MUTILATION. - By m. is meant the cutting off or extirpation (here also any equivalent action, e.g., complete and perfect atrophy) by which a so-called organ (the eyes, the tongue, etc.) or a part of the body that has an organic function (hands, arms, feet, legs) is removed.
I. VARIOUS KINDS AND MORALITY OF MUTILATION
Mutilation is grave or light according to the importance of the part mutilated; the extraction of a tooth, of a nail, the cutting off of a particle of a finger, if not legitimately motivated, are lightly sinful mutilations. In relation to the lawfulness of mutilation, it is well to recall the difference between voluntary and involuntary mutilation and between direct and indirect mutilation.
There is indirect mutilation when it is not only not intended and willed by the agent (it is only permitted or tolerated), but at the same time is either not the immediate effect of the action performed (for example, in the case of legitimate defense, during which mutilation of an organ occurs), or, if it is immediate, the mutilation is produced together with another lawful effect (for example, the throwing of a bomb against the enemy in war, which, by hypothesis, produces more or less certainly the complete fracture of a hand). There is, on the other hand, direct mutilation when it is not only immediately and of itself produced by the agent's action, but is also and at the same time willed and intended either in itself or as a means to an end that the agent wishes to attain, but without having the right to do so (for example, the cutting off of a leg in order to be exempted from military service). Now, as regards the lawfulness of indirect mutilation, reference is made to the general principles of morals concerning the cause with a double effect, of which one is not good (v. IMPUTABILITÀ, II. I. degli effetti).
For the lawfulness of direct mutilation it must be held that in general it is forbidden as an intrinsically unlawful action, inasmuch as no one has direct or proprietary dominion over his own or others' members. Nevertheless, since man has the useful dominion over them, it is lawful in the case where it is indispensable for the salvation of the person: hence the lawfulness, for example, of surgical operations necessary for the life of the individual; and also of mutilation in favor of third parties, as in the case of blood transfusion, of the donation of an organ not absolutely necessary: for example, of an eye. Vermeersch justifies it by that kind of moral unity which unites all men among themselves and makes them as it were one single body.
II. CASTRATION
In recent years, the question of the lawfulness of castration has aroused particular interest. It is understood here as the extirpation (or the perpetual and complete atrophy) of the organs necessary for reproduction, in both man and woman. In this regard it should be noted that, through the deprivation of the sexual glands, the individual takes on different somatic characteristics according to the age at which the mutilation (v. ENDOCRINE, GLANDS) occurred. The deprivation of such glands after puberty can spare castrated individuals, at least for a certain time, the "libido" and the essential reflexes of the function, so as to render them still "potentes ad coeundum," for which reason in Italian civil law their marriage is considered lawful and valid. On the contrary, in canon law such individuals are considered in any case affected by impotence, and therefore incapable of contracting marriage, because, being deprived of the sexual glands, they are incapable of a marital copula with the effusion of that "verum semen" which, according to Catholic doctrine, is indispensable for the attainment of the "una caro." To such a concept is linked the constitution of Sixtus V (28 June 1587) addressed to the Nuncio of Spain, which forbids totally castrated individuals to marry, a thing until then permitted quite frequently in that region, precisely because "certum et manifestum est, eos verum semen emittere non posse" (v. IMPOTENCE).
As for the lawfulness of castration, the following conclusions derive from the principles set out above: 1) castration is certainly unlawful if perpetrated for the purpose of preserving a feminine timbre in the voice, there being a disproportion between the means and the end (moreover, the question is only of historical interest); 2) it is likewise certainly unlawful if done for the purpose of overcoming temptations against chastity, inasmuch as the means is not adequate to the end (the most interesting historical case is that of Origen [v.]); 3) it is certainly unlawful for the purpose of avoiding future pregnancies, even if gravely dangerous for the woman; indeed it is never lawful to perform actions that are intrinsically evil; 4) it is likewise unlawful, for the same reasons, for eugenic purposes, even if permitted or commanded by the public authority, and even if the efficacy of the means were demonstrated (v. STERILIZATION); 5) even direct castration is lawful, according to the general principles of morals, when it constitutes the only and indispensable way of saving the individual from certain or gravely probable death, provided always that the cause bringing about the said death or danger is the presence of the organs of procreation (to avoid confusion it should be noted that in the decree of the Holy Office of 24 Feb. 1940 the term "direct" sterilization is taken in a somewhat narrower sense than the technical one); 6) whether castration is lawful as a penalty to be inflicted by the public authority against delinquents is strongly disputed: in the judgment of most it does not seem lawful, even setting aside the not contemptible argument of possible abuses; 7) today the opinion is gaining ground that castration is lawful in cases in which the presence of the organs indispensable for reproduction is the sole and certain cause of grave mental disturbances or of very grave sexual perversions (Scremin, v. bibl.).
III. PENALTIES AGAINST MUTILATORS
In the CIC the irregularity ex delicto is established (can. 985, no. 5) which, although it is not strictly a penalty, strikes ad modum poenae. For one who has attempted suicide or self-mutilation, exclusion from so-called legitimate acts is established, and moreover, where clerics are concerned, suspension and removal from the care of souls. In the Italian Penal Code various other penalties are also established against one who causes impotence for procreation
(art. 552) and against one who inflicts personal injuries (v.) (art. 582 ff.).
Bibliography7 works
Lorenzo Simeone - Giuseppe de Ninno