of God... partakers of the very life of God... he therefore Son of God by nature, we by grace» (De Incarn. Dei Verbi et c. Arianos, 8). The divinity of the Holy Spirit is likewise proved by the fact that the Spirit, like the Word and together with it, makes us divine (Ep. ad Serapionem, 1, 24); an argument dear also to St Basil (De Spiritu Sancto, 9, 22 and elsewhere). St Cyril of Alexandria emphasizes the human-divine union of the Hypostatic Union as an exemplar of the union between God and man elevated to participation in supernatural life: «We participate in the divine nature not only because by grace we are elevated to supernatural glory, but also because we possess God as dwelling within us» (In Io., I, 9).
In this way the Eastern Fathers presented grace rather as a state of communion with God. In the West, however, Pelagianism (v.) gave occasion to highlight the dynamic and anthropological aspect of grace. To Pelagius, who exalted human activity to the point of attaining eternal life by his own strength, St Augustine, the doctor of grace, opposed the action of God in man, placing all human ethical activity within the supernatural sphere, where divine grace and our freedom are harmonized. From the vast works of St Augustine it is not difficult to gather these principles, which form the fabric of his supernatural anthropology against the Stoicized naturalism of Pelagius: a) God rules man, even in the sphere of free will without impairing it (De corrept. et gratia, 14, 45; De spiritu et littera, 37, 58, and elsewhere); b) grace is not the term of human effort and merit, but is the free gift of God (Ep. 207 ad Vitalem and elsewhere); c) before original sin man possessed grace, by which he could persevere in holiness (auxilium sine quo non); after sin a stronger grace is necessary, which positively influences man and induces him to persevere (auxilium quo; cf. De corrept. et gratia, 13, 14). St Augustine sings the triumph of grace over the reluctances of the flesh and the straying spirit, according to his dramatic experience, which brings him close to St Paul.
II. NECESSITY
Human activity may be considered in relation to the true and to the good, according to its supreme specific faculties: the intellect and the will. Moreover, both the true and the good may belong to two distinct spheres, the one natural and the other supernatural, according as they are proportioned to human nature or transcend its potentiality and exigencies (v. ORDINE NATURALE E SOPRANNATURALE). Against Pelagianism (v.), which concedes too much to the natural forces of man, and against Lutheranism (v.), which denies too much, Catholic doctrine teaches these points:a) Despite original sin and its consequences, man can know by his own intellect every truth of natural order, even the existence and principal attributes of God (cf. Vatican Council, sess. III, De Revelatione, can. 1). Yet moral necessity requires the extrinsic aid of Revelation, because mankind attains «expeditiously, with firm certitude and without falling into error» the whole complex of ethical-religious truths (Vatican Council, sess. III, chap. 2).
b) To know the absolutely supernatural truths, such as the mysteries (v.), divine Revelation is required (objective aid); to assent to them with certitude and on account of the authority of God, faith (v.) is required, which, although it has a rational foundation as credibility, is supernatural and therefore the effect of grace, as a free determination of the will and as the consent of the intellect (Council of Trent, sess. VI, chaps. 6-7; Vatican Council, sess. III, chap. 3 and corresponding canons).
c) Man, even without the aid of grace, can in general do natural good and avoid evil; but he cannot do all the good nor observe the whole natural law, so as to avoid every sin, without that aid.
d) Yet grace is physically necessary to perform even the least salutary act, that is, one proportioned to the supernatural end, which is eternal life. Indeed, not even a positive preparation for grace is possible without grace, and even for the man already sanctified the special aid of actual grace is necessary to persevere for a long time in that state, and a very special aid for final perseverance, to which eternal life is bound (Council of Carthage, Arausican II, Trent, sess. VI; moreover, V. X).
Thus the Church vindicates the fundamental integrity of human nature as well as the free cooperation of man with God against the ethical-religious pessimism of Luther, Baius and Jansenius; and defends the necessity of the supernatural intervention of God in the activity of man wounded by original sin, against the anthropological naturalism of Pelagius.
III. ESSENCE
Luther, starting from the concept of original sin as an intrinsic and irreparable corruption of nature, was logically forced to reduce the redemptive grace of Christ to an extrinsic element in the psychology of man, namely to the mercy of God, which conceals sin and imputes to the sinner (who remains always such on this earth) the holiness of the Redeemer. Later Baius would say that grace is an integrative element of human nature and in concreto is reduced to the very activity of man insofar as it is morally good, that is, corresponding to the law of God.Catholic doctrine is clearly summarized in the Council of Trent (sess. VI, chaps. 6–7) with regard both to sanctifying grace (habitual) and to actual grace. Sanctifying grace is the formal cause of our sanctification, in the sense that God produces in our soul the justice that renews us and truly makes us holy (chap. 7). Grace and charity are poured by the Holy Spirit into our heart and adhere to it (chap. 11). Grace is therefore a supernatural reality wrought by God in the depths of the soul, as is already known from divine Revelation. Luther’s extrinsicism cannot be reconciled with the teaching of St. Paul and St. John, nor with that of St. Peter, who speaks of a sharing (koinōnía) in the divine nature by man. The reality of grace is confirmed by its formal effects, namely, adoptive filiation and the right to eternal life, which constitutes merit (q.v.).
