VETO. — The *veto* or exclusive right (*ius exclusionis, ius exclusivae*) is one of the forms of interference by civil authority in the election of the Pope and constituted, in recent centuries, a pretended right or privilege by which the sovereigns of Germany (later Austria), Spain, and France could officially exclude one of the cardinals from the papal election before it was completed. However, ecclesiastical law did not oblige the present cardinals to accept such exclusion as a true right (Wernz, *Ius canonicum*, I, 1st ed., Rome 1894, p. 664).
Extraneous interference in papal elections has recurred in various forms and aspects throughout the history of the Papacy, but it took on a particular and constant aspect during the 16th century, when disputes for supremacy in Italy—where the Pope was also a prince—led France and Spain (along with the Empire) to form factions within the Sacred College aligned with their respective political interests. This divided the cardinals into opposing parties and enabled these powers to influence papal elections through their adherents. Hence the conclaves of that period were marked by political rather than religious considerations, a pattern that persisted throughout the century. By its end, Spanish influence became intolerable, as Philip III pursued his father Philip II’s tendency to direct conclaves according to his own will, despite the prohibition issued by Pius IV against any direct bargaining aimed at including or excluding one or more cardinals from election. Especially during the war with France, exacerbated by religious strife, Spain presented itself as the intolerant champion of Catholicism and claimed a leading role in the conclave. The methods employed were still solicitations or threats by lay or ecclesiastical representatives of the sovereigns to induce individual cardinals to vote for or against certain candidates. Lists of cardinals were even circulated, indicating those deemed more or less favorable and on whom support could be counted to advance particular candidacies. These practices continued into the 18th century, prolonging and complicating conclaves due to the difficulty of securing the required two-thirds majority for any single candidate. Yet even more extreme measures were adopted.
The reform introduced by Gregory XV (1621–22), which imposed secret ballot to prevent surprise elections and render them more free, did not succeed in eliminating the interference of princes or the bargains conducted—more or less openly—by ambassadors through crown cardinals, national protectors, or other trusted intermediaries. These figures would indicate individuals deemed unacceptable, upon whom their colleagues were not to cast votes. In the 1644 conclave, Cardinal Albornoz, a Spaniard, imposed the *exclusiva* against Cardinal Sacchetti, an act repeated against him in 1655. Cardinal Albizzi then drafted a document rejecting as illicit Spain’s claim to the right of exclusion; he was answered, as in the earlier case, that it would be contrary to conscience to vote for a cardinal excluded by so illustrious and pious a king. Thus the practice evolved into a true and formal *exclusiva*, presented by a cardinal on behalf of his sovereign before the Sacred College. Such an exclusion was proposed as late as possible, when a disapproved candidate seemed close to the papacy; and since a sovereign could exercise the *exclusiva* only once during a conclave, it was reserved for cases where other means proved insufficient to prevent an undesired election. Once an election had occurred, exclusion was no longer permissible. These were the rules, though on occasion the threat of exclusion sufficed without formal presentation, as in the cases of France and Spain in 1669 and France in 1676. In 1721, the long-standing alliance of interest between the Empire and Spain broke down, and Spain aligned its interests with France against the Empire. It was then that the Emperor proposed his *exclusiva* against Cardinal Paolucci. In 1730, Spain—with French support—excluded Cardinal Imperiali; in 1758, France excluded Cardinal Cavalchini; in 1823, Austria excluded Cardinal Severoli; in 1830, Spain excluded Cardinal Giustiniani. Particularly notorious was Austria’s exclusion in 1903 of Cardinal Rampolla del Tindaro, which prompted the measures taken by Pius X against the *veto*.
A copious literature has debated whether formal exclusion constituted a genuine right of the three powers in question, binding upon the Sacred College, or was merely an abuse, albeit tolerated in certain periods. Advocates of the former view have further questioned whether such a right was based on custom or acquired through prescription.
Wahrmund, supporting the customary-right thesis, noted that the earliest manifestations of formal exclusion date to the late 17th and early 18th centuries, and thus fall outside prohibitions issued prior to that time; consequently, its development cannot be considered contrary to law. Sägmüller, by contrast, traced the origins of exclusion to the 16th century and specifically to Charles V (in the conclaves of 1549–50 and 1555), arguing that such a supposed right was directly challenged by Gregory XV’s bull *Aeterni Patris* and that its later development, though tolerated for reasons of expediency and prudence, remained unlawful. Pivano, after critiquing the customary theory, argued that the *ius exclusivae* arose in favor of Spain, Austria, and France through prescription, following uninterrupted exercise over at least a hundred years of quasi-possession in good faith.
The thesis that formal exclusion was introduced into Church governance by a custom contra legem encounters the obstacle of lacking the two essential requirements: *opinio iuris vel necessitatis* and *rationabilitas*. In other words, it does not appear that the acts in question were performed with the conviction of their legal obligatoriness, nor can such behavior be deemed reasonable, since it contradicted the principles upon which the Church’s constitution and legislation were founded—principles repeatedly affirmed in papal pronouncements. There can be no doubt that the exercise of a genuine right of *veto* in papal elections would violate the constitutional principle of lay power. Nor does the theory—despite Pivano’s penetrating analysis—that the *ius exclusivae* was acquired by prescription seem to have greater juridical foundation, especially because the Catholic states in question could not be said to have acted in good faith, as has been rightly observed (Falco): they were not exercising a right belonging to others but engaging in an action prohibited by canon law—the intrusion into papal elections.
Today it may be held that formal exclusion was never truly a right but only an arbitrary claim, tolerated in certain historical periods (notably the 18th century), which created no obligation for the cardinals. Moreover, there is no evidence that they were bound by the condemnations of Pius IV, Gregory XV, or Clement XII, which addressed *intercessiones principum* but did not expressly and absolutely condemn the *veto* in its formal sense.
Pius IX, with the bulls *In hac sublimi* (23 Aug. 1871), *Licet per apostolicas* (8 Sept. 1874) and *Consulturi* (10 Oct. 1877), condemned any intervention by civil authority in the election of the Pope; in these documents, however, he did not make express reference to the *jus exclusivae*, so that some writers (Pivano) have been led to believe that the papal condemnation did not concern the *jus exclusivae* as such but rather those tendencies—especially asserted in Germany—which looked forward to a return to the ancient system of papal election with the participation of the people and the lower clergy.
To remove any doubt regarding the legitimacy of the *jus exclusivae*, X (v.), prompted also by the events of the Conclave from which he emerged elected on 20 Jan. 1904, with the constitution *Commissum Nobis* expressly reprobated the so-called civil *jus exclusivae*, even when expressed merely as a desire, as well as any intervention or intercession, proclaiming that it was not lawful for anyone—even the supreme heads of states, under any pretext—to interfere in the grave matter of the election of the Roman Pontiff. This explicit prohibition, reinforced by the sanction of a *latae sententiae* excommunication reserved to the future Pope, was published only in March 1909 (v. PAPA).