INHIBITION. – From the Latin verb *inhibere*, meaning to restrain or check. Among jurists, it retained its etymological sense and was used to denote the compulsory impediment to the exercise of a right (cf. 1, X, 3, 2) and often referred to the action of a judge who prohibits an act or the exercise of a given right (e.g., the appellate judge who forbids the execution of a first-instance sentence).
In current canon law, *inhibitio iuris*—which is the ancient *sequestratio impropria*—of which a remnant remains in can. 1699 § 3, consists in the temporary prohibition issued by a judge against the use of a disputed right, so as to avoid causing prejudice to another’s right. Hence, to *inhibit* is to prohibit the *exercitium iuris*; a prohibition that is not punitive in nature but rather precautionary (v. SEQUESTRO).
The object of such a prohibition or *i.* may be any right whatsoever. It differs from sequestration in that it does not involve the deprivation of possession of a thing, which in sequestration is entrusted to a third party.
Sequestration, moreover, has as its direct object the *res*, whereas *i.* has as its proper and direct object the exercise of a right. It is therefore properly said that *i.* consists in a *non facere*.
The *i.* may also be imposed at the request of a party; in such a case, it is required: 1) that the possession of the right in question be demonstrated (can. 1672 § 1-2; a *fumus boni iuris* suffices, and full proof is not necessary); 2) that there exists the danger of harm should the *i.* not be ordered, and that no other remedy exists to protect the contested right (can. 1674).
Thus, during the process concerning the validity of a marriage, the use of the marriage itself may be prohibited or inhibited, or the separation of the spouses may be ordered (cf. X, IV, 1, 14; S. C. de Sacramentis, *Instructio* of 15 August 1936, art. 63); similarly, even after two sentences in favor of the nullity of a marriage, if the defender of the bond has appealed in due time, should a new marriage have been attempted, the judge must, *ex officio* or at the request of the defender of the bond, order the *inhibitio exercitii iuris* (cf. loc. cit., art. 223, can. 1672 § 3).
In cases of public interest, both the promoter of justice and the defender of the bond may request the *i.* of the exercise of the disputed right, and the judge may order it even *ex officio* (can. 1672 § 3).