From these secure principles theology rightly deduces that sanctifying grace is of an accidental nature and is more precisely reduced to an entitative habit or habitual quality inherent in the essence of the soul, thereby elevating it to a deiform mode of being, almost a new nature. When this is integrated by the infused virtues and the gifts of the Holy Spirit (q.v.), it becomes the principle of supernatural activity proportioned to eternal life.
The richness of divine grace is not the same in all, but it can increase both through worthy frequentation of the sacraments, especially the Most Holy Eucharist, and through generous cooperation on the part of man. Grace is lost, together with charity, at the moment when the soul performs a gravely sinful act that makes impossible the coexistence of the bond of friendship and union with God. Whoever is in grace has God within himself (q.V. COABITAZIONE).
If errors and heresies have arisen concerning the essence of sanctifying (habitual) grace, great theological controversies have flared up around the essence of actual grace. The Thomists, following in the footsteps of St. Thomas, hold that actual grace is a positive divine influence upon the faculties of the soul to move them to act in the supernatural sphere. In other words, actual grace would be nothing other than physical premotion (q.v.) transferred to the supernatural plane. The Molinists, by contrast, identify actual grace with the human act itself, which is at once from God and from the creature according to the double aspect of the supernatural and vitality. Some (Billot) admit this identification only for elicited acts, which are like the awakening of the activity of the will, which then proceeds to act freely without further divine influence. According to the Thomist doctrine, actual grace is a transient operative virtue, easily reducible to a fluent quality distinct from God and the soul upon which it acts. Indeed, in the documents of Revelation grace is called vocatio, illuminatio, pulsatio, tractio—terms that express a true action of God upon the creature. St. Thomas speaks in this sense (Summa Theol., I-II, q. 109, art. 9): “A man who exists in habitual grace... still needs the help of grace in another way, namely, that he be moved by God to act rightly.” Elsewhere he alludes to a gratuitous help “interiorly moving the affections.”
The theological controversies focus especially on the nature of efficacious grace and all depend on the different ways of conceiving divine concurrence (q.v.) in general with regard to free human activity. It is beyond dispute that there exists both sufficient grace and efficacious grace, at least in the sense that divine grace sometimes produces its effect (the salutary act) and sometimes remains sterile. Sacred Scripture bears witness to both: “Because I called and you refused” (Prov 1:24); “Jerusalem, Jerusalem... how often I would have gathered your children... and you would not” (Mt 23:37). Thus man can refuse God’s invitation and forfeit the fruits of His gift. On the other hand, we read: “As the divisions of waters, so the heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord: whithersoever he will, he shall turn it” (Prov 21:1); “I will cause you to walk in my precepts” (Ezek 36:27); “For it is God who worketh in you both to will and to accomplish” (Phil 2:13). The obvious meaning of such expressions leads to the concept of an action, namely, a divine grace that infallibly attains its effect.
The Church has defined: (a) that man can resist grace (Council of Trent, sess. VI, chaps. 4 on justification); (b) that there is a merely sufficient grace, which is likewise a gift of God (against Jansenism: Jansenius’s propositions 1 and 2, Denz.-U., 1092–93; and Jansenist proposition 6, Denz.-U., 1206); (c) that there is a grace that obtains its effect while preserving human freedom (Council of Trent, sess. VI, chaps. 5–6). The efficacy of grace is connected with the question of God’s antecedent and consequent will (q.v.).
Yet a lively theological controversy arose in the 16th century over the nature of the efficacy of grace, between the Jesuit Molina and the Dominican Báñez, who represented the Thomist tradition. For the complex question see MOLINISM and BAÑEZ. Here it suffices to recall what pertains strictly to the problem of grace in relation to human freedom.
