LIBELLO. — This is the written pleading by a party whereby the subject matter of the dispute which it is intended to institute is submitted to the competent judge. The origin of the L., as a means of initiating proceedings, is very ancient.
The written form had been in constant use since the 5th century for the initiation of cases, even before the imperial tribunals.
This custom was subsequently codified, to the extent that in the Decretals of Gregorio IX there is a specific title, De libelli oblatione (tit. III, bk. II). It may be said that the presentation of the L. was essential for the subsequent course of a case, so much so that no judgment existed without an l. An exception to the rule was constituted by summary cases, in which the claim could be submitted orally, though it was subsequently set down in writing by the notary (c. II, V, 11 in Clem.). The CIC, in title VI, chapter I, book IV, De libello litis introductorio, merely confirms the practice established in the law of the Decretals, admitting only two exceptions to the written submission of the claim: the first is the case of one who does not know how to write; the second resumes the practice mentioned above, whereby the claim may be submitted orally in cases of lesser importance and of easier resolution and investigation. In these cases, however, the notary must draw up a written instrument which, once confirmed and signed by the party, takes the place of the L.
That the L. is absolutely necessary is stated by the CIC itself in can. 1706: « If one person wishes to bring another person before a court, he must submit to the competent judge an L. stating the subject matter of the dispute and requesting the judge’s assistance ».
Can. 1708 indicates what the content of the L. must be. Two celebrated verses, quoted as a curiosity, express what the L. must contain: « Quis, quid, coram quo, quo iure petatur et a quo - recte compositus quisque libellus habet ». The L. must therefore indicate the judge, that is, the tribunal competent to hear and adjudicate the dispute; the subject matter of the dispute itself, both immediate—for example, condemnation or a declaration of a right—and mediate; the persons, whether physical or juridical, every uncertainty as to the identity of the person making the claim and of the person against whom it is made always having to be eliminated; and the right on which the claim is based. Moreover, an essential requirement is the signature of the plaintiff or of his procurator. This concerns the substantive content of the L.; as regards its form, the requirements are brevity and clarity of exposition, all the more so since the specification of the elements of the proceedings is completed in the joinder of issue.
The canonical procedural system grants the party only the power to draw up and submit the L.; the citation of its contents is already an act of the judge and follows upon examination of the L. itself. In fact, once he has received the L., the judge must examine his jurisdiction and the plaintiff’s legal capacity to appear in court, and must also examine the content of the L. both substantively and formally. This examination, which must be completed within one month of its submission, ends with the issuance of a decree admitting or rejecting the L. In the first case, the judge will summon the plaintiff and the defendant for the joinder of issue. More complex and more worthy of consideration is the case of rejection of the L. The tribunal and its president reject it both for errors that can be corrected—in which case the party may either submit a new one to the same judicial office or appeal to the immediately higher judge—and for any other cause. In the latter event, since rejection of the L. amounts to a refusal to rule on the merits, the party has no recourse but to apply to the immediately higher judge. Although this remedy is analogous to an appeal, it differs from one because the examination is not preceded by proceedings, as is likewise the case before the tribunal first seised, and because it does not end with a judgment but with a decree that is not subject to appeal. If the appellate tribunal decides to admit the L., the lower judge, to whom the decision on the merits is entrusted under the rules concerning jurisdiction, must proceed with the citation and the subsequent acts. If, on the other hand, the appellate tribunal decides that the L. must be rejected, this decision is final, without prejudice always to the party’s right to submit a new claim with a new L.
Even in the Code of Civil Procedure of the Vatican City State, although under the name of judicial claim—a name which some authors would also have preferred for the CIC—the action is initiated by means of an L.; here too, the citation is already an act of the judge, who, however, may not reject the L. but may only invite the plaintiff to complete or correct II.
#### LIBERA COLLAZIONE : V. PROVVISTA CANONICA.