DOMINATIVE POTESTAS. - The right of an imperfect society and of the superiors constituted within it to command the individual members and to make use of their work within the constitutive laws of that society itself can be defined thus.
This right does not belong to public authority, since it is not necessary to its purpose and since it has ends quite distinct from those of public society. It arises radically from the free will of the members of the society, who, in entering it, accept its laws and bind themselves to observe them by a formal or at least tacit promise.
The person subject to the p. d. finds himself in a condition of special dependence, distinct from the simple subjection of the citizen or of the Christian with regard to public society. Indeed, one could not conceive of a society whose members preserved their autonomy and did not place their own energies at the service of that society itself; on the other hand, a duplicate of public society, to which it belongs to promote the common good, must not be constituted; therefore whoever becomes a member of a society logically intends the attainment of a particular good, possible with greater ease in union.
The p. d. entails the right to command, and therefore to oblige to the extent and in the manner required by the matter commanded and by the nature of the society and by the foundation that binds the members to the society. The obligation can be not only juridical, but properly moral, in conscience. Free entry entails a handing over of oneself, a placing of oneself at disposal by a true contract, even if tacit. Authors recognize a true obligation of justice, such that there is a violation of justice in the dependent who refuses to obey. By virtue of this power the master can invalidate the vows of his dependents, insofar as they are incompatible with what has been agreed (can. 1312). In religious, to this title, essential in every human society, another is added, by force of the vow of obedience (v.), an obligation of religion, grave in itself, supposing sufficient matter and the other conditions. The vow that is made to God obliges precisely when the Superior commands in the name of God.
I. ACTIVE SUBJECT
The active subject (superior) is fixed concretely in the various societies by the constitutive law, by agreements made between the members. In the Church even lay persons and women, incapable of jurisdiction (abbesses, etc.), enjoy effective p. d. over the members of the community (can. 501 § 1).
II. NATURE OF THE DOMINATIVE POTESTAS
Theologians in general treat the question almost only with regard to the family unit and religious institutes; at most they content themselves with setting out rights and duties, without a comparative study of the nature of the power in the various imperfect civil and ecclesiastical societies that are not recognized (cf. cann. 684-87). To liken the family, in which the power is by natural right with indissoluble bonds, even if the law completes the natural right, to a society of which anyone can become a member by a rescindable contract, appears unnatural; to equate a society with religious bonds (in which rebellion against the power takes on the character of sacrilege) with a society of economic interests, in which the member is bound only by title of justice or fidelity, does not seem logical.
III. OBJECT AND SCOPE
The object and scope of the p. d. are fixed by the nature and end of the society, by its constitutional laws, by the lawful agreements entered into in the aggregation of individual members; in general, whatever falls outside these cannot be its object (there is dispute regarding the Rule of St. Francis and of the Society of Jesus, as to whether the p. d. extends to every honest thing, even beyond the Rule). There are three principal acts that can be performed by virtue of the p. d.: to command, to direct, to punish (though only with disciplinary and paternal penalties; cf. cann. 2306, 2312), even by one who is only a layman.
Among other things, one who is invested only with the p. d. has no right to dispense from any ecclesiastical law (and consequently, for himself, from any law approved by public authority, e.g., the constitutions). This principle, being odious, must be understood strictly; but it presents practical difficulties. It is generally taught that by virtue of the p. d. one may: a) declare the existence of excusing causes or grounds exempting from an ecclesiastical law; b) dispense from merely disciplinary internal norms of the constitutions, if these grant the power to do so. For although the constitutions are often approved by the supreme authority, since they do not bind in conscience (as is usually provided by the constitutions themselves), they lack an essential element for constituting a formal law, and must be considered as directive norms only (silence in the refectory, exemption of an individual from some common act, etc.); c) dispense ministerialiter from some ecclesiastical law (sufficiency, fasting, etc.); that is, to verify, so to speak, the presence of certain conditions by which the Ordinary dispenses, availing himself of the Superior; d) apply or declare operative a law, even a penal one; e.g., the case contemplated by can. 646, without however the particular juridical consequences of a judicial declaration; thus to declare, if the constitutions authorize it, that the conditions exist by which one is deprived of a voice in the Chapter, loses internal precedence, ceases from office, etc. Finally, the p. d. entails the right to give juridical (not jurisdictional) precepts in accordance with can. 24 (e.g., to prohibit certain things in accordance with can. 661 §§ 1, 2, coll. canon. 649); and also to give precepts to all members in a stable manner.
Bibliography5 works
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