TopiciLibro V

Latino

Utrum autem proprium an non proprium est quod dictum est, per haec considerandum. Assignatur autem proprium aut per se et semper, aut ad aliud aut aliquando. Per se quidem, ut hominis, animal mansuetum natura; ad aliud autem, ut animae ad corpus, quoniam illa quidem imperare nata, hoc autem parere; semper autem, ut Dei, animal immortale; aliquando vero, ut alicujus hominis ambulare in gymnasio. Sunt autem proprii, quod ad alterum assignatum est, aut duo problemata, aut quatuor. Nam si de hoc quidem assignatum quidpiam fuerit, de illo vero negatum idipsum, duo duntaxat problemata fiunt, quemadmodum hominis ad equum proprium est quod bipes est. Nam et quod homo non bipes est argumentabitur quispiam, et quod equus bipes: utrinque autem removetur proprium. Si autem de utroque utrumque assignatum fuerit, et de utroque negatum, quatuor problemata erunt, ut hominis proprium ad equum, quod ille quidem bipes, hic autem quadrupes est: nam et quod homo non bipes est, et quod esse quadrupes natus est, argumentari est; et quod equus bipes, et quod non quadrupes, possibile est argumentari. Quolibet igitur modo ostenso, interimitur quod propositum est. Est autem per se quidem proprium, quod ad omnia assignatur, et ab omni separat (quemadmodum hominis animal mortale disciplinae susceptivum); ad aliud autem, quod non ab omni, sed ab aliquo statuto determinat (ut virtutis ad disciplinam, quoniam illa quidem in pluribus, haec in rationali solo, et in habentibus rationem nata est fieri); semper autem, quod secundum omne tempus verificatur, et nunquam relinquitur (quemadmodum animalis ex anima et corpore compositum esse); aliquando vero, quod secundum aliquod tempus verificatur, et non ex necessitate semper consequitur, ut alicujus hominis, ambulare in foro. Est autem ad alterum proprium assignare, differentiam dicere, aut in omnibus et semper, aut ut multum et in plurimis. Et in omnibus quidem et semper, quemadmodum hominis proprium ad equum quoniam bipes, nam homo quidem et omnis, et semper est bipes; equus autem nullus est bipes, et nunquam. Ut multum autem et in plurimis, quemadmodum rationalis proprium principare ad concupiscibile, et irascibile, eo quod illud quidem imperat, haec autem parent; nam neque rationale semper imperat, sed quandoque illi imperatur, neque concupiscibili et irascibili semper imperatur, sed imperant quandoque, cum fuerit hominis anima flagitiosa. Propriorum autem ea maxime logica sunt, quae per se et semper, et quae ad aliud. Nam ejus quod ad aliud est proprium, plura problemata sunt, quemadmodum diximus et prius, nam aut duo, aut quatuor, ex necessitate fiunt problemata. Plures autem orationes fiunt ad haec, quod autem per se est et semper, ad multa est argumentari, et ad plura tempora observare: quod per se quidem ad multa, nam ad unumquodque eorum quae sunt, ut pote cui oportet inesse proprium, quare si non ab omni separat, non erit bene assignatum proprium; quod autem semper, ad plura tempora est observare, et sive non inest, sive non infuerit, sive non inerit, non erit proprium. Quod vero aliquando, ad illud (quod nunc dicitur) tempus, consideramus. Non igitur sunt rationes ad ipsum plures. Logicum autem est problema, ad quod rationes fiunt, et crebrae quidem, et bonae. Ad aliud igitur proprium dictum, ex iis quae sunt de accidente locis inspiciendum, si huic quidem accidit, illi vero non. De iis autem quae semper, et quae per se, per haec considerandum.

Inglese

128b15The question whether the attribute stated is or is not! a property, should be examined by the following methods:

128b16Any ‘property’ rendered is always either essential and permanent or relative and temporary: e.g. it is an ‘essential property’ of man to be ‘by nature a civilized animal’: a ‘relative property’ is one like that of the soul in relation to the body, viz. that the one is fitted to command, and the other to obey: a ‘permanent property’ is one like the 128b20property which belongs to God, of being an ‘immortal living being’: a ‘temporary property’ is one like the property which belongs to any particular man of walking in the gymnasium.

128b22'[The¹ rendering of a property ‘relatively’ gives rise either to two problems or to four. For if he at the same time render this property of one thing and deny it of another, only two problems arise, as in the case of a statement 128b25that it is a property of a man, in relation to a horse, to be a biped. For one might try both to show that a man is not a biped, and also that a horse is a biped: in both ways the property would be upset.² If on the other hand he render one apiece of two attributes to each of two things, and deny it in each case of the other, there will then be four problems; as in the case of a statement that it is a property 128b30of a man in relation to a horse for the former to be a biped and the latter a quadruped. For then it is possible to try to show both that a man is not naturally a biped, and that he is a quadruped, and also that the horse both is a biped, and is not a quadruped. If you show any of these at all, the intended attribute is demolished. ]

128b34An ‘essential’ property is one which is rendered of a thing 128b35in comparison with everything else and distinguishes the said thing from everything else, as does ‘a mortal living being capable of receiving knowledge’ in the case of man. A ‘relative’ property is one which separates its subject off not from everything else but only from a particular definite thing, as does the property which virtue possesses, in comparison with knowledge, viz. that the former is naturally produced in more than one faculty, whereas the latter is produced in that of reason alone, and in those who have a reasoning faculty. A ‘permanent’ property is one which is true at 129aevery time, and never fails, like being ‘compounded of soul and body’, in the case of a living creature. A ‘temporary’ property is one which is true at some particular time, and does not of necessity always follow; as, of some particular 129a5man, that he walks in the market-place.

129a6To render a property ‘relatively’ to something else means to state the difference between them as it is found either universally and always, or generally and in most cases: thus a difference that is found universally and always, is one such as man possesses in comparison with a horse, viz. being a biped: for a man is always and in every case 129a10a biped, whereas a horse is never a biped at any time. On the other hand, a difference that is found generally and in most cases, is one such as the faculty of reason possesses in comparison with that of desire and spirit, in that the former commands, while the latter obeys: for the reasoning faculty does not always command, but sometimes also is under command, nor is that of desire and spirit always 129a15under command, but also on occasion assumes the command, whenever the soul of a man is vicious.

129a17Of ‘properties’ the most ‘arguable’ are the essential and permanent and the relative. For a relative property gives 129a20rise, as we said before,³ to several questions: for of necessity the questions arising are either two or four, so that arguments in regard to these are several. An essential and a permanent property you can discuss in relation to many things, or can observe in relation to many periods of time: if ‘essential’, discuss it in comparison with many things: 129a25for the property ought to belong to its subject in comparison with every single thing that is, so that if the subject be not distinguished by it in comparison with everything else, the property could not have been rendered correctly. So a permanent property you should observe in relation to many periods of time; for if it does not or did not, or is not going to, belong, it will not be a property. On the other hand, about a temporary property we do not inquire further than in regard to the time called ‘the present’; and 129a30so arguments in regard to it are not many; whereas an ‘arguable’ question is one in regard to which it is possible for arguments both numerous and good to arise.

129a32The so-called ‘relative’ property, then, should be examined by means of the commonplace arguments relating to Accident, to see whether it belongs to the one thing and not to the other: on the other hand, permanent and essential 129a35properties should be considered by the following methods.

Owen 1853

Whether what is asserted be property or not property, must be examined through these (places).

Property is assigned either per se and always, or with relation to something else and sometimes, as the property of man per se is an animal naturally mild, but in relation to something else, as of the soul to the body, that the one commands, but the other obeys; always, as of God to be an immortal animal, but sometimes, as of a certain person to walk in the Gymnasium.

Nevertheless, the property assigned with reference to something else produces either two or four problems. For if it is affirmed of one thing, but the same denied of another, two problems only arise, as of man with regard to horse, the property is that he is a biped. For that man is not a biped may be argued by some one, also that a horse is a biped, and in both ways the property may be removed. But if each is affirmed of each, and denied of each, there will be four problems, as the property of man with reference to horse is that the former is biped, but the latter quadruped, for that man is not a biped and that he is naturally a quadruped may be argued, and that a horse is a biped and not a quadruped is capable of argument, in whatever way therefore it is shown, the proposition is subverted.

That indeed is property per se, which is attributed to all, and separates from every thing, as of man to be a mortal animal capable of science.

Property on the other hand with relation to another, is that which does not separate from every thing, but from a certain definite thing, as of virtue in regard to science, the property is that the one is naturally adapted to be in many, but the other in the reasoning faculty alone, and in those who possess the reasoning faculty.

Again, the property “always” is that which is true at all times and never fails, as of animal to be composed of soul and body, but the property “sometimes” is that which is true at a certain time, yet does not always follow from necessity, as of a certain man to walk in the Forum.

We may however assign property with reference to something else, when we assert that difference is either in all and always, or for the most part, and in most, for instance, in all and always, as the property of man with respect to horse is the being biped, for both always and every man is a biped, but no horse is ever a biped. For the most part and in most, as the property of the rational in regard to the appetitive and irascible part, is that the one commands, but the other obeys, since neither does the rational always govern, but sometimes is also governed, nor are the appetitive and irascible always governed, but sometimes also govern when a man’s soul is depraved.

Of properties however those are especially logical, which are per se, and always, with reference to something else. For the property with reference to something else produces many problems, as also we observed before, since either two or four problems arise from necessity, wherefore many arguments originate in reference to these. Still we may argue about what is per se and always, in reference to many things, or observe it with regard to many times, what is per se indeed, with reference to many things, for it is necessary that property should be present with a subject in regard to each thing that exists, so that if it is not separated as to all, it would not be well assigned as property. But we may observe that which is always, with regard to many times, and both whether it is not present, or was not present, or will not be present, it will not be property. But the property at a certain time, we observe as to the present time, wherefore there are not many arguments belonging to it, but that is a logical problem, in reference to which numerous and good arguments may be framed.

What therefore is stated to be property with reference to something else, must be considered from the places concerning accident, viz. whether it happens to one, but not to another, but those which are at all times, and per se, we must examine by the following places.

Latino

Primum quidem an non bene assignatum est proprium, an bene. Ejus autem quod est non bene, aut bene, est unum quidem, si non per notiora, aut per notiora positum est proprium. Destruenti quidem, si non per notiora; at construenti, si per notiora. Ejus autem quod non per notiora est, hoc quidem si omnino ignotius positum est proprium quod assignavit, illo cujus proprium dixit. Non enim erit bene positum proprium, nam propter notitiam proprium facimus. Discendi enim causa, et proprium, et definitiones facimus. Per notiora igitur accipiendum: sic enim magis erit sufficienter cognoscere, ut puta qui ponit ignis proprium esse simillimum animae, ignotiore quam ignis utitur anima (magis enim scimus quid est ignis quam quid anima), non igitur erit bene positum proprium ignis, simillimum animae. Aliud autem, si non notius est hoc huic inesse. Oportet enim non solum notius esse re, sed huic inesse, notius esse: nam qui non scit huic inest, neque si illi soli notius inest cognoscit. Quare cum quodvis horum acciderit, obscurum fit proprium, ut quia qui ponit ignis proprium, in quo primo anima nata est esse, ignotiore utitur quam sit ignis, eo quod ignotius est, si in hoc est anima, et si in hoc primo est; non erit itaque bene positum proprium ignis, in quo primo anima nata est esse. Construenti autem, si per notiora positum est proprium, et si per notiora secundum utrumque modum. Erit enim bene secundum hoc positum proprium, nam constructivorum locorum ejus quod bene, alii quidem secundum hoc solum, alii autem simpliciter monstrabunt quod bene, ut quia qui dixit animalis proprium, sensum habere, per notiora, et notius assignavit proprium secundum utrumque modum; quare erit bene assignatum secundum hoc, animalis proprium, sensum habere. Deinde destruenti quidem, si quod nominum quae in proprio sunt assignata multipliciter dicitur, vei etiam tota oratio plura significat. Non enim erit bene positum proprium, ut quoniam sentire multa significat, unum quidem sensum habere alterum autem sensum uti, non erit animalis proprium bene positum quod natum est sentire. Quapropter non utendum est, neque nomine, quod multipliciter dicitur, neque oratione, quae plura significet, quia quod multipliciter dicitur, obscurum facit quod dictum est, dubitante eo qui debet argumentari, quodnam dicit eorum quae multipliciter dicuntur, nam proprium discendi gratia assignatur. Amplius autem ad hoc necessarium est redargutionem aliquam fieri cum sic assignant proprium, quando in dissidente quispiam conficiet syllogismum, de eo quod multipliciter dicitur. Construenti autem, si non plura significat neque nominum quidpiam, neque tota oratio. Erit enim secundum hoc bene positum proprium, ut quia neque corpus plura significat, neque mobilissimum in superiorem locum, neque totum quod ex his compositum est, erit bene positum secundum hoc ignis proprium corpus mobilissimum in superiorem locum. Deinde destruenti quidem si multipliciter dicitur illud cujus proprium assignatur, non determinatur autem cujus eorum ponatur proprium. Non enim bene erit assignatum proprium, ob quas autem causas non immanifestum est ex iis quae prius dicta sunt, nam eadem accidere necessarium est; ut quia scire hoc plura significat (unum enim scientiam habere hoc, alterum autem scientia uti hoc, aliud vero scientiam esse hujus, aliud autem scientia uti hujus), non erit ejus quod est scire hoc, bene assignatum proprium ullum, non determinato cujus horum ponitur proprium. Construenti vero, si non dicitur multipliciter hoc cujus proprium ponitur, sed est unum et simplex. Erit enim bene positum secundum hoc proprium, ut quia homo simpliciter dicitur, erit bene positum secundum hoc hominis proprium, animal mansuetum natura. Deinde destruenti quidem, si frequenter dictum est idem in proprio (saepe enim latent hoc facientes et in propriis, quemadmodum et in terminis), non erit bene positum quod hoc sustinet, proprium. Conturbat enim audientem, quod frequenter dicitur, obscurum igitur necessarium est fieri, et praeter id rugari videntur. Eveniet autem frequenter idem dicere duobus modis: uno quidem quando nominaverit frequenter idem, ut si quis proprium assignet ignis; corpus tenuissimum corporum, hic enim frequenter dixit corpus. Secundo autem, si quis assumat orationes pro nominibus, ut si quis reddat terrae proprium, substantiam quae maxime corporum secundum naturam fertur in inferiorem locum, deinde assumat pro corporibus, hujusmodi substantias, unum enim et idem est corpus, et hujusmodi substantia; erit ergo hoc modo substantia frequenter dicta, quare neutrum erit bene positum proprium. Construenti vero, si nullo utitur frequenter nomine eodem. Erit enim secundum hoc bene assignatum proprium, ut quia qui dixit hominis proprium, animal disciplinae susceptivum, non usus est frequenter eodem nomine, erit utique secundum hoc bene assignatum hominis proprium. Deinde destruenti quidem, si tale aliquid assignavit in proprio nomen, quod omnibus insit. Inutile enim erit, quod non separat ab aliquo, quod autem in propriis dicitur, separare oportet, quemadmodum et quae in terminis; non igitur erit bene positum proprium, ut quia qui posuit scientiae proprium opinionem indissuasibilem a ratione, unum existens, tali aliquo usus est proprio (uno, inquam) quod omnibus inest, non erit utique bene positum scientiae proprium. Astruenti autem, si nullo usus est communi, sed quod ab aliquo separat, erit bene positum secundum hoc proprium, ut quia qui dixit animalis proprium animam habere, nullo usus est communi, erit secundum hoc bene positum proprium animalis, animam habere. Deinde destruenti quidem, si plura propria assignat ejusdem, non determinans quod plura ponit. Non enim erit bene positum proprium; nam quemadmodum nec in terminis oportet praeter eam (quae indicat substantiam) orationem adjungere quidpiam plusculum, sic nec in propriis praeter eam (quae facit proprium quod dictum est) orationem quidquam coassignandum. Inutile enim fit ejusmodi, ut quia qui dixit proprium ignis, tenuissimum et levissimum, plura assignavit propria (utrumque enim de solo igne verum est dicere), non erit bene positum proprium ignis, corpus subtilissimum et levissimum. Astruenti vero si non plura ejusdem propria assignavit, sed unum. Erit enim secundum hoc bene positum proprium, ut quia qui dixit humidi proprium, corpus quod in omnem figuram ducitur, unum assignavit proprium, et non plura, erit secundum hoc bene positum humidi proprium.

