INTUITIONISM. – A philosophical term whose meaning is not always precisely definable, sometimes replaced by the other term “intuitivism.” In general, it designates a doctrine that attributes to intuition (v.) or intuitive knowing a superior or special importance and function compared to other forms of knowledge. In this sense, intuitionism distinguishes itself from or opposes rationalism, intellectualism, etc., with respect to which, in its polemical positions (characteristic especially of contemporary philosophy), it presents itself, negatively, as anti-rationalistic and anti-intellectualistic.
In itself, however, and in its positive aspect, it does not deny or exclude the validity of rational or intellectual knowledge. In any case, it indicates immediate or direct knowledge and thus different from mediated, discursive, or indirect knowledge. On the one hand, it seeks to satisfy the exigency of concrete knowing—that is, knowledge that embraces in a single glance (synoptic), without abstracting or impoverishing—and, on the other, the need for a more intimate, more interior, more penetrating, and fuller possession of the truth than that permitted by rational knowledge. From the mystical point of view, it translates (often in vivid images and pregnant symbols of spirituality) the desire for ever fuller and more direct contact with God. This explains why intuitive knowledge is now considered as the initial degree of knowing, now as the final one, in which the dialectic of knowing culminates: in the first case it remains absorbed into higher degrees, in the second it includes and surpasses the others. Intuitionism, in the proper sense, is only this latter.
In the history of thought it presents various forms: a) gnoseological, when a theory of knowledge considers intuition as the direct and primary source of truth; b) ethical, when a moral doctrine assumes direct and immediate experience as the source for recognizing ethical values; c) aesthetic, when aesthetic activity in general is considered an act of intuition; d) scientific, when an epistemological theory attributes scientific discovery to a kind of instinctive divination, to a rapid and intuitive “knower.”
Before delving more deeply, through brief historical sketches, into these principal forms of intuitionism, it is necessary to clarify two fundamental positions of intuitionism itself. The way of understanding the value of intuition or intuitive knowledge proper to classical Christian thought is indeed different from that proper to modern subjectivist and immanentist thought: for the former, the act of intuition is receptive of the intuitive object or of the truth (whether sensible or intelligible); for the latter, it is, instead, creative of its object—that is, in the act in which intuitive spirit “constitutes,” “posits,” or “creates” the truth or the intuitive reality. This is the substantial difference that obtains (in this as in other problems) between the “realism” of Greek-Christian philosophy and the “subjectivism” of modern philosophy.
Although the term itself is lacking, intuitive knowledge (intellectual intuition) is foundational to Platonic epistemology: the vôgôs, or immediate knowledge of principles, is more perfect than the sôvôs, or analytical discursive process, which yields an imperfect and derivative knowledge “that stands to science as an image to the object” (Respubl., 510 a). The latter presupposes the former, whose scope in Plato is metaphysical: souls had an original intellectual intuition even before falling into a body, when, following the gods, they “with difficulty beheld the essences” (μόχος καθορώσα τὰ ὄντα, Phaedr., 248 a). The dormant memory of this primal intuition is awakened by contact with sensible things, producing in the soul “amazement” and kindling the èpôs to the point of frenzy (μαχία, ibid., 250 a b). Of all essences, only Beauty is visible through sensible images; it alone shines to the sight (κάλλος δὲ τότε ἦν ἰδὲν λαμπρόν, ibid., 250 b) and kindles in the “newly initiated” an intimacy of love without limit, not “adulterated by mortal assumption, intent on mortal and petty things” (σωφροσύνη δυνητή κεκαμένην, ὄντα τε καὶ φειδωλὰ οἰκονομοῦσα, ibid., 256 e). Thus Plato does not separate intellectual intuition from sensible (one might say “aesthetic”) intuition, and makes both the origin, foundation, and even the end (contemplation, as the apex of dialectic, is itself a form of intuition) of discursive and rational knowing. And since dialectic is also (above all) moral elevation, one may say that Plato’s gnoseological intuition is implicitly also ethical.
