DILEMMA. - From δὶς λῆμμα (double assumption), a form of reasoning in which from two or more members of a disjunctive premise one draws either an identical conclusion, or different conclusions, but always to the opponent's detriment. For example, to the skeptic who asserts the impossibility of knowing the truth one objects: the assertion is either false or true; in either case the truth can be known. Because of its particular structure and dialectical force the d. was called by St. Jerome syllogismus cornutus (Epist., 69, n. 2). For its efficacy to be apodictic, the disjunctive premise must cover all possible cases (sit disinnicio completa), and the conclusion must rest on a necessary and exclusive logical connection (sit consequentia necessaria): if the first condition is lacking, the d. gives rise to "evasion"; if the second is lacking, it may be susceptible of "retortion."

Bibliography2 works

BIBL.: G. Rossignoli, Principi di filosofia, I, Rome 1905, pp. 60-61; J. Fröbes, Logica formalis, ibid. 1940, pp. 242-44.

Ugo Viglino

@incollection{ec4_dilemma, author = {Viglino, Ugo}, title = {Dilemma}, booktitle = {Enciclopedia Cattolica}, volume = {IV}, pages = {1601--1602}, note = {Cited by column}, publisher = {Ente per l’Enciclopedia Cattolica e per il Libro Cattolico}, address = {Città del Vaticano}, year = {1950}, url = {https://azioneromana.com/article/dilemma} }

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