Luis de Molina, concerned lest freedom be compromised or denied by the Lutherans, constructed a theological system to safeguard it despite divine foreknowledge, natural concurrence, grace, and predestination. He does not admit a direct influence of God upon the human will in such a way as to determine it to act; rather, he reduces divine action to a simultaneous concurrence (more cooperative than operative). Moreover, while subordinating the world and man to God, he maintains that there is in things a concatenation of causes and circumstances that influence the free determination of the will. This is foreseen by God through His middle knowledge but is not directly caused by the divine will, which brings things about according to the order foreseen (independently of it) in the divine essence. On these principles Molina explains the efficacy of grace extrinsically, namely, in relation to the correspondence of the free will of man, to whom grace is offered. One and the same grace can be merely sufficient. If God wills to save a man, He explores the free will through His middle knowledge and, according to its foresight, prepares those graces to which the man will certainly correspond, given his psychological dispositions and the circumstances of time and place.
The main difficulty of Molinism is that it seems to attribute the efficacy of grace—and hence eternal salvation—more to man than to God. To avoid this difficulty, the congruism (q.v.) of Suárez and other Jesuits arose, recognizing in efficacious grace a greater benefit than in sufficient grace, inasmuch as the former possesses within itself a congruity to obtain more surely the consent of the free will and thus the salutary act.
The Dominicans, represented by Domingo Báñez, following in the footsteps of St Thomas, defend a clear distinction between one grace and another. In keeping with their system on predestination and divine concurrence (physical predetermination), they maintain that the free human act, like any other reality, depends on the divine will as its determining cause. Efficacious grace is by its very nature such as to infallibly bend the human will to a particular act. Yet the act that follows is free, because it springs from a will that could resist (in the divided sense), though in fact it does not resist (in the composite sense). Sufficient grace, on the other hand, is of a quite different nature; it does not move to action but merely prepares the subject for action.
The reef on which Thomism runs aground is human freedom, which seems compromised under the action of grace intrinsically efficacious. To avoid this reef, attenuated systems have arisen, going under the generic name of syncretism, in that they seek to reconcile extreme positions. Such is the theory worked out by the Sorbonne and adopted by St Alphonsus Liguori; such also are the efforts recently made by theologians on both sides (Billot, Guillermin, Marin-Sola, etc.). The Church leaves the matter open to discussion. Yet to overcome the deadlock of the long-standing controversy, it now seems necessary to take the path of a sound eclecticism, able to draw from each opposing system the best elements in an attempt to reach a solution that avoids the harshness of extremists. Modern syncretism is on the right track and tends to reconcile human freedom with efficacious grace by attenuating divine action and harmonizing it with the demands of human psychology. Molinism removes the mystery from man and concentrates it in God; rigid Thomism does the opposite. It seems more just to leave the mystery where it is, namely at the point where supernatural energy of grace is inserted into the complex psychology of the human act. Yet one must avoid what seems repugnant to true human freedom, such as the physical predetermination to one end of the Báñezian school, and what seems repugnant to the supreme causality of God, such as the middle knowledge of the Molinists. An adequate solution will never be reached, however, until the obscurity of faith gives way to the light of the beatific vision.
IV. CAUSE AND EFFECTS
The Council of Trent has spelled out in detail the causality involved in grace (Session VI, chap. 7): sanctifying grace (or justifying grace) has its final cause in the glory of God and of Christ, and, as regards man, in eternal life; its efficient cause in God who purifies and sanctifies; its meritorious cause in Jesus who has redeemed us by meriting for us and making satisfaction to divine justice offended by us; its instrumental cause in the sacrament of Baptism; and finally its formal cause in the justice and holiness with which God justifies us and truly makes us holy.What is of greatest interest is the efficient cause. It is God who produces grace in us, as the healing of sin and as a sharing in the divine nature and life. There is debate over the nature of the action by which God produces grace: one cannot speak of creation, because grace is not a substance but an accident, and the proper term of the creative act is substantial being. Theologians say that God draws grace from the obediential potency of the soul, which means that the soul has a (passive) capacity with respect to the grace that God infuses into II. The sacraments are credited with an instrumental causal influence in the production of grace, but it is debatable whether this is physical causality or moral causality.
The distribution of grace depends on the free will of God; yet, since he wills the salvation of all (1 Tim 2:3–6), he grants to all at least sufficient grace to be saved. It is a doctrine of faith that God gives grace to avoid evil and to do good to the faithful in a state of sanctification (cf. the first proposition of Jansenius, condemned by Innocent X: Denz.-U., 1092). It is also certain that God bestows grace on sinners so that they may be converted: “As I live, says the Lord, I desire not the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live” (Ezek 33:11). Nor are those lacking in the benefit of grace who are unbelievers, whether positive (who have rejected faith through sin) or negative (who do not have faith because they do not know divine revelation): the Church has condemned the contrary opinion of Jansenius (fifth proposition: Denz.-U., 1379). The reason lies in the truth of God’s salvific will and in the universality of the redemption accomplished by Jesus Christ, who “died for all” (2 Cor 5:14). Yet the salvation of unbelievers (q.v.) remains a theological problem in part.
