PRESIDENT OF THE TRIBUNAL
The magistrate placed at the head of a tribunal, alongside his colleagues, is responsible for directing the proceedings and, in general, for adopting the measures necessary to ensure the proper administration of justice in the cases brought before the tribunal.
In addition to these functions, which are strictly inherent to the exercise of judicial activity—and which normally belong to whoever presides over or is appointed to a judicial body, even temporarily or for specific cases—various other administrative duties may be entrusted to the president, insofar as he holds the stable and primary role of head and representative of the tribunal. These duties, relating to the responsibility for the regular functioning of the service, the exercise of supervision and discipline, and, in general, the hierarchical authority over the tribunal’s personnel, etc., are regulated and specified differently according to the particular organization of judicial administration in various legal systems.
In the tribunals of the Catholic Church, while the figure of the president, in relation to the first of the two categories of functions mentioned above—namely, those strictly judicial—generally conforms to the common principles of procedural law, in administrative and hierarchical terms it presents particular characteristics, in connection with the special structure of ecclesiastical judicial organs and the close link between the exercise of their functions and other manifestations of ecclesiastical authority (*V. GIUDICE ECCLESIASTICO; TRIBUNALI ECCLESIASTICI*).
It is therefore necessary to distinguish between ordinary tribunals of first and second instance and the tribunals of the Holy See. Although the bishop, as the natural judge in every diocese for all controversies not reserved to the Holy See, may personally exercise judicial power and thus, strictly speaking, may himself preside over the diocesan tribunal (*canons 1573 §1, 1578*), whenever the law requires that judgment be rendered by a collegial body, he is permitted—and indeed encouraged by the law itself—to exercise these functions through the ministry of another person. To this end, it is prescribed that every bishop must appoint an official, with ordinary judicial authority, in a person distinct from the vicar general (except in small dioceses or those with few cases), to whom vice-officials may be added as assistants or substitutes. The official or vice-official, in addition to judging as a sole judge, alone or with assessors, has the specific function of presiding over the collegial tribunal (*canons 1573, 1575, 1577*).
The origin of the figure of the official in diocesan curias has given rise to interesting historical questions. The opinion commonly held until recently was that the institution of the *officiales*, along with that of the vicar general, was due essentially to the reaction of bishops in the 13th century against the excessive power of the archdeacons, as well as to the fact that bishops were not personally versed in the new procedural forms that had developed in connection with Roman law (*V. DIACONO*). A vicar general, also called *officialis principalis*, was therefore appointed to reside in the episcopal see, along with subordinates, *officiales foranei*, who collaborated more specifically with the archdeacons. The competencies would then gradually have diverged, with administrative management remaining with the vicar and judicial functions with the *officialis*.
More recently, however, it has been argued (*Fournier*) that the office of the vicar general, determined not so much by the need to curb the usurpations of the archdeacons as by the habitual absences of bishops after the 14th century, would have no connection with the *officiales*, who already appear much earlier, namely in the 11th century, invested with judicial functions. The official, an ordinary judge removable *ad nutum*, would have gradually concentrated in himself the functions of the ancient *presbyterium*, eventually absorbing the affairs that had been within the competence of the archdeacon.
However one may judge this matter, it is certain that after the Council of Trent, which completed the reaction against the archdeacon while preserving the vicar general, the separation of the exercise of judicial power from administrative power into two distinct delegates of the bishop became general and was expressly enshrined in the *Codex Iuris Canonici* (*canons 1573 §1*). Thus, even when, as in Italy, the territorial smallness of dioceses allows a single official to cumulatively perform both roles, the offices of vicar general and official, even when held by the same person, remain distinct and independent (*cf. canons 1573 §§5, 6*).
The requirements for appointment as official or vice-official are set out in the *CIC* as follows: they must be priests of unblemished reputation, doctors or experts in canon law, and at least 30 years of age. They are removable *ad nutum* of the bishop and require confirmation upon a change of bishop, but do not cease their functions nor can they be removed during a sede vacante. If the same person holds both the offices of vicar general and official, during a sede vacante he ceases his functions as vicar but not as official. However, if the official is elected as capitular vicar, he must appoint a new official (*canons 1573 §§5, 6, 7*).
The functions of the official or vice-official as president of the collegial tribunal are, first, those inherent to the power to issue the measures necessary for the administration of justice in individual cases (*canon 1577 §2*) and thus to direct the conduct of the proceedings, appointing the ponens (*v.*) or rapporteur and replacing him if necessary (*canon 1584*), signing the various procedural acts together with the actuary (*canon 1643 §2*), ordering, if deemed appropriate, the printing of defenses and documents and moderating their length (*canons 1863-64*), and convening the judges for deliberation (*canon 1871*). He also has the power to perform certain pre-instructional or supplementary acts of instruction that the *CIC* generally entrusts to the judge (*canons 1712 §1, 1764 §1, 1782 §1, 1915 §2, etc.*), to judge on the exception of suspicion raised against the promoter of justice, the defender of the bond, and other tribunal members (*canon 1614 §3*), and, according to some authors, even to declare the peremption of a case.
In addition to this somewhat summary enumeration of the powers of the president of the collegial tribunal, as may be inferred from the norms scattered throughout the *CIC*, a more precise definition and enumeration of presidential powers is provided, with regard to matrimonial judgments, by the *Instructio* of the Sacred Congregation for the Discipline of the Sacraments, dated August 15, 1936. The powers extend to all matters concerning the constitution and citation of the parties, the joinder of issue, the setting of deadlines, the taking of evidence, etc. Part of these powers is subject to the condition that the college does not reserve them to itself (*art. 68 §2*), and in general, an appeal may be made to the college against any act or decree of the president (*art. 69*).
The same rules established for diocesan tribunals of first instance regarding the position and functions of the president or official also apply to appellate tribunals at metropolitan or suffragan sees with appellate functions (*V. TRIBUNALI ECCLESIASTICI*).
As for the tribunals of the Holy See, the Sacred Roman Rota and the Apostolic Signatura, although they do not present, given the characteristics of their structure and functioning, a true and proper figure of a prelate with the usual hierarchical, administrative as well as jurisdictional powers, are nevertheless directed by organs to a certain extent assimilable to II. Thus, the Sacred Rota is presided over by a dean, who presides over the auditors as primus inter pares (can. 1598). However, since the Rota judges in turns of three auditors (determined in a nearly automatic way by seniority), the collegial body constituted by each turn is presided over by the ponens or rapporteur, in the forms and with the powers determined by the special norms. For the Apostolic Signatura, the directive functions are exercised by one of the cardinals who compose it, who has the title and functions of prefect (can. 1602).
This official acts as sole judge in the so-called "Congress"; whereas in the so-called "full" Signatura (plenary session), all the cardinals composing the tribunal intervene. Here too, special rules are given, in conjunction with the fundamental norms established by the CIC.