Mutilation

MUTILATION. – By m. is understood the cutting off or removal (here also any equivalent action, e.g., complete and total atrophy) by which an organ properly so called (the eyes, the tongue, etc.) or a part of the body having an organic function (hands, arms, feet, legs) is eliminated.

I. VARIOUS TYPES AND MORALITY OF MUTILATION

Mutilation is grave or slight according to the importance of the part mutilated; the extraction of a tooth or a fingernail, or the cutting off of a portion of a finger, when not legitimately motivated, are slightly sinful mutilations. With regard to the liceity of mutilation, it is useful to recall the distinction between voluntary and involuntary mutilation, and between direct and indirect mutilation.

Mutilation is indirect when it is not only neither intended nor willed by the agent (but merely permitted or tolerated), but, at the same time, either is not the immediate effect of the action performed (for example, in the case of legitimate self-defence, during which mutilation of an organ occurs), or, if immediate, is produced together with another licit effect (for example, throwing a bomb at the enemy in wartime which, by hypothesis, produces with greater or lesser certainty the complete fracture of a hand). Mutilation, on the other hand, is direct when it is not only immediately and in itself produced by the agent’s action, but is also at the same time willed and intended, either in itself or as a means to an end which the agent seeks to attain without having the right to do so (for example, cutting off a leg in order to be exempted from military service). As regards the liceity of indirect mutilation, reference should now be made to the general principles of morality concerning a cause with a double effect, one of which is not good (v. IMPUTABILITÀ, II. I. degli effetti).

As regards the liceity of direct mutilation, it must be held that it is generally prohibited as an intrinsically illicit action, since no one has direct dominion or ownership over his own or another’s limbs. Nevertheless,

since man possesses useful dominion over them, it is licit when indispensable for the preservation of the person: hence, for example, the liceity of surgical operations necessary for the individual’s life; and also of mutilation for the benefit of third parties, as in the case of a blood transfusion or the donation of an organ that is not absolutely necessary—for example, an eye. Vermeersch justifies it by that kind of moral unity which unites all human beings with one another and makes them, as it were, one body.

II. CASTRATION

In recent years, the question of the liceity of castration has aroused particular interest. Here it is understood as the removal (or the perpetual and complete atrophying) of the organs necessary for reproduction, in both man and woman. In this regard, it should be noted that, through deprivation of the sexual glands, the individual assumes different somatic characteristics according to the age at which the m. occurred (v. ENDOCRINE, GLANDOLE, GLANDOLE). Deprivation of these glands after puberty may spare castrated individuals, at least for a certain time, the «libido» and the essential reflexes of the function, so as still to render them «potentes ad coeundum»; consequently, in Italian civil law, their marriage is considered licit and valid. In canon law, on the contrary, such individuals are in any case considered affected by impotence, and therefore incapable of contracting marriage, because, being deprived of the sexual glands, they are incapable of marital intercourse with the emission of that «verum semen» which, according to Catholic doctrine, is indispensable for attaining the «una caro». Connected with this concept is the constitution of Sixtus V (28 June 1587), addressed to the Nuncio of Spain, which forbids totally castrated individuals to marry—a practice that until then had been very frequently permitted in that region—precisely because «certum et manifestum est, eos verum semen emittere non posse» (v. IMPOTENZA).

As regards the liceity of castration, the following conclusions derive from the principles set out above: 1) castration is certainly illicit if carried out in order to preserve a feminine timbre in the voice, since there is a disproportion between the means and the end (in any event, the question has only historical interest); 2) it is likewise certainly illicit if performed in order to overcome temptations against chastity, since the means are not adequate to the end (the most interesting historical case is that of Origen [v.]); 3) it is certainly illicit when intended to avoid future pregnancies, even if these would be gravely dangerous for the woman; it is never licit, in fact, to perform intrinsically evil actions; 4) for the same reasons, it is also illicit for eugenic purposes, even if permitted or commanded by the public authority, and even if the efficacy of the means were demonstrated (v. STERILIZZAZIONE); 5) even direct castration is licit, according to the general principles of morality, when it constitutes the sole and indispensable means of saving the individual from certain or highly probable death, provided that the cause producing such death or danger is the presence of the reproductive organs (to avoid confusion, it should be noted that in the decree of the Holy Office of 24 February 1940, the term «direct» sterilization is taken in a somewhat narrower sense than its technical meaning); 6) whether castration is licit as a punishment to be inflicted by the public authority on criminals is highly controversial: in the opinion of most, it does not appear licit, even apart from the not inconsiderable argument concerning possible abuses; 7) today the opinion is gaining ground that castration is licit in cases where the presence of the organs indispensable for reproduction is the sole and certain cause of serious mental disturbances or extremely grave sexual perversions (Scremin, V. BIBLICA.).

III. PENALTIES AGAINST THOSE WHO MUTILATE

The CIC establishes the irregularity ex delicto (can. 985, n. 5), which, although not strictly speaking a penalty, affects one ad modum poenae. For anyone who has attempted suicide or mutilation, exclusion from the so-called legitimate acts is established; moreover, when clerics are involved, suspension and removal from the care of souls are imposed. The Italian Penal Code likewise establishes various other penalties against anyone who causes impotence for procreation

(art. 552) and against anyone who inflicts personal injuries (v.) (art. 582 ff.).

BIBL.: In addition to the treatises on moral theology, among which cf. particularly A. Vermeersch, Theol. mor., II, Roma 1945, n. 299, V. A. Michel, Mutilation, in DThC, X, coll. 2569-81. On castration v.: E. Boganelli, De coacta sterilizzazione, in Apollinaris, 9 (1936), pp. 58-84; L. Verweck, La castration au point de vue therapeutique, pénal, social, moral, in St Luc médical, 1936, pp. 128-176; J. J. Clifford, The morality of castration for carcinoma of the prostate, in Theol. studies, 5 (1944), pp. 429-52; M. Riquet, La castration, Parigi 1948; L. Seremin, Dizionario di morale professionale per i medici, Roma 1949, pp. 86-93; H. Bless, Manuale di psichiatria pastorale, Torino 1950, pp. 37-38; A. Boschi, Nuove questioni matrimoniali, ivi 1950, pp. 261-83.

Lorenzo Simeone - Giuseppe de Ninno

Cite this article

“MUTILAZIONE.” Enciclopedia Cattolica, vol. VIII (1952), p. 933. Azione Romana digital edition, https://azioneromana.com/article/mutilazione.