Although in his philosophy reason clearly prevails over intuition, Aristotle (v.) regards principles (τα ἄμεσα) as objects of immediate apprehension in the sense of being evident in themselves. Plotinus (v.), following Plato, identifies pure intellectual contemplation (the union of the soul, detached from the sensible, with the Νοῦς) with intuitive thought. For him too, intuition belongs to the first (προτέρα) or higher soul, while discursive reasoning belongs to the second (δευτέρα) or lower soul; indeed, intuitive science excludes reasoning and is proper to the divine Intellect (and to human intellect insofar as it returns to the Νοῦς), “for reasoning is not possible in eternity” (οὐ γὰρ ἐγένετο καὶ δόξα, τον τόξα), where all is intuited at once and decisions are made at once, without reasoning or choice (Επιν., VI, 7, 1-3).
In Christian philosophy of the early centuries, intuitive knowledge acquires a new and significant meaning and importance as an interior experience of truth, especially with St. Augustine. The concept of “interiority” replaces the Platonic notion of “innatism”; intellectual intuition becomes a loving, vital, and living participation in truth, an experience of spiritual life. The philosophical meaning of the term is enriched with a mystical sense and charged with theological value (in relation to the problem of grace), without, however, any confusion or identification of meanings (at least in Augustine).
To the soul belong naturally ratio and intelligentia or intellectus (De Civ. Dei, XI, 2): the former is “est mentis motio, ea quae discuntur distinguendi et connectendi potens” (De ord., II, 11, n. 30); the latter, superior to ratio, is an interior vision of truth objectively present to the mind. Hence intellect is the true eye of the soul (ibid., 9, n. 26), while ratio is the discursive faculty (analysis and synthesis) applied to sensibles for judgment (De vera relig., cap. 29, n. 30). In short: reason constructs the science of the sensible world (De divers. quaest. ad Simplic., I, II, cap. 2, n. 3), while intelligence is applied intuitively to the intelligible world of supreme ideas (Solil., I, I, cap. 6, n. 13).
This Augustinian intuition, which excludes neither reason nor discursive procedure (and which is realistic, inasmuch as intuitive truth is an object given to the mind), has nourished later Christian philosophy down to St. Anselm, whose celebrated ontological argument (v.) has its roots in that intuition; it is found again in the Franciscan school (St. Bonaventure), in modern Christian philosophy (e.g., Pascal, Rosmini, etc.), as well as, in its most interior sense of spirituality, in Christian mysticism of every age.
Thomistic Scholasticism accepts an intuitive knowledge in the Aristotelian sense of immediate evidence of principles and, in another sense, of evident knowledge of an external object present or actual. There are thus implicit the two meanings that intuition has had in modern thought, the Cartesian and the Kantian, while the difference between realism and subjectivism regarding truth and reality remains firm.
Indeed Descartes identifies intuitive truth with evident truth, principle and foundation of discursive reasoning: intuition is the «conception évidente», which arises from the sole light of reason and is more certain «parce qu'elle est plus simple que la déduction». Or, as he still says: «Atque perspicuum est intuitum mentis tum ad illas omnes extendi [naturas simplices], tum ad necessarias illarum inter se connexiones cognoscendas, tum denique ad reliqua omnia quae intellectus praecise, vel in se ipso, vel in phantasia esse experitur» (Regulae, XII). Descartes also admits an intuitive knowledge which, so to speak, derives from discursive exercise: the fourth rule of method renders thought so agile (it «exercises» it) that it can then embrace in a single mental act what it previously saw successively and discursively (Discours de la méthode, part 2). In short, there is an intuition slowly and laboriously acquired, as Blondel notes. Both Locke and Leibniz retain the Cartesian intuition as evidence: all primitive truths are known «par intuitio», whether they are «vérités de raison ou vérités de fait» (Nouv. Essais, I, IV, cap. 2, § 1).
Intuitionist is the philosophy of the so-called Scottish School (v. REID; STEWART) to which Hamilton and French eclecticism are linked: the foundation of knowledge is the intuition of rational truths, superior to experience; on the other hand, the subject knows directly
The existence of material objects is established without the intervention of reason. Merely perceiving an object, says Reid, suffices to produce an “irresistible conviction” or a belief beyond all doubt in its actual existence. This conviction is immediate and not the result of reasoning; that is, “it is not by reasoning and demonstration that we come to be convinced of the existence of the objects we perceive.” In short, the mere act of perceiving (intuiting) an object is enough to admit its existence (Reid, *Essays on the Powers of the Human Mind*, Edinburgh 1785, Essay II, chap. 6). Within man there is a “suggestion,” an “instinct,” an original and infallible “belief” that leads him to acknowledge the reality of perceived things, as is attested by the universal consensus of all thinking beings.
