Monologium, on the Being of God44 Chapter XLIV. How one is the essence of the other.
Chapter XLIV. How one is the essence of the other.
Hence, even if one is called the essence of the other, there is no departure from truth; but the supreme simplicity and unity of their common nature is thus honored. For, not as one conceives of a man's wisdom, through which man is wise, though he cannot be wise through himself, can we thus understand the statement that the Father is essence of the Son, and the Son the essence of the Father. We cannot understand that the Son is existent through the Father, and the Father through the Son, as if the one could not be existent except through the other, just as a man cannot be wise except through wisdom.
For, as the supreme Wisdom is ever wise through itself, so the supreme Essence ever exists through itself. But, the perfectly supreme Essence is the Father, and the perfectly supreme Essence is the Son. Hence, the perfect Father and the perfect Son exist, each through himself, just as each is wise through himself.
For the Son is not the less perfect essence or wisdom because he is an essence born of the essence of the Father, and a wisdom born of the wisdom of the Father; but he would be a less perfect essence or wisdom if he did not exist through himself, and were not wise through himself.
For, there is no inconsistency between the subsistence of the Son through himself, and his deriving existence from his Father. For, as the Father has essence, and wisdom, and life in himself; so that not through another's, but through his own, essence he exists; through his own wisdom he is wise; through his own life he lives; so, by generation, he grants to his Son the possession of essence, and wisdom, and life in himself, so that not through an extraneous essence, wisdom, and life, but through his own, he subsists, is wise, and lives; otherwise, the existence of Father and Son will not be the same, nor will the Son be equal to the Father. But it has already been clearly proved how false this supposition is.
Hence, there is no inconsistency between the subsistence of the Son through himself, and his deriving existence from the Father, since he must have from the Father this very power of subsisting through himself. For, if a wise man should teach me his wisdom, which I formerly lacked, he might without impropriety be said to teach me by this very wisdom of his. But, although my wisdom would derive its existence and the fact of its being from his wisdom, yet when my wisdom once existed, it would be no other essence than its own, nor would it be wise except through itself.
Much more, then, the eternal Father's eternal Son, who so derives existence from the Father that they are not two essences, subsists, is wise, and lives through himself. Hence, it is inconceivable that the Father should be the essence of the Son, or the Son the essence of the Father, on the ground that the one could not subsist through itself, but must subsist through the other. But in order to indicate how they share in an essence supremely simple and supremely one, it may consistently be said, and conceived, that the one is so identical with the other that the one possesses the essence of the other.
On these grounds, then, since there is obviously no difference between possessing an essence and being an essence, just as the one possesses the essence of the other, so the one is the essence of the other, that is, the one has the same existence with the other.
Unde etiam si alter alterius dicatur essentia, non erratur a veritate; sed summa unitas simplicitasque commendatur communis naturae. Non enim quemadmodum intelligitur sapientia hominis, per quam homo sapiens est, qui per se non potest esse sapiens; ita intelligi potest, si dicatur Pater essentia Filii, et Filius essentia Patris, ut eo modo sit Filius existens per patrem, et Pater per Filium, quasi non possit alter existens esse nisi per alterum; sicut homo non potest esse sapiens, nisi per sapientiam. Sicut namque summa sapientia semper sapit per se; ita summa essentia semper est per se. Est autem perfecte summa essent a Pater, et perfecte summa essentia Filius; pariter ergo perfectus Pater per se est, et pariter perfectus Filius per se est, sicut uterque sapit per se. Non enim idcirco minus perfecta est essentia vel sapientia Filius, quia est essentia nata de Patris essentia, et sapientia de sapientia; sed tunc minus perfecta essentia vel sapientia esset, si non esset per se aut non saperet per se. Nequaquam enim repugnat ut Filius et per se subsistat, et de Patre habeat esse. Sicut enim Pater habet essentiam, et sapientiam, et vitam in semetipso; ut non per alienam, sed per suam essentiam sit, per suam sapientiam sapiat, per suam vitam vivat; ita gignendo, dat Filio essentiam habere, et sapientiam et vitam in semetipso; ut non per extraneam, sed suam essentiam, sapientiam et vitam subsistat, sapiat et vivat; alioquin non erit idem esse Patris et Filii, nec erit par Patri Filius: quod quam falsum sit liquidissime superius pervisum est. Quare non repugnat Filium et subsistere per se, et esse de Patre; quia hoc ipsum, id est, per se ipsum posse subsistere, necesse est illum de Patre habere. Nam si quis sapiens suam me sapientiam, cujus prius expers essem, doceret, utique hoc ipsa sapientia ejus facere non incongrue diceretur, sed quamvis mea sapientia ab illius sapientia haberet esse et sapere; tamen cum jam esset, nonnisi sua essentia esset, nec saperet nisi seipsa. Multo igitur magis aeterni Patris coaeternus Filius, qui sic habet a Patre esse, ut non sint duae essentiae, per se subsistit, sapit et vivit. Non igitur sic intelligi potest quod Pater Filii, aut Filius Patris sit essentia; quasi alter non possit subsistere per se sed per alterum; sed ad significandum quam habent communionem summe simplicis, summeque unius essentiae, sic congrue dici et intelligi potest quia sic est alter idipsum quod alter, ut alter habeat essentiam alterius. Hac itaque ratione, quoniam utique non aliud est habere essentiam, quam essentiam esse: sicut habet alter alterius essentiam, ita est alter alterius essentia, id est, idem esse est alteri, quod alteri.