Violence

VIOLENCE. - In theological-canonical language, by violence, force or coercion is meant a motion that comes from an external principle, while the subject opposes or resists it. For there to be an act of violence, therefore, two elements are required: 1) a motion from an external principle (true violence cannot be brought about from within); fear (which is sometimes called moral violence, taking the effect for the cause) is therefore distinguished from violence; 2) resistance or opposition on the part of the subject.

Violence is absolute if the subject resists in every way, relative if the subject resists, but not as much as he can and should. The latter is also called moral violence and is the cause of fear (v.). The resistance that is opposed to violence can be internal, if it consists in the dissent of the will, or external, if one attempts to repel the motion of violence by persuasion, by prayers, by threats, by shouting or by defending oneself: or it can be both internal and external at the same time.

I. EXERCISE OF VIOLENCE

The will cannot suffer violence with regard to its elicited acts, deriving immediately from the will itself, such as consenting, loving, etc. It can, however, undergo violence with regard to commanded acts, that is, acts to be produced by means of another power, whether external or internal (v. WILL).

II. INFLUENCE OF VIOLENCE ON THE VOLUNTARY, ON THE FREE, AND ON MORALITY

1. If the subject resists internally and externally, as he can and should, the act determined by violence will be entirely involuntary, in no way imputable either to merit or to demerit. The same internal and external resistance, voluntary and free, is good or bad, according as the violence impels one to attain evil or good.

2. In the case in which the subject resists externally, with all the resistance of which he is capable, but internally consents or has an affection for the act to which the violence impels him, in order to judge, one must examine the imputability both of the internal consent, and of the act itself performed, and of the external resistance. Certainly the internal consent is to be imputed, but this imputability diminishes according to the degree of freedom and voluntariness of the consent itself; and thus, for example, the greater the violence brought to bear, or the more overpowering the pleasure naturally included in the very act of violence and alluring to the will, the lesser will be the imputability of the consent, whether it be a matter of good or of evil. The external act of violence itself, considered in the abstract apart from the internal consent itself, from which, moreover, it derives, is not voluntary, nor imputable. The external resistance, which occurs for another motive, different from the internal consent (for example, to avoid infamy), considered separately, has its own imputability, which is also to be considered in relation to the degree of imputability of the internal consent.

3. If the subject dissents only internally, and externally neither consents nor resists, but remains passive, the external act is indirectly voluntary and also sinful, whenever there is an obligation to resist externally. Such cases must be resolved according to the principles of the indirect voluntary and of material cooperation in the sin of one's neighbor. Here it is sufficient to note that: a) when, by resisting externally, the subject can without disproportionate inconvenience repel the violence and prevent the evil, he is bound to resist; b) even when the resistance to ward off the external sin appears useless, it can be obligatory for another motive, as for example as a protest necessary to prevent scandal, or even to avoid the danger of internal consent, for example in matters of chastity.

4. In the case in which the subject internally dissents and resists externally somewhat, but not as much as he can and morally should, the external act is indirectly voluntary and imputable, insofar as there is an obligation to resist effectively.

III. VIOLENCE IN CANON LAW

With regard to violence and its influence, the Code of Canon Law decrees: "Acts which a physical or moral person performs under external force to which resistance cannot be made are considered as not done" (can. 103 § 1). Physical violence that removes all faculty of acting entirely excludes the offense (can. 2205 § 1). As regards its influence on a juridical act, moreover, the Code generally attributes to violence the same effect as grave fear: thus with regard to marriage (can. 1087 § 1), thus with regard to admission to the novitiate or to profession (can. 542, no. 1; 572 § 1), with regard to the assistance of the Ordinary and the parish priest at marriage (can. 1095 § 1), with regard to the remission of a penalty (can. 2238).

IV. VIOLENCE IN ITALIAN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LAW

The law considers only violence as a cause of fear, that is, moral violence; doctrine, on the other hand, distinguishes between absolute violence, which deprives the subject of all will, directly influencing the manifestation (such as forcing an individual to make a gesture that is objectively one of assent with the head) and which renders the transaction radically null for absolute lack of will, and moral "vis" (vis compulsiva), which, under the influence of a threat, causes the process by which the threatened person forms his will to unfold in the sense desired by the one threatening and which renders the act voidable (not null), for the reason that the act performed is still an expression of the will of the one from whom it proceeds ("quamvis si liber essem, noluissem, tamen coactus volui"). This kind of violence is considered by canon law together with the fear (v.) of which it is the cause.

In Italian criminal law, rather than as a mitigating circumstance (art. 62 of the Italian Penal Code) or one excluding the crime, violence or threat is considered as constituting a crime in its own right in its various forms: as simple threat (art. 612), as intimidation directed in general at compelling others to do, tolerate or omit something (art. 610), as intimidation directed at compelling others to commit a crime (art. 611), as intimidation of a public official (art. 336, 339), or of a political, administrative or judicial body or of representatives thereof (art. 338, 339), as a means of taking justice into one's own hands (art. 392-93). Many of these forms of crime fall directly or indirectly among crimes against individual liberty, and the individual who suffers it is compelled to act under the influence of fear. The special type of violence that goes by the name of carnal violence may also be referred to as a crime against individual liberty, since sexual liberty is a part of the more general individual liberty (art. 519, 539-44; Italian Civil Code, art. 269; v. STUPRO). On the exercise of violence in a strike, v. SCIOPERO.

Pietro Palazzini