Inglese

129b1First, see whether the property has or has not been rendered correctly. Of a rendering being incorrect or correct, one test is to see whether the terms in which the property is stated are not or are more intelligible—for destructive purposes, whether they are not so, and for constructive 129b5purposes, whether they are so. Of the terms not being more intelligible, one test is to see whether the property which he renders is altogether more unintelligible than the subject whose property he has stated: for, if so, the property will not have been stated correctly. For the object of getting a property constituted is to be intelligible: the terms therefore in which it is rendered should be more intelligible: for in that case it will be possible to conceive 129b10it more adequately, e.g. any one who has stated that it is a property of ‘fire’ to ‘bear a very close resemblance to the soul’, uses the term ‘soul’, which is less intelligible than ‘fire’—for we know better what fire is than what soul is—, and therefore a ‘very close resemblance to the soul’ could not be correctly stated to be a property of fire. Another test is to see whether the attribution of A (property) to B (subject) fails to be more intelligible. For not only should the property be more intelligible than its subject, 129b15but also it should be something whose attribution to the particular subject is a more intelligible attribution. For he who does not know whether it is an attribute of the particular subject at all, will not know either whether it belongs to it alone, so that whichever of these results happens, its character as a property becomes obscure. Thus (e. g.) a man who has stated that it is a property of fire to be ‘the primary element wherein the soul is naturally found’, has introduced a subject which is less intelligible 129b20than ‘fire’, viz. whether the soul is found in it, and whether it is found there primarily; and therefore to be ‘the primary element in which the soul is naturally found’ could not be correctly stated to be a property of ‘fire’, On the other hand, for constructive purposes, see whether the terms in which the property is stated are more intelligible, and if they are more intelligible in each of the aforesaid ways. For then the property will have been correctly stated in 129b25this respect: for of constructive arguments, showing the correctness of a rendering, some will show the correctness merely in this respect, while others will show it without qualification. Thus (e.g.) a man who has said that the ‘possession of sensation’ is a property of ‘animal’ has both used more intelligible terms and has rendered the property more intelligible in each of the aforesaid senses; so that to ‘possess sensation’ would in this respect have been correctly rendered as a property of ‘animal’.

129b30Next, for destructive purposes, see whether any of the terms rendered in the property is used in more than one sense, or whether the whole expression too signifies more than one thing. For then the property will not have been correctly stated. Thus (e.g.) seeing that to ‘be sentient’ signifies more than one thing, viz. (1) to possess sensation, 129b35(2) to use one’s sensation, ‘being naturally sentient’ could 130anot be a correct statement of a property of ‘animal’. The reason why the term you use, or the whole expression signifying the property, should not bear more than one meaning is this, that an expression bearing more than one meaning makes the object described obscure, because the man who is about to attempt an argument is in doubt which of the various senses the expression bears: and this will not. do, for the object of rendering the property is that he may 130a5understand. Moreover, in addition to this, it is inevitable that those who render a property after this fashion should be somehow refuted whenever any one addresses his syllogism to that one of the term’s several meanings which does not agree. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether both all the terms and also the expression as 130a10το ἃ whole avoid bearing more than one sense: for then the property will have been correctly stated in this respect. Thus (e.g.) seeing that ‘body’ does not bear several Meanings, nor ‘quickest to move upwards in space’, nor yet the whole expression made by putting them together, it would be correct in this respect to say that it is a property of fire to be the ‘body quickest to move upwards in space’.

130a15Next, for destructive purposes, see if the term of which he renders the property is used in more than one sense, and no distinction has been drawn as to which of them it is whose property he is stating: for then the property will not have been correctly rendered. The reasons why this is so are quite clear from what has been said above:¹ for the same results are bound to follow. Thus (e.g.) seeing that 130a20‘the knowledge of this’ signifies many things—for it means (I) the possession of knowledge by it, (2) the use of its knowledge by it, (3) the existence of knowledge about it, (4) the use of knowledge about it—no property of the ‘knowledge of this’ could be rendered correctly unless he draw a distinction as to which of these it is whose property he is rendering. For constructive purposes, a man should see if the term of which he is rendering the property avoids 130a25bearing many senses and is one and simple: for then the property will have been correctly stated in this respect. Thus (e.g.) seeing that ‘man’ is used in a single sense, ‘naturally civilized animal’ would be correctly stated as a property of man.

130a29Next, for destructive purposes, see whether the same term 130a30has been repeated in the property. For people often do this undetected in rendering ‘properties’ also, just as they do in their ‘definitions’ as well: but a property to which this has happened will not have been correctly stated: for the repetition of it confuses the hearer; thus inevitably the meaning becomes obscure, and further, such people are thought to babble. Repetition of the same term is likely 130a35to happen in two ways: one is, when a man repeatedly uses the same word, as would happen if any one were to render, as a property of fire, ‘the body which is the most rarefied of bodies’ (for he has repeated the word ‘body’); the second is, if a man replaces words by their definitions, as would 130bhappen if any one were to render, as a property of earth, ‘the substance which is by its nature most easily of all bodies borne downwards in space’, and were then to substitute ‘substances of such and such a kind’ for the word ‘bodies’: for ‘body’ and ‘a substance of such and such a kind’ mean one and the same thing. For he will have repeated the word ‘substance’, and accordingly neither of 130b5the properties would be correctly stated. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether he avoids ever repeating the same term; for then the property will in this respect have been correctly rendered. Thus (e.g.) seeing that he who has stated ‘animal capable of acquiring knowledge’ as a property of man has avoided repeating the same 130b10term several times, the property would in this respect have been correctly rendered of man.

130b11Next, for destructive purposes, see whether he has rendered in the property any such term as is a universal attribute. For one which does not distinguish its subject from other things is useless, and it is the business of the language of ‘properties’, as also of the language of definitions, 130b15to distinguish. In the case contemplated, therefore, the property will not have been correctly rendered. Thus (e.g.) a man who has stated that it is a property of knowledge to be a ‘conception incontrovertible by argument, because of its unity’, has used in the property a term of that kind, viz. ‘unity’, which is a universal attribute; and therefore the property of knowledge could not have been correctly stated. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether he has avoided all terms that are common to everything and used a term that distinguishes the subject from something: for then the property will in 130b20this respect have been correctly stated. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as he who has said that it is a property of a ‘living creature’ to ‘have a soul’ has used no term that is common to everything, it would in this respect have been correctly stated to be a property of a ‘living creature’ to ‘have a soul’.

130b23Next, for destructive purposes see whether he renders more than one property of the same thing, without a definite proviso that he is stating more than one: for then the 130b25property will not have been correctly stated. For just as in the case of definitions too there should be no further addition beside the expression which shows the essence, so too in the case of properties nothing further should be rendered beside the expression that constitutes the property mentioned: for such an addition is made to no purpose. Thus (e. g.) a man who has said that it is a property of fire 130b30to be ‘the most rarefied and lightest body’ has rendered more than one property (for each term is a true predicate of fire alone); and so it could not be a correctly stated property of fire to be ‘the most rarefied and lightest body’. On the other hand, for constructive purposes, see whether he has avoided rendering more than one property of the same thing, and has rendered one only: for then the property will in this respect have been correctly stated. 130b35Thus (e.g.) a man who has said that it is a property of a liquid to be a ‘body adaptable to every shape’ has rendered as its property a single character and not several, and so the property of ‘liquid’ would in this respect have been correctly stated.

Owen 1853

First, (it must be considered) whether property be not well or be well explained; of the ill or well,¹ one point indeed is, if the property is laid down, not through things which are more known, or which are more known; subverting it, if not through things more known, but confirming it if through things more known. Now of the (being laid down), not through things more known, one (place) is, if the property which a person assigns, is altogether more unknown, than that of which he states it to be the property, for the property will not be well laid down. For we introduce property for the sake of knowledge, wherefore it should be assigned through things more known, for thus it will be more possible sufficiently to apprehend it. For instance, since he who lays it down as the property of fire to be most similar to the soul, employs the soul, which is more unknown than fire, (for we know more what fire, than what the soul, is,) it would not be well laid down as the property of fire to be most similar to the soul. Another (way) is, if it is not more known that this is present with that, since it is necessary not only that (the property) should be more known than the thing, but also that it should be more known to be present with this thing, since he who is ignorant, whether it is present with this thing, will not know whether it is present with this alone, so that whatever of these happens to be the case, the property becomes obscure. For instance, since he who lays down the property of fire, to be that, in which first, soul is naturally adapted to be,² uses what is more unknown than fire, if soul is inherent in this, and if it is inherent in this first, hence that in which first, soul is naturally adapted to be, would not be well placed as the property of fire. We confirm property indeed, if it is placed through things more known, and if through things more known according to each mode, for according to this, property will be well placed, since of the topics capable of confirming any thing well, some will show that it is placed according to this only, but others simply that it is well placed.³ For instance, since he who says that the property of animal is to possess sense, assigns the property through things more known, and in a manner more known, according to each mode, after this it would be well assigned, as the property of animal to possess sense.

In the next place, we subvert it, (property,) if some one of the names which are assigned in the property is multifariously predicated, or if altogether the sentence also signifies many things, for the property will not be laid down. For instance, since to perceive signifies many things,⁴⁵ one to possess sense, but another to use sense, a natural aptitude to sensation would not be well laid down as the property of animal. On this account we must neither employ a name of multifarious signification nor a sentence, as signifying property, because what is multifariously predicated, renders the statement obscure; he who is about to argue being in doubt which of the things multifariously predicated he (the other) means, for property is assigned for the sake of learning. Besides, there must of necessity be a certain elenchus against those who thus explain property, when in (a signification in) which what is proposed is false, some one frames a syllogism of what is multifariously predicated. On the other hand, we confirm it, if neither any one of the names, nor the whole sentence signify many things; for in this respect the property will be well laid down, thus since neither body denotes many things, nor that which is most easily moved to an upward place, nor the whole composed of these, according to this, a body which is most easily moved to an upward place would be well assigned as the property of fire.

In the next place, we subvert it if that is multifariously predicated, of which they assign the property, yet it is not defined, of which of them the property is laid down, for the property (thus), will not be well assigned. On account of what reason is not obscure from what has been before said, for the same things must necessarily result, for instance, since to know this thing scientifically, signifies many things, (viz. that this possesses science and that it uses science, and that there is a science of it, and that we use the science of it,) the property of scientifically knowing this thing, would not be well assigned when it is not defined, of which of them, the property is laid down. We confirm it, however, if that of which the property is placed, be not multifariously predicated, but is one and simple, for as to this, the property will be well laid down, for instance, since man is predicated as one thing, it would be well laid down as to this, that the property of man (consisted in his being) an animal naturally mild.

Again, we subvert it, if the same thing has frequently been mentioned in the property, for oftentimes it escapes notice when men do this, as well in properties as in definitions. Now the property of this kind will not be well laid down, for the frequent repetition disturbs the hearer, so that obscurity necessarily arises, and besides this men seem loquacious. Still it will happen that the same thing is frequently repeated in two modes, the one, when we often denominate the same, as if any one assigned the property of fire to be a body the most subtle of all bodies, (for he repeats the word body,) and in the second place, if a man assumes definitions instead of names, as if he should give as the property of earth, that it was an essence which, most of all bodies, naturally tends to a downward place, and should afterwards assume, instead of (the word) bodies, such essences, for body and such an essence are one and the same thing, so that he will repeat the word essence, and neither of the properties would be well placed. We confirm it, indeed, if no one and the same name be frequently used, for as to this the property will be well assigned, e. g. since he who says, the property of man is an animal capable of science, does not frequently employ the same name, in this respect the property of man would be well assigned.

Next, property is subverted, if such a name is assigned in the property as is present with all, for that will be useless which is not separated from some, but what is asserted in properties, we ought to separate, as also in definitions, wherefore, the property will not be well stated. Thus, since he who assigns as the property of science, opinion immutable by reason, being one, uses a certain such thing in property, viz. one which is present with all, the property of science would not be well stated; on the other hand we confirm it, if no common term has been used, but one separating from a certain thing, for in this respect the property would be well stated, thus, since he who says the property of animal is to have a soul, uses no common (term), in this respect it would be well laid down, as the property of animal, that it possesses a soul.

Moreover it is subverted, if a person assign many properties of the same thing, not distinguishing that he assigns many, for the property will not be well placed. For as in definitions it is not requisite that any thing more should be added, than the sentence denoting the essence, so neither in properties should any thing be added, besides the sentence which constitutes what is asserted to be the property, since a thing of this kind is useless. Thus, since he who states that the property of fire is to be a body of the greatest subtlety and lightness, assigns many properties, (for it is true) to assert each of fire alone, it would not be well laid down as the property of fire to be a body, most subtle and most light. On the other hand, he confirms property who has not assigned many properties, but one of the same thing, for as to this, the property will be well stated, thus, since he who says that the property of moisture is a body which can be brought to every shape, assigns one property and not many, in this respect property of moisture would be well stated.

Latino

Deinde destruenti quidem, si eodem usus est cujus proprium assignavit, aut eorum quae sunt illius aliquo. Non enim erit bene positum proprium, nam discendi gratia assignatur proprium, idem autem eidem similiter ignotum est, id autem quod aliquid eorum est quae sunt ejus, posterius; non igitur est notius, quare non fit ut per hoc quisquam magis quidpiam discat, ut quia qui dixit animalis proprium, substantiam cujus species est homo, aliquo usus est eorum quae sunt animalis, non erit bene positum proprium. Construenti autem, si neque eodem, neque eorum quae sunt ipsius aliquo utitur. Erit enim bene secundum hoc positum proprium, ut quia qui posuit animalis proprium ex anima et corpore compositum esse, neque eorum quae sunt ipsius aliquo usus est: erit utique bene secundum hoc assignatum animalis proprium. Eodem autem modo et in aliis considerandum est quaenam non faciunt aut faciunt notius. Destruenti quidem, si aliquo usus est, aut opposito, aut omnino simul natura, aut posteriore aliquo. Non enim erit bene positum proprium, nam oppositum simul natura, quod autem simul natura, et posterius, non efficit notius, ut quia qui dixit boni proprium quod malo maxime opponitur, opposito est usus boni, non erit profecto bene assignatum boni proprium. Construenti autem, si nullo usus est neque opposito, neque omnino simul natura, neque posteriore. Erit enim secundum hoc bene assignatum proprium, ut quia qui posuit disciplinae proprium, opinionem maxime facientem fidem, nullo usus est neque opposito, neque omnino simul natura, neque posteriore, erit secundum hoc bene positum disciplinae proprium. Deinde destruenti quidem, si non quod semper sequitur proprium assignavit, sed id quod fit quandoque non proprium. Non enim erit bene pronuntiatum proprium, nam neque in quo deprehendimus inesse ipsum, de hoc et nomen ex necessitate verificatur, neque in quo deprehenditur non inesse, de hoc ex necessitate non dicetur nomen, quare non erit bene positum proprium. Amplius autem ad haec, neque quando quisquam assignaverit proprium, erit manifestum si inest, siquidem tale est, ut quod ipsum relinquere possit; non igitur erit clarum esse proprium, ut quia qui posuit animalis proprium moveri quandoque, vel stare tale, assignaverit proprium quod fit quandoque non proprium, nequaquam erit bene positum proprium. Astruenti vero, si quod ex necessitate semper est, proprium assignaverit. Erit enim bene positum secundum hoc proprium, ut quia qui posuit virtutis proprium quod habentem facit studiosum, quod semper sequitur, proprium assignavit; erit utique secundum hoc bene assignatum virtutis proprium. Deinde destruenti quidem, si quod nunc proprium est assignans, non determinaverit quod non proprium assignat. Non enim erit bene positum proprium, primum quidem quia quod praeter consuetudinem fit omne, semper determinatione indiget, solent autem ut plurimum omnes, quod semper sequitur proprium assignare; secundo autem, quia immanifestum est quia non determinaverit, si quod nunc est proprium voluerit ponere. Non igitur danda est objurgationis occasio, ut quia qui posuit alicujus hominis proprium sedere cum aliquo homine, quod nunc proprium est posuit, non bene proprium assignabit, si non determinans dixerit quod nunc. Construenti autem, si nunc proprium assignans determinando posuit, quod nunc proprium posuerit. Erit enim bene positum secundum hoc proprium, ut quia qui dixit cujusdam hominis proprium ambulare nunc alicubi, distinguens posuit hoc, bene erit positum proprium. Deinde destruenti quidem, si tale assignavit proprium, quod manifestum non est aliter inesse quam sensu. Non enim erit bene positum proprium, nam omne sensibile extra sensum factum immanifestum est, latens enim est si adhuc inest, eo quod sensu solum cognoscitur. Erit autem verum hoc in iis quae non ex necessitate semper consequuntur, ut quia qui posuit solis proprium, astrum quod fertur super terram lucidissimum, tali usus est in proprio (super terram, inquam, ferri) quod sensu cognoscitur, non utique erit bene solis assignatum proprium; immanifestum enim erit cum occidet sol, si adhuc feratur super terram, eo quod nos tunc deseruimus sensum. Construenti vero, si tale assignavit proprium, quod non sensu est manifestum, aut cum sit sensibile, ex necessitate inesse manifestum est. Erit enim secundum hoc bene positum proprium, ut quia qui posuit superficiei proprium, quod primum coloratum est, sensibili quidem aliquo usus est (coloratum esse, inquam), tali quidem quod manifestum est inesse semper: erit secundum hoc bene assignatum superficiei proprium. Deinde destruenti quidem, si terminum ut proprium assignavit. Non enim erit bene positum proprium, nam non oportet indicare quod quid est esse proprium, ut quia qui dixit hominis proprium animal gressibile bipes, quod quid est esse significans assignavit hominis proprium, non utique erit hoc hominis proprium bene assignatum. Construenti autem, si quod conversim quidem praedicatur assignavit proprium, non autem quod quid est esse indicans. Erit enim secundum hoc bene assignatum proprium, ut quia qui posuit hominis proprium animal mansuetum natura, quod conversim quidem praedicatur, assignavit proprium, non quod quid est quidem indicans; erit secundum hoc bene assignatum proprium hominis. Deinde destruenti quidem, si non quidpiam in quid est ponens, assignavit proprium. Oportet enim in propriis, quemadmodum in terminis, primum assignari genus, deinde sic jam addere reliqua et separare. Quare quod non hoc modo positum est proprium, non erit bene assignatum, ut quia qui dixit animalis proprium animam habere, non posuit quidquam in quo aut in quid est animal, non erit bene positum animalis proprium. Construenti vero, si quis quidpiam quod in quid est ponens ejus cujus proprium assignavit, reliqua adjungit. Erit enim secundum hoc bene assignatum proprium, ut quia qui posuit hominis proprium animal disciplinae susceptibile, quidpiam quod in quid est ponens, assignavit proprium: erit secundum hoc bene positum proprium hominis.

