DOMINATIVE POWER. — This may be defined as the right of an imperfect society and of the superiors constituted within it to command individual members and to employ their work within the constitutive laws of the society itself.
This right does not belong to public authority, since it is not necessary to its purpose and has ends quite distinct from those of public society. It arises fundamentally from the free will of the society’s members, who, upon entering it, accept its laws and bind themselves to observe them by formal or at least tacit promise.
The person subject to dominative power is placed in a special condition of dependence, distinct from the simple subjection of a citizen or a Christian with regard to public society. Indeed, one could not conceive of a society whose members retained autonomy without placing their energies at the service of the society itself; on the other hand, one must not create a duplicate of public society, whose task it is to promote the common good. Therefore, whoever becomes a member of a society logically intends the attainment of a particular good, which is more easily achieved through union.
Dominative power entails the right to command and thus to oblige to the extent and in the manner required by the matter commanded, the nature of the society, and the bond that unites members to the society. The obligation may be not only juridical but properly moral, in conscience. Free entry implies a surrender of oneself, a placing of oneself at the disposal of the society through a true, albeit tacit, contract. Authors acknowledge a genuine obligation of justice, and a lesion of justice occurs in the dependent who refuses to obey. By virtue of this power, the superior may invalidate the vows of dependents insofar as they are incompatible with what has been agreed (can. 1312). In religious, in addition to this power—which is essential in every human society—there is another, arising from the vow of obedience (q.v.), namely, the right to dispense from certain ecclesiastical laws (and consequently, for oneself, from certain laws approved by public authority, e.g., constitutions).
This principle, being somewhat odious, must be strictly interpreted; yet it presents practical difficulties. It is generally taught that by dominative power one may: a) declare the existence of excusing or exempting causes from an ecclesiastical law; b) dispense from merely disciplinary internal norms of the constitutions, if these grant such power. For although constitutions are often approved by the supreme authority, since they do not bind in conscience (as is usually provided for in them), they lack an essential element to constitute a formal law and must be considered merely as directive norms (silence in the refectory, exemption of an individual from some common act, etc.); c) dispense ministerially from some ecclesiastical law (e.g., office duties, fasting, etc.), that is, verify the presence of certain conditions so that the Ordinary may dispense by employing the superior; d) apply or declare operative a law, even a penal one; e.g., the case contemplated by can. 646, though without the particular juridical consequences of a judicial declaration; thus, if the constitutions so authorize, to declare that the conditions are met whereby one is deprived of a voice in the Chapter, loses internal precedence, ceases from office, etc. Finally, dominative power entails the right to issue juridical (not jurisdictional) precepts in accordance with can. 24 (e.g., to prohibit certain things in accordance with can. 661 §§ 1–2, Coll. can. 649) and to issue precepts to all members in a stable manner.