The principles of morality are likewise immediate and direct. Already Shaftesbury—and with him the philosophers of the so-called moral sense—had posited in man an innate “instinct” of esteem and admiration for what is noble and just, identifying it with the principle of ethics. HUTCHESON, FRANCIS (v.) likewise bases morality on an innate and immediate sentiment of benevolence, which reason employs (and thus reason’s function is secondary and not primary) to discover the means for its practical realization.
Thus, shortly after the appearance of Kantian criticism, as a reaction to Hume’s phenomenism on the one hand and to Hobbes’s systematized egoism on the other, there arose within English empiricism (also under Platonic influences) a moral philosophy that developed in England and spread to other countries. Kant (v.) intuitive knowledge acquires an original meaning, especially in transcendental aesthetics. *Anschauung* (intuition) is knowledge that refers immediately to objects, provided that the object is given and in some way modifies the mind. Objects are given through sensibility (the capacity to receive representations), and they are what furnish the intuitions (*Critique of Pure Reason*, Transcendental Aesthetic, § 1). Yet every intuition is but the representation of a phenomenon. Man does not know objects in themselves but only his own mode of perceiving them (ibid., sect. II, § 8).
For Kant, intuition is connected with sense, but it contains a formal element: space and time are the “pure forms” known a priori, that is, prior to any actual perception; they are pure intuition (*reine Anschauung*: ibid.). From this sensible intuition Kant distinguishes intellectual intuition, or that by which the existence of the object of intuition is given; this belongs, so far as man can know, only to the Supreme Being. Sensible intuition is derivative (*intuitus derivativus*), the other is original (*intuitus originarius*: ibid., sect. II, § 8, IV).
For Fichte, intellectual intuition is identified with self-consciousness, yet it is inseparable from a concept and from sensible intuition: all three form a synthesis.Schelling directly links back to Fichte: self-consciousness is knowledge that is “absolutely free” (not through proofs, reasoning, or concepts) and thus is an intuition in which the one intuiting and the intuited are “identical.” He calls it “intellectual intuition,” in contrast to sensible intuition, which does not produce its object, as happens instead in the knowledge of the self. “Intellectual intuition is the organ of all transcendental thought,” which is therefore “constantly accompanied by it” (System des transzendentalen Idealismus: Werke, III, p. 361).
SCHOPENHAUER, ARTHUR (v.) speaks of intuition in the broadest sense of immediate and non-conceptual knowledge, whether of things or of their relations. Every intuition is intellectual, that is, “it places us in the presence of the real” (Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, I, § 4). The perfect form of intuitive knowledge is aesthetic contemplation, which effects the symbolic transition from vulgar knowledge of individual objects to knowledge of the Idea: “… knowledge is freed from service to the will, and precisely for this reason the subject ceases to be merely individual, becoming a pure subject of knowledge, devoid of will. And it no longer pursues relations according to the principle of sufficient reason, but rather abides in the contemplation of the object presented, and in this it immerses itself” (ibid., III, § 34, trans. II. by P. Savj Lopez, Bari 1920).Ceasing to consider things according to the principle of reason is enough, for intellectual knowledge is intellectual, that is, “it puts us in the presence of the real” (Il mondo come volontà e rappresentazione, I, § 4). The perfect form of intuitive knowledge is aesthetic contemplation, which effects the symbolic transition from the vulgar knowledge of individual objects to that of the Idea: “... knowledge is freed from the service of the will, and precisely for this reason the subject ceases to be merely individual, becoming a pure subject of knowledge, devoid of will. And it no longer pursues relations according to the principle of reason, but rather abides in the form of contemplation of the object offered, and in this it immerses itself” (ibid., III, § 34, trans. II. by P. Savj Lopez, Bari 1920). Ceasing to consider things according to the principle of reason