DILATA

DILATA. — This is the formula of response used in the Sacred Congregations (v. CONGREGAZIONI ROMANE, SACRE) when, to a petition or appeal or a question proposed, a definitive answer—whether affirmative or negative—cannot be given on the appointed day, but must be deferred for any reason. This most often occurs when it is deemed necessary to complete the proofs, or to clarify some point of law, or to consult another expert.

The response *dilata* implies the postponement of the decision, generally without setting a new date (when, however, this date is fixed at the time of the deferral, instead of *dilata* the usual response is *iterum proponatur*).

**Dilemma.** — From δις λήμμα (double premise), a form of reasoning in which from two or more members of a disjunctive premise one draws either an identical conclusion or different conclusions, but always to the detriment of the opponent. For example, to the skeptic who asserts the impossibility of knowing the truth, one may object: the assertion is either false or true; in either case, truth can be known. Owing to its particular structure and dialectical force, the dilemma was called by St. Jerome a *syllogismus corantus* (Epist., 69, no. 2). For its efficacy to be apodictic, it is necessary that the disjunctive premise embrace all possible cases (*sit disiunctio completa*), and that the conclusion be founded on a necessary and exclusive logical connection (*sit consequentia necessaria*): if the first condition is lacking, the dilemma gives rise to "evasion"; if the second is lacking, it may be susceptible to "counter-thrust."

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BIBL.:** G. Rossignoli, *Principi di filosofia*, I, Rome 1905, pp. 60-61; J. Fróbes, *Logica formalis*, ibid. 1940, pp. 242-44.