Inglese

130b39Next, for destructive purposes, see whether he has employed either the actual subject whose property he is rendering, or any of its species: for then the property will 131anot have been correctly stated. For the object of rendering the property is that people may understand: now the subject itself is just as unintelligible as it was to start with, while any one of its species is posterior to it, and so is no more intelligible. Accordingly it is impossible to understand anything further by the use of these terms. Thus (e. g.) any one who has said that it is a property of ‘animal’ to be ‘the substance to which “man” belongs as a species’ 131a5has employed one of its species, and therefore the property could not have been correctly stated. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether he avoids introducing either the subject itself or any of its species: for then the property will in this respect have been correctly stated. Thus (e.g.) a man who has stated that it is a property of a living creature to be ‘compounded of soul and body’ has avoided introducing among the rest either 131a10the subject itself or any of its species, and therefore in this respect the property of a ‘living creature’ would have been correctly rendered.

131a12You should inquire in the same way also in the case of other terms that do or do not make the subject more intelligible: thus, for destructive purposes, see whether he has employed anything either opposite to the subject or, in 131a15general, anything simultaneous by nature with it or posterior to it: for then the property will not have been correctly stated. For an opposite is simultaneous by nature with its opposite, and what is simultaneous by nature or is posterior to it does not make its subject more intelligible. Thus (e.g.) any one who has said that it is a property of good to be ‘the most direct opposite of evil’, has employed the opposite of good, and so the property 131a20of good could not have been correctly rendered. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether he has avoided employing anything either opposite to, or, in general, simultaneous by nature with the subject, or posterior to it: for then the property will in this respect have been correctly rendered. Thus (e. g.) a man who has stated that it is a property of knowledge to be ‘the most convincing conception’ has avoided employing anything either opposite to, or simultaneous by nature with, or 131a25posterior to, the subject; and so the property of knowledge would in this respect have been correctly stated.

131a27Next, for destructive purposes, see whether he has rendered as property something that does not always follow the subject but sometimes ceases to be its property: for then the property will not have been correctly described. For 131a30there is no necessity either that the name of the subject must also be true of anything to which we find such an attribute belonging; nor yet that the name of the subject will be untrue of anything to which such an attribute is found not to belong. Moreover, in addition to this, even after he has rendered the property it will not be clear whether it belongs, seeing that it is the kind of attribute that may fail: and 131a35so the property will not be clear. Thus (e.g.) a man who has stated that it is a property of animal ‘sometimes to move and sometimes to stand still’ has rendered the kind of property which sometimes is not a property, and so the property could not have been correctly stated. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether he has rendered something that of necessity must always be a 131bproperty: for then the property will have been in this respect correctly stated. Thus (e.g.) a man who has stated that it is a property of virtue to be ‘what makes its possessor good’ has rendered as property something that always follows, and so the property of virtue would in this respect have been correctly rendered.

131b5Next, for destructive purposes, see whether in rendering the property of the present time he has omitted to make a definite proviso that it is the property of the present time which he is rendering: for else the property will not have been correctly stated. For in the first place, any unusual procedure always needs a definite proviso: and it is the usual procedure for everybody to render as property some 131b10attribute that always follows. In the second place, a man who omits to provide definitely whether it was the property of the present time which he intended to state, is obscure: and one should not give any occasion for adverse criticism. Thus (e.g.) a man who has stated it as the property of a particular man ‘to be sitting with a particular man’, states the property of the present time, and so he cannot have rendered the property correctly, seeing that he has described it without any definite proviso. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether, in rendering the 131b15property of the present time, he has, in stating it, made a definite proviso that it is the property of the present time that he is stating: for then the property will in this respect have been correctly stated. Thus (e.g.) a man who has said that it is the property of a particular man ‘to be walking now’, has made this distinction in his statement, and so the property would have been correctly stated.

131b19Next, for destructive purposes, see whether he has rendered 131b20a property of the kind whose appropriateness is not obvious except by sensation: for then the property will not have been correctly stated. For every sensible attribute, once it is taken beyond the sphere of sensation. becomes uncertain. For it is not clear whether it still belongs, because it is evidenced only by sensation. This principle 131b25will be true in the case of any attributes that do not always and necessarily follow. Thus (e. g.) any one who has stated that it is a property of the sun to be ‘the brightest star that moves over the earth’, has used in describing the property an expression of that kind, viz. ‘to move over the earth’, which is evidenced by sensation; and so the sun’s property could not have been correctly rendered: for it will be uncertain, whenever the sun sets, whether it continues to 131b30move over the earth, because sensation then fails us. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether he has rendered the property of a kind that is not obvious to sensation, or, if it be sensible, must clearly belong of necessity: for then the property will in this respect have been correctly stated. Thus (e.g.) a man who has stated that it is a property of a surface to be ‘the primary thing that is coloured’, has introduced amongst the rest a sensible 131b35quality, ‘to be coloured’, but still a quality such as manifestly always belongs, and so the property of ‘surface’ would in this respect have been correctly rendered.

131b38Next, for destructive purposes, see whether he has rendered the definition as a property: for then the property will not have been correctly stated: for the property of 132aa thing ought not to show its essence. Thus (e.g.) a man who has said that it is the property of man to be ‘a walking, biped animal’ has rendered a property of man so as to signify his essence, and so the property of man could not have been correctly rendered. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether the property which he has rendered forms a predicate convertible with its subject, 132a5without, however, signifying its essence: for then the property will in this respect have been correctly rendered. Thus (e.g.) he who has stated that it is a property of man to be a ‘naturally civilized animal’ has rendered the property so as to be convertible with its subject, without, however, showing its essence, and so the property of ‘man’ would in this respect have been correctly rendered.

132a10Next, for destructive purposes, see whether he has rendered the property without having placed¹ the subject within its essence. For of properties, as also of definitions, the first term to be rendered should be the genus, and then the rest of it should be appended immediately afterwards, and should distinguish its subject from other things. Hence a property which is not stated in this way could not 132a15have been correctly rendered. Thus (e. g.) a man who has said that it is a property of a living creature to ‘have a soul’ has not placed ‘living creature’ within its essence, and so the property of a living creature could not have been correctly stated. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether a man first places within its essence the subject whose property he is rendering, and then appends the rest: for then the property will in this respect have been correctly rendered. Thus (e. g.) he who has 132a20Stated that it is a property of man to be an ‘animal capable of receiving knowledge’, has rendered the property after placing the subject within its essence, and so the property of ‘man’ would in this respect have been correctly rendered.

Owen 1853

In the next place, the subverter (ought to consider) if he (the proposer) has used that, the property of which he assigns, or some of its (subjects), for the property will not be well laid down. For the property is assigned, for the sake of learning; the same thing therefore is similarly unknown with itself, but what is the subject of a certain thing is posterior to it, and therefore is not more known. Hence, through these, greater instruction in any thing does not happen, e. g. since he who states the property of animal, to be a substance, a species of which is man, uses some one of the subjects of this (animal), the property would not be well stated. But the confirmer (must observe) if he uses neither it, nor any of its subjects, for in this respect, property will be well stated; thus, since he who lays down the property of animal, to be composed of soul and body neither uses it, nor any of its subjects, the property of animal, with regard to this, would be well assigned.

In the same manner, also, consideration must be paid as to the other things which do not, or which do render, a thing more known, subverting, indeed, if what is opposite is used, or in short, what is simultaneous in nature, or any thing posterior, for the property will not be well stated. What is opposite is indeed simultaneous in nature, but what is simultaneous in nature and what is posterior, do not render a thing more known. For instance, since he who states the property of good, to be that which is especially opposed to evil, uses the opposite of good, the property of good would not be well assigned. On the other hand, we confirm it if nothing opposite is used, nor, in short, what is simultaneous in nature, nor what is posterior, for as to this, the property will be well assigned; e. g. since he who lays down the property of knowledge, to be a notion in the highest degree credible, uses neither an opposite, nor what is simultaneous in nature, nor what is posterior, so far as regards this, the property of knowledge would be well stated.

We next subvert peculiarity, indeed, if what does not always follow, has been assigned as the property, but that which sometimes happens not to be property, for the property will not be well explained: since neither will the name even be necessarily verified, in respect of that in which we apprehend its being inherent, nor of what it is apprehended not to be inherent, will the name necessarily not be asserted of this. Further, besides these, neither when the property is assigned, will it be clear whether it is inherent, if it is a thing of that kind as to fail, therefore the property will not be clear; e. g. since he who places the property of animal sometimes to be moved and to stand still, has assigned a property which is sometimes not a property, the latter would not be well laid down. On the other hand, it is confirmed, if that is assigned which is necessarily always a property, for in this respect the property would be well stated, since he who asserts the property of virtue to be that which makes its possessor a worthy man, assigns that which always follows as a property, so far as regards this, the property of virtue would be well assigned.

In the next place, it is subverted if some one assigning that which is now a property, does not declare that he assigns what is now a property, since the property will not be well stated. For, first, every thing which is contrary to custom requires explanation, and for the most part, all men are accustomed to assign as property that which is always consequent; secondly, he is uncertain who does not explain whether he desired to state that which is now property, wherefore a pretext of reproof must not be given. For instance, since he who states the property of a certain man, is to sit with a certain man, lays down that which is now a property; he would not place the property well, if he did not speak with explanation. Nevertheless, he confirms it if, assigning what is property at present, he explains that he adduces the present property, for in this respect the property will be well stated; thus, since he who asserts the property of a certain man to be his walking now, asserts this with a distinction, the property would be well alleged.

Next, it is subverted if such a property is assigned, which is in no other way evident to be inherent than by sense, since the property will not be well placed; for every thing sensible, when it is external to sense becomes obscure, since it is not apparent whether it is still inherent, because of its only being known by sense. This, indeed, would be true in those things which do not always follow from necessity.¹ For example, since he who asserts the property of the sun to be the most splendid star moved above the earth, uses such (an expression) in the property, to be moved above the earth, which is known by sense, the property of the sun would not be well assigned, for it would be doubtful when the sun sets, whether it is moved above the earth, because of sense then failing us. Property, however, is confirmed if such a kind has been given, as is not evident to sense, or which, being sensible, is manifestly inherent of necessity, for in this respect the property will be well stated. Thus, since he who lays down, as the property of superficies, to be that which is first coloured, uses, indeed, something sensible, viz. to be coloured, but of such a kind as is evidently always inherent, in this respect the property of superficies would be well assigned.

Next, it is subverted if definition is assigned as property, for the property will not be well stated, since it ought not to manifest the very nature of a thing; e. g. since he who says the property of man is to be an animal pedestrian biped, assigns as the property of man that which signifies his very nature, the property of man would not be well assigned. But we confirm it if a property which reciprocates is assigned, yet which does not manifest the very nature of a thing, since in this respect the property would be well assigned; e. g. since he who states the property of man to be an animal naturally mild, assigns a property which reciprocates indeed, yet does not manifest the very nature of man, in this respect the property of man would be well assigned.

Moreover, it is subverted, if he who assigns the property, does not assert what a thing is, since it is necessary with properties, as with definitions, to assign the first genus, next, to add what remains, and to separate. Hence, the property which is not placed after this manner would not be well assigned; thus, since he who asserts that the property of animal is to have a soul, does not state what an animal is, the property of animal would not be well laid down. Again, we confirm it, if any one, asserting what that is of which he assigns the property, annexes what remains, for in this respect the property will be well assigned; thus, since he who asserts the property of man to be an animal susceptible of science, by asserting what man is, assigns his property, in this respect, the property of man would be well assigned.

Latino

Utrum igitur bene an non bene assignetur proprium, per haec inspiciendum.

Utrum vero proprium est omnino quod dictum est, an non proprium, ex his considerandum. Nam simpliciter construentes proprium quod bene positum est, loci iidem erunt iis qui proprium omnino faciunt; in illis igitur dicentur. Primum ergo destruenti quidem inspiciendum ad unum quodque eorum cujus proprium assignavit. Ut si nulli inest, aut si non de hoc quidem verificatur, aut si non est proprium cujusque eorum secundum illud cujus proprium assignavit. Non enim erit proprium, quod positum est esse proprium, ut quia de geometra non verificatur indeceptibilem esse ab oratione (nam decipitur geometer cum pseudographiam facit), non erit hoc scientis proprium, non decipi ab oratione. Construenti autem si de omni verificatur, et qua de hoc verificatur. Erit enim proprium, quod positum est esse proprium, ut quia animal disciplinae susceptivum de omni homine verificatur, et qua homo, erit hominis proprium animal disciplinae susceptivum. Est autem locus hic destruenti quidem, si non de quo nomen et oratio verificatur, et si non de quo oratio et nomen verificatur. Construenti autem, si de quo nomen et oratio, et si de quo oratio et nomen praedicatur. Deinde destruenti quidem, si non de quo oratio et nomen verificatur, et si non de quo nomen et oratio verificatur. Non enim erit proprium, quod positum est esse proprium, ut quia animal quidem disciplinae susceptivum verificatur de Deo; homo autem non praedicatur, non erit hominis proprium, animal disciplinae susceptivum. Construenti autem, si de quo oratio et nomen praedicatur, et si de quo nomen et oratio praedicatur. Erit enim proprium quod positum est esse proprium, ut quia de quo animam habere verificatur animal, et de quo animal animam habere, erit animam habere animalis proprium. Deinde destruenti quidem, si subjectum proprium assignavit ejus quod in subjecto esse dicitur. Non enim erit proprium quod positum est esse proprium, ut quia qui posuit proprium subtilissimi corporis, ignem, subjectum assignavit praedicati proprium, non erit ignis corporis subtilissimi proprium. Propter hoc autem non erit subjectum, ejus quod in subjecto esse dicitur proprium, eo quod idem esset plurium et differentium specie proprium, nam eidem plura quaedam discrepantia specie insunt, de solo dicta, quorum erit omnium proprium quod subjectum est, si quis hunc in modum ponat proprium. Construenti vero, si quod in subjecto est, assignavit proprium subjecti. Erit enim proprium quod positum est non esse proprium, siquidem de solo praedicatur (ut dictum est) proprium, ut quia qui dixit terrae proprium corpus gravissimum specie, subjecti assignavit proprium, quod de sola dicitur re, et ut proprium praedicatur, erit terrae proprium recte positum. Deinde destruenti quidem, si secundum participationem assignavit proprium. Non enim erit proprium, quod positum est esse proprium, nam quod secundum participationem inest, ad quod quid est esse conducit; erit autem hujusmodi differentia quaedam de aliqua specie dicta, ut quia qui dixit hominis proprium gressibile bipes, secundum participationem assignavit proprium, non erit utique proprium hominis gressibile bipes. Construenti autem, si non secundum participationem assignavit proprium, nec quod quid est esse indicans, conversim praedicata re. Erit enim proprium quod positum est esse proprium, ut quia qui posuit animalis proprium quod natum est sentire, neque secundum participationem assignavit proprium, neque quod quid esse indicans, conversim re praedicata, erit utique quod sentire natum est, animalis proprium. Deinde destruenti quidem, si non contingit simul inesse proprium, sed vel posterius, vel priusquam idipsum nomen. Non enim erit proprium quod positum est esse proprium, aut nunquam, aut non semper, ut quoniam contingit alicui prius fore, et posterius ambulare per forum quam quod homo, non erit ambulare per forum hominis proprium, aut nunquam aut non semper. Construenti autem, si simul ex necessitate semper inest, cum neque terminus, neque differentia sit. Erit enim proprium, quod positum est forsitan non esse proprium, ut quia animal disciplinae susceptivum, simul ex necessitate semper est, et id quod est homo, cum neque differentia sit, nec terminus erit animal disciplinae susceptivum hominis proprium. Deinde destruenti quidem, si eorumdem qua eadem sunt, non est idem proprium. Non enim erit proprium, quod positum est esse proprium, ut quia non est proprium prosequendi, apparere quibusdam bonum, neque eligendi fuerit utique proprium apparere quibusdam bonum; idem enim est prosequendum et eligendum. Construenti, si ejusdem quatenus idem proprium. Erit enim proprium quod positum est non esse proprium, ut quoniam hominis, qua homo dicitur proprium tripartitam animam habere, et terrigenae quatenus terrigena est, erit proprium tripartitam animam habere. Utilis autem locus hic et in accidente, nam iisdem in eo quod eadem sunt eadem oportet inesse vel non inesse. Deinde destruenti quidem, si eorum quae sunt eadem specie, non idem semper specie proprium est. Neque enim ejus quod dictum erit proprium, quod positum est esse proprium, ut quia idem est specie homo et equus, non semper autem equi est proprium stare a se, nec hominis erit proprium moveri a se. Idem enim est specie moveri, et stare a se, quatetenus utrique eorum ut animal est, accidit. Construenti vero, si eorum quae sunt eadem specie, idem semper specie sit proprium. Erit enim proprium quod positum est non esse proprium, ut quia hominis est proprium esse gressibile bipes, et avis erit proprium esse volatile bipes, utrumque enim horum est idem quatenus illa quidem sub eodem sunt genere species, cum sint sub animali, haec autem ut generis differentiae animalis. Hic autem locus falsus est, quando alterum quidem eorum quae dicuntur uni alicui soli inest speciei, alterum vero inest pluribus, quemadmodum gressibile quadrupes.

