### THING. — I. GENERAL NOTIONS.
In legal language, a thing is any portion of the external world capable of being used to satisfy human needs; a concept which, as can be seen, tends to coincide with that of an economic good.
However, excluded from the notion of a thing, besides the human body and its parts, are all those immaterial entities which are not susceptible of that exclusive dominion which is protected by the action of revindication (immaterial goods).
Legally, things are distinguished into fungible and non-fungible, according as they are such that one can be substituted for another, so that they are indicated only by sums or quantities of a given category, or are considered in their individuality; into divisible and indivisible, according as they are susceptible or not of division, with the warning that indivisible are considered not only those things for which division would entail material destruction, but also those in which
the parts resulting from the division do not, in proportion, retain the value of the whole thing (thus a diamond whose value consists in a particular size is indivisible); into consumable, whose use consists in destroying them (foodstuffs) or in disposing of them (money), and non-consumable, which can offer more than once to the person to whom they belong the utility of which they are capable; into simple, which by nature constitute a single whole, and composite, which consist of several parts, of the same or different materials, put together by man to serve a certain purpose; into fructiferous and non-fructiferous, according as, remaining intact and preserving their purpose, they do or do not, more or less periodically, yield a certain product capable of becoming an autonomous thing; into movable and immovable, according as they can or cannot be transported from one place to another without prejudice to their material integrity (with regard to this last classification it should be noted that there are things which, although movable, are traditionally called, in relation to their use, immovable by destination, and which the Italian Civil Code, art. 817, now calls appurtenances).
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### II. CANON LAW.
In canon law the term *thing* is also used in a more general sense, to denote everything that is not a person; in this sense, Book III of the *Codex Iuris Canonici*, in the title *De rebus*, includes the means for attaining the end of the Church, distinguishing them into spiritual things, temporal things, and mixed things (can. 726). According to this terminology, spiritual things are the sacraments (v.), sacramentalia (v.), and ecclesiastical offices (v.); temporal things are those which have economic value; mixed things are those which have economic value but also possess a spiritual element, which may derive especially from the conferral of a sacramental (e.g., sacred things, of which more will be said shortly).
But, apart from this already broad notion of *thing*, and limiting ourselves here to those things having economic value, canon law, besides the general distinctions already seen above (cf. can. 1497 § 1 and others, for the distinction between divisible and indivisible things; can. 1543, for the distinction between fungible and non-fungible things, etc.), has others peculiar to itself. Thus, ecclesiastical goods, i.e., those things or patrimonial rights which belong to an ecclesiastical juridical person (v.), are distinguished from non-ecclesiastical goods (can. 1497 § 1; V. TEMPORAL GOODS OF THE CHURCH); precious things from non-precious things (can. 1497 § 2); sacred things from non-sacred things (can. 1497 § 2).
Precious things are subject to some special rules regarding prescription (can. 1511 § 1), administration (can. 1522 n. 2), alienation and other acts exceeding ordinary administration (can. 1532 § 1 n. 1 and 1533).
Sacred things are those which, by means of blessing or consecration, have been destined to serve immediately and exclusively the worship of God. These, in turn, are subdivided into consecrated things, which are destined to divine worship by the solemn rite of consecration (e.g., cathedral churches, immovable altar stones: cf. can. 1137, 1148, 1150, 1497 § 2, 1539 § 1, 1199, 1200, 1169 §§ 2 and 5, 1167, 1155, 1156, 239 § 1 n. 20, 323 § 2, 294 § 2), and blessed things, which are destined to divine worship by the less solemn rite of blessing (e.g., bells, cemeteries: cf. can. 1156-59, 1169 § 5, 239 § 1 n. 20, 1165 §§ 1, 2 and 4, 1196, 1304, 1279 § 4).
In canon law, sacred things are not considered, as in Roman law, absolutely *extra commercium*, inasmuch as it is not the thing in itself that is considered absolutely incommensurable, but the sacred character inherent in it, i.e., its destination to spiritual use. In other words, sacred things, as they can be the object of private rights, being owned either by ecclesiastical entities or by private individuals (cf. can. 1510), can also, in certain determined cases and subject to the prescribed formalities, be exchanged, donated, or alienated; but in an onerous act concerning a sacred thing, it is not lawful to include in its value, and thus in the determination of the price, the character of consecration or blessing, under pain of committing the sin of simony (can. 1539 § 1); likewise, prescription (v.) does not divest the thing of its sacred character. It goes without saying, however, that this exceptional legal situation arising from such a character ceases to have reason to exist and the norms of common law apply whenever the efficacy of the consecration or blessing ceases, as in the case of the so-called *esecratio ecclesiae* which follows the destruction of the greater part of a church, or in the case of the so-called *decretum de profanando* (or *esecratio*) issued by ecclesiastical authority (can. 1187).
