Monologium, on the Being of God17 Chapter XVII. It is simple in such a way that all things that can be said of its essence are one and the same in it: and nothing can be said of its substance except in terms of what it is.
Chapter XVII. It is simple in such a way that all things that can be said of its essence are one and the same in it: and nothing can be said of its substance except in terms of what it is.
Is it to be inferred, then, that if the supreme Nature is so many goods, it will therefore be compounded of more goods than one? Or is it true, rather, that there are not more goods than one, but a single good described by many names? For, everything which is composite requires for its subsistence the things of which it is compounded, and, indeed, owes to them the fact of its existence, because, whatever it is, it is through these things; and they are not what they are through it, and therefore it is not at all supreme. If, then, that Nature is compounded of more goods than one, all these facts that are true of every composite must be applicable to it. But this impious falsehood the whole cogency of the truth that was shown above refutes and overthrows, through a clear argument.
Since, then, that Nature is by no means composite and yet is by all means those so many goods, necessarily all these are not more than one, but are one. Any one of them is, therefore, the same as all, whether taken all at once or separately. Therefore, just as whatever is attributed to the essence of the supreme Substance is one; so this substance is whatever it is essentially in one way, and by virtue of one consideration. For, when a man is said to be a material body, and rational, and human, these three things are not said in one way, or in virtue of one consideration. For, in accordance with one fact, be is a material body; and in accordance with another, rational; and no one of these, taken by itself, is the whole of what man is.
That supreme Being, however, is by no means anything in such a way that it is not this same thing, according to another way, or another consideration; because, whatever it is essentially in any way, this is all of what it is. Therefore, nothing that is truly said of the supreme Being is accepted in terms of quality or quantity, but only in terms of what it is. For, whatever it is in terms of either quality or quantity would constitute still another element, in terms of what it is; hence, it would not be simple, but composite.
Quid ergo, si illa summa natura tot bona est, eritne composita tam pluribus bonis; an potius non sunt plura bona, sed unum bonum tam pluribus nominibus significatum? Omne enim compositum, ut subsistat, indiget his ex quibus componitur; et illis debet quidem quod est, quia quidquid est, per illa est; et illa quod sunt, per illud non sunt: et idcirco penitus summum non est. Si igitur natura illa composita est ex pluribus bonis, haec omnia, quae omni composito insunt, in illam incidere necesse est: quod nefas falsitatis aperta ratione destruit et obruit tota, quae supra patuit, necessitas veritatis. Cum igitur illa natura nullo modo composita sit et tamen omnimodo tot illa bona sit, necesse est ut illa omnia non plura, sed unum sint. Idem igitur est quodlibet unum illorum, quod omnia, sive simul, sive singula; ut cum dicitur justitia, vel essentia, idem significat, quod alia, vel omnia simul, vel singula. Quemadmodum itaque unum est, quidquid essentialiter de summa substantia dicitur; ita ipsa uno modo una consideratione est, quidquid est essentialiter. Cum enim aliquis homo dicitur et corpus, et rationalis, et homo; non uno modo vel consideratione haec tria dicitur. Secundum aliud est enim corpus, et secundum aliud rationalis, et singulum horum non est totum id quod est homo. Illa vero summa essentia nullo modo sic est aliquid, ut illud idem secundum alium modum, aut secundum aliam considerationem non sit; quia quidquid aliquo modo essentialiter est, hoc est totum quod ipsa est. Nihil igitur quod de ejus essentia, vere dicitur, in eo quod qualis, vel quanta; sed in eo quod quid sit, accipitur. Quidquid enim est, vel quale, vel quantum, est etiam aliud in eo quod quid est, unde non simplex, sed compositum est.