Quoniam autem idem et diversum multipliciter dicitur, labor est sophistice assumenti unius assignare, et solius alicujus proprium, nam quod inest alicui cui accidit aliquid, et accidenti inerit sumpto cum eo cui accidit, ut quod inest homini, et albo homini inerit, si fuerit albus homo, et quod albo homini inest, inerit et homini. Calumniabitur autem aliquis multa propriorum quod subjectum id aliud est quod secundum se facit, aliud autem cum accidente, ut aliud quidem hominem esse dicet, aliud vero album hominem. Amplius autem diversum faciens habitum, et quod secundum habitum dicitur, nam quod habitui inest, et ei quod secundum habitum dicitur inerit, et quod ei quod secundum habitum dicitur inest, et habitui inerit, ut quoniam sciens secundum scientiam dicitur affici, non inerit scientiae proprium, indissuasibile a ratione, nam et sciens indissuasibilis erit a ratione. Construenti autem dicendum quoniam non est diversum simpliciter id cui accidit, et accidens cum eo cui accidit sumptum, sed aliud dicitur, eo quod diversum sit ipsis, esse; non enim idem est homini esse, quod sit homo, et albo homini esse, quod sit albus homo. Praeterea autem considerandum est ad casus dicenti, quod neque sciens est indissuasibile a ratione, sed indissuasibilis a ratione, neque scientia indissuasibile, sed indissuasibilis a ratione, nam ei qui omnino instat, omnino est adversandum.

Inglese

132a23The inquiry, then, whether the property has been correctly rendered or no, should be made by these means. The question, on the other hand, whether what is stated is 132a25Or is not a property at all, you should examine from the following points of view. For the commonplace arguments which establish absolutely that the property is accurately stated will be the same as those that constitute it a property at all: accordingly they will be described in the course of them.

132a28Firstly, then, for destructive purposes, take a look at each subject of which he has rendered the property, and see (e.g.) if it fails to belong to any of them at all, or to be true of them in that particular respect, or to be a property 132a30of each of them in respect of that character of which he has rendered the property: for then what is stated to be a property will not be a property. Thus, for example, inasmuch as it is not true of the geometrician that he ‘cannot be deceived by an argument’ (for a geometrician is deceived when his figure is misdrawn), it could not be a property of the man of science that he is not deceived by an argument. 132a35For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether the property rendered be true of every instance, and true in that particular respect: for then what is stated not to be a property¹ will be a property. Thus, for example, inasmuch 132bas the description ‘an animal capable of receiving knowledge’ is true of every man, and true of him qua man, it would be a property of man to be ‘an animal capable of receiving knowledge’. [This commonplace rule means— 132b5for destructive purposes, see if the description fails to be true of that of which the name is true; and if the name fails to be true of that of which the description is true: for constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if the description too is predicated of that of which the name is predicated, and if the name too is predicated of that of which the description is predicated.]²

132b9Next, for destructive purposes, see if the description fails to apply to that to which the name applies, and if the name 132b10fails to apply to that to which the description applies: for then what is stated to be a property will not be a property. Thus (e. g.) inasmuch as the description ‘a living being that partakes of knowledge’ is true of God, while ‘man’ is not predicated of God, to be ‘a living being that partakes of knowledge’ could not be a property of man. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if the name as well be predicated of that of which the description is predicated, and if the description as well be predicated of that 132b15of which the name is predicated. For then what is stated not to be a property will bea property. Thus (e.g.) the predicate ‘living creature’ is true of that of which ‘having a soul’ is true, and ‘having a soul’ is true of that of which the predicate ‘living creature’ is true; and so ‘having a soul’ would be a property of ‘living creature’.

132b19Next, for destructive purposes, see if he has rendered 132b20a subject as a property of that which is described as ‘in the subject’: for then what has been stated to be a property will not be a property. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as he who has rendered ‘fire’ as the property of ‘the body with the most rarefied particles’, has rendered the subject as the property of its predicate, ‘fire’ could not be a property of ‘the body with the most rarefied particles’, The reason why the subject will not be a property of that which is 132b25found in the subject is this, that then the same thing will be the property of a number of things that are specifically different. For the same thing has quite a number of specifically different predicates that belong to it alone, and the subject will be a property of all of these, if any one states the property in this way. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if he has rendered what is found in the subject as a property of the subject: 132b30for then what has been stated not to be a property will be a property, if it be predicated only of the things of which it has been stated to be the property. Thus (e.g.) he who has said that it is a property of ‘earth’ to be ‘specifically the heaviest body’ has rendered of the subject as its property something that is said of the thing in question alone, and is said of it in the manner in which a property is predicated, and so the property of ‘earth’ would have been rightly stated.

132b35Next, for destructive purposes, see if he has rendered the property as partaken of: for then what is stated to be a property will not bea property. For an attribute of which the 133asubject partakes is a constituent part of its essence: and an attribute of that kind would be a differentia applying to some one species. E.g., inasmuch as he who has said that ‘walking on two feet’ is a property of man has rendered 133a5the property as partaken of, ‘walking on two feet’ could not be a property of ‘man’. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if he has avoided rendering the property as partaken of, or as showing the essence, though the subject is predicated convertibly with it: for then what is stated not to bea property will bea property. Thus (e. g.) he who has stated that to be ‘naturally sentient’ is a property of ‘animal’ has rendered the property neither as partaken 133a10of nor as showing the essence, though the subject is predicated convertibly with it; and so to be ‘naturally sentient’ would be a property of ‘animal’.

133a12Next, for destructive purposes, see if the property cannot possibly belong simultaneously, but must belong either as posterior or as prior to the attribute described in the name: for then what is stated to be a property will not be a 133a15property—either never, or not always. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as it is possible for the attribute ‘walking through the market-place’ to belong to an object as prior and as posterior to the attribute ‘man’, ‘walking through the market-place’ could not be a property of ‘man ’—either never, or not always. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if it always and of necessity belongs simultaneously, without being either a definition or a differentia: for then what is 133a20stated not to be a property will bea property. Thus (e. g.) the attribute ‘an animal capable of receiving knowledge’ always and of necessity belongs simultaneously with the attribute ‘man’, and is neither differentia nor definition of its subject, and so ‘an animal capable of receiving knowledge’ would be a property of ‘man’.

133a24Next, for destructive purposes, see if the same thing fails 133a25to be a property of things that are the same as the subject, so far as they are the same: for then what is stated to be a property will not be a property. Thus, for example, inasmuch as it is no property of a ‘proper object of pursuit’ to ‘appear good to certain persons’, it could not be a property of the ‘desirable’ either to ‘appear good to certain persons’: for ‘proper object of pursuit’ and ‘desirable’ mean the same. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if the same thing be a property of something that is the same as the subject, in so far as it is the same. For then what is stated 133a30not to be a property will be a property. Thus (e. g.) inasmuch as it is called a property of a man, in so far as he is a man, ‘to have a tripartite soul’, it would also be a property of a mortal, in so far as he is a mortal, to have a tripartite soul. This commonplace rule is useful also in dealing with Accident: for the same attributes ought either to belong or not belong to the same things, in so far as they are the same.

133a35Next, for destructive purposes, see if the property of things that are the same in kind as the subject fails to be always the same in kind as the alleged property: for then 133bneither will what is stated to be the property be the property of the subject in question. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as a man and a horse are the same in kind, and it is not always a property of a horse to stand by its own initiative, it could not be a property of a man to move by his own initiative; for to stand and to move by his own initiative are the 133b5same in kind, because they belong to each of them in so far as each is an ‘animal’. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if of things that are the same in kind as the subject the property that is the same as the alleged property is always true: for then what is stated not to be a property will bea property. Thus (e. g.) since³ it is a property of man to be a ‘walking biped’, it would also be a property of 133b10a bird to be a ‘flying biped’: for each of these is the same in kind, in so far as the one pair have the sameness of species that fall under the same genus, being under the genus ‘animal’, while the other pair have that of differentiae of the genus, viz. of ‘animal’. This commonplace rule is deceptive whenever one of the properties mentioned belongs to some one species only while the other belongs to many, as does ‘walking quadruped’.

133b15Inasmuch as ‘same’ and ‘different’ are terms used in several senses, it is a job to render to a sophistical questioner a property that belongs to one thing and that only. For an attribute that belongs to something qualified by an accident will also belong to the accident taken along with the subject which it qualifies; e.g. an attribute that belongs 133b20to ‘man’ will belong also to ‘white man’, if there be a white man, and one that belongs to ‘white man’ will belong also to' man' One might, then, bring captious criticism against the majority of properties, by representing the subject as being one thing in itself, and another thing when combined with its accident, saying, for example, that ‘man’ is one thing, and ‘white man’ another, and moreover by representing 133b25as different a certain state and what is called after that state. For an attribute that belongs to the state will belong also to what is called after that state, and one that belongs to what is called after a state will belong also to the state: e. g. inasmuch as the condition of the scientist is called after his science, it could not be a property of ‘science’ that it is ‘incontrovertible by argument’; for then the scientist also 133b30will be incontrovertible by argument. For constructive purposes, however, you should say that the subject of an accident is not absolutely different from the accident taken along with its subject; though it is called ‘another’ thing because the mode of being of the two is different: for it is 133b35not the same thing for a man to be a man and for a white man to be a white man. Moreover, you should take a look along at the inflections, and say that the description of the 134aman of science is wrong: one should say not ‘it’ but ‘he is incontrovertible by argument’; while the description of Science is wrong too: one should say not ‘it’ but ‘she is incontrovertible by argument’. For against an objector who sticks at nothing the defence should stick at nothing.

Owen 1853

Whether, however, what is assigned as property, be so well, or ill, must be examined from such (places), but whether what is stated be altogether property or not property, must be inspected from these. For those which simply confirm that the property is well stated, will be the same places as those which produce property at all, therefore they will be explained with them.

First then in confirmation, we must regard each particular, of which the property has been assigned, as whether it is present with no individual, or is not verified in this respect, or whether it is not the property of each of them, as regards that of which the property has been assigned, for the property will not be that which was laid down as the property. For instance, since it is not truly asserted of a geometrician that he cannot be deceived by argument, (for a geometrician is deceived when there is made a false description,) it would not be the property of a scientific man, not to be deceived by argument. It is confirmed, on the other hand, if it is verified of every thing, and is true as regards this, for that will be property which was stated not to be property; e. g. since an animal capable of science is verified of every man, and so far as he is man, an animal capable of science would be the property of man. This place indeed is for subversion, if a sentence is not verified of what the name is verified, and if of what the sentence is verified the name is not verified, but it belongs to confirmation, if of what the name, the sentence also is verified, and if of what a sentence is predicated, a name also is.

In the next place, we subvert it, if, of what the sentence is, the name also is not verified, and if, of what the name is spoken, the sentence is not, since what is stated to be property, will not be property. For example, since animal partaking of science is verified of God, but man is not predicated, animal partaking of science would not be the property of man. But we confirm it, if, of what the sentence is, the name also is predicated, and if, of what the name, the sentence also is predicated, since that will be property which was stated not to be so; thus, since animal is verified of that of which the possession of a soul is, and the possession of a soul of that of which animal is, the possession of a soul would be the property of animal.

Again, it is subverted, if the subject is assigned as the property of what is stated in the subject, since that will not be property which is stated to be so; e. g. since he who asserts the property of body, consisting of the most subtle parts, is fire, assigns the subject² as the property of that which is predicated,³ fire would not be the property of a body of the most subtle parts. Wherefore the subject will not be the property of that which is in the subject, because the same thing will be the property of many things specifically different, since many things differing in species are present with the same, being predicated of it alone, the property of all which, will be the subject, if a person thus places the property. Again, property is confirmed if that which is in the subject is assigned as the property of the subject, for that will be property which was stated not to be so, if it is predicated of those alone of which it is said to be the property; thus, since he who says that the property of earth, is body specifically the heaviest, assigns the property of the subject which is predicated of that thing alone, and as a property, the property of earth would be rightly stated.

We next subvert it, if the property is assigned according to participation, for that will not be property which was stated to be so, since what is present according to participation, belongs to the very nature of a thing, but this sort would be a certain difference predicated of some one species: thus, since he who says the property of man is a pedestrian biped, assigns the property according to participation, pedestrian biped would not be the property of man. We confirm, on the contrary, if the property is not assigned according to participation, nor manifests the very nature when the thing reciprocates, for that will be property which is stated not to be property; thus, since he who places the property of animal, as naturally to possess sensation, neither assigns property according to participation, nor manifests the very nature, the thing itself reciprocating with it, naturally to possess sensation, would be the property of animal.

Again, we subvert it, if the property cannot be at the same time inherent, but either subsequent or prior to, that of which it is the name, for what is stated to be property, will not be so, either never, or not always: thus, since it is possible for walking through the forum, to be present with some one, both prior and subsequent to its being man, walking through the forum would not be the property of man, either never, or not always. We confirm it however, if it is always present from necessity at the same time, being neither definition nor difference, since that will be property which was stated not to be so; thus, since animal capable of science, and man, always exist necessarily at one and the same time, being neither difference nor definition, animal susceptible of science, would be the property of man.

Moreover, we subvert it, if the same thing is not the property of the same things, so far as they are the same, since that will not be property which is stated to be so; thus, since it is not the property of what is the object of pursuit, to appear good to certain persons, the latter would not be the property of the eligible, for what is the object of pursuit, and the eligible, are the same thing. But it is confirmed, if the same is the property of the same, so far as it is the same, since that will be property which is stated not to be so: thus, since of man, so far as he is man, the possession of a tripartite soul is said to be the property; the possession of this, would also be the property of mortal, so far as mortal. Now this place is likewise useful for accident, since it is necessary that the same things should be or not be present, with the same things, so far as they are the same.