is enough, for intellectual knowledge is intellectual, that is, “it puts us in the presence of the real” (Il mondo come volontà e rappresentazione, I, § 4). The perfect form of intuitive knowledge is aesthetic contemplation, which effects the symbolic transition from the vulgar knowledge of individual objects to that of the Idea: “... knowledge is freed from the service of the will, and precisely for this reason the subject ceases to be merely individual, becoming a pure subject of knowledge, devoid of will. And it no longer pursues relations according to the principle of reason, but rather abides in the form of contemplation of the object offered, and in this it immerses itself” (ibid., III, § 34, trans. II. by P. Savj Lopez, Bari 1920). Ceasing to consider things according to the principle of reason is enough, for intellectual knowledge is intellectual, that is, “it puts us in the presence of the real” (Il mondo come volontà e rappresentazione, I, § 4). The perfect form of intuitive knowledge is aesthetic contemplation, which effects the symbolic transition from the vulgar knowledge of individual objects to that of the Idea: “... knowledge is freed from the service of the will, and precisely for this reason the subject ceases to be merely individual, becoming a pure subject of knowledge, devoid of will. And it no longer pursues relations according to the principle of reason, but rather abides in the form of contemplation of the object offered, and in this it immerses itself” (ibid., III, § 34, trans. II. by P. Savj Lopez, Bari 1920). Ceasing to consider things according to the principle of reason is enough, for intellectual knowledge is intellectual, that is, “it puts us in the presence of the real” (Il mondo come volontà e rappresentazione, I, § 4). The perfect form of intuitive knowledge is aesthetic contemplation, which effects the symbolic transition from the vulgar knowledge of individual objects to that of the Idea: “... knowledge is freed from the service of the willAnd this no longer follows the relations, according to the principle of reason, but rather becomes immersed in the contemplation of the object offered, and in this it is absorbed» (ibid., III, § 34, Italian trans. by P. Savj Lopez, Bari 1920). It is enough to cease considering things according to the principle of reason, for intellectual knowledge is intellectual, that is, «it puts us in the presence of the real» (Il mondo come volontà e rappresentazione, I, § 4). The perfect form of intuitive knowledge is aesthetic contemplation, which effects the symbolic transition from vulgar knowledge of individual objects to knowledge of the idea: «... knowledge is freed from the service of the will, and precisely for this reason the subject ceases to be merely individual, becoming pure subject of knowledge, devoid of will. And this no longer follows the relations, according to the principle of reason, but rather becomes immersed in the contemplation of the object offered, and in this it is absorbed» (ibid., III, § 34, Italian trans. by P. Savj Lopez, Bari 1920). It is enough to cease considering things according to the principle of reason, for intellectual knowledge is intellectual, that is, «it puts us in the presence of the real» (Il mondo come volontà e rappresentazione, I, § 4). The perfect form of intuitive knowledge is aesthetic contemplation, which effects the symbolic transition from vulgar knowledge of individual objects to knowledge of the idea: «... knowledge is freed from the service of the will, and precisely for this reason the subject ceases to be merely individual, becoming pure subject of knowledge, devoid of will. And this no longer follows the relations, according to the principle of reason, but rather becomes immersed in the contemplation of the object offered, and in this it is absorbed» (ibid., III, § 34, Italian trans. by P. Savj Lopez, Bari 1920). It is enough to cease considering things according to the principle of reason, for intellectual knowledge is intellectual, that is, «it puts us in the presence of the real» (Il mondo come volontà eKnowledge frees itself from the service of the will, and precisely for this reason the subject ceases to be merely individual, becoming a pure subject of knowledge, devoid of will. And this no longer follows relations according to the principle of reason, but rather enters into the form of contemplation of the object presented, and immerses itself in this» (ibid., III, § 