The principal effects of grace are justification and merit: both are treated in their own articles (q.v.). Here it suffices to note that justification is an effect of grace as formal cause and consists in a real liberation from sin and a true sharing in the divine nature and life. Man, however, has reduced it to a juridical fiction, namely to a non-imputation of sin and an imputation of the holiness of God and the merits of Jesus Christ.
Merit is an effect of grace as efficient cause and has its root in the free cooperation of man with the divine action, whereby man acquires a right to eternal life. From the whole of Catholic doctrine on grace, while the infinite love of God toward his creature stands out, the value and dignity of human nature and person are also revealed, called as it is to cooperate with God for its own salvation. There is thus a harmony of the divine and the human that affirms the rights and dominion of God without impinging on the psychology and dignity of man. This harmony is gravely compromised both by Pelagianism and by Lutheranism.
2. Holy Fathers: I. Habert, Theologiae Graecorum Patrum iudiciae circa universam materiam Gratiae, Paris 1647; F. Wörter, Die christl. Lehre über das Verhältnis von Gnade und Freiheit von den apost. Zeiten bis auf Augustinus, Freiburg im Br. 1860; O. Koerber, S. Irenaeus de Gratia sanctificante, Würzburg 1865; E. Scholl, Die Lehre des hl. Basilius von der Gnade, Freiburg im Br. 1881; G. A. Pell, Die Lehre des hl. Athanasius von der Sünde und Erlösung, 1888; F. K. Hünermann, Das hl. Gregor von Nazianz Lehre von der Gnade, Kempten 1890; F. Holtz, Das hl. Gregor von Nyssa Lehre vom Menschen, Freiburg im Br. 1890; E. Weigl.
Die Heilstheire of St. Cyril of Alexandria; Mainz 1905; I. B. Aufhauser, Die Heilstheire of St. Gregory of Nyssa; Munich 1910; T. Salgueiro, La doctrine of St. Augustine on Grace according to the treatise to Simplician; Oporto 1925; J. Rivière, Notre vie dans le Christ chez St. Augustine, in La vie spirituelle, 11 (1930), pp. 71-94; N. Merlin, St. Augustine and the dogmas of original sin and grace; Paris 1931; V. Capanaga, The Augustinian theology of grace and the history of the controversy; El Escorial 1933; T. M. Kugo, On the relation between Augustinian charity and actual grace; Mundelein 1936; I. Fahey, Doctrina s. Hieronymi de Gratiae divinae necessitate, 11 (1937); L. Janssens, Notre filiation divine d'après St. Cyril of Alexandria, in Ephemerides theologicae Lovanienses, 15 (1938), pp. 233-78; I. Gross, The deification of the Christian according to the Greek Fathers; Paris 1938; J. Schmucker, The grace of original justice and the grace of the redeemed in Augustine's De corruptione et gratia; Regensburg 1939; F. Di Sciascio, Fulgentius of Ruspe and the principal problems of grace; Rome 1941; R. Pio, Habitual grace in St. Augustine, 11 (1943); H. du Manoir, Dogme et spiritualité chez St. Cyril of Alexandria; Paris 1944, pp. 163-84 et passim.
3. Scholastics: P. Minges, The doctrine of grace of Duns Scotus; Mainz 1900; I. Ude, Doctrina Capreoli de influxu Dei in actus voluntatis humanae; Graz 1905; K. Heim, The essence of grace and its relation to the natural functions of man in Alexander of Hales; Leipzig 1907; G. Božitković, The doctrine of St. Bonaventure on grace and free will; Marienbad 1919; F. Mitzka, The teaching of St. Bonaventure on preparation for sanctifying grace, in Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie, 50 (1926), pp. 27-72, 220-52; H. Doms, The doctrine of grace of St. Peter Damian; Breslau 1929; J. Shupp, The doctrine of grace of Peter Lombard; Freiburg im Br. 1932; M.-L. Congar, Albert the Great theologian of sanctifying grace, in La vie spirituelle, 15 (1933), pp. 109-40; V. Doucet, The disputed questions on grace of Matthew of Aquasparta now first edited with a critical introduction; Quaracchi 1935; I. Hartnett, The teaching of St. Bonaventure on deiformity; Mundelein 1936; I. Auer, The development of the doctrine of grace in high scholasticism, I; Freiburg im Br. 1942; A. Landgraf, The knowability of one's own state of grace according to the teaching of early scholasticism, in Scholastik, 20-24 (1949), pp. 39-58.