Again, we subvert, if of things the same in species, the property is not always the same in species, since neither will what is stated be the property of the thing proposed; thus, since man and horse are the same in species, but it is not always the property of a horse to stand from himself, neither will it be the property of man to be moved from himself, since to be moved and to stand from self are the same in species, and happen to each of these, so far as he is animal. On the other hand, we confirm it, if of what are the same in species the property is always the same, for that will be property which is stated not to be so; thus, since it is the property of man to be a pedestrian biped, it would also be the property of bird to be a winged biped, since each of these is specifically the same, so far as some⁴ are as species under the same genus, being under animal, but others⁵ are as differences of the genus, animal. Now this place indeed is false, when one of those mentioned is present with one species alone, but the other with many, as a pedestrian quadruped.⁶

Since however “same” and “different” are multifariously predicated, it is difficult, when they are sophistically assumed, to assign the property of some one thing alone; for what is present with something to which any thing happens, will also be present with the accident assumed together with that, to which it is accidental; thus, what is present with man, will also be with white man, if man is white, and what is with white man, will also be with man. Some one however may find fault with many of these properties, if he makes one subject subsistent per se, but another with accident, as if he stated man to be one thing, but white man another, moreover, making the habit another, and that which is enunciated according to the habit. For what is present with habit will also be present with what is denominated according to habit, and what is present with that denominated according to habit, will also be present with habit. Thus, since he who possesses science is said to be scientifically disposed, the property of science would not be the being immutable in opinion by reason, for the man of science will be unpersuadable by reason. In confirmation however it must be stated, that that to which a thing happens, and the accident taken together with that to which it is accidental, are not different simply, but they are said to be so from their essence being different, since it is not the same thing for man to be man, and for a white man to be a white man.⁷ Besides, we must inspect cases, stating that neither will he be scientific, who is (a thing) unpersuadable by reason, but he who is unpersuadable by reason, nor is science that which cannot be induced to change its opinion by reason, but the being unchangeable by reason,⁸ for he who in every way objects, must in every way be opposed.⁹

Latino

Deinde destruenti quidem, si quod natura inest volens assignare, hoc modo ponit secundum locutionem, ut quod semper inest significet. Videbitur enim moveri posse quod positum est proprium esse, ut quia qui dixit hominis proprium bipes, vult quidem quod natura inest assignare: significat autem locutione, quod semper inest, non erit hominis proprium bipes, non enim omnis homo est duos pedes habens. Construenti autem, si vult quod natura inest proprium assignare, et locutione hoc modo significat: non enim movebitur secundum hoc proprium, ut quia qui hominis proprium assignavit, animal disciplinae susceptivum, et vult, et dictione significat quod natura inest proprium, non movebitur, secundum hoc quod non sit proprium hominis, animal disciplinae susceptivum. Amplius, quaecunque dicuntur ut secundum aliud aliquod primum, aut ut primum ipsum, labor est assignare talium proprium. Nam si ejus quod est secundum aliud aliquid proprium assignavit, et de primo verificabitur, si autem primi posuerit, et de eo quod est secundum aliud praedicabitur, ut si quis assignet superficiei proprium coloratum esse, et de corpore verificatur coloratum esse, si autem corporis, et de superficie praedicabitur, quare non de quo oratio et nomen verificabitur. Accidit autem in quibusdam propriis plerumque fieri aliquod peccatum, propter hoc quod non determinetur quomodo et quorum ponit quis proprium; omnes enim conantur assignare proprium, aut quod natura inest, ut hominis bipes, aut quod nunc inest, ut hominis alicujus quatuor digitos habere, aut specie, ut ignis subtilissimum, aut simpliciter, ut animalis vivere, aut secundum aliud, ut animae prudens, aut ut primum, quemadmodum rationalis prudens, aut in eo quod habet, ut scientis indissuasibile a ratione (nihil enim aliud quam habendo aliquid erit indissuasibile a ratione), aut in eo quod habeatur, ut scientiae indissuasibile a ratione, aut in eo quod participatur, ut animalis sentire (sentit enim et aliud quid ut homo, sed participans jam hoc, sentit), aut in eo quod participat, ut alicujus animalis vivere. Qui non addit igitur, natura peccat, eo quod contingit quod naturae inest, non inesse illi cui natura inest, ut homini duos pedes habere, qui vero non determinat, quoniam quod inest assignat quod non erit tale quale nunc inest id, ceu quatuor digitos habere hominem, non indicans quoque quod ut primum, aut ut secundum aliud ponit, quod non de quo oratio et nomen verificabitur, ut coloratum esse sive superficiei, sive corporis assignaverit proprium, non praedicens etiam quod aut in eo quod est habere aut in eo quod haberi proprium assignavit. Ideo non erit proprium quod assignatum est, nam inerit (si in eo quod habetur assignavit proprium) etiam habenti, si autem habenti, et ei quod habetur, ut indissuasibile a ratione, scientiae vel scientis positum proprium, non praesignificans etiam in eo quod participat vel participatur, eo quod et in aliis quibusdam inerit proprium. Si enim in eo quidem quod participatur assignavit, participantibus inerit, si vero in eo quod participat, iis quae participantur, ut si alicujus animalis posuerit vivere proprium, non dividens etiam specie quod uni soli inerit eorum quae sub eo sunt, cujus proprium ponit, nam quod est secundum superabundantiam, uni soli inest, ut ignis levissimum. Aliquoties autem et specie addens peccat. Nam oportebit unam speciem esse eorum quae dicuntur, quando specie addiderit: hoc autem in quibusdam non accidit, ut nec in igne, non enim est una species ignis, nam diversum est carbo et flamma, et lux specie, cum unumquodque horum sit ignis; propter hoc autem non oportet, quando specie additur, diversam esse speciem ejus quod dicitur, quoniam his quidem magis, illis autem minus inerit quod dictum est proprium, ut in igne subtilissimum, subtilior enim est lux carbone et flamma. Hoc autem non oportet fieri quando non, et nomen magis praedicatur de quo oratio magis verificatur. Si autem non, non erit de quo oratio magis, et nomen magis. Amplius autem ad haec idem esse accidit proprium ejus quod simpliciter, et ejus quod maxime in simpliciter tali, ut in igne se habet subtilissimum, nam et simpliciter et ignis et lucis erit hoc ipsum proprium, subtilissima enim est lux; cum igitur alius sic assignat proprium, argumentandum, sibi autem non danda haec instantia, sed statim cum ponit proprium determinandum est quomodo ponit proprium.

Deinde destruenti quidem, si idem ejusdem proprium posuit. Non enim erit proprium, quod positum est esse proprium, nam idem eidem omne, quid est esse indicat; quod autem esse indicat, non proprium, sed terminus est, ut quia qui dixit honesti proprium decens esse, idem ejusdem proprium assignavit (idem enim est honestum et decens), non utique erit decens, honesti proprium. Construenti autem, si non ejusdem proprium assignavit, cum conversim praedicatum posuit. Nam erit proprium quod positum est non esse proprium, ut quia qui posuit animalis proprium id quod substantia animata, non idem quidem ejusdem proprium posuit, et conversim praedicatum assignavit, erit animalis proprium substantia animata. Deinde etiam in iis quae similium partium sunt considerandum est, destruenti quidem, si quod totius est proprium, non verificatur de parte, aut quod partis, non dicitur de toto. Non enim erit proprium, quod positum est esse proprium, accidit autem in aliquibus hoc fieri. Assignabit enim aliquis in iis quae similium partium sunt proprium, aliquoties quidem in toto respiciens, aliquoties autem in eo quod secundum partem dicitur ipse seipsum intelligens, at erit neutrum recte assignatum, ut in toto quidem, quia qui dixit maris proprium, plurima aqua salsa, alicujus similium partium posuit proprium, et tale assignavit quod non verificatur de parte (non enim erit quiddam maris plurima aqua salsa), non utique erit maris proprium, plurima aqua salsa. In parte autem, ut quia qui posuerit aeris proprium, respirabile, similium quidem partium alicujus dixit proprium, tale autem assignavit quod de quo aere verum est, de toto autem non dicitur (non enim erit universus aer respirabilis), non erit utique aeris proprium respirabile. Astruenti autem, si verificatur de unaquaque similium partium quod est proprium earum secundum totum. Erit enim proprium, quod positum est non esse proprium, ut quia verificatur de omni terra deorsum ferri secundum naturam; est autem et hoc proprium alicujus terrae secundum totum; nam secundum terram, et id quod est terram esse, erit terrae proprium deorsum ferri secundum naturam.

Inglese

134a5Next, for destructive purposes, see if, while intending to render an attribute that naturally belongs, he states it in his language in such a way as to indicate one that invariably belongs: for then it would be generally agreed that what has been stated to be a property is upset. Thus (e.g.) the man who has said that ‘biped’ is a property of man intends 134a10roto render the attribute that naturally belongs, but his expression actually indicates one that invariably belongs: accordingly, ‘biped’ could not be a property of man: for not every man is possessed of two feet. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if he intends to render the property that naturally belongs, and indicates it in that way in his language: for then the property will not be upset in this respect. Thus (e.g.) he who renders as a property of 134a15‘man’ the phrase ‘an animal capable of receiving knowledge’ both intends, and by his language indicates, the property that belongs by nature, and so ‘an animal capable of receiving knowledge’ would not be upset or shown in that respect not to be a property of man.

134a18Moreover, as regards all the things that are called as they are primarily after something else, or primarily in themselves, it is a job to render the property of such things. For if you 134a20render a property as belonging to the subject that is so called after something else, then it will be true of its primary subject as well; whereas if you state it of its primary subject, then it will be predicated also of the thing that is so called after this other. Thus (e.g.) if any one renders ‘coloured’ as the property of ‘surface’, ‘coloured’ will be true of body as well; whereas if he render it of ‘body’, it will be predicated 134a25also of ‘surface’. Hence the name as well will not be true of that of which the description is true.}¹

134a26In the case of some properties it mostly happens that some error is incurred because of a failure to define how as well as to what things the property is stated to belong. For every one tries to render as the property of a thing something that belongs to it either naturally, as ‘biped’ 134a30belongs to ‘man’, or actually, as ‘having four fingers’ belongs to a particular man, or specifically, as ‘consisting of most rarefied particles’ belongs to ‘fire’, or absolutely, as ‘life’ to ‘living being’, or one that belongs to a thing only as called after something else, as ‘wisdom’ to the ‘soul’, or on the other hand primarily, as ‘wisdom’ to the ‘rational faculty’, or because the thing is in a certain state, as 134a35‘incontrovertible by argument’ belongs to a ‘scientist’ (for simply and solely by reason of his being in a certain state will he be ‘incontrovertible by argument’), or because it is the state possessed by something, as ‘incontrovertible by 134bargument’ belongs to ‘science’, or because it is partaken of, as ‘sensation’ belongs to ‘animal’ (for other things as well have sensation, e. g. man, but they have it because they already partake of ‘animal’), or because it partakes of something else, as ‘life’ belongs to a particular kind of ‘living 134b5being’. Accordingly he makes a mistake if he has failed to add the word ‘naturally’, because what belongs naturally may fail to belong to the thing to which it naturally belongs, as (e.g.) it belongs to a man to have two feet: so too he errs if he does not make a definite proviso that he is rendering what actually belongs, because one day that attribute will not be what it now is,² e.g. the man’s possession 134b10of four fingers. So he errs if he has not shown that he states a thing to be such and such primarily, or that he calls it so after something else, because then its name too will not be true of that of which the description is true, as is the case with ‘coloured’, whether rendered as a property of ‘surface’ or of ‘body’. So he errs if he has not said beforehand that he has rendered a property to a thing either because that thing possesses a state, or because it is a state possessed by something; because then it will not be a property. For, supposing 134b15he renders the property to something as being a state possessed, it will belong to what possesses that state; while supposing he renders it to what possesses the state, it will belong to the state possessed, as did ‘incontrovertible by argument’ when stated as a property of ‘science’ or of the ‘scientist’. So he errs if he has not indicated beforehand that the property belongs because the thing partakes of, or is partaken of by, something; because then the property will 134b20belong to certain other things as well. For if he renders it because its subject is partaken of, it will belong to the things which partake of it; whereas if he renders it because its subject partakes of something else, it will belong to the things partaken of, as (e. g.) if he were to state ‘life’ to be a property of a ‘particular kind of living being’, or just of ‘living being’, So he errs if he has not expressly distinguished the property that belongs specifically, because then it will belong only to one of the things that fall under the term of which he states the property: for the superlative belongs only to one of 134b25them, e. g. ‘lightest’ as applied to ‘fire’. Sometimes, too, a man may even add the word ‘specifically’, and still make a mistake. For the things in question should all be of one species, whenever the word ‘specifically’ is added: and in some cases this does not occur, as it does not, in fact, in the case of fire. For fire is not all of one species; for live coals and flame and light are each of them ‘fire’, but are of 134b30different species. The reason why, whenever ‘specifically’ is added, there should not be any species other than the one mentioned, is this, that if there be, then the property in question will belong to some of them in a greater and to others in a less degree, as happens with ‘consisting of most rarefied particles’ in the case of fire: for ‘light’ consists of more rarefied particles than live coals and flame. And this 134b35should not happen unless the name too be predicated in a greater degree of that of which the description is truer; otherwise the rule that where the description is truer the 135aname too should be truer is not fulfilled. Moreover, in addition to this, the same attribute will be the property both of the term which has it absolutely and of that element therein which has it³ in the highest degree, as is the condition of the property ‘consisting of most rarefied particles’ in the case of ‘fire’: for this same attribute will be the 135a5property of ‘light’ as well: for it is ‘light’ that ‘consists of the most rarefied particles’. If, then, any one else renders a property in this way one should attack it; for oneself, one should not give occasion for this objection, but should define in what manner one states the property at the actual time of making the statement.

135a9Next, for destructive purposes, see if he has stated a thing 135a10as a property of itself: for then what has been stated to be a property will not be a property. For a thing itself always shows its own essence, and what shows the essence is not a property but a definition. Thus (e.g.) he who has said that ‘becoming’ is a property of ‘beautiful’ has rendered the term as a property of itself (for ‘beautiful’ and ‘becoming’ are the same); and so ‘becoming’ could not be a property 135a15of ‘beautiful’. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if he has avoided rendering a thing as a property of itself, but has yet stated a convertible predicate: for then what is stated not to be a property will be a property. Thus he who has stated ‘animate substance’ as a property of ‘living-creature’ has not stated ‘living-creature’ as a property of itself, but has rendered a convertible predicate, so that ‘animate substance’ would be a property of ‘living-creature’.

135a20Next, in the case of things consisting of like parts, you should look and see, for destructive purposes, if the property of the whole be not true of the part, or if that of the part be not predicated of the whole: for then what has been stated to be the property will not be a property. In some cases it happens that this is so: for sometimes in rendering a 135a25property in the case of things that consist of like parts a man may have his eye on the whole, while sometimes he may address himself to what is predicated of the part: and then in neither case will it have been rightly rendered. Take an instance referring to the whole: the man who has said that it is a property of the ‘sea’ to be ‘the largest volume of salt water’, has stated the property of something that consists of like parts, but has rendered an attribute of 135a30such a kind as is not true of the part (for a particular sea is not ‘the largest volume of salt water’); and so ‘the largest volume of salt water’ could not be a property of the ‘sea’. Now take one referring to the part: the man who has stated that it is a property of ‘air’ to be ‘breathable’ has stated the property of something that consists of like parts, 135a35but he has stated an attribute such as, though true of some air, is still not predicable of the whole (for the whole of the air is not breathable); and so ‘breathable’ could not be 135ba property of ‘air’. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether, while it is true of each of the things with similar parts, it is on the other hand a property of them taken as a collective whole: for then what has been stated not to be a property will be a property. Thus (e.g.) while it is true of earth everywhere that it 135b5naturally falls downwards, it is a property of the various particular pieces of earth taken as ‘the Earth⁴ so that it would be a property of ‘earth’ ‘naturally to fall downwards’,

Owen 1853

Property is, in the next place, subverted, if he who wishes to assign what is naturally inherent, places it after that manner in his discourse, as to signify what is always inherent, since he will seem to have subverted that, which was stated to be the property. Thus, since he who says that the property of man is to be a biped, wishes to assign what is naturally inherent indeed, but signifies in the enunciation what is always inherent, biped would not be the property of man, since not every man has two feet. On the other hand, he confirms it, if he desires to assign the property which is naturally inherent, and signifies it after this manner in his speech, for as to this, property will not be subverted. Thus, since he who assigns the property of man, to be an animal susceptible of science, both desires and also signifies in speech, the property which is naturally inherent, it would not, as regards this, be subverted, as that an animal susceptible of science is not the property of man.

Besides, with regard to such things as are enunciated, as to some other first, or as that which is itself first, (i. e. per se,) it is difficult to assign the property of such as these; for if you assign the property of what is through something else, it will also be verified in respect of what is first, but if you assign the property of the first, it will also be predicated of that which subsists according to something else. Thus, if some one asserts the property of superficies to be coloured, to be coloured will also be verified of body, but if of body, it will also be predicated of superficies; so that of what a sentence is verified, a name is not also verified.¹

Nevertheless, it happens with some properties, that an error for the most part happens from the want of definition, as to how and of what things the property is assigned. For all men endeavour to assign property, either as what is naturally inherent, as biped of man, or as what is (merely) inherent, as of a certain man to have four fingers, or as in species, as of fire that which is most subtle, or simply, as of animal to live, or through another, as of soul to be wise, or as the first, as of the reasoning faculty to possess prudence, or as in having, as of the scientific to be unconvincible by argument, (for to be un-convinvible in argument will be nothing else than to have something,*) or from being had, as of science, the being unchanged by reason, or from being participated, as sensation, by animal, (since something else also has sensation as man, but he perceives because he is a participant of animal,) or in consequence of participating, as of a certain animal to live. He errs, therefore, who does not add the word naturally, because what is naturally inherent, it is possible may not be inherent in that, to which it is natural to be inherent, as in a man to have two feet. He, however, who does not distinguish that he assigns what is inherent (errs), because a thing will not be such (sometimes) as it is now, as for man to have four fingers, but he errs who does not show that he assigns it, as what is first, or as through something else, because the name will not be verified of that, of which the definition is, as to be coloured, whether it is assigned as the property of superficies or of body. He, again, who does not previously declare that he assigns property, either from having, or from being had, (errs,) because it will not be property, for it will be inherent, if he assign the property from being had, in that which has, but if from having, in that which is had, as the being unconvincible by reason being laid down as the property of science, or of the scientific man. He, again, who does not, besides, signify (that he assigns property), from a thing partaking or being partaken of, (errs,) because the property will be present with certain other things also; if, indeed, he assign it from being partaken of, it will be present with those partaking it, but if from its partaking, with those which are partaken of, as if to live should be placed as the property of some certain animal, or of animal. (Again he errs), who does not distinguish (that the property is assigned) in species, because it will be present with one thing alone, of those which are under this, of which he assigns the property, for what exists according to excess is present with one thing alone; as of fire, that which is most light. Sometimes, indeed, he who adds the expression “in species” errs, for it will be necessary that there should be one species of the things stated, when the words “in species” are added, but this does not occur in some things, as neither in fire, for there is not one species of fire, since a burning coal, flame, and light, each of them being fire, are specifically different. For this reason, there is no necessity, when the words “in species” are added, that there should be another species of what is stated, because what is assigned as property will be more present with some, but less with others, as of fire that which is most subtle, for light is more subtle than a burning coal, and than flame. Nevertheless, this ought not to happen, when the name is not more predicated of that, of which the sentence is more verified,² for otherwise it will not be (true), that of what the sentence is more, the name is also more (predicated.) Moreover, besides these, the same thing will happen to be the property of what is simply, and of what is especially; in what is simply, as the most subtle happens in the case of fire, for this very thing will be property of light also, since light is most subtle. If, therefore, another person should thus assign property, we must argue, but he must not yield to this objection, but straightway, when the property is assigned, define the manner in which he assigns it.

