INHIBITION. - From the Latin verb inhibere, to hold back, to restrain. Among jurists it preserved its etymological meaning, and was used to indicate the compulsory impediment of the exercise of a right (cf. 1, X, 3, 2) and often indicated the action of the judge, who forbids an act or the exercise of a given right (for example, the appellate judge who forbids the execution of the judgment of first instance).
In current canon law the inhibitio iuris — which is the ancient sequestratio impropria — of which a remnant survives in can. 1699 § 3, consists in the temporary prohibition issued by the judge against using a disputed right, in order to avoid causing prejudice to another's right. Therefore to inhibit is to forbid the exercitium iuris; a prohibition that has the character not of a penalty, but of a security (v. SEQUESTRATION).
The object of such a prohibition, or i., can be any right. It differs from sequestration through the absence of deprivation of possession of the thing, which in sequestration is entrusted to third parties.
Sequestration, moreover, has as its direct object the res, whereas the i. has as its proper and direct object the exercise of a right. Properly, therefore, it is said that the i. consists in a non facere.
The i. can also be imposed at the request of a party; in that case it is required: 1) that possession of the right whose i. is sought be demonstrated (can. 1672 §§ 1-2; the fumus bonis iuris is sufficient and a full demonstration is not necessary); 2) that the danger of harm exist should the i. not be ordered, and that no other remedy exist for the protection of the contested right (can. 1674).
Thus, while the process on the validity of a marriage is pending, the use of the marriage itself may be forbidden and inhibited, or the separation of the spouses may be ordered (cf. X, IV, 1, 14; S. C. de Sacramentis, Instructio d. 15 Augusti 1936, art. 63); thus, also after two sentences in favor of the nullity of a marriage, if the defender of the bond has appealed within the useful time, should a new marriage have been attempted, the judge must ex officio, or at the request of the defender of the bond himself, order the inhibitio exercitii iuris (cf. loc. cit., art. 223, can. 1672 § 3).
In causes of public interest both the promoter of justice and the defender of the bond may request the i. of the exercise of the disputed right, and the judge may order it even ex officio (can. 1672 § 3).
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Vincenzo Fagiolo