**V. also CHURCH; CEMETERY.**
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### III. ITALIAN LAW.
For ecclesiastical goods in general, V. ECCLESIASTICAL GOODS.
Regarding the legal regime of sacred things in Italian state law, numerous questions have been raised and various theses advanced.
The main point of controversy concerns the commercial or non-commercial nature of churches.
Before the Concordat, alongside the two radical theses according to which churches, and in general sacred things, either would be non-commercial in the ancient sense of Roman law, or would be commercial without any consideration of the purpose of worship and the public use to which they are destined, there were other opinions: one according to which in the present matter the canon law should also be considered in force for the State; another according to which churches constituted a demesne of ecclesiastical institutions analogous to that of provinces and municipalities; yet another according to which churches are treated as commercial inasmuch as there exists a servitude of public use in favor of the faithful over buildings destined for worship; and finally, one according to which in our law the sacred character acquired after the consecration or blessing of buildings or objects of worship is not taken into consideration, but regard is had only to the actual and current destination of a building or object to public worship; so that the principles applicable to immovable property and things destined for public service, in the categories of which they would fall, would apply to them.
In the silence of the Lateran Concordat, the aforementioned question remains open. However, from articles 9 and 10 of the Concordat it emerges that sacred buildings are in a different condition from other buildings and that therefore the same rules applicable to private-use buildings do not apply to them.
In accordance with such norms, DEL GIUDICE adhered to the thesis that considers churches as public property of ecclesiastical institutions; JOMOLO shared, though not without limitations and reservations, the opinion according to which, for the purpose of public worship, buildings and sacred objects would fall under the category of things directly destined for public service, and therefore should be deemed unseizable, unattachable, and inalienable, inasmuch as in the conflict between the interest of worship—better still, the interest of the population in having worship—and the interest of the creditor of the institution or the person to whom they belong to proceed executively against them to satisfy their claims, the latter interest must yield to the former; FALCO held that churches must be recognized as inalienable in the terms set forth by canon law, i.e., in the limited sense that things destined for worship can form the object of private-law legal relationships but cannot be the object of acts that would deprive them of the worship use to which they are destined: thus they cannot be subjected to forced execution, and furthermore, alienation or prescription does not cause them to lose their destination for spiritual use.
Following the Concordat, art. 22 of the Book on Property in the Civil Code (now art. 831 of the Civil Code), after establishing in general terms that the property of ecclesiastical institutions is subject to the norms of the Civil Code, insofar as not otherwise provided by special laws concerning them, stipulates—though limited to buildings destined for the public exercise of Catholic worship—that these, even if belonging to private individuals, cannot be diverted from their destination even by means of alienation, until such destination has ceased in conformity with the laws governing them (i.e., canon law).
For other provisions of lesser importance on buildings of worship, cf. art. 879 of the Civil Code; art. 15 of the Royal Decree-Law of 26 July 1917, no. 1513; arts. 98, 171, 192 of the Consolidated Text of 18 June 1931, no. 773; art. 12 of the Royal Decree of 22 Nov. 1937, no. 2105; art. 4 of the Law of 8 May 1940, no. 408; art. 171 of the Royal Decree of 6 May 1940, no. 635; art. 27 of the Law of 26 Oct. 1940, no. 1543, subsequently modified and supplemented several times (lastly by Legislative Decree of 29 May 1947, no. 649); and furthermore V. CEMETERY.
Other provisions of Italian law concern sacred things in general, for which, for example, absolute unseizability is established (art. 514, no. 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure), and various forms of protection (cf. art. 404 of the Penal Code; arts. 61 and 295 of the War Law Royal Decree of 8 July 1938, no. 1415, annex A; art. 8 of the Law of 10 June 1939, no. 1089; arts. 179 and 187 of the Military Penal Code of War).