In the next place, property is subverted if a thing is assigned as the property of itself, for what is stated to be, will not be property, since every thing which is the same with a thing, manifests essence, but that which manifests essence is not property, but definition; thus, since he who says that the becoming, is a property of good, assigns that which is the property of itself, (for the good and the becoming are the same,) the becoming, would not be the property of the good. On the other hand, we confirm it, if the same is not assigned as the property of itself, but that which reciprocates is laid down, for what is stated not to be, will be property; e. g. since he who asserts the property of animal is animated substance, does not lay down the same thing as the property of itself, but assigns what reciprocates, animated substance would be the property of animal.

Next, we must consider this in the case of those which consist of similar parts, the subverter indeed whether the property of the whole is not verified of the part, or whether the property of the part is not predicated of the whole, since what is stated to be, will not be property. In some things indeed this occurs, as a man may assign property in things of similar parts, sometimes looking to the whole, and sometimes directing his attention to what is enunciated according to a part, yet neither will be rightly assigned. For instance, in the whole of thing; since he who states the property of the sea is an abundance of salt water, introduces the property of a certain thing, consisting of similar parts, but assigns such as is not verified of a part, (for a certain sea does not abound with salt water,) the property of the sea would not be an abundance of salt water. Again, in the case of a part, e. g. since he who states the property of air to be the respirable, asserts the property of a certain thing of similar parts, but assigns such a thing as is verified of a certain air, but is not spoken of all air, (for all is not respirable,) the respirable would not be the property of air. Now he who confirms, (must see) whether of each of the things consisting of similar parts, that is verified, which is the property of them according to the whole, since what is stated not to be, will be property: thus, since it is verified of all earth to tend naturally downward, and this is the property of certain earth according to earth, to tend naturally downward would be the property of earth.

Latino

Deinde ex oppositis considerandum est, primum quidem ex contrariis, destruenti quidem, si contrarii non est contrarium. Neque enim contrarii erit contrarium proprium, ut quia contrarium est justitiae quidem injustitia, optimo autem pessimum, non est autem justitiae proprium optimum, non erit injustitiae proprium pessimum. Construenti autem si contrarii contrarium proprium est, et contrarii contrarium proprium erit. Ut quia contrarium est bono quidem malum, eligendo autem fugiendum, est autem boni proprium eligendum, erit mali proprium fugiendum. Secundum autem, ex iis quae ad aliquid sunt, destruenti quidem, si hoc quod ad aliquid est, ejus quod est ad aliquid non est proprium. Neque enim hoc quod ad aliquid est, ejus quod ad aliquid est erit proprium, ut quia dicitur duplum quidem ad dimidium, superans autem ad superatum, non est autem dupli proprium superans, non erit dimidii proprium superatum. Construenti autem, si ejus quod est ad aliquid, hoc quod ad aliquid est proprium, et ejus quod est aliquid, id quod est ad aliquid erit proprium. Ut quia dicitur duplum quidem ad dimidium id esse quod duo ad unum, est autem dupli proprium, ut duo ad unum, erit dimidii proprium, ut unum ad duo. Tertium autem destruenti quidem, si habitus, id quod secundum habitum dicitur non est proprium, neque profecto privationis, id quod secundum privationem dicitur, erit proprium, et si privationis, id quod secundum privationem dicitur non est proprium, neque habitus, id quod secundum habitum dicitur erit proprium. Ut quia non dicitur surditatis proprium insensibilitatem esse, neque auditus erit proprium sensum esse. Construenti vero, si quod secundum habitum dicitur, est habitus proprium, et privationis, id quod secundum privationem dicitur erit proprium, et si privationis, id quod secundum privationem dicitur, est proprium, et habitus, quod secundum habitum dicitur erit proprium. Ut quia visus est proprium videre, secundum quod habemus visum, erit caecitatis proprium non videre, secundum quod non habemus visum, nati habere. Deinde ex affirmationibus et negationibus, primum quidem ex ipsis quae praedicantur. Est autem locus hic utilis destruenti tantum, ut si affirmatio, vel quod secundum affirmationem dicitur, ejus est proprium, non erit profecto ejus negatio, neque quod secundum negationem dicitur, proprium, si autem sit negatio, aut quod secundum negationem dicitur proprium, ejusdem non erit affirmatio, neque quod secundum affirmationem dicitur proprium, ut quia proprium animalis est animatum, non erit animalis proprium, non animatum. Secundum autem ex praedicatis, vel etiam non praedicatis, et de quibus praedicatur vel non praedicatur, destruenti quidem, si affirmationis affirmatio non est proprium. Neque enim negatio negationis erit proprium, et si negatio negationis non est proprium, neque affirmationis affirmatio erit proprium, ut quia non est proprium hominis animal, neque non hominis non animal; si autem non hominis non videtur proprium non animal, neque hominis erit proprium animal. Construenti autem, si affirmationis affirmatio est proprium. Nam et negatio negationis erit proprium, si autem negationis negatio est proprium, et affirmatio affirmationis erit proprium, ut quia non animalis est proprium non vivere, erit animalis proprium vivere, et si animalis proprium videtur vivere, et non animalis proprium videbitur non vivere. Tertium autem ex ipsis subjectis, destruenti quidem, si quod assignatum est proprium, affirmationis est proprium. Non erit enim idem et negationis proprium; si autem negationis est proprium quod assignatum est, non erit affirmationis proprium, ut quia animalis proprium est animatum, non animalis non erit proprium animatum. Construenti vero, si assignatum proprium non est affirmationis proprium, erit negationis. At hic locus deficit, nam affirmatio negationis, et negatio affirmationis non est proprium, quandoquidem affirmatio negationi omnino non inest, negatio autem affirmationi inest quidem, at non ut proprium inest. Deinde ex iis quae ex opposito dividuntur, destruenti quidem, si eorum quae ex opposito dividuntur, nullum ullius reliquorum ex opposito divisorum est proprium. Neque enim quod positum est, erit proprium ejus cujus positum est proprium, ut quia animal sensibile nullius aliorum mortalium animalium est proprium, non erit animal intelligibile Dei proprium. Construenti autem, si caeterorum quae ex opposito dividuntur quodvis est proprium talium quorumcunque eorum quae ex opposito dividuntur. Nam reliquum erit ejus proprium cujus positum est non esse proprium, ut quia prudentiae est proprium, per se natum esse rationalis virtutem esse, et aliarum virtutum sic uniuscujusque sumptae, erit temperantiae proprium per se natum esse concupiscibilis virtutem esse.

Inglese

135b7Next, look from the point of view of the respective opposites, and first (a) from that of the contraries, and see, for destructive purposes, if the contrary of the term rendered fails to be a property of the contrary subject. For then neither will the contrary of the first be a property of the 135b10contrary of the second. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as injustice is contrary to justice, and the lowest evil to the highest good, but ‘to be the highest good’ is not a property of ‘justice’, therefore ‘to be the lowest evil’ could not be a property of ‘injustice’. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if the contrary is the property of the contrary: for then also the contrary of the first will be the property of the contrary of the second. Thus (e.g.) 135b15inasmuch as evil is contrary to good, and objectionable to desirable, and ‘desirable’ is a property of ‘good’, ‘objectionable’ would be a property of ‘evil’.

135b17Secondly (4) look from the point of view of relative opposites and see, for destructive purposes, if the correlative of the term rendered fails to be a property of the correlative of the subject: for then neither will the correlative of the first be a property of the correlative of the second. 135b20Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as ‘double’ is relative to ‘half’, and ‘in excess’ to ‘exceeded’, while ‘in excess’ is not a property of ‘double’, ‘exceeded’ could not be a property of ‘half’. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if the correlative of the alleged property is a property of the subject’s correlative: for then also the correlative of the first will be a property of the correlative of the second: e.g. inasmuch as ‘double’ is relative to ‘half’, and the 135b25proportion 1 : 2 is relative to the proportion 2 : 1,¹ while it is a property of ‘double’ to be ‘in the proportion of 2 to 1’, it would be a property of ‘half’ to be ‘in the proportion of 1 to 2’,

135b27Thirdly (c) for destructive purposes, see if an attribute described in terms of a state (X) fails to be a property of the given state (Y): for then neither will the attribute described in terms of the privation (of X) be a property of the privation (of Y). Also if, on the other hand, an attribute 135b30described in terms of the privation (of X) be not a property of the given privation (of Y), neither will the attribute described in terms of the state (X) be a property of the state (Y). Thus, for example, inasmuch as it is not predicated as a property of ‘deafness’ to be a ‘lack of sensation’, neither could it be a property of ‘hearing’ to be a ‘sensation’. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if an attribute described in terms of a state (X) is a property of the given state (Y): for then also the attribute that is described in terms of the privation (of X) will be 135b35a property of the privation (of Y). Also, if an attribute described in terms of a privation (of X) be a property of 136athe privation (of Y), then also the attribute that is described in terms of the state (X) will be a property of the state (Y). Thus (e. g.) inasmuch as ‘to see’ is a property of ‘sight’, inasmuch as we have sight, ‘failure to see’ would be a property of ‘blindness’, inasmuch as we have not got the sight we should naturally have.

136a5Next, look from the point of view of positive and negative terms; and first (a) from the point of view of the predicates taken by themselves. This common-place rule is useful only for a destructive purpose. Thus (e.g.) see if the positive term or the attribute described in terms of it is a property of the subject: for then the negative term or the attribute 136a10described in terms of it will not be a property of the subject. Also if, on the other hand, the negative term or the attribute described in terms of it is a property of the subject, then the positive term or the attribute described in terms of it will not be a property of the subject: e.g. inasmuch as ‘animate’ is a property of ‘living creature², ‘inanimate’ could not be a property of ‘living creature’.

136a14Secondly (b) look from the point of view of the predicates, 136a15positive or negative, and their respective subjects ;' and see, for destructive purposes, if the positive term fails to be a property of the positive subject: for then neither will the negative term be a property of the negative subject. Also, if the negative term fails to be a property of the negative subject, neither will the positive term be a property of the positive subject. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as ‘animal’ is not a property of ‘man’, neither could ‘not-animal’ be a property 136a20of ‘not-man’. Also if ‘not-animal’ seems not to be a property of ‘not-man’, neither will ‘animal’ be a property of ‘man’. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if the positive term is a property of the positive subject: for then the negative term will be a property of the negative subject as well. Also if the negative term be a property of the negative subject, the positive will be a property of 136a25the positive as well. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as it is a property of ‘not-living being’ ‘not to live’, it would be a property of ‘living being’ ‘to live’: also if it seems to be a property of ‘living being’ ‘to live’, it will also seem to be a property of ‘not-living being’ ‘not to live’.

136a29Thirdly (c) look from the point of view of the subjects taken by themselves, and see, for destructive purposes, if 136a30the property rendered is a property of the positive subject: for then the same term will not be a property of the negative subject as well. Also, if the term rendered be a property of the negative subject, it will not be a property of the positive. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as ‘animate’ is a property of ‘living creature’, ‘animate’ could not be a property of ‘not-living creature’. For constructive purposes,³ on the other hand, if the term rendered fails to be a property of 136a35the affirmative subject it would be a property of the negative. This commonplace rule is, however, deceptive: for a positive term is not a property of a negative, or a negative of a positive. For a positive term does not belong at all 136bto a negative, while a negative term, though it belongs to a positive, does not belong as a property.

136b2Next, look from the point of view of the co-ordinate members of a division, and see, for destructive purposes, if none of the co-ordinate members (parallel with the property rendered) be a property of any of the remaining set of 136b5co-ordinate members (parallel with the subject): for then neither will the term stated be a property of that of which it is stated to be a property. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as ‘sensible living being’ is not a property of any of the other living beings,! ‘intelligible living being’ could not be a property of God. For⁴ constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if some one or other of the remaining co-ordinate members (parallel with the property rendered) be a property of each of these co-ordinate members (parallel with the 136b10subject): for then the remaining one too will be a property of that of which it has been stated not to be a property. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as it is a property of ‘wisdom’ to be essentially ‘the natural virtue of the rational faculty’, then, taking each of the other virtues as well in this way, it would be a property of ‘temperance’ to be essentially ‘the natural virtue of the faculty of desire’.

Owen 1853

We must next consider from opposites; first, from contraries, the subverter indeed whether the contrary is not the property of the contrary, since a contrary will not be the property of a contrary; thus, since injustice is contrary to justice, but the worst to the best, and the best is not the property of justice, neither would the worst be the property of injustice. On the other hand, the confirmer (must examine), whether the contrary is the property of the contrary, for a contrary will be the property of a contrary; thus, since evil is contrary to good, and what is to be avoided to what is eligible, but the property of good is the eligible, the property of evil would be that which is to be avoided.

Next, from relatives; the subverter indeed if one relative is not the property of another relative, for this relative will not be the property of that relative; thus, since the double is spoken relatively to the half, and the exceeding to the exceeded, but the exceeding is not the property of the double, the exceeded would not be the property of the half. It is confirmed however, if one relative is the property of another, for this relative will be the property of that; thus, since the double is spoken relatively to the half, one indeed with relation to two, but two to one, and the property of the double is as two to one, the property of the half will be as one to two.

Thirdly, it is subverted, if what is predicated according to habit is not the property of the habit, since neither will what is predicated according to privation be the property of privation; also if what is predicated as to privation is not the property of privation, neither will what is predicated as to habit be the property of habit; thus, since privation of sense is not said to be the property of deafness,¹ neither would sensation be the property of hearing. Again, it is confirmed, if what is predicated according to habit is the property of habit, for what is predicated as to privation will be also the property of privation; and if what is predicated as to privation is the property of privation, what is predicated as to habit will be the property of habit. Thus, since it is the property of sight to see, according as we possess sight, not to see, would be the property of blindness, according as we do not possess sight when we are naturally adapted to have it.

Moreover, from affirmatives and negatives, and, first, from the predicates themselves; but this place is useful for the subverter only. Thus, if affirmation, or what is predicated as to affirmation, is the property of a thing, neither negation nor what is predicated as to negation will be the property of it; but if negation, or what is predicated according to negation, is its property, neither affirmation nor what is predicated as to affirmation will be its property; thus, since animated is the property of animal, what is not animated will not be the property of animal.

Secondly, from things predicated or not predi-cated, and of which they are predicated or not predicated, subverting it indeed if affirmation is not the property of affirmation; for neither will negation be the property of negation, and if nega-tion is not the property of negation, neither will affirmation be the property of affirmation. Thus, since animal is not the property of man, neither would what is not animal be the property of what is not man, and if what is not animal ap-pears to be not the property of what is not man, neither will animal be the property of man. We confirm it, on the con-trary, if affirmation is the property of affirmation, for nega-tion will also be the property of negation, and if negation is the property of negation, affirmation also will be the property of affirmation; thus, since not to live is the property of what is not animal, to live would be the property of animal; and if to live appears the property of animal, not to live will appear the property of what is not animal.

Thirdly, from subjects themselves, subverting indeed if the assigned property is the property of affirmation, since the same will not also be the property of negation; but if what is assigned be the property of negation, it will not be the property of affirma-tion; thus, since the animated is the property of animal, the animated would not be the property of what is not animal. On the other hand confirming it, if the assigned be not the property of affirmation, for it would be that of negation. This place however is false, for affirmation is not the property of negation, nor negation of affirmation, for affirmation is not wholly present with negation, but negation is with affirmation, yet is not present as a property.²

Next, from things oppositely divided, subvert-ing indeed, if none of the oppositely divided is the property of no one of the remaining oppositely divided, since neither will what is stated, be the property of that of which it is stated as the pro-perty; thus, since sensible animal is the property of no other animal, intelligible animal would not be the pro-perty of God. Again, confirming it, if any one of the re-mainder oppositely divided, is the property of each of these which are oppositely divided; for the remainder will be the property of that of which it is stated not to be the property; thus, since it is the property of prudence to be naturally per se, the virtue of the reasoning part, and of each of the other virtues thus assumed, the property of prudence would be, to be naturally per se, the virtue of the appetitive part of the soul.