34, Italian trans. by P. Savj Lopez, Bari 1920). It is enough to cease considering things according to the principle of reason, for intellectual knowledge is intellectual, that is, «it places us in the presence of the real» (Il mondo come volontà e rappresentazione, I, § 4). The perfect form of intuitive knowledge is aesthetic contemplation, which effects the symbolic transition from vulgar knowledge of individual objects to that of the idea: «... knowledge frees itself from the service of the will, and precisely for this reason the subject ceases to be merely individual, becoming a pure subject of knowledge, devoid of will. And this no longer follows relations according to the principle of reason, but rather enters into the form of contemplation of the object presented, and immerses itself in this» (ibid., III, § 34, Italian trans. by P. Savj Lopez, Bari 1920). It is enough to cease considering things according to the principle of reason, for intellectual knowledge is intellectual, that is, «it places us in the presence of the real» (Il mondo come volontà e rappresentazione, I, § 4). The perfect form of intuitive knowledge is aesthetic contemplation, which effects the symbolic transition from vulgar knowledge of individual objects to that of the idea: «... knowledge frees itself from the service of the will, and precisely for this reason the subject ceases to be merely individual, becoming a pure subject of knowledge, devoid of will. And this no longer follows relations according to the principle of reason, but rather enters into the form of contemplation of the object presented, and immerses itself in this» (ibid., III, § 34, Italian trans. by P. Savj Lopez, Bari 1920). It is enough to cease considering things according to the principle of reason, for intellectual knowledge is intellectual, that is, «it places us in the presence of the real» (Il mondo come volontà e rappresentazione, I, § 4).The perfect form of intuitive knowledge is aesthetic contemplation, which effects the symbolic transition from the vulgar knowledge of individual objects to that of the Idea: “... knowledge is freed from the service of the will, and precisely for this reason the subject ceases to be merely individual, becoming a pure subject of knowledge, devoid of will. And it no longer pursues relations according to the principle of sufficient reason, but rather abides in the form of contemplation of the object presented, and in this it immerses itself” (ibid., III, § 34, Italian trans. by P. Savj Lopez, Bari 1920). It is enough to cease considering things according to the principle of sufficient reason, because intellectual knowledge is intellectual, that is, “it places us in the presence of the real” (Il mondo come volontà e rappresentazione, I, § 4).
The perfect form of intuitive knowledge is aesthetic contemplation, which effects the symbolic transition from the vulgar knowledge of individual objects to that of the Idea: “... knowledge is freed from the service of the will, and precisely for this reason the subject ceases to be merely individual, becoming a pure subject of knowledge, devoid of will. And it no longer pursues relations according to the principle of sufficient reason, but rather abides in the form of contemplation of the object presented, and in this it immerses itself” (ibid., III, § 34, Italian trans. by P. Savj Lopez, Bari 1920). It is enough to cease considering things according to the principle of sufficient reason, because intellectual knowledge is intellectual, that is, “it places us in the presence of the real” (Il mondo come volontà e rappresentazione, I, § 4).
The perfect form of intuitive knowledge is aesthetic contemplation, which effects the symbolic transition from the vulgar knowledge of individual objects to that of the Idea: “... knowledge is freed from the service of the will, and precisely for this reason the subject ceases to be merely individual, becoming a pure subject of knowledge, devoid of will. And it no longer pursues relations according to the principle of sufficient reason, but rather abides in the form of contemplation of the object presented, and in this it immerses itself” (ibid., III, § 34, Italian trans. by P. Savj Lopez, Bari 1920). It is enough to cease considering things according to the principle of sufficient reason, because intellectual knowledge is intellectual, that is, “it places us in the presence of the real” (Il mondo come volontà e rappresentazione, I, § 4).
The perfect form of intuitive knowledge is aesthetic contemplation, which effects the symbolic transition from the vulgar knowledge of individual objects to that of the Idea: “... knowledge is freed from the service of the will, and precisely for this reason the subject ceases to be merely individual, becoming a pure subject of knowledge, devoid of will. And it no longer pursues relations according to the principle of sufficient reason, but rather abides in the form of contemplation of the object presented, and in this it immerses itself” (ibid., III, § 34, Italian trans. by P. Savj Lopez, Bari 1920).It is enough to cease considering things according to the principle of reason, for intellectual knowledge is intellectual, that is, “it puts us in the presence of the real” (*Il mondo come volontà e rappresentazione*, I, § 4). The perfect form of intuitive knowledge is aesthetic contemplation, which effects the symbolic transition from the common knowledge of individual objects to that of the Idea: “... knowledge is freed from service to the will, and precisely for this reason the subject ceases to be merely individual, becoming a pure subject of knowledge, devoid of will. And this no longer pursues relations according to the principle of reason, but rather abides in the form of contemplation of the object presented, and in this it immerses itself” (*ibid.*, III, § 34, trans. II. by P. Savj Lopez, Bari 1920). It is enough to cease considering things according to the principle of reason, for intellectual knowledge is intellectual, that is, “it puts us in the presence of the real” (*Il mondo come volontà e rappresentazione*, I, § 4). The perfect form of intuitive knowledge is aesthetic contemplation, which effects the symbolic transition from the common knowledge of individual objects to that of the Idea: “... knowledge is freed from service to the will, and precisely for this reason the subject ceases to be merely individual, becoming a pure subject of knowledge, devoid of will. And this no longer pursues relations according to the principle of reason, but rather abides in the form of contemplation of the object presented, and in this it immerses itself” (*ibid.*, III, § 34, trans. II. by P. Savj Lopez, Bari 1920). It is enough to cease considering things according to the principle of reason, for intellectual knowledge is intellectual, that is, “it puts us in the presence of the real” (*Il mondo come volontà e rappresentazione*, I, § 4). The perfect form of intuitive knowledge is aesthetic contemplation, which effects the symbolic transition from the common knowledge of individual objects to that of the Idea: “... knowledge is freed from service to the will, and precisely for this reason the subject ceases to be merely individual, becoming a pure subject of knowledge, devoid of will. And this no longer pursues relations according to the principle of reason, but rather abides in the form of contemplation of the object presented, and in this it immerses itself” (*ibid.*, III, § 34, trans. II. by P. Savj Lopez, Bari 1920).And this no longer follows relations according to the principle of reason, but rather becomes a form of contemplation of the object presented, and in this it immerses itself» (ibid., III, § 34, Italian trans. by P. Savj Lopez, Bari 1920). It is enough to cease considering things according to the principle of reason, for intellectual knowledge is intellectual, that is, «it puts us in the presence of the real» (*Il mondo come volontà e rappresentazione*, I, § 4). The perfect form of intuitive knowledge is aesthetic contemplation, which effects the symbolic transition from vulgar knowledge of individual objects to that of the idea: «... knowledge is freed from service to the will, and precisely for this reason the subject ceases to be merely individual, becoming a pure subject of knowledge, devoid of will. And this no longer follows relations according to the principle of reason, but rather becomes a form of contemplation of the object presented, and in this it immerses itself» (ibid., III, § 34, Italian trans. by P. Savj Lopez, Bari 1920). It is enough to cease considering things according to the principle of reason, for intellectual knowledge is intellectual, that is, «it puts us in the presence of the real» (*Il mondo come volontà e rappresentazione*, I, § 4). The perfect form of intuitive knowledge is aesthetic contemplation, which effects the symbolic transition from vulgar knowledge of individual objects to that of the idea: «... knowledge is freed from service to the will, and precisely for this reason the subject ceases to be merely individual, becoming a pure subject of knowledge, devoid of will. And this no longer follows relations according to the principle of reason, but rather becomes a form of contemplation of the object presented, and in this it immerses itself» (ibid., III, § 34, Italian trans. by P. Savj Lopez, Bari 1920). It is enough to cease considering things according to the principle of reason, for intellectual knowledge is intellectual, that is, «it puts us in the presence of the real» (*Il mondo come volontà e rappresentazione*, I, § 4). The perfect form of intuitive knowledge is aesthetic contemplation, which effects the symbolic transition from vulgar knowledge of individual objects to that of the idea: «...Knowledge frees itself from the service of the will, and precisely for this reason the subject ceases to be merely individual, becoming a pure subject of knowledge, devoid of will. It no longer follows relations according to the principle of reason, but rather enters into a state of contemplation of the object presented, and immerses itself in it» (ibid., III, § 34, Italian trans. by P. Savj Lopez, Bari 1920). It is enough to cease considering things according to the principle of reason, for intellectual knowledge is intellectual, that is, «it places us in the presence of the real» (Il mondo come volontà e rappresentazione, I, § 4). The perfect form of intuitive knowledge is aesthetic contemplation, which effects the symbolic transition from vulgar knowledge of individual objects to knowledge of the idea: «... knowledge frees itself from the service of the will, and precisely for this reason the subject ceases to be merely individual, becoming a pure subject of knowledge, devoid of will. It no longer follows relations according to the principle of reason, but rather enters into a state of contemplation of the object presented, and immerses itself in it» (ibid., III, § 34, Italian trans. by P. Savj Lopez, Bari 1920). It is enough to cease considering things according to the principle of reason, for intellectual knowledge is intellectual, that is, «it places us in the presence of the real» (Il mondo come volontà e rappresentazione, I, § 4). The perfect form of intuitive knowledge is aesthetic contemplation, which effects the symbolic transition from vulgar knowledge of individual objects to knowledge of the idea: «... knowledge frees itself from the service of the will, and precisely for this reason the subject ceases to be merely individual, becoming a pure subject of knowledge, devoid of will. It no longer follows relations according to the principle of reason, but rather enters into a state of contemplation of the object presented, and immerses itself in it» (ibid., III, § 34, Italian trans. by P. Savj Lopez, Bari 1920). It is enough to cease considering things according to the principle of reason, for intellectual knowledge is intellectual, that is
invece, identifica l'intuizione con l'arte: le opere d'arte sono conoscenze intuitive (Estetica, 6a ed., Bari 1928 p. 17). La conoscenza intuitiva si distingue da quella logica: la prima è conoscenza per la «fantasia», dell'individuale, delle cose «singole», produttrice di immagini, l'altra per l'intelletto, dell'«universale», delle «relazioni» tra le cose, produttrice di «concetti» (ibid., p. 3). Ogni vera intuizione o rappresentazione è, insieme, «espressione» (ibid., p. 11). Perciò si distingue anche dalla sensazione che non si oggettivizza in un'espressione. È una forma teoretica autonoma, che s'identifica col fatto estetico e artistico.
Mentre il Bergson oppone l'intuizione all'astratto intellettualismo scientifico, altri pensatori, invece, colgono un sapere intuitivo anche nelle scienze e ad esse pertinente. Così W. Whewell osserva che l'induzione non è un ragionamento né distinto né riducibile al sillogismo; è un ragionamento logicamente scorretto e procedente per supposizioni ipotetiche. «L'induzione non è concludente in quanto ragionamento. Non è un ragionamento; è un'altra via per giungere alla verità» e precisamente quella della «congettura» (guessing: Fillos, della scienza induttiva. Sulla filo. della scoperta, Edimburgo 1860, p. 454). Pertanto la scoperta richiede l'iniziativa ardita, il genio scientifico, l'intuizione. Il Poincaré (v.) dà grande rilievo all'intuizione dell'ordine matematico «qui nous fait deviner des harmonies et des relations cachées» (Science et méthode, Parigi 1908, p. 47). Con la logica «si dimostra», con l'intuizione «s'inventa». «La faculté qui nous apprend à voir, c'est l'intuition; sans elle le géomètre serait comme un écrivain ferré sur la grammaire, mais qui n'aurait pas d'idées» (ibid., p. 137).
L'intuizione è una forma di conoscenza su cui non può cadere dubbio. Però l'II. inteso in opposizione alla ragione e al sapere discorsivo o come svalutazione o negazione di esso è una posizione polemica e come tale negativa: lo stesso sapere intuitivo perderebbe il suo valore se fosse negativo della ragione o ad essa antitetico. È l'errore delle forme antintellettualistiche e antirazionali d'i., pericolose per la filosofia ed anche da un punto di vista teologico, se si spingono fino ad ammettere l'intuizione diretta ed immediata dell'Essere in sé o di Dio. L'II. moderno, da parte sua, identificando nel conoscere umano la verità o la realtà conosciuta con l'atto soggettivo dell'intuizione, con ciò stesso nega l'intuire, perché non c'è più intuire se il soggetto e l'oggetto fanno uno e se quest'ultimo è una posizione o una creazione del primo. L'intuizione nell'intelligenza finita ha senso come presenza o interiorità della verità alla mente di cui è oggetto (Agostino) senza che sia la Verità in sé (Dio), a cui però rimanda, ma la verità come può essere presente alla mente nell'ordine naturale, di cui la ragione si serve per giudicare delle cose e stabilire tra esse nessi e rapporti.