SACCHEGGIO. – In its most common sense, it is the act whereby the movable property of a city or of part of an enemy state’s territory is left to the victorious soldiery for plunder.
In ancient military practice, it was considered the victor’s right to abandon to looting cities and places that had offered resistance without coming to terms in due time; this benefited the soldiers, for whom the license granted by victory afforded recompense for the sufferings and losses endured, going so far as massacre and the abuse of women. In the case of mercenary troops, looting often formed part of the terms, at least tacitly, of their employment, or served as compensation for unpaid wages.
Looting may also occur within the jurisdiction of a state during party struggles or the actions of armed bands operating outside the law. In this case, it constitutes a crime no longer international in character, but national.
I. IN ITALIAN CRIMINAL LAW
Here the definition of the act is more detailed; s. assumes a different legal classification according to the direction of the agent’s activity. In the Penal Code currently in force, it appeared logical to the new legislator that such acts might first of all be committed for the purpose of attacking the security of the State.In this case, one of the crimes provided for against the personality of the State is committed, and because of their utmost gravity they are punished with the severest penalty following the death penalty, life imprisonment (art. 285 Penal Code). Furthermore, in art. 419 the new Penal Code contemplates the offence of devastation and s., whose criminal activity is directed against public order. The same acts, objectively considered—devastation and s. qualified by a particular specific intent—assume a different classification as an offence. In the first case, the offence is constituted by the fact that the criminal’s purpose must in every case be to attack the security of the State. In the second case, by contrast, only the security of property is directly endangered. But since the consequence is to alarm and intimidate the population (arts. 419–22), the offence is not regarded as having been committed merely against individual things and assets (whose protection is guaranteed by arts. 624–25), but against property, understood as a social institution closely connected with public order (v. PROPRIETÀ).
II. IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
In the field of international law, the figure of plunder, understood as that complex of acts committed by the soldiers of the victorious army and aimed at the forcible and violent appropriation of things found in a fortress or city taken by assault, is the subject of conflicting opinions. Some writers consider (more accurately, “considered”) this practice justified as a punitive measure against a city taken by assault. Others maintain (or maintained) that plunder directed against a belligerent who violates the laws of war is lawful, harking back to ancient theories (Cicero, De officiis, I, 3, c. 6), to which even theologians were not unsympathetic, provided that the war was just (Sum. Theol., 2ª-2ª, q. 66, a. 8, ad 1). The more recent doctrine, however, is opposed to the traditional theories and unanimously condemns acts of plunder. Plunder is now formally prohibited by the instruments expressing the most advanced part of contemporary international law (Instruct. americ., art. 74; Déclaration de Bruxelles, arts. 18 and 39; Manuel d'Oxford, 1880, art. 32 and 1913, arts. 18-29).Accordingly, plunder must no longer be regarded as admissible either as reprisal (v.), nor justified on the ground that it may prove an effective means of stimulating soldiers to acts of daring. Under Articles 23 and 28 of the Regulations annexed to the Hague Convention of 29 July 1899 and 18 October 1907, a belligerent is forbidden “to destroy or seize enemy property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war.” Articles 46 and 47 of the same Regulations contain general provisions concerning respect for private property and the prohibition of booty and plunder. No exception may be allowed to the rule, since the forcible dispossession of private persons of what belongs to them is in itself a crime and can never become lawful on the occasion of war.
As regards the Italian legal system, it contains sanctions enacted in fulfilment of obligations arising from international conventions. Thus, in the Military Penal Code for Wartime: “Whoever commits an act intended to permit the plunder of a city or other places, even if taken by assault, shall be punished by death and degradation,” Article 186, which implements Article 28 of the Regulations annexed to the Hague Convention of 1899.
Plunder must not, however, be confused with booty or prize of war, which is permitted within certain limits even under contemporary international law. That is, a belligerent may lawfully, during incursions into or more or less permanent occupations of enemy territories, seize certain property of the enemy State, such as weapons, ships, money, etc.—in general, all property useful for the continuation of the war.
Certain limits must nevertheless be observed, namely: 1) the right of prize may be exercised only by the belligerent State and not by individuals; 2) it may be exercised only in the territory or territorial waters of the belligerent States or on the high seas; 3) it must not extend to private property (cf. arts. 23 and 52 of the Hague Convention, 1907).
The right of maritime prize is less clear, in the absence of common international legislation and uniform practice among States. While it is understandable that warships, together with weapons, may be made the object of prize, it is less understandable that the same should be possible with merchant ships. The principle defended in this regard in the eighteenth century by the Alliance of Neutral States—that of the “free ship,” with the exception of goods constituting contraband of war—was not, however, accepted by all.
The principle established before the International Conference of Paris (1856), which considered only ships and goods belonging to the enemy State or its subjects to be legitimate objects of prize, was likewise practised by only some States.
The same was true of the two principles accepted by the Paris Conference: a) the flag of the neutral State covers the goods found on board, except for contraband of war; b) goods belonging to neutral States are not subject to prize even when carried on enemy ships, again except for contraband of war. Finally, the London Declaration (1909) was never ratified by the States; nor was the Permanent International Prize Court for Maritime Prizes, established at the Hague Conference (1907), ever put into practical operation.
Ordinarily, at the beginning of a war, tribunals are established to deal with related questions.
III. IN MORAL THEOLOGY
Looting against the State constitutes a violation of legal justice (v. GIUSTIZIA) and of the right of ownership, whether of private individuals or of the State itself, which is to be regarded as a common owner when its own goods are concerned. Resistance to a usurping government or to imposed laws likewise does not justify acts of looting, since active resistance can also be conceived without acts of looting. When, moreover, looting is directed against private individuals, groups of persons, or juridical persons, it constitutes unjust harm. In both cases, restitution (v.) follow, cooperation (v.) in evil arise.In international law, even when States wage a just war, they must, insofar as possible, respect the right of ownership of the legitimate possessors of captured goods.
War, in fact, does not remove the right of ownership and does not place enemies beyond all law. This also applies in the case of maritime prize, and in dealings not only with private individuals but also with neutral States, without prejudice to the right to prevent, by legitimate means, war contraband.