PEREMPTION. – In canon law, this may mean the cessation of the right of action, or indicate a manner in which the instance of the suit comes to an end. Peremptio actionis is not an exclusive term, since it may be replaced by the synonym extinctio actionis. The exclusive term, however, is peremptio instantiae, which indicates the manner in which the instance ends before its natural conclusion.
The abbreviation p. is used by the CIC in can. 1736–39 in speaking of the extinction of the instantia litis. Once this has begun with the litis contestatio, it is directed toward an end, which finds its natural place either in the proceedings (the judge’s sentence, decisive oath, arbitral award) or in other ways outside the proceedings but pertaining to them (settlement). The instance of the suit may also be interrupted or end before its natural conclusion. Peremption or renunciation, in fact, are the two ways in which the instance ends without the proceedings having run their normal course. Peremption results from the inactivity of the parties in the proceedings; indeed, according to can. 1736, if neither party performs any procedural act for two years at first instance or for one year at the appellate level, the proceedings are extinguished; if it is a case of peremption at the appellate level, the first-instance sentence becomes res judicata. Grave and worthy of consideration is can. 1737: peremption «obtinet ipso iure, adversus omnes»; the intervention of the parties is not only unnecessary but entirely superfluous, because not even a decree of the judge declaring the instance perempted is required; and it may also be raised ex officio. Peremption operates even against minors and persons assimilated to them, who appear in court through an intermediary, without prejudice to the representatives’ right to seek damages from representatives who, through fault, have allowed the instance to lapse. Naturally, peremption extinguishes the proceedings and not the action, which, subject always to the limitation and extinction periods, may be brought again, unless it is a case of peremption at the appellate level. Peremption (can. 1738) extinguishes the acts of the proceedings, but not those of the case, which retain their value in another instance between the same parties, whereas with respect to third parties they have merely documentary value. Since peremption is a consequence of the inactivity of both parties to the case, each of them must bear the expenses incurred by that party.