ASSOCIATION. — An association may be defined as a group of men freely constituted within the State for the attainment of a common purpose through the union of their efforts. It therefore consists of two constituent elements: a more or less numerous group of rational subjects and a psychological bond caused by an act of consensual will; and an element of purpose, which in the ideal order occasions consent and in the practical order constitutes the goal of cooperation.
The content of the concept of association might lead one to assimilate it to other social formations, such as the family and the State; but numerous differences, refer-
While the cause of the a. consists solely in a voluntary act of the members, morally non-necessary because determined by a contingent and variable purpose, the cause, on the other hand, of the family lies in the natural instinct of procreation, for the continuation and propagation of life and the education of offspring; and that of the State in the equally natural law of solidarity, which drives man to seek his fellow, in order to establish social relations enabling him to attain the total good of life. Since these latter causes are natural, and the ends for whose realization they operate are universal and imperative, it follows that the family and the State possess the character of natural and necessary societies, in opposition to the a., which is a voluntary and contingent union.
Nevertheless, the a. too must ultimately be traced back, in order to discover the objective foundation on which to establish the corresponding right, to the need that the human subject has to be supplemented in his natural deficiencies by the help of his fellows, so that he may not only attain physical, intellectual, and moral perfection, but also achieve a number of particular private or public purposes that require the joining of individual forces. On this point Leo XIII teaches in Rerum Novarum that «the feeling of his own weakness drives man to wish to unite the work of others with his own... The instinct of this natural inclination moves him, just as toward civil society, so toward other particular societies, certainly small and imperfect, but nonetheless true societies».
This natural inclination, activated by the need for the help of others, provides the foundation for the right of each individual to unite his forces with those of other subjects, thereby giving life to the a. This right is nothing other than the faculty of grouping together in active centers of collaboration for the attainment of certain particular ends. The family, on the one hand, although intrinsically perfect, is not sufficient to provide man with everything necessary for his full development; and the State, on the other, although its purpose is the total well-being of human life, cannot extend its direct action to all particular ends. Consequently, interests arise within it that cannot be protected without particular unions; religious, cultural, economic, and political purposes present themselves, which can better be attained through collaboration. Hence the usefulness, and often the necessity, of groupings, and therefore the natural right of a. for individuals.
It follows, as Leo XIII again teaches in the encyclical cited, that «although these private associations exist within the State, and are, as it were, parts of it, the State cannot prohibit their formation. For man has from nature the right to unite in societies; and natural rights the State must protect, not destroy». Nevertheless, this right is not absolute, but finds its limits both in the ends that the a. may set for themselves and in the superior and predominant rights of the common good.
The a. is not legitimate if its ends are contrary to the most fundamental laws of rational human nature, to morality, or to justice. Moreover, since the a. is a group within the State of which it forms part, it cannot be considered legitimate if its purpose and the corresponding action conflict with the overriding duty to collaborate for the common good of the entire social body. Against such forms of a., the civil authority has both the right and the duty to intervene for the protection of the public good.
«There are, however, cases», Leo XIII adds, after affirming the natural right to unite in societies, «that render prohibition legitimate and obligatory. When particular societies pursue a purpose openly contrary to the honesty of justice or to the security of civil society, the State legitimately opposes them, either by forbidding their formation or by dissolving them once formed». He warns, however, that in this matter it is necessary to proceed with the utmost caution, in order not to invade the rights of citizens or do harm under the pretext of the public good. Outside the cases mentioned, the State is obliged to respect and protect the freedom of citizens to group themselves in particular a., while nevertheless always exercising its high directive function, in order to channel and direct all forces toward the collective good.
This obligation becomes even more urgent when religious a. are concerned; since they pursue an honest end, they are entirely legitimate and highly advantageous to society and its true good. Moreover, precisely by virtue of the superior purpose toward which they direct their activity, they remain exempt from the direct jurisdiction of the civil power and fall within the exclusive sphere of the power of the Church, which alone is competent to regulate their origin and life through its laws.