VETO. - The V. or exclusive (ius exclusionis, ius exclusivae) is one of the forms of interference by the civil authority in the election of the Supreme Pontiff, and involved a supposed right or privilege whereby, in the last centuries, the sovereigns of Germany (later Austria), Spain, and France, before the papal election had been completed, could each officially exclude one of the cardinals participating in the election; this was not, however, such that, by any special ecclesiastical law, the cardinals present were obliged to adhere to the exclusion made as to a genuine right (Wernz, Ius canon., I, 1st ed., Rome 1894, p. 664).
Foreign interference in the papal election recurs in different forms and aspects throughout the history of the Papacy, but it assumed a particular and consistent character during the sixteenth century, when the disputes over supremacy in Italy, where the pontiff was also a prince, led France and Spain (together with the Empire) to form within the Sacred College groups adhering to their respective policies, dividing the cardinals into opposing parties, and to exert influence through them over the papal elections. Hence those conclaves agitated more by political than religious interests, which are found in that period. Toward the end of the century, Spain’s influence became intolerable, because Philip III persisted in his father Philip II’s tendency to direct the conclaves according to his own will, although Pius IV had prohibited every agreement intended to include or exclude one or more cardinals from the election. Especially on the occasion of the war with France, which was marred by religious struggles, Spain became an intolerant champion of Catholicism and therefore claimed to have the leading role in the conclave. These were still appeals or threats exercised by the lay or ecclesiastical representatives of the sovereigns in order to induce individual cardinals to vote for some candidates or to exclude others from the possibility of being elected pontiffs. Lists of prelates even circulated, classified according to whether they seemed more or less favorable and could be relied upon to support and make particular candidacies more probable. These methods continued during the eighteenth century and made conclaves lengthy and difficult, because of the consequent difficulty of obtaining two-thirds of the votes for a single person. But attempts were made to go even further.
The reform by which Gregory XV (1621–22) imposed secret balloting, in order to prevent surprise elections and make them freer, did not succeed in eliminating the interference of princes or the agreements conducted more or less openly by ambassadors through the crown cardinals, the cardinal protectors of the individual kingdoms, or other trusted agents. These were the men who indicated the persons considered least acceptable, toward whom their colleagues’ votes were not to be directed. In the Conclave of 1644, Cardinal Albornoz, a Spaniard, brought the exclusive against Cardinal Sacchetti; the exclusive was then repeated against Albornoz himself in 1655. Cardinal Albizzi thereupon drafted a memorandum rejecting as illicit Spain’s claim to the right of exclusion; he was answered, analogously to what had been said in the previous case, that in conscience one could not give one’s vote to a cardinal excluded by so illustrious and pious a king. Thus the genuine and official exclusive had been reached, presented by a cardinal in the name of his sovereign before the Sacred College. This was proposed as late as possible, when an undesirable candidate seemed by then close to the Papacy; and since such an exclusive could be exercised during a conclave only once in the name of a sovereign, it was not advisable to propose it until the other means of preventing an undesired election appeared insufficient. Once the election had taken place, exclusion was no longer admissible. These were the rules, but at times the exclusive was threatened without subsequently needing to be officially proposed, as in the case of those of France and Spain in 1669 and of France in 1676. In 1721 the community of interests between the Empire and Spain, which had lasted until then, was broken, and Spain aligned its interests with those of France against the Empire. It was then that the Emperor proposed his exclusive against Cardinal Paolucci. In 1730 Spain, supported by France, excluded Cardinal Imperiali; in 1758 France excluded Cardinal Cavalchini; in 1823 Austria excluded Cardinal Severoli; in 1830 Spain excluded Cardinal Giustiniani. Particularly resounding was Austria’s exclusion in 1903 of Cardinal Rampolla del Tindaro, which prompted Pius X’s measures against the V.
A substantial literature developed on the question of whether the formal exclusive constituted a true and proper right of the three powers mentioned and therefore bound the Sacred College, or whether it was merely an abuse, even if tolerated during certain periods. The proponents of the first thesis subsequently asked whether such a right was customary or had been acquired by prescription.
Wahrmund, a supporter of customary right, observed that the first manifestations of the formal exclusive date from the end of the seventeenth century and the first part of the eighteenth, and consequently that the prohibitive provisions enacted earlier did not concern the exercise of such a claim by Catholic states; its development therefore cannot be considered contrary to the law. Sägmüller, on the other hand, began from the premise that the origins of the exclusive date back to the sixteenth century and specifically to Charles V (the Conclaves of 1549–50 and 1555), so that this presumed right was directly struck by Gregory XV’s bull Aeterni Patris, and its subsequent development was contrary to the law, even if tolerated for reasons of expediency and prudence. Pivano, after criticizing the theory of custom, maintained that the ius exclusivae arose in favor of Spain, Austria, and France through prescription, following the uninterrupted exercise, extending for at least one hundred years, of quasi-possession in good faith.
The thesis that the formal exclusive was introduced into the Church’s legal order by a custom contra legem encounters the obstacle of the absence of the two essential requirements, the opinio iuris vel necessitatis and rationabilitas. In other words, it does not seem that, in this case, there was continuous observance of the acts arising from the conviction, on the part of those who performed them, of their juridical obligatoriness; in any event, such conduct would have been irrationabilis, since it conflicted with the principles on which the constitution and legislation of the Church are founded, principles confirmed by numerous papal pronouncements.
There is no doubt that the exercise of a true and proper right of V. in the election of the Supreme Pontiff would violate the constitutional principle of lay power. Nor does the theory that the ius exclusivae was acquired by prescription seem to have any greater juridical foundation—despite Pivano’s penetrating investigation—especially because the continuous bona fides of the aforementioned Catholic states could not be regarded as present, given that, as was rightly observed (Falco), this was not a matter of exercising a right belonging to others, but of an action prohibited by the canonical laws: interference in the election of the Supreme Pontiff.
Today it seems possible to hold that the formal exclusive was never capable of being regarded as a right, but only as an arbitrary claim, tolerated during certain periods of history (the eighteenth century), which created no obligation for the cardinals. On the other hand, it has not been proved that they could be considered included in the condemnations of Pius IV, Gregory XV, or Clement XII, which speak of the « intercessiones principum » and not of the V. form.
Pio IX, con le bolle In hac sublimis (23 ag. 1871), Licet per apostolicas (8 sett. 1874) e Consulturi (10 ott. 1877), condannò qualsiasi intervento della potestà laica nell'elezione del Pontefice; in tali documenti, però, non fece un espresso riferimento all'esclusiva, per cui qualche scrittore (Pivano) ha mostrato di ritenere che la condanna pontificia non riguardasse l'esclusiva ma piuttosto quegli orientamenti, affermatisi specialmente in Germania, che auspicavano un ritorno all'antico sistema dell'elezione del Pontefice con l'intervento del popolo e del clero inferiore.
Ad eliminare qualsiasi dubbio sulla legittimità dello ius exclusivae, Pio X (v.), a ciò spinto anche dalle vicende del Conclave dal quale era uscito eletto il 20 genn. 1904, con la cost. Commissum Nobis « riprovava assolutamente il V. civile detto anche esclusiva, anche sotto la forma di semplice desiderio, così pure qualunque intervento od intercessione, proclamando che non era lecito ad alcuno, nemmeno ai supremi capi delle nazioni, sotto alcun pretesto interpersi od ingerirsi nel grave affare della elezione del Romano Pontefice ». Questa esplicita proibizione, sorretta dalla sanzione della scomunica latae sententiae riservate al futuro Pontefice, fu pubblicata solo nel marzo 1909 (v. II).
Pio Paschini*