DISSIMULAZIONE

DISSIMULATION. — In canon law, it refers to the attitude of a superior who, though aware of a transgression of the law, pretends not to know of II. It is essentially a negative act. While in tolerance the superior expresses disapproval and externally makes it clear, and at times even directly manifests it through a decree with the formula “quod tolerari poterit,” in dissimulation, the superior feigns ignorance and wishes to be recognized as such. Hence the distinctions: dissimulation denotes rather a provisional attitude of the superior, imposed by unavoidable or difficult-to-remove contingencies, yet having juridical consequences, inasmuch as it does not permit, in the external forum, that proceedings be taken against the transgressor, neither ex officio nor at the instance of a party; dissimulation does not remove the obligation, and in current legislation it does not imply a dispensation, as was believed by some in the time of Lucius III and Innocent III, especially with regard to matrimonial impediments, according to the formula “dispensando dissimulato et dissimulando dispensat.”

Tolerance, on the other hand, does not merely indicate an attitude of the superior but can at times denote a stable juridical condition with a permissive faculty to act contrary to the law and with the obligation for others not to impede it within the limits of the concession (cf. can. 5 of the CIC, regarding tolerance toward custom).

Both dissimulation and tolerance are negative acts to which authority is almost compelled, for a higher purpose.

In moral theology, the term dissimulation is sometimes used to indicate improperly so-called simulation (v. SIMULATION).

BIBL.: A. Di Pauli, *Dissimulare poteri*, in *Archiv f. kathol. Kirchenrecht*, 92 (1912), pp. 250-69 and 397-414; A. Van Hove, *De privilegiis et de dispensationibus*, Malines-Rome 1939, pp. 313-314; I. Chelodi-P. Cipriotti, *In canonicum de personis*, 3rd ed., Vicenza-Trento 1942, p. 144. Enrico M. Zanetta