FUNZIONALISMO

FUNCTIONALISM (IN ART): *V. RATIONALISM.*

FUNCTIONALISM. — The founder of this ethnological trend, originally English, is considered to be B. Malinowski, whose disciples include R. Firth, A. F. Richard, R. F. Fortune, and M. Mead. For a time, A. Radcliffe-Brown was regarded as one of its leaders alongside Malinowski. In Germany, W. Mühlmann became a staunch advocate of functionalism and its most systematic exponent; Fr. Krause’s “theory of structure” is ideologically connected to II. S. M. Shirokogoroff, S. R. Steinmetz, R. Thurnwald, and D. Westermann were revived by Mühlmann in relation to functionalism, though they do not truly belong to it; in fact, Shirokogoroff attacked Malinowski and his followers, arguing that they had debased ethnological science by addressing practical matters unrelated to II. Mühlmann himself acknowledges that they belong to functionalism only to a certain extent.

Functionalism was initially antihistorical but later acknowledged the need for a historical approach. Malinowski and his disciples remained at the first stage of functionalism, whereas Radcliffe-Brown surpassed II. Indeed, when discussing the concept of function in social life, Radcliffe-Brown states that between the historical and functional trends, “there need not be any conflict, only a difference. There is, and can be, no conflict between functional theory and the view that every culture, every social system is the end result of a unique series of historical events... The two kinds of explanation do not oppose each other but complement one another. I see no reason why the two kinds of study, history and function, should not be pursued side by side in perfect harmony.” A. A. Lesser and Mühlmann share this view.

The first stage of functionalism is easily understood when one considers that it emerged from the observation of phenomena arising among Eastern and primitive peoples due to contact with Western European-American civilization, particularly in the colonial territories of Africa and Oceania. These phenomena involved the adaptation to new forms of civilization. Mühlmann placed such importance on these phenomena that he sought to judge all the countless contacts that have occurred throughout history between different peoples and their varied civilizations, viewing them as experiments that reveal both the characteristics and the entirety of civilization. This is what constitutes “the search for the model,” as seen in Mühlmann’s functionalist methodology, which also informs his definition of ethnology: the science of the forms and processes of adaptation of peoples and their individuals as they orient themselves toward new forms of civilization, their geographical, social, and cultural environment, and the diffusion of these adaptations across space and time.

The functionalist conception of civilization was developed especially by Malinowski, who regarded civilization as a whole in which the parts are related to the whole and determined by II. The manner in which he indicates the relationships between part and whole, the qualities of function or structure, varies in each civilization. This is why its individual systems or elements are understood in their essence through the method of illuminating the part in relation to the whole. Mühlmann distinguishes three environments in relation to man: the natural or geographical environment, the social environment, and the cultural environment. Man is not only an environment in himself but also in relation to others; these two variables, though seemingly constant, are in a specific functional dependency. Here, “functional” is taken in a strict sense: a variation in one of the two quantities entails a variation in the other (it is clear how false this principle is in the relationship between the natural environment and man, except in cases such as that of shepherds with their flocks). Since the term “function” has many meanings, Mühlmann proposes its abolition in ethnology and often uses the term “structure” or both together.

Mühlmann divides all ethnological facts into two groups: intentional and functional. Intentional facts are those that indicate historical life as consciousness; functional facts are those that comprehend it as activity. According to Fr. Schmidt’s interpretation, intentional facts would be the conceptions that indigenous peoples have of their own civilization, while functional facts are the facts of that civilization as they actually exist in the external world. He presents two criteria for this grouping: the criterion of historical value for intentional data and the criterion of return for functional data.

For Mühlmann, civilization is life itself; thus, he rejects the notion of “cultural elements” or “cultural monuments,” as Ratzel had already expressed, preserved in our museums. The monuments and cultural materials in our museums are not symbols of something dead but indicators of processes, of regular forms of life whose qualities extend far beyond the objects themselves, introducing us to the entire civilization to which they belong. It is understandable, then, that functionalism places great importance on psychology in all its branches, especially the psychology of the individual, “and on sociology, to the extent that Mühlmann goes so far as to say that the study of society is logically, though not practically, indistinguishable from the study of culture.

