INFANTICIDE. - From infanticidium (infans and caedo). It is the voluntary homicide committed against the person of a newborn. In the strict sense it is the intentional killing of a newborn done by the mother or by a member of the family to save its honor. In these terms it is understood by the majority of modern codes; hence the need for special consideration.
In Greece deformed newborns had to be killed (Sparta), or else the father disposed with absolute power of his own offspring (Athens).
In Rome the mother who killed her own newborn was considered guilty of homicide and punished according to the Lex Cornelia (Dig., 46, 9); the father, on the other hand, by virtue of the patria potestas, could kill his own children with impunity.
Christianity severely condemned i. from its very beginnings (Pseudo-Barnabas, Ep., 19: PG 2, 778; Ep. ad Diognetum, 5: ibid. 1174); the apologists opposed it with extreme violence, relentlessly accusing the pagans of this vice (St. Justin, I Apol., 27: PG 6, 370; Athenagoras, Legatio, 35: ibid. 970; Tertullian, Apol., 9: CSEL, 69, p. 26; id., Ad nationes, 1, 16: ibid., XX, p. 87; Minucius Felix, Octavius, 30: ibid., II, p. 43; Clement of Alexandria, Paedag., 3, 3: PG 8, 585; Lactantius, Div. Inst., 6, 20: CSEL, 19, p. 559). The Fathers courageously continued the struggle (St. Basil, Sermo 22: PG 32, 1378-79; St. Ambrose, Hexaemeron, 6, 4: CSEL, 32, p. 218). In their turn the councils established very grave penalties against those who made themselves guilty of such a crime (Councils of Elvira [ca. 305], can. 63; Council of Ancyra [314], can. 21; Council of Lerida [524], can. 2; Council of Mainz [847], can. 21). It must not be forgotten that, under the influence of the Church, the Roman emperors, beginning with Constantine, took their stand against i.
In the Middle Ages and even later i. was ordinarily punished with death as qualified homicide: but at times, taking into account the special psychological conditions of the mother, especially in cases of adulterine filiation, the death penalty was commuted to lifelong relegation to a convent. The ecclesiastical sanctions for such a crime remained very severe, as appears from the Decretals of Gregory IX (1-3, de his qui filios occiderunt, V, 9).
The penal laws of the individual modern States have made i. a separate problem, providing for a reduction of penalty in cases of the killing of a newborn by the mother or by a member of the family for reasons of honor. Thus in Italy (Cod. pen., art. 578).
The moral consideration of direct i. (for indirect i. or abandonment of infancy v. INFANZIA ABBANDONATA) cannot be based on the principle of the cause of honor adduced by the law of the State. I. is a grave sin. Indeed the killing of the newborn by the mother or by a member of the family is qualified homicide, containing a twofold malice.
It is a grave sin against justice (V commandment), since in no case are the parents, and still less the relatives, masters of the life of the newborn, which belongs only to God. It is a grave sin against piety (IV commandment), since the parents cannot deny to the newborn those goods which by the will of God, expressed by nature, they are called to give him, first among which is the preservation of life.
Nevertheless in the individual case of i., when the mother herself, in the immediate puerperium, kills her own offspring, the particular physio-psychological circumstances of the mother must be kept in mind, which certainly influence her will, diminishing in part her freedom of determination and therefore her moral responsibility. This will be judged on the basis of the objective norms and the special conditions mentioned above, which have considerable weight in determining a mother to make herself guilty of i.
For the accusation of i. launched against the Christians, v. ACCUSE CONTRO I CRISTIANI.
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Vittorio Maconi