Apprehension

APPREHENSION. - In philosophical language, chiefly Scholastic, a. (from ad-prehendere, to take, to grasp) designates, in a broad sense, every perceptive act by which the mind comes to know something; in a strict sense, the first operation of thought, generating the pure concept, on this side of the synthesis of affirmation or negation realized in judgment. In the first sense, a. is almost synonymous with perception and is used by St. Thomas also to designate sense perception (In Boeth. De Trinit., VI, 2). In the more specific meaning, a., as opposed to judgment, represents in man the initial form of spiritual knowledge that puts us in contact with the intelligible contents and values of things. For this reason it was called by the Scholastics "apprehensio simplex, cognitio essentiarum, indivisibilium intelligentia" (cf. St. Thomas, I Perhermeneias, 1). It is well known that in Thomist philosophy a., as an act of thought by which the quiddity of things is grasped, in a more or less distinct manner, is realized principally through an abstractive operation of the intellect (v. ABSTRACT; ABSTRACTION). Worth noting, in relation to the theory of knowledge, is the realistic meaning emerging from the etymology of the word: ad prehendere, as a moving of thought toward the object in order to take possession of it in the intentional unity of the concept.

A final meaning, more technical and little used, is that by which a. is opposed to comprehension, as partial knowledge limited to an adequate and total knowledge.

Ugo Viglino