Latino

Deinde ex casibus, destruenti quidem, si casus non est casus proprium. Neque enim casus erit proprium casus, ut quia non est ejus quod est juste proprium id quod bene, neque justi proprium erit bonum. Construenti autem, si casus est proprium casus. Nam et casus erit casus proprium, ut quia hominis est proprium gressibile bipes, et homini erit proprium gressibili bipedi dici. Non solum autem in eo quod dictum est secundum casus est considerandum, sed et in oppositis, quemadmodum et in prioribus locis dictum est, destruenti quidem, si oppositi casus, non est proprium oppositi casus. Neque enim oppositi casus erit proprium oppositi casus, ut quia non est ejus quod est juste proprium quod bene, neque injuste erit proprium quod male. Construenti vero, si oppositi casus est proprium oppositi casus. Nam et oppositi casus erit proprium oppositi casus, ut quia honesti est proprium optimum, et inhonesti erit proprium pessimum. Deinde ex iis quae similiter se habent, destruenti quidem, si quod similiter se habet, ejus quod similiter se habet non est proprium. Neque enim quod similiter se habet, ejus quod similiter se habet erit proprium, ut quia similiter se habet ad exstruendum aedificium aedificator, et medicus ad efficiendum sanitatem, non est autem proprium medici efficere sanitatem, neque aedificatoris erit proprium exstruere aedificium. Construenti autem, si quod similiter se habet erit proprium ejus quod similiter se habet. Nam et quod similiter se habet, ejus quod similiter se habet erit proprium, ut quoniam similiter se habet medicus ad id quod est esse effectivum sanitatis, et ludimagister ad id quod est esse effectivum bonae habitudinis, est autem proprium magistri ludi esse effectivum bonae habitudinis, erit proprium et medici effectivum esse sanitatis. Deinde ex iis quae sic se habent, destruenti quidem, si quod sic se habet, ejus quod sic se habet non est proprium. Neque enim quod sic se habet, ejus quod sic se habet erit proprium. Si autem ejus quod sic se habet, id quod sic se habet est proprium, ejus non erit proprium cujus positum est esse proprium. Ut quia sic se habet prudentia ad honestum et turpe, eo quod disciplina utrisque eorum est, non est autem prudentiae proprium disciplinam esse honesti, non utique erit proprium prudentiae disciplinam esse turpis; si vero est proprium prudentiae disciplinam esse honesti, non erit proprium ejusdem disciplinam esse turpis, impossibile est enim ejusdem plura esse propria. Construenti vero nihil locus iste utilis, nam quod sic se habet, unum ad plura comparatur. Deinde destruenti quidem, si quod secundum esse dicitur, non est ejus quod secundum esse dicitur proprium. Nam neque corrumpi ejus quod est secundum corrumpi, neque generari ejus quod secundum generari dicitur, erit proprium. Ut quia est hominis proprium esse animal, neque ejus quod est hominem generari, erit proprium generari animal, neque ejus quod est hominem corrumpi erit proprium corrumpi animal. Eodem autem modo accipiendum est et ex generari ad esse et corrumpi, et ex corrumpi ad esse et generari, quemadmodum dictum est nunc ex esse ad generari, et corrumpi. Construenti autem, si ejus quod est secundum esse ordinatum est. Est autem per se, ordinatum proprium, nam et ejus quod secundum generari dicitur, erit hoc quod secundum generari dicitur proprium, et ejus quod secundum corrumpi, hoc quod secundum corrumpi est assignatum, ut quia hominis est proprium esse mortalem, et ejus quod est generari hominem, erit proprium generari mortalem, et ejus quod est corrumpi hominem, corrumpi mortalem. Eodem autem modo accipiendum est ex generari et corrumpi, et ad esse et ad ipsa ex ipsis fieri, quemadmodum et in destruenti dictum est. Deinde inspiciendum ad idem suppositi, destruenti quidem, si ideae non inest, aut si non qua id dicitur, cujus est proprium assignatum. Non enim erit proprium quod positum est esse proprium, ut quoniam ipsi homini non inest quiescere qua homo est, sed qua idea, non erit hominis proprium quiscere. Construenti autem, si ideae inest, et secundum hoc inest qua dicitur de illo ipso cujus positum est non esse proprium. Erit enim proprium quod positum est non inesse proprium, ut quoniam inest ipsi animali ex anima et corpore compositum esse, et qua animal est ipsi inest id, erit proprium animalis ex corpore et anima compositum esse.

Inglese

136b15Next, look from the point of view of the inflexions, and see, for destructive purposes, if the inflexion of the property rendered fails to be a property of the inflexion of the subject: for then neither will the other inflexion be a property of the other inflexion. Thus (e. g.) inasmuch as ‘beautifully’ is not a property of ‘justly’, neither could ‘beautiful’ be a property of ‘just’. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if the inflexion of the property rendered is a property of the inflexion of the subject: for then also the other inflexion will be a property of the other inflexion. 136b20Thus (e. g.) inasmuch as ‘walking biped’ is a property of man, it would also be any one’s property ‘as a man’ to be described ‘as a walking biped’. Not only in the case of the actual term mentioned should one look at the inflexions, but also in the case of its opposites, just as has been laid down in the case of the former commonplace rules as well.)¹ 136b25Thus, for destructive purposes, see if the inflexion of the opposite of the property rendered fails to be the property of the inflexion of the opposite of the subject: for then neither will the inflexion of the other opposite be a property of the inflexion of the other opposite. Thus (e. g.) inasmuch as ‘well’ is not a property of ‘justly’, neither could ‘badly’ be a property of ‘unjustly’. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if the inflexion of the opposite of the property originally suggested is a property of the inflexion 136b30of the opposite of the original subject: for then also the inflexion of the other opposite will be a property of the inflexion of the other opposite. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as ‘best’ is a property of ‘the good’, ‘worst’ also will be a property of ‘the evil’.

136b32Next, look from the point of view of things that are in a like relation, and see, for destructive purposes, if what is in a relation like that of the property rendered fails to be a property of what is in a relation like that of the subject: for then neither will what is in a relation like that of the 136b35first be a property of what is in a relation like that of the second. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as the relation of the builder towards the production of a house is like that of the doctor towards the production of health, and it is not 137aa property of a doctor to produce health, it could not be a property of a builder to produce a house. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if what is in a relation like that of the property rendered is a property of what is in a relation like that of the subject: for then also what is in a relation like that of the first will be a property of what is in a relation like that of the second. Thus (e. g.) inasmuch as the relation of a doctor towards the possession of ability to produce health is like that of 137a5sa trainer towards the possession of ability to produce vigour, and it is a property of a trainer to possess the ability to produce vigour, it would be a property of a doctor to possess the ability to produce health.

137a7Next look from the point of view of things that are identically related, and see, for destructive purposes, if the predicate that is identically related towards two subjects fails to be a property of the subject which is identically related to it as the subject in question; for then neither 137a10will the predicate that is identically related to both subjects be a property of the subject which is identically related to it as the first. If, on the other hand, the predicate which is identically related to two subjects is the property of the subject which is identically related to it as the subject in question, then it will not be a property of that of which it has been stated to be a property. [Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as prudence is identically related to both the noble and the base, since it is knowledge of each of them, and it is not a property of prudence to be knowledge of the noble, it 137a15could not be a property of prudence to be knowledge of the base. If, on the other hand, it is a property of prudence to be the knowledge of the noble, it could not be a property of it to be the knowledge of the base]² For it is impossible for the same thing to be a property of more than one subject. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, this commonplace rule is of no use: for what is ‘identically related’ is 137a20a single predicate in process of comparison with more than one subject.

137a21Next, for destructive purposes, see if the predicate qualified by the verb ‘to be’ fails to be a property of the subject qualified by the verb ‘to be’: for then neither will the destruction of the one be a property of the other qualified by the verb ‘to be destroyed’, nor will the ‘becoming’ the one be a property of the other qualified by the verb ‘to become’. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as it is not a property of ‘man’ to be an animal, neither could it be a property of 137a25becoming a man to become an animal; nor could the destruction of an animal be a property of the destruction of a man. In the same way one should derive arguments also from ‘becoming’ to ‘being’ and ‘being destroyed’, and from ‘being destroyed’ to ‘being’ and to ‘becoming’, exactly as 137a30they have just been given from ‘being’ to ‘becoming’ and ‘being destroyed’. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if the subject set down as qualified by the verb ‘to be’ has the predicate set down as so qualified, as its property: for then also the subject qualified by the verb ‘to become’ will have the predicate qualified by ‘to become’ as its property, and the subject qualified by the verb ‘to be destroyed’ will have as its property the predicate rendered with this qualification. Thus, for example, inasmuch as it 137a35is a property of man to be a mortal, it would be a property of becoming a man to become a mortal, and the destruction of a mortal would be a property of the destruction of a man. 137bIn the same way one should derive arguments also from ‘becoming’ and ‘being destroyed’ both to ‘being’ and to the conclusions that follow from them, exactly as was directed also for the purpose of destruction.

137b3Next take a look at the ‘idea’ of the subject stated, and see, for destructive purposes, if the suggested property fails to belong to the ‘idea’ in question, or fails to belong to it 137b5in virtue of that character which causes it to bear the description of which the property was rendered: for then what has been stated to be a property will not be a property. Thus (e. g.) inasmuch as ‘being motionless’ does not belong to ‘man-himself’ qua' ‘man’, but qua ‘idea’, it could not be a property of ‘man’ to be motionless. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if the property in question belongs to the idea, and belongs to it in that respect in virtue of which there is predicated of it that character³ of 137b10which the predicate in question has been stated not to be a property: for then what has been stated not to be a property will be a property. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as it belongs to ‘living-creature-itself’ to be compounded of soul and body, and further this belongs to it qua ‘living-creature’, it would be a property of ‘living-creature’ to be compounded of soul and body.

Owen 1853

In the next place, from cases, subverting property indeed if case is not the property of case, for neither will one case be the property of the other; thus, since what is beautifully is not the property of what is justly, the beautiful would not be the property of the just. On the other hand, confirming if case is the property of case, for the one case will be the property of the other; thus, since pedestrian biped is the property of man (in the nominative case), it would also be the property of man to be called pedestrian biped (in the dative case). Not only however must we observe cases in respect of what has been stated, but also in opposites, as was observed in the former places, subverting indeed if the case of the opposite is not the property of the case of the opposite, for neither will the case of one opposite be the property of the case of another opposite; thus, since what is well (done) is not the property of what is justly (done), neither would be ill (done), the property of that which is done unjustly. Again, we confirm it, if the case of the opposite be the property of the case of the opposite, for the case of this opposite will be the property of the case of that opposite; thus, since best is the property of good, worst would be the property of evil.

Next, from those which subsist similarly, subverting, indeed, if what subsists similarly is not the property of what has similar subsistence, for neither will what subsists similarly be the property of that which has similar subsistence. Thus, since the builder of a house subsists similarly with regard to building a house, as the physician with regard to producing health, but it is not the property of the physician to produce health, neither would it be the property of the house-builder to produce a house.

It is confirmed, however, if what subsists similarly is the property of what has similar subsistence, for the similarly subsisting will also be the property of what has similar subsistence; thus, since the physician subsists similarly with regard to being effective of health, as the trainer of the gymnasium to the being effective of a good habit of body, but the being effective of a good habit of body is the property of the trainer, to be effective of health would be the property of the physician.

Next, from those which subsist after the same manner, subverting, indeed, if what subsists after the same manner is not the property of what subsists after the same manner, for neither will what subsists after the same manner be the property of what subsists after the same manner, but if of that which subsists after the same manner, that which subsists after the same manner, is the property, it will not be the property of that thing of which it is stated to be the property. Thus, since prudence subsists after the same manner with regard to the honourable and the base, from their being a science of each of them, but to be the science of the honourable is not the property of prudence, it would not be the property of prudence to be the science of the base, but if it is the property of prudence to be the science of the honourable, it would not be the property of it to be the science of the base, since it is impossible that the same thing should be the property of many. For him who confirms, indeed, this place is of no use, for what subsists after the same manner is one thing compared with many.¹ Next, we subvert it, if what is said to exist is not the property of what is said to exist, since neither will to be corrupted be the property of that which is said to be corrupted, nor to be generated of what is said to be generated. For instance, since it is not the property of man to be animal, neither will to be generated animal, be the property of to be generated man, nor will the corruption of animal, be the property of the corruption of man. After the same manner, we must assume (the argument) from being generated to existence and being corrupted, and from being corrupted to existence and being generated,² as was just now said from existence, to the being generated and corrupted. Again, we confirm it, if of what is arranged according to existence, the property is that which is arranged according to the same, for what is said to be according to the being generated, will also be the property of what is said to be according to the being generated, and of what is said to be corrupted that which is assigned according to this. Thus, since to be mortal is the property of man, to be generated mortal would also be the property of the being generated man, and the corruption of mortal of the corruption of man. In the same way, indeed, we must take the argument, both from the being generated and the being corrupted with regard both to existence and to the same from the same, as was observed to him who subverts.

Next, we must pay attention to the idea of the thing proposed, subverting, indeed, if it be not present with the idea, or if not as to this, according to which that is stated, of which the property is a sign,³ for what is stated to be, will not be the property. Thus, since rest is not present with man himself, so far as he is man, but so far as he is idea,⁴ rest would not be the property of man. We confirm it, indeed, if it is present with the idea, and is present so far as it is predicated of this very thing, of which it is stated not to be the property, for what is stated not to be, will be property. Thus, since it is present with animal—itself⁵ to be composed of soul and body, and this is present with it, so far as it is animal, to be composed of soul and body would be the property of animal.

Latino

Deinde ex magis et minus. Primum quidem destruenti, si quod magis est, ejus quod magis non est proprium. Neque enim quod minus est, ejus quod minus erit proprium, neque quod minime ejus quod minime, neque quod maxime ejus quod maxime, neque quod simpliciter ejus quod simpliciter, ut quia non est magis colorari magis corporis proprium, neque minus colorari minus corporis proprium erit, neque colorari corporis omnino. Construenti autem, si quod magis est ejus quod magis est, est proprium. Nam quod minus est, ejus quod minus est erit proprium, et quod minime, ejus quod minime, et quod maxime, ejus quod maxime, et quod simpliciter, ejus quod simpliciter, ut quia magis viventis magis sentire est proprium, et minus viventis minus sentire erit proprium, et ejus quod maxime id quod maxime, et ejus quod minime id quod minime, et ejus quod simpliciter id quoque quod simpliciter. Et ex eo autem quod simpliciter, ad eadem considerandum, destruenti quidem, si quod simpliciter non est proprium. Neque enim quod magis est ejus quod magis, neque quod minus ejus quod minus, neque quod maxime ejus quod maxime, neque quod minime ejus quod minime erit proprium, ut quia non est hominis proprium studiosum, neque magis hominis, magis studiosum erit proprium. Construenti autem, si quod simpliciter est, ejus quod simpliciter est proprium. Nam et hoc quod magis ejus quod magis, et quod minus ejus quod minus, et quod minime ejus quod minime, et quod maxime ejus quod maxime erit proprium, ut quia est ignis proprium sursum ferri secundum naturam, et magis ignis erit magis proprium sursum ferri secundum naturam; eodem autem modo considerandum est et ex aliis hujusmodi. Secundum autem, destruenti quidem, si quod magis est, non est ejus quod magis est proprium. Neque enim quod minus est ejus quod minus erit proprium, ut quoniam magis est proprium animalis sentire quam hominis scire; non est autem animalis proprium sentire, quare non erit hominis proprium scire. Construenti autem, si quod minus, ejus quod minus est proprium. Nam et quod magis ejus quod magis erit proprium, ut quia minus est proprium hominis mansuetum natura quam animalis vivere, est autem hominis proprium mansuetum natura, erit proprium animalis vivere. Tertium vero, destruenti quidem, si cujus magis est, proprium non est. Neque enim cujus est minus proprium, erit ejus proprium, si autem illius est proprium, non erit hujus proprium, ut quia colorari magis superficiei quam corporis est proprium, non est autem superficiei proprium, non erit corporis proprium colorari, si vero est superficiei proprium, non erit corporis proprium. Construenti autem hic locus non est utilis, nam impossibile est idem plurium proprium esse.