The article acknowledges, as has been stated, the necessity of historical ethnology. It admits that there is development in civilization, which occurs over time and therefore belongs to history. “Both aspects,” writes Mühlmann, “that of development and that of history, the functional and the historical, are equally necessary, because the former shows us only the logical possibility, but not the realization, while the latter shows the realization, but not the logical possibility.” According to him, every cultural contact is essentially an historical experimental fact. It differs from the experimental fact of the natural sciences, because in human social and cultural life there is not only determination but also indetermination, not only necessity but also the freedom of human will. Thus Mühlmann places ethnology between history and biology. He notes that there is not only tradition or cultural borrowing between peoples, but also within the same people between man and man, between one social stratum and another, and from one generation to the next. Therefore, up to a certain point, two orders of factors must be distinguished in the history of civilization: internal and external ones. In this cultural tradition from one generation to another or from one people to another, a cultural selection takes place, by which only what is suitable is accepted. In every cultural phenomenon there is a temporal course, which is transformation and change. This is normal; what poses a problem, however, is the fact of the permanence, little or not at all varied, of a cultural phenomenon over a longer period, that is, it raises the question of the tempo and mode by which transformation occurs. Indeed, the comparative study of the individual cultural units of a civilization shows their differing rates of development; for example, technology, law, and social organization may have reached different stages of development. This is then irreversible, according to Mühlmann himself. The value of variations in being is judged according to the criterion of social, cultural, and historical importance, which presupposes historical investigation of individual phenomena; then the search for their historical course to arrive at the type. The tempo of transformation can be ascertained in three ways: 1) by means of written documents; 2) by connecting archaeological material with ethnographic material in a specific place where cultural contact and exchange have occurred; 3) through the traditions of the indigenous peoples themselves, in so far as they contain memories of historical events of the people. This is generally the most important method, because it allows one to approach most closely the actual process of cultural transformation.

For the comparison of two or more civilizations, a comparison made to discover concordant features that indicate a common origin and cultural borrowing between the civilizations in question, Mühlmann gives six rules, which it is not possible to analyze here. While affirming that the search for causality is a deep need of our spirit, which places cause before effect in temporal order, he nevertheless rejects, in the name of some modern scientists, e.g., Heisenberg, the ordinary concept of causality. He wishes to substitute historical-cultural certainty with that of statistical correlation, whose results lie between certainty and probability, which is obtained by the search for the model or type, as stated above. This theory of Mühlmann has been justly judged by Fr. Schmidt to be a ridiculous conception.

In criticizing ethnological theories, Mühlmann makes many pertinent observations that reveal his uncommon insight. Particularly apt is his remark concerning history, namely that it will in future be much influenced by etiology and anthropology and especially by functionalist methodology in the evaluation of historical facts; it will no longer be possible to write world history without taking into consideration the so-called primitive peoples.

The article in its first form was rejected by Radcliffe-Brown in the solemn inaugural address of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland in 1940, deploring having been considered a member and indeed a leader or one of the leaders of the functionalist school, which, according to him, does not really exist except as a myth in the mind of Malinowski, whose activity has done nothing but cause so much useless discussion in ethnology.

Fr. Schmidt has made a profound critique of the article according to Mühlmann’s latest and extensive factual systematization, showing its inadequacies and manifold inaccuracies, particularly the superficiality and unreasonableness of his attacks, simplifications, and misunderstandings regarding the historical-cultural method, while at the same time acknowledging that he merits credit for having discovered some weak points in other systems and theories and having brought valuable new perspectives. In summary, Fr. Schmidt’s judgment is that given at the conclusion of his critique of Krause’s theory of structure in the following two points: 1) the historical-cultural method is right to utilize the structural or functional theory, which is useful both for preparatory ethnological work and for ascertaining certain relationships in the coexistence of civilizations in space; 2) the structural theory, however, must turn to the historical-cultural method for the solution of the main question of ethnology, namely to reach greater depths of time, going back to the origins, and thus to deeper causal sequences.

