SOVRANITÀ. - Since the middle of the last century, the concept of s. has become the keystone of the modern conception of the State. Yet both its content and its subject are still disputed, since the State (v.) and law stands in the way of their precise determination, so that no unambiguous definition can be found among publicists. It may be said that the most general meaning of the term, derived from the Late Latin superanus, is that of superiority and, in the specific case of the society to which it is applied, that of a power, authority, or function superior to other powers and functions existing within the same political organism. From this relative sense, the transition was not difficult to the more proper one of potestas suprema, which became the central core of the concept, though it must be more precisely defined.
I. GENESIS OF THE CONCEPT OF S
Its origin is commonly traced to the sixteenth century, BODIN, JEAN (v.), who, in his De republica (1576), is said to have systematized it for the first time.Even before Bodin, the word had become current usage, to designate the power of the king in opposition to the feudal powers subordinate to him; it appears, for example, in Budé (De l'institution du prince, Paris 1547). It must further be acknowledged that Bodin systematized the principle of s. in a more organic manner. Once these concessions have been made, it must nevertheless be noted to the contrary that Bodin’s conception does not differ substantially from earlier ones, since what he calls s. is nothing other than what earlier thought called authority or imperium. In every society, he says, there must be a supreme power, called maiectas: it is therefore the potestas suprema, concerning which the speculation that preceded him had long discoursed.
Nor is the definition he gives of it new: summa in cives legibusque soluta potestas (ibid.). The conception of public power as legibus solutus goes back to Roman Law, from which medieval jurists continued to draw inspiration, while subjecting the concept to extensive re-elaboration in order to limit its meaning. Bartolo maintained that the prince is legibus solutus, but at the same time added that it is just and equitable for him to be subject to the law. Baldus, referring to the Roman legal phrase, attributed to him the fullness of power, but considered him bound by the laws of God and by natural law. Bodin evidently belongs to this current, for, after defining s. as supreme power legibus solutus, he adds that it remains limited by the ius divinum, natural law, and the law of nations (cf. A. van Hove, De legibus, Malines 1930, n. 202 ff.).
Nor can Bodin be called original in attributing s. to the republic as such, since Catholic theorists had already conceived authority as a right arising spontaneously from the fact of association, whose original subject was the people, understood as a unity, as an organic moral body. This is the conception that clearly predominates throughout the whole Middle Ages and among the writers of the sixteenth century, although the word s. was unknown to them. Moreover, not one of the elements usually attributed to s. had not already been emphasized in preceding centuries, such as, for example, autonomy and independence, undoubtedly included in the concept of autarky or self-sufficiency, recognized by Aristotle as a property of the State and expressed in the Scholastic definition of it, conceived as a societas perfecta (cf. Santonastaso, Le dottrine politiche da Lutero a Suárez, Milan 1946, p. 77 ff.).
To encounter the first formulations of a theory of s. approaching that of the more modern doctrine of the State, one must descend to the eighteenth century, when, from a common naturalistic background, the theories of Hobbes and Rousseau sprang forth, in whom s. takes the form of an absolutely unlimited power. With the latter, in particular, the concept of popular s. was affirmed, founded upon a naive contractualism, by virtue of which s., divided into fragments in each member of society, would be nothing other than the arithmetical sum of the particular s.’s, gathered together in the so-called general will. Upon this individualistic basis French public law scholarship developed the concept of national s., partly correcting Rousseau’s atomistic conception (cf. E. Crosa, op. cit. in bibl.).
A strictly juridical re-elaboration of s. was achieved in nineteenth-century Germany, where, for predominantly political reasons, there was a vigorous reaction against natural-law theory. National s. was replaced by the s. of the State, and this was conceived as an essential quality of the latter, as a subjective right of its juridical personality. The change of subject, however, was not accompanied by an equivalent change in the scope already assigned to the concept: s. continued to be defined as an absolutely unlimited power.
II. DETERMINATION OF THE CONCEPT OF S
It remains to determine precisely the concept within this sparse historical framework. The term s. commonly signifies the supreme power of the State, the summa potestas, intended to direct the life of the political entity, with the authority to govern and impose the law, furnishing it with coercive force. This definition, however, requires supplementation. A rational conception of collective life cannot dispense with an indication of the end toward which society is naturally and essentially directed, and therefore the concept of s. cannot avoid referring to II. It will consequently define s., as Suárez had defined political power (Def. Fid., I. III, cap. 2, n. 4), as a supreme power to govern the State civilly, understanding by the adverb civilly the immediate purpose which public power must serve. The elements that together constitute the concept of s. are therefore three: two intrinsic elements that reveal its substance, and one extrinsic to s. in itself, but intrinsic to the political aggregate. The two intrinsic elements consist in the fact that s. is a power, its generic aspect, but a power distinguished from others in that it is supreme within its order, its specific aspect; the extrinsic element is the end, the common good, toward which the wills of the members of the community are directed. Some clarification will make the concept thus outlined more intelligible. Taparelli conceives the sovereign as the center in which that universal authority is actualized which necessarily emerges, by a necessary law of our nature, from the association of men (Saggio teoretico di diritto naturale, I, 4ª ed., Roma 1928, p. 225 sgg.). S. is therefore an authority, and specifically social authority. Consequently, it consists in the primordial right which the social aggregate possesses from the moment of its initial constitution, to regulate the activity of all its members for the attainment of the collective end. There is therefore no difficulty in accepting the most common theory, which conceives s. as a power or subjective right of the State, connected with its juridical personality.The points of convergence with contemporary doctrine may indeed be extended to two further characteristics which it is customary for that doctrine to attribute to s., namely, that it is an essential and original mark of the State. Both of these characteristics follow from an objective examination of the political aggregate. An association of men cannot do without a central power to regulate its activity: s., therefore, insofar as it is the authority to direct and govern, is essential to II. Moreover, since the presence of a unitary power is a necessity of nature, that power or right arises spontaneously at the moment when the being of society is actualized through the meeting of free wills, so that not even the consent of the human race could prevent its arising and becoming established. In its generic aspect, s. is therefore a power or an authority, and properly that power which finds its firm foundation in the original right of society to require from its members the services necessary and useful to the common good.
The specific characteristic distinguishing s. from other powers consists in its supremacy. It is a summa potestas, essentially not ordered to submit to another authority of the same order, the last in the hierarchical scale, with a scope of action extending to all the particular powers operating within the State. It is nevertheless necessary to establish the conditions required for a power to possess this character. According to Suárez, a power is called supreme when it recognizes no superior above itself. Taparelli, in turn, continuing the tradition, considers independence from another superior authority essential to the concept of s., since s. is nothing other than authority that does not depend (ibid.). The negative mark of the supreme potestas is therefore independence from any other power of the same order.
Suárez further adds (Def. Fid., I. III, cap. 2, n. 4) that civil power is called supreme when, in the same order and with respect to the same end, ad illam sit resolutio in sua sphera, seu in tota communitate quae illi subest. That is to say, a power is supreme when it possesses the judgment of last instance for resolving questions concerning collective life, through the exclusive exercise of coercion. In other words, true s. exists when the power signified by it stands at the summit of the social hierarchy, subordinating to itself the lower units and their respective powers, in order to decide autonomously and with full competence on whatever concerns the common good. It is the competence of competences, the center in which all the lesser competences that derive from it come together and are resolved.
Integrating the preceding conclusion, s. may now be defined as the supreme and unitary right to govern public society, without dependence on any other authority of the same order.
For questions concerning the origin, subject, and intrinsic and extrinsic limits of s., on whose solution Catholic doctrine differs significantly from contemporary doctrine, see the entry AUTORITÀ.