Sermons on the Song of Songs81 Sermon LXXXI. Of the similarity and likeness of the soul to the Word, in respect of its identity of essence, its immortality of existence, and its freