STRIKE. — It is the concerted abstention from work. The phenomenon is highly complex and can be studied from several points of view. Here, however, particular interest attaches—and will therefore be considered—the historical-phenomenological aspect, the juridical aspect, and above all the moral aspect.
I. HISTORICAL-PHENOMENOLOGICAL ASPECT
The strike is essentially linked to the socio-economic order commonly called capitalist, and as this system develops and grows ever stronger, the strike becomes an increasingly frequent and widespread social phenomenon.1. Considered statically: a) the strike presents itself in various forms. According to the manner in which it unfolds, there are either pure strikes, i.e., simple abstention from work, or abstention from work combined with efforts to prevent others from working (e.g., by removing tools, damaging equipment, threatening those who might wish to work, occupying factories, etc.). Simultaneous abstention by all workers or successive abstention by small groups so as to paralyze the entire production process (chain strike); continued abstention for a considerable time or brief periods chosen so as to achieve substantially the same result (lightning strike). As for the activities suspended as a result of the strike, special consideration must be given to essential public services (e.g., the supply of gas and electricity in cities, transportation, etc.). As for the participants, it suffices to mention civil servants. In terms of scope, a distinction is made between partial strikes and general strikes. b) Strikes pursue different ends: proper ends, if they directly concern the strikers, and ends of support for other strikers (sympathy strike); the proper ends are above all economic or political; in turn, economic ends may aim either at securing respect for and observance of clauses already recognized or at achieving new clauses. Historically, it is not accurate to say that strikes have exclusively economic aims. More than once they have had purely political objectives (attempts to influence the form of government, foreign policy, etc.). Suffice it to recall some Belgian strikes at the end of the last century aimed at securing universal suffrage and those of July 1950 for the abdication of King Leopold. c) Strikes have varying results; that is, good or bad, economic or social, for the parties involved or for third parties, for private individuals or for the authorities. Economically harmful results include, for the parties involved, loss of wages and profits, and for third parties, at least temporary lack of goods and services or increased cost thereof. Economically beneficial results may include, for workers (if the strike is economic and achieves its aims), the advantages gained. Socially harmful results include the hardening of positions that necessarily arises between the parties involved, between them and third parties, and between many citizens and representatives of public authority. It is inevitable, in fact, that opposing parties entrench themselves in their positions and regard each other as enemies; equally inevitable is that third parties react to the harm they are forced to suffer and demand protection from the public authority they feel has failed to protect them adequately. There are also positive social consequences: the forceful denunciation of hidden or evident injustices, the strong assertion of trampled rights, etc. Hence the strike is a highly complex phenomenon, with both positive and negative aspects.
2. Examined dynamically: a) the strike tends increasingly to broaden its objectives; if initially it was mainly a tool for the economic advancement of the working class, over time it has assumed above all political tasks. Nor is it excluded that in the future it may be used for the most unusual purposes (e.g., sporting ones). b) The strike tends to take on ever more technically advanced forms, i.e., forms capable of inflicting ever greater harm on the opponent with the least possible harm to those who resort to it: by choosing the most opportune moment (e.g., the pre-Easter period for confectioners), by making the strike ever more universal, by reducing it to a succession of brief or partial strikes (lightning strikes; chain strikes, etc.), by preventing the activity of scabs, and finally by the new form of non-cooperation.
