INFANTICIDE. – From infanticidium (infans and caedo). It is voluntary homicide committed against a newborn. In the strict sense, it is the intentional killing of a newborn by the mother or by a member of the family in order to preserve the family’s honor. It is understood in these terms by the majority of modern codes; hence the need for special consideration.
In Greece deformed newborns had necessarily to be killed (Sparta), or else the father exercised absolute power over his offspring (Athens).
At Rome, the mother who killed her own newborn was regarded as guilty of homicide and punished according to the Lex Cornelia (Dig., 46, 9); the father, on the other hand, by virtue of the patria potestas, could kill his children with impunity.
Christianity condemned it severely from its beginnings (Pseudo-Barnabas, Ep., 19: PG 2, 778; Ep. ad Diognetum, 5: ibid. 1174); the apologists opposed it with the utmost force, ruthlessly accusing the pagans of this vice (s. Giustino, I Apol., 27: PG 6, 370; Atenagora, Legatio, 35: ibid. 970; Tertulliano, Apol., 9: CSEL, 69, p. 26; id., Ad nationes, 1, 16: ibid., XX, p. 87; Minucio Felice, Octavius, 30: ibid., II, p. 43; Clemente Al., Paedag., 3, 3: PG 8, 585; Lattanzio, Div. Inst., 6, 20: CSEL, 19, p. 559). The Fathers continued the struggle courageously (s. Basilio, Sermo 22: PG 32, 1378–79; s. Ambrogio, Hexaemeron, 6, 4: CSEL, 32, p. 218). In turn, the councils established very severe penalties against those who became guilty of this crime (Councils of Elvira [ca. 305], can. 63; Council of Ancyra [314], can. 21; Council of Lerida [524], can. 2; Council of Mainz [847], can. 21). It must not be forgotten that, under the influence of the Church, the Roman emperors, beginning with Constantine, took a stand against infanticide.
In the Middle Ages and even later, infanticide was ordinarily punished by death as aggravated homicide; but at times, taking into account the mother’s particular psychological circumstances, especially in cases of adulterous parentage, the death penalty was commuted to lifelong confinement in a convent. The ecclesiastical sanctions for this crime remained very severe, as is shown by the Decretals of Gregory IX (1–3, de his qui filios occiderunt, V, 9).
The penal laws of the individual modern states have made infanticide a separate issue, providing for a reduction of the penalty in cases where a newborn is killed by the mother or by a member of the family for reasons of honor. Thus in Italy (Cod. pen., art. 578).
The moral consideration of direct infanticide (for indirect infanticide or child abandonment V. INFANZIA ABBAN-DONATA) cannot be based on the principle of the cause of honor invoked by the law of the state. Infanticide is a grave sin. Indeed, the killing of a newborn by the mother or by a member of the family is aggravated homicide, containing a twofold malice.
It is a grave sin against justice (the Fifth Commandment), since in no case are the parents, and still less the relatives, masters of the newborn’s life, which belongs to God alone. It is a grave sin against piety (the Fourth Commandment), since the parents cannot deny the newborn those goods which, by God’s will, expressed through nature, they are called upon to provide, the first among them being the preservation of life.
Nevertheless, in the individual case of infanticide, when the mother herself, in the immediate postpartum period, kills her own child, the mother’s particular physiological and psychological circumstances must be taken into consideration; these certainly affect her will, partly diminishing her freedom of determination and consequently her moral responsibility. This will be judged on the basis of the objective norms and the special conditions mentioned above, which have considerable weight in determining a mother to become guilty of infanticide.
For the accusation of infanticide levelled against Christians, V. ACCUSE CONTRO I CRISTIANI.