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To this reservation, some sacred functions are by their nature withdrawn from inferior ministers, so that the consecration of a bishop cannot be performed except by another bishop. Others are withdrawn by positive law and reserved to certain ministers of worship in preference to others. Thus the consecration of a bishop is reserved to the Pope (can. 953) and cannot be performed by others without his mandate; the consecration of churches and altars is reserved as a valid rite to bishops, and to abbots and prelates *nullius* (can. 323 §2, 239 §1), as a licit rite to bishops, abbots or prelates *nullius*, ordinary of the place, with the exception of titular churches and their altars (can. 1155); the conferral of tonsure and minor orders is reserved, besides to the bishop, to cardinals and to abbots or prelates *nullius* (can. 239 §1, 22; 323 §2, 964 §1°). Some sacred functions are reserved to the cathedral chapter, and within the chapter the minister must be chosen according to a certain order (can. 397 nn. 1-3, 462 n. 7); others are reserved by can. 426 to the parish priest (solemn Baptism, public Communion brought to the sick in the parish and viaticum to the sick, Extreme Unction, announcing the Holy Orders and marriages (can. 998 §1, 1022 ff.), assisting and blessing marriages (can. 1094, 1088 ff.), celebrating funerals according to can. 1216 (cf. however can. 1218), blessing houses on Holy Saturday or at another time established by custom, blessing the baptismal font, imparting blessings outside the church with pomp and solemnity, conducting processions outside the church with solemnity, saving the rights of the chapter, of religious (can. 1291, 1293), customs and privileges (see better under the individual headings). By particular law, even the first Communion of children may be reserved as a sacred function to the parish priest, and likewise the blessing of women after childbirth. When sacred functions are thus reserved, they cannot be performed in other churches (can. 481); otherwise their exercise is free according to liturgical laws (thus triduums, solemn novenas, etc.: can. 482), provided they do not interfere with parochial ministry (can. 716 §1, 609 §1) or in special cases the competent authority has not ordered otherwise, or it does not concern privileges and a question of a local church or of religious or ecclesiastical associations regarding a function in question.

III. TIME AND PLACE OF SACRED FUNCTIONS

Sacred functions must be performed at the prescribed time, unless freedom is allowed or they depend on the circumstances of other acts, even profane ones. Some sacred functions may be performed at any time of day or night, others at a specific time of day, others in periods or cycles of the liturgical year. The ordinary of the place, for a just cause, may also define the schedule of sacred functions (can. 1171).

Time, as is known, can be reckoned: naturally, civilly, and liturgically. In relation to sacred functions, the last type of time reckoning is directly relevant, but indirectly the canonical and civil computation of time also has its importance. Thus, in the private celebration of Mass, private recitation of the Divine Office, Communion, one may follow local time, whether true, mean, or legal, whether regional or extraordinary; in other cases, one must follow the common time of the place. Therefore in solemn sacred functions (solemn Mass, conventual Mass, solemn Divine Office, solemn Vespers, etc.) one must follow the time commonly used in the place of the sacred function (can. 13 §1).

Sacred functions have their natural place for performance in a sacred place, and indeed some, always making the necessary exceptions, have more specific determinations regarding place, thus: for Baptism (can. 773), for Communion (can. 869), for Confession (can. 908-910), for Confirmation (can. 791-792), for the celebration of Matrimony (can. 1109), for the celebration of the Holy Mass (can. 822, 823), for the conferral of Orders (can. 1088, 1109).

The greatest restrictions apply to the celebration of sacred functions in a private oratory (can. 1195 §1). With the exception of Mass, other sacred functions cannot normally be celebrated there.