INIBIZIONE. — From the Latin verb inhibere, to restrain, to check. Among jurists it retained its etymological meaning and was used to indicate the coercive impediment to the exercise of a right (cf. 1, X, 3, 2); it often also indicated the action of a judge who prohibits an act or the exercise of a given right (e.g., an appellate judge who prohibits enforcement of the judgment of the court of first instance).
In current canon law, inhibitio iuris—which is the ancient sequestratio impropria—of which a remnant is found in can. 1699 § 3, consists in a temporary prohibition issued by the judge against exercising a right in dispute, in order to prevent prejudice to another’s right. Thus, to inhibit is to prohibit the exercitium iuris; this prohibition is not punitive in character, but precautionary (v. SEQUESTRO).
The object of such a prohibition, or i., may be any right. It differs from sequestration in that it does not entail deprivation of possession of the thing, which in sequestration is entrusted to third parties.
Sequestration, moreover, has the res as its direct object, whereas i. has the exercise of a right as its proper and direct object. Properly speaking, therefore, i. is said to consist in a non facere.
I. may also be imposed at the request of a party; in that case, it is necessary: 1) that possession of the right whose exercise is to be inhibited be demonstrated (can. 1672 §§ 1–2; fumus bonis iuris is sufficient, and full proof is not necessary); 2) that there be a danger of harm if i. is not ordered, and that no other remedy exist for protecting the right in dispute (can. 1674).
Thus, while proceedings concerning the validity of a marriage are pending, the use of the marriage itself may be prohibited and inhibited, or the spouses may be ordered to separate (cf. X, IV, 1, 14; S. C. de Sacramentis, Instructio d. 15 Augusti 1936, art. 63); likewise, even after two judgments in favor of the nullity of a marriage, if the defender of the bond has appealed within the prescribed period, should a new marriage have been attempted, the judge must ex officio, or at the request of the defender of the bond himself, order the inhibitio exercitii iuris (cf. loc. cit., art. 223, can. 1672 § 3).
In cases involving the public interest, both the promoter of justice and the defender of the bond may request the inhibition of the exercise of the right in dispute, and the judge may order it also ex officio (can. 1672 § 3).