MUTILAZIONE

MUTILATION. – By *mutilation* is understood the cutting or removal (here also any equivalent action, e.g., complete and permanent atrophy) by which a proper organ (the eyes, the tongue, etc.) or a part of the body that has an organic function (hands, arms, feet, legs) is suppressed.

I. VARIOUS KINDS AND MORALITY OF MUTILATION

The gravity of mutilation depends on the importance of the part mutilated; the extraction of a tooth, the cutting of a fingernail, or the amputation of a small portion of a finger, if not legitimately motivated, are lightly sinful mutilations. In relation to the lawfulness of mutilation, it is well to recall the distinction between voluntary or involuntary mutilation and direct or indirect mutilation.

Indirect mutilation occurs when it is not only not intended or desired by the agent (it is merely permitted or tolerated), but at the same time it is not an immediate effect of the action performed (e.g., in the case of legitimate defense, during which mutilation of an organ occurs), or, if immediate, the mutilation is produced together with another lawful effect (e.g., the throwing of a bomb at the enemy in war, which, by hypothesis, more or less certainly produces the complete fracture of a hand). Direct mutilation, on the other hand, occurs when it is not only immediately and per se produced by the agent’s action, but is also at the same time willed and intended either in itself or as a means to an end that the agent desires to achieve, though without having the right to do so (e.g., the cutting off of a leg to be exempted from military service). Now, as regards the lawfulness of indirect mutilation, reference should be made to the general principles of moral theology on the principle of double effect, one of which is not good (v. IMPUTABILITY, II. *I. of the effects*).

As for the lawfulness of direct mutilation, it must be held that in general it is forbidden as an intrinsically illicit action, inasmuch as no one has direct ownership or property rights over his own or another’s limbs. Nevertheless, since man does have indirect ownership, it is lawful when it is indispensable for the preservation of the person: hence the lawfulness, for example, of surgical operations necessary for the life of the individual; and also of mutilation for the benefit of others, as in the case of blood transfusion, the donation of an organ not absolutely necessary, e.g., an eye. Vermeersch justifies this by that kind of moral unity which unites all men and makes them as it were one body.

II. CASTRATION

In recent years, particular interest has been aroused by the question of the lawfulness of castration, understood here as the removal (or the permanent and complete atrophy) of the organs necessary for reproduction, whether in man or woman. In this regard, it should be noted that the deprivation of the sexual glands causes the individual to assume different somatic characteristics according to the age at which the mutilation occurs (v. ENDOCRINE, GLANDOLE, GLANDS). The deprivation of such glands after puberty may spare in the castrated individual, at least for a certain time, the “libido” and the essential reflexes of the function, so as to render them still “potens ad coeundum,” whereby in Italian civil law their marriage is considered lawful and valid. On the contrary, in canon law such individuals are considered incapable of marriage, since, being deprived of the sexual glands, they are incapable of marital intercourse with the effusion of that “verum semen” which, according to Catholic doctrine, is indispensable for the attainment of “one flesh.” To this concept is linked the constitution of Sixtus V (28 June 1587) addressed to the Nuncio of Spain, which forbids totally castrated individuals from contracting marriage, a practice hitherto permitted with some frequency in that region, precisely because “certum et manifestum est, eos verum semen emittere non posse” (v. IMPOTENCE).

As regards the lawfulness of castration, the following conclusions derive from the principles expounded above: 1) castration is certainly illicit if perpetrated for the purpose of preserving a feminine timbre of voice, there being a disproportion between the means and the end (besides, the question has only historical interest); 2) it is likewise certainly illicit if performed to overcome temptations against chastity, inasmuch as the means is not adequate to the end (the most interesting historical case is that of Origen [v.]); 3) it is certainly illicit when performed to avoid future pregnancies, even if these would gravely endanger the woman; for it is never lawful to perform intrinsically evil actions; 4) it is likewise illicit for eugenic purposes, even if permitted or commanded by public authority, and even if the efficacy of the means were demonstrated (v. STERILIZATION); 5) direct castration is lawful, in accordance with the general principles of moral theology, when it constitutes the only and indispensable means of saving from certain or gravely probable death an individual whose life is threatened by the presence of the organs of procreation (to avoid confusion, it should be noted that in the decree of the Holy Office of 24 Feb. 1940 the term “direct sterilization” is taken in a somewhat narrower sense than the technical one); 6) whether castration is lawful as a penalty to be inflicted by public authority on criminals is highly controversial: in the judgment of most, it does not seem lawful, quite apart from the not inconsiderable argument of possible abuses; 7) today the opinion is gaining ground that castration is lawful in cases where the presence of the organs indispensable for reproduction is the sole and certain cause of grave mental disturbances or very serious sexual perversions (Scremin, V. BIBLICA.).

III. PENALTIES AGAINST MUTILATORS

The *Codex Iuris Canonici* establishes irregularity *ex delicto* (can. 985, n. 5), which, although not strictly a penalty, strikes *ad modum poenae*. For one who has attempted suicide or mutilated himself, exclusion from so-called legitimate acts is established, and, if he is a cleric, suspension and removal from the care of souls. The Italian Penal Code also establishes various other penalties against those who cause impotence for procreation (art. 552) and against those who inflict personal injuries (art. 582 ff.).

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BIBL.:** Besides the treatises on moral theology, among which cf. in particular A. Vermeersch, *Theologia moralis*, II, Rome 1945, n. 290, V. A. Michel, *Mutilation*, in *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, X, cols. 2569-81. On castration v.: E. Boganelli, *De coacta sterilizatione*, in *Apollinariis*, 9 (1936), pp. 58-84; L. Vervaeck, *La castration au point de vue thérapeutique, pénal, social, moral*, in *St Luc médical*, 1936, pp. 128-176; J. J. Clifford, *The morality of castration for carcinoma of the prostate*, in *Theological Studies*, 5 (1944), pp. 439-52; M. Riquet, *La castration*, Paris 1948; L. Scremin, *Dizionario di morale professionale per i medici*, Rome 1949, pp. 86-93; H. Bless, *Manuale di psichiatria pastorale*, Turin 1950, pp. 37-38; A. Boschi, *Nuove questioni matrimoniali*, ibid. 1950, pp. 261-83.

Lorenzo Simeone – Giuseppe de Ninno