II. JURIDICAL ASPECT
Public authority could not remain indifferent to the strike and adopted attitudes ranging from absolute prohibition in law and in fact, to silence, to permission even in law. Compare, for example, in France the situation created by articles 414, 415, and 416 of the Napoleonic Penal Code, whereby strikes—and lockouts—were considered criminal offenses, with the situation created by the law of 25 May 1864, which repealed all provisions prohibiting strikes as such, leaving only the incrimination of crimes committed in the course of labor conflicts, with the intent of limiting their freedom, and finally with the provisions of the French Constitution of 1946, which place the right to strike among the fundamental rights of the citizen. A similar evolution occurred in England: from the extremely rigorous law of 1725 under George I, which imposed the death penalty, through the laws of 1800, 1824, and 1825, one arrives at the repeal of the Master and Servant Acts of 1867, then to the laws of 1871 and 1875, which no longer penalized coalitions and strikes except for certain limitations, and finally to the juridical recognition of the Trade Unions (1871–76). Something similar, with the Fascist interlude, occurred in Italy: from articles 414, 415, and 416 of the Napoleonic Code extended to Italy, one passes to the Penal Code of 1889, which punished only violence and threats impairing the freedom to work. The Fascist regime prohibited strikes and lockouts (Law of 3 April 1926, no. 503, and articles 502–509 of the Penal Code of 1930). Finally, the new Constitution, in article 40, states that “the right to strike is exercised within the framework of the laws regulating it.” These laws are still in preparation.III. MORAL ASPECT
It seems necessary to distinguish between a perfectly organized society and an imperfectly organized society, reasoning first in hypothesis and then in thesis. A perfectly organized society is understood not so much as one in which there are no grounds for controversy, but rather one in which institutions suited to secure justice exist and function effectively, whereas an imperfectly organized society is one in which such institutions either do not exist or, if they do, do not in fact operate.1. In a perfectly organized society, where suitable institutions for securing justice exist and function effectively, it is not permissible to resort to a means that, even if it may bring benefits, also brings disadvantages. On the other hand, in an imperfectly organized society, when the following conditions obtain: a) the cause is just; b) it cannot otherwise be defended; c) there is a well-founded hope of success; and d) there is a certain proportion between the goods hoped for and the evils feared, there is no apparent reason why the strike cannot be considered legitimate.
2. Without doubt, our society is imperfectly organized. Not only do causes of conflict exist, but institutions suited to secure justice do not always exist or, if they do, do not always function in practice.
3. Can one envisage a day when society will be perfectly organized? However one answers this question, there can be no doubt that today, under certain conditions, the strike is legitimate. The State therefore cannot prohibit II. At the same time, however, admitting the legitimacy of the strike is not the end of the matter. What remains to be done is, first, to eliminate the just causes that make recourse to this weapon legitimate, and then to create institutions that, even in the case of a just cause, allow justice to be obtained without having to resort to so dangerous an instrument.
The moral aspect therefore also requires the intervention of the legislator; and an intervention that, avoiding the unacceptable positions of complete prohibition and total freedom, realistically initiates, together with the improvement of social conditions, the creation of suitable legislation. Once such legislation exists, it binds in conscience and becomes a norm of conduct.
IV. PARTICULAR APPLICATIONS
The principles outlined above require further clarification when applied to particular cases. Here, one should speak of political strikes, solidarity strikes, strikes in essential public services, general strikes, and non-cooperation. A few remarks will suffice. First, it should be noted that a strike would not be considered political if directed against the State in cases where the State is an employer, for example, in nationalized enterprises.As for the solidarity strike, solidarity with those suffering injustice, whoever they may be, is fundamentally human and Christian, deriving above all from natural and supernatural brotherhood; and this solidarity is not confined to classmates. Employers are also bound to be in solidarity with workers suffering injustice, and vice versa, workers are bound to be in solidarity with employers when they are victims of injustice. Therefore, class solidarity cannot be accepted in the sense that one must be in solidarity at all costs and in every case with those of one's own class against those of the opposite class. Moreover, one must choose forms of solidarity that constitute effective rather than merely apparent solidarity. From this perspective, a strike often does not represent an act of solidarity at all. By broadening the strike, instead of strengthening the front, one risks weakening it, and thus, instead of aiding the group, one lends a hand to the aggressor. Often, it will be better, rather than striking, to continue working and to give part of one’s salary or wages to those on strike, enabling them to continue resisting until victory. The truest solidarity may consist in the establishment and maintenance of a class resistance fund that allows workers to endure the hardships of the strike and to continue it for a very long time, or even indefinitely.
As for strikes in essential public services, it is evident how much their suspension particularly affects the poor. The harm done to third parties is therefore especially grave here. Strikes in essential public services can therefore only be admitted in the most exceptional cases, when the insensitivity of the majority of citizens to the evident and repeatedly proclaimed injustice of those in essential public services has been firmly demonstrated.
For the general strike, it should only be permitted in extreme cases of evident necessity and when the majority of citizens have proven insensitive to certain evident injustices.
The gravity of the cases mentioned above demonstrates that, particularly in these instances, the intervention of the legal system is necessary. It is especially on these points that the creation of institutions allowing disputes to be resolved through less costly means than strikes should begin.
GIOVANNI BATTISTA GUZZETTI