Quartum, destruenti quidem, si quod magis est ejus proprium, non est proprium, neque profecto quod minus est ejus proprium, erit proprium. Ut quia magis est proprium animalis sensibile quam partibile, non est autem animalis sensibile proprium, quare non erit animalis partibile proprium. Construenti autem, si quod minus est ejus proprium, est proprium. Nam et quod magis est ejus proprium, erit proprium, ut quoniam minus est proprium animalis sentire quam vivere, est autem animalis proprium sentire, erit animalis proprium vivere. Deinde ex his quae similiter insunt, primum quidem destruenti, si quod similiter est proprium, non est proprium ejus cujus similiter est proprium. Neque enim quod similiter est proprium, erit proprium ejus cujus similiter est proprium, ut quia similiter est proprium concupiscibilis concuspiscere, et rationalis ratiocinari, non est autem proprium concupiscibilis concupiscere, non erit rationalis proprium ratiocinari. Construenti vero, si quod similiter est proprium, ejus est proprium cujus est similiter proprium. Nam et quod similiter est proprium, erit ejus proprium cujus similiter est proprium, ut quia similiter est rationalis proprium primum prudens, et concupiscibilis proprium primum temperans, est autem rationalis primum prudens: erit igitur concupiscibilis proprium primum temperans.

Secundum autem, destruenti quidem, si quod similiter est proprium non est proprium ejus. Nam neque quod similiter est proprium, erit proprium ejus, ut quia similiter est proprium hominis videre et audire, non est hominis proprium videre, non utique hominis proprium audire. Construenti vero, si quod similiter est ejus proprium, est proprium. Nam quod similiter est ejus proprium, proprium erit, ut quia similiter est proprium animae, aliquid partium ejus primo esse concupiscibile, et rationale primo; est autem proprium animae, quidpiam partium ejus esse concupiscibile primo, erit utique proprium animae, quidpiam partium ejus esse rationale primo. Tertium vero destruenti quidem, si cujus similiter est proprium non est proprium. Neque enim cujus similiter proprium, erit proprium, si autem illius est proprium, non erit alterius proprium, ut quia urere similiter est proprium flammae et carbonis, non est autem flammae proprium urere; non erit carbonis proprium urere, si autem est flammae proprium, non erit carbonis proprium urere. Construenti autem hic locus non est utilis, differt autem quod est ex similiter se habentibus, ab eo quod ex iis est quae similiter insunt, quoniam illud quidem secundum proportionem sumitur non in eo quod inest aliquid comparatum, hoc autem ex eo quod inest, alicui comparatur.

Inglese

137b14Next look from the point of view of greater and less 137b15degrees, and first (a) for destructive purposes, see if what is more-P fails to be a property of what is more-S: for then neither will what is less-P be a property of what is less-S, nor least-P of least-S, nor most-P of most-S, nor P simply of S simply. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as being more highly coloured is not a property of what is more a body, neither 137b20could being less highly coloured be a property of what is less a body, nor being coloured be a property of body at all. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if what is more-P is a property of what is more-S: for then also what is less-P will be a property of what is less-S, and least-P of least-S, and most-P of most-S, and P simply of S simply. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as a higher degree of sensation is a property of a higher degree of life, a lower 137b25degree of sensation also would be a property of a lower degree of life, and the highest of the highest and the lowest of the lowest degree, and sensation simply of life simply.

137b27Also you should look at the argument from a simple predication to the same qualified types of predication, and see, for destructive purposes, if P simply fails to be a 137b30property of S simply; for then neither will more-P be a property of more-S, nor less-P of less-S, nor most-P of most-S, nor least-P of least-S. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as ‘virtuous’ is not a property of ‘man’, neither could ‘more virtuous’ be a property of what is ‘more human’. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if P simply is a property of S simply: for then more-P also will be 137b35a property of more-S, and less-P of less-S, and least-P of least-S, and most-P of most-S. Thus (e.g.) a tendency to move upwards by nature is a property of fire, and so also 138aa greater tendency to move upwards by nature would be a property of what is more fiery. In the same way too one should look at all these matters from the point of view of the others as well.

138a4Secondly (4) for destructive purposes, see if the- more likely property fails to be a property of the more likely 138a5subject: for then neither will the less likely property be a property of the less likely subject. Thus (e. g.) inasmuch as ‘perceiving’ is more likely to be a property of ‘animal’ than ‘knowing’ of ‘man’, and ‘perceiving’ is not a property of ‘animal’, ‘knowing’ could not be a property of ‘man’. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if the less likely property is a property of the less likely subject; for then too the more likely property will be a property of the 138a10more likely subject. Thus (e. g.) inasmuch as ‘to be naturally civilized’ is less likely to be a property of man than ‘to live’ of an animal, and it is a property of man to be naturally civilized, it would be a property of animal to live.

138a12Thirdly (c) for destructive purposes, see if the predicate fails to be a property of that of which it is more likely to be a property: for then neither will it be a property of that of which it is less likely to be a property: while if it is 138a15a property of the former, it will not be a property of the latter. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as ‘to be coloured’ is more likely to be a property of a ‘surface’ than of a ‘body’, and it is not a property of a surface, ‘to be coloured’ could not be a property of ‘body’; while if it is a property of a ‘surface’, it could not be a property of a ‘body’. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, this commonplace 138a20rule is not of any use: for it is impossible for the same thing to be a property of more than one thing.

138a21Fourthly (d) for destructive purposes, see if what is more likely to be a property of a given subject fails to be its property: for then neither will what is less likely to be a property of it be its property. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as ‘sensible’ is more likely than ‘divisible’ to be a property of ‘animal’, and ‘sensible’ is not a property of animal, 138a25‘divisible’ could not be a property of animal. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if what is less likely to be a property of it is a property; for then what is more likely to be a property of it will be a property as well. Thus, for example, inasmuch as ‘sensation’ is less likely to be a property of ‘animal’ than ‘life’, and ‘sensation’ is a property of animal, ‘life’ would be a property of animal.

138a30Next, look from the point of view of the attributes that belong in a like manner, and first (a) for destructive purposes, see if what is as much a property fails to be a property of that of which it is as much a property: for then neither will that which is as much a property as it be a property of that of which it is as much a property. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as ‘desiring’ is as much a property of the faculty of desire as ‘reasoning’ is a property of 138a35the faculty of reason, and desiring is not a property of the faculty of desire, reasoning could not be a property of the faculty of reason. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if what is as much a property is a property of that of which it is as much a property: for then also 138bwhat is as much a property as it will be a property of that of which it is as much a property. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as it is as much a property of ‘the faculty of reason’ to be ‘the primary seat of wisdom’ as it is of ‘the faculty of desire’ to be ‘the primary seat of temperance’, and it is a property of the faculty of reason to be the primary seat of wisdom, it would be a property of the faculty of desire 138b5to be the primary seat of temperance.

138b6Secondly (b) for destructive purposes, see if what is as much a property of anything fails to be a property of it: for then neither will what is as much a property be a property of it. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as ‘seeing’ is as much a property of man as ‘hearing’, and ‘seeing’ is not a property of man, ‘hearing’ could not be a property of 138b10man. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if what is as much a property of it is its property: for then what is as much a property of it as the former will be its property as well. Thus (e.g.) it is as much a property of the soul to be the primary possessor of a part that desires as of a part that reasons, and it is a property of the soul to be the primary possessor of a part that desires, and so it 138b15would be a property of the soul to be the primary possessor of a part that reasons.

138b16Thirdly (c) for destructive purposes, see if it fails to be a property of that of which it is as much a property: for then neither will it be a property of that of which it is as much a property as of the former, while if it be a property of the former, it will not be a property of the other. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as ‘to burn’ is as much a property of ‘flame’ as of ‘live coals’, and ‘to burn’ is not a property 138b20of flame, ‘to burn’ could not be a property of live coals: while if it is a property of flame, it could not be a property of live coals. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, this commonplace rule is of no use.

138b23The rule based on things that are in a like relation! differs from the rule based on attributes that belong in a like manner,”¹ because the former point is secured by analogy, 138b25not from reflection on the belonging of any attribute, while the latter is judged by a comparison based on the fact that an attribute belongs.

Owen 1853

Next, from the more and less, first indeed subverting, if the more is not the property of the more, for neither will the less be the property of the less, nor the least of the least, nor the most of the most, nor the simply of the simply. Thus, since to be more coloured, is not the property of what is more body, neither will to be less coloured, be the property of what is less body, nor in short will to be coloured, be the property of body. We confirm it however, if the more is the property of the more, since the less also will be the property of the less, and the least of the least, and the most of the most, and the simply of the simply; for instance, since to perceive more, is the property of what is more vital, to perceive less, would be the property of the less vital, and the most of the most, the least of the least, and the simply of the simply.

From the simply too, the subverter must consider whether the simply is not the property of the simply, for neither will the more be the property of the more, nor the less of the less, nor the most of the most, nor the least of the least; thus, since it is not the property of man to be worthy, neither would to be more worthy, be the property of what is more man. The confirmer however (must consider), whether what is simply is the property of what is simply, for the more will be the property of the more, the less also of the less, the least of the least, and the most of the most; thus, since it is the property of fire naturally to tend upwards, it would also be the property of what is more fire naturally to tend more upwards, and in the same manner we must direct attention from other things also, to all these.

Secondly, it is subverted, if the more is not the property of the more, since neither will the less be the property of the less; thus, since it is more the property of animal to perceive, than of man to know, but it is not the property of animal to perceive, it would not be the property of man to know. We confirm it indeed, if the less is the property of the less, for the more will also be the property of the more; thus, since it is less the property of man to be naturally mild than of animal to live, but it is the property of man to be naturally mild, it would be the property of animal to live.

Thirdly, we subvert it, if it is not the property of which it is more the property, since neither will it be the property of that of which it is less the property, but if it is the property of that, it will not be the property of this. Thus, since to be coloured is more the property of superficies than of body, but it is not the property of superficies, neither would to be coloured be the property of body; if however it is the property of superficies, it would not be the property of body. This place indeed is not useful to the confirmer, since it is impossible that the same thing should be the property of many.

Fourthly, it is subverted if what is more the property (of the thing), is not its property, since neither will what is less its property be the property, e. g. since the sensible is more the property of animal than the partible, but the sensible is not the property of animal, the partible would not be the property of animal. But it is confirmed if what is less its property is the property of it, since what is more its property will be the property; thus, since it is less the property of animal to perceive than to live, but to perceive is the property of animal, to live would be the property of animal.

Next, from things which exist similarly, first indeed subverting, if what is similarly the property, is not the property of that of which it is similarly the property, since neither will what is similarly property be the property of this of which it is similarly the property. Thus, since it is similarly the property of the appetitive part of the soul to desire, and of the reasoning part to reason; but to desire is not the property of the appetitive part, neither would to reason be the property of the reasoning part. On the other hand, we confirm it, if what is similarly property is the property of this of which it is similarly the property; for what is similarly property will be the property of this thing of which it is similarly the property. For instance, since what is primarily prudent is similarly the property of the reasoning part, and what is primarily temperate of the appetitive part, but what is primarily prudent is the property of the reasoning, the primarily temperate would be the property of the appetitive part.

Secondly, we subvert it, if what is similarly the property (of a thing) is not its property, since neither will what is similarly property be the property of it. Thus, since it is similarly the property of man to see and to hear, but to see is not the property of man,¹ neither would the property of man be to hear. Again, we confirm it, if what is similarly the property (of a thing) is its property, for what is similarly its property will be the property; thus, since it is similarly the property of the soul that a part of it should be appetitive primarily and argumentative, but it is the property of the soul that a part of it is primarily appetitive, it would be the property of the soul that a part of it is primarily argumentative.

Thirdly, it is subverted, if it is not the property of what it is similarly the property, since neither will it be the property of what it is similarly the property, but if it is the property of that, it will not be the property of the other. Thus, since to burn is similarly the property of flame and of a burning coal, but it is not the property of flame to burn, neither would it be the property of a burning coal to burn,² but if it is the property of flame, it would not be the property of a burning coal: this place however is of no use to him who confirms.

Nevertheless, (the place) from things similarly affected, differs from that from things similarly inherent, because the one is assumed according to analogy, and is not considered in respect of something being inherent, but the other is compared from something being inherent.

Latino

Deinde destruenti quidem, si potentia proprium assignans, et non ad ens assignavit proprium potentia, cum non contingat ei potentia inesse cum ens non est. Non enim erit proprium quod positum est esse proprium, ut quia qui dixit aeris proprium respirabile, potentia quidem assignavit proprium (nam tale proprium ut respirari possit, respirabile est), assignavit autem et ad non esse proprium, nam et cum non est animal quod spirare natum ex aere, contingit aerem esse, non tamen cum non est animal, possibile est spirare, quare neque aeris erit proprium hujusmodi possibile respirari tunc, quia animal non erit quod tale est ut respirare possit, non ergo erit aeris proprium respirabile. Construenti autem, si potentia assignans proprium, tam ad ens assignavit proprium quam ad non ens, cum contingat potentia non enti inesse. Erit enim proprium quod positum est non esse proprium, ut quia qui assignavit proprium, entis possibile pati, aut facere potentia assignans proprium, ad ens assignavit proprium (nam cum ens est, et possibile pati quid, aut facere erit), quare proprium erit entis possibile pati quid, aut facere. Deinde destruenti quidem, si per superabundantiam posuit proprium. Non erit enim proprium quod positum est esse proprium, accidit enim sic assignantibus proprium, non de quo orationem et nomen verificari, nam corrupta re, nihil minus erit oratio, nam eorum quae sunt, alicui maxime inest, ut si quis assignet ignis proprium, corpus levissimum, corrupto enim igne, erit aliquod corporum quod levissimum erit, quare non erit ignis proprium, corpus levissimum. Construenti autem, si non per superabundantiam posuit proprium. Erit enim secundum hoc bene positum proprium, ut quia qui posuit hominis proprium animal mansuetum natura, non superabundantia assignavit proprium, erit utique secundum hoc bene positum proprium.

Inglese

138b27Next, for destructive purposes, see if in rendering the property potentially, he has also through that potentiality rendered the property relatively to something that does not exist, when the potentiality in question cannot belong 138b30to what does not exist: for then what is stated to be a property will not be a property. Thus (e.g.) he who has said that ‘breathable’ is a property of ‘air’ has, on the one hand, rendered the property potentially (for that is ‘breathable’ which is such as can be breathed), and on the other hand has also rendered the property relatively to what does not exist:—for while air may exist, even though there exist no animal so constituted as to breathe the air, 138b35it is not possible to breathe it if no animal exist: so that it will not, either, be a property of air to be such as can be breathed at a time when there exists no animal such as to breathe it—and so it follows that ‘breathable’ could not be a property of air.

139a1For constructive purposes, see if in rendering the property potentially he renders the property either relatively to something that exists, or to something that does not exist, when the potentiality in question can belong to what does not exist: for then what has been stated not to be a property will be a property. Thus (e.g.) he who renders it as a 139a5property of ‘being’ to be ‘capable of being acted upon or of acting’, in rendering the property potentially, has rendered the property relatively to something that exists: for when ‘being’ exists, it will also be capable of being acted upon or of acting in a certain way: so that to be ‘capable of being acted upon or of acting’ would be a property of ‘being’.

139a9Next, for destructive purposes, see if he has stated the 139a10property in the superlative: for then what has been stated to be a property will not be a property. For people who render the property in that way find that of the object of which the description is true, the name is not true as well: for though the object perish the description will continue in being none the less; for it belongs most nearly to something that is in being. An example would be supposing any one were to render ‘the lightest body’ as a property of 139a15‘fire’: for, though fire perish, there will still be some form of body that is the lightest, so that ‘the lightest body’ could not be a property of fire. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if he has avoided rendering the property in the superlative: for then the property will in this respect have been correctly stated. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as he who states ‘a naturally civilized animal’ as a property of man has not rendered the property in the 139a20superlative, the property would in this respect have been correctly stated.

Owen 1853

Next, property is subverted indeed, if he who assigns it in capacity, assigns also that property in capacity, to that which is not; capacity being by no possibility present with a non-entity, for what is laid down to be, will not be, property. Thus, since he who says the property of air is that which may be breathed, assigns property in capacity, (for a property of this kind is that which is capable of being breathed,) but also assigns the property to that which is not; for although an animal should not exist, which is naturally capable of breathing the air, yet the air may exist, though if animal is not, it is not possible to breathe; hence a thing of such a kind as that it may be breathed, will not then be the property of air, when there will not be such an animal as can breathe, wherefore what may be breathed would not be the property of air.

Again, we confirm it, if he who assigns it in capacity either assigns the property to that which is, or to that which is not, when capacity may be present with what is not, since what is stated not to be property, will be property. Thus, since he who assigns as the property of being, the ability to suffer or to act, assigning property in capacity, has assigned property to being, (for when being is, it will also be able to suffer, or to do, something,) hence ability to suffer or to act, would be the property of being.

Next, it is subverted, if it is placed in hyperbole, since what is laid down to be, will not be property. For it happens to those who thus assign property, that the name is not verified in respect of what the sentence¹ is verified, since the thing being corrupted, the sentence will nevertheless remain, for it will especially be present with something existing; thus, if some one should assign the property of fire to be the lightest body, for when fire is corrupted, there will be a certain body, which will be the lightest, so that the lightest body would not be the property of fire. It is confirmed however, if the property is not placed in hyperbole, for as to this, the pro-perty will be well stated, e. g. since he who states the pro-perty of man, to be an animal naturally mild, does not assign property in hyperbole, so far as regards this, the property would be well stated.