LIBELLO. — It is the written pleading by a party with which the competent judge is asked to consider the subject of the dispute that one intends to initiate. The origin of the *libellus* as a means of introducing a lawsuit is very ancient.
The written form had been in constant use since the 5th century for the introduction of causes even before imperial tribunals.
This custom was later codified, so much so that in the *Decretals* of Gregory IX there is a specific title, *De libelli oblatione* (t. III, 1, II). It can be said that the presentation of the *libellus* was essential for the subsequent conduct of a case, so much so that there was no judgment without II. An exception to the rule was summary causes, for which the claim could be presented orally, though it was subsequently drawn up in writing by the notary (c. II, V, 11 in *Clém.*). The CIC, in title VI, chapter I, book IV, *De libello litis introductorio*, merely confirms the usage established in the law of the *Decretals*, admitting only two exceptions to the written presentation of the claim: the first is the case of one who cannot write, the second restores the usage, to which reference has been made above, of being able to present the claim orally in causes of lesser importance and of easier solution and investigation. Even in these cases, however, the notary must draw up a written act which, confirmed and subscribed by the party, takes the place of the *libellus*.
That the *libellus* is absolutely necessary is stated by the CIC itself in can. 1706: “Whenever a person wishes to summon another in judgment, he must exhibit to the competent judge a *libellus* in which the subject of the controversy is stated and the ministry of the judge is requested.”
Can. 1708 indicates what the content of the *libellus* must be. Two celebrated verses, cited by way of curiosity, express what it must contain: “Qui, quid, coram quo, quo iure petatur et a quo — recte compositus quisque libellus habet.” The *libellus* must therefore indicate the judge, that is, the tribunal competent to hear and judge the controversy; the subject of the controversy itself, whether immediate, e.g., a condemnation, a declaration of a right, or mediate; the persons, whether physical or juridical, it being necessary always to remove any uncertainty about the identity of the one who seeks and of the one to whom the claim is made; and the right upon which the claim is founded. Moreover, an essential requirement is the subscription of the plaintiff or of his procurator. This concerns the substantive content of the *libellus*; as for its form, the requirements are brevity and clarity of exposition, especially since the specification of the elements of the process is accomplished in the joinder of issue.
The canonical procedural system grants to the party only the power to draft and present the *libellus*; the citation of the defendant is already an act of the judge and follows upon the examination of the *libellus* itself. Indeed, the judge, upon receiving the *libellus*, must conduct an examination of the competence and of the standing of the plaintiff to litigate, and must also examine the content of the *libellus* both substantively and formally. This examination, which must be completed within a month of the presentation, concludes with the issuance of a decree by which the *libellus* is admitted or rejected. In the first case, the judge will cite the plaintiff and the defendant for the joinder of issue. More complex and worthy of consideration is the case of rejection of the *libellus*. Indeed, the tribunal and the presiding judge reject it either for amendable errors, in which case the party may either present a new one to the same judicial office or appeal to the judge immediately superior, or for any other cause, and then, equivalent to the rejection of the *libellus* is the denial of a decision on the merits, the party having no recourse but to appeal to the judge immediately superior. This appeal, though analogous to an appeal, nevertheless differs from it because no proceeding is prefaced to the examination, as is also the case before the court of first instance, and because it does not terminate with a sentence but with a decree that is not subject to appeal. If the appellate tribunal decides in favor of admission, the lower judge, to whom the decision on the merits is deferred according to the rules on competence, must proceed to the citation and to the further acts. If, instead, the appellate tribunal decides that the *libellus* must be rejected, this decision is final, though the party always retains the right to bring a new claim with a new *libellus*.
Even in the Code of Civil Procedure of the State of Vatican City, though under the name of *domanda giudiziale* [judicial claim], a name which some authors would have preferred also for the CIC, the introduction of the lawsuit is made by means of a *libellus*; here too the citation is already an act of the judge, who, however, cannot reject the *libellus* but can only invite the plaintiff to complete or correct II.
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I. Noval, *Commentarium CIC*, IV, Torino-Roma 1920, pp. 381 ff.;
E. Eichmann, *Das Prozessrecht des CIC*, Vienna 1921, §§ 35-36;
A. Vermeersch-J. Creusen, *Epitome iuris canonici*, III, 6th ed., Malines 1937, pp. 143 ff.;
F. Roberti, *De processibus*, Città del Vaticano 1940, pp. 423 ff.;
F. Della Rocca, *Istituzioni di diritto processuale canonico*, Torino 1946, pp. 183 ff.;
Wernz-Vidal, VI (1949), pp. 331 ff.