Against Hermogenes 14
14 Tertullian Pushes His Opponent into a Dilemma PL 2, 209
Now, if it be also argued, that although Matter may have afforded Him the opportunity, it was still His own will which led Him to the creation of good creatures, as having detected what was good in matter—although this, too, be a discreditable supposition—yet, at any rate, when He produces evil likewise out of the same (Matter), He is a servant to Matter, since, of course, it is not of His own accord that He produces this too, having nothing else that He can do than to effect creation out of an evil stock—unwillingly, no doubt, as being good; of necessity, too, as being unwilling; and as an act of servitude, because from necessity. Which, then, is the worthier thought, that He created evil things of necessity, or of His own accord? Because it was indeed of necessity that He created them, if out of Matter; of His own accord, if out of nothing. For you are now labouring in vain when you try to avoid making God the Author of evil things; because, since He made all things of Matter, they will have to be ascribed to Himself, who made them, just because He made them. Plainly the interest of the question, whence He made all things, identifies itself with (the question), whether He made all things out of nothing; and it matters not whence He made all things, so that He made all things thence, whence most glory accrued to Him. Now, more glory accrued to Him from a creation of His own will than from one of necessity; in other words, from a creation out of nothing, than from one out of Matter. It is more worthy to believe that God is free, even as the Author of evil, than that He is a slave. Power, whatever it be, is more suited to Him than infirmity. If we thus even admit that matter had nothing good in it, but that the Lord produced whatever good He did produce of His own power, then some other questions will with equal reason arise. First, since there was no good at all in Matter, it is clear that good was not made of Matter, on the express ground indeed that Matter did not possess it. Next, if good was not made of Matter, it must then have been made of God; if not of God, then it must have been made of nothing.—For this is the alternative, on Hermogenes’ own showing.
Per quod probabitur manifeste materiae deservisse. Nam etsi dicatur, licet ex occasione materiae, suo tamen arbitrio bona protulisse, quasi nactus bonum materiae, quamquam et hoc turpe sit, certe cum ex eadem etiam mala profert, vel haec utique non de suo arbitrio proferendo, servit materiae, aliud non habens facere quam ex malo proferre; invitus utique qua bonus, ex necessitate ut invitus, et ex servitute ut ex necessitate. Quid ergo dignius, ex necessitate eum condidisse mala, an ex voluntate? Si quidem, ex necessitate condidit, si ex materia: ex voluntate, si ex nihilo. Jam enim sine caussa laboras, ne malorum auctor constituatur Deus: quia, etsi de materia fecit, ipsi deputabuntur qui fecit, proinde quatenus fecit. Plane sic interest unde fecerit, ac si de nihilo fecisset: nec interest unde fecerit, ut inde fecerit, unde eum magis decuit. Magis autem eum decuit ex voluntate fecisse, quam ex necessitate, id est, ex nihilo potius quam ex materia. Dignius est Deum etiam malorum auctorem liberum credere, quam servum. Quaecumque potestas ei, quam pusillitas competit. Si et sic concedimus materiam quidem nihil boni habuisse, Dominum vero, si quid boni edidit, sua virtute edidisse, aliae aeque oborientur quaestiones. Primo, si bonum in materia omnino non fuit, non ex materia bonum factum est, quod materia scilicet non habuit. Dehinc, si non ex materia, jam ergo ex Deo factum. Si nec ex Deo, jam ergo ex nihilo factum. Hoc enim superest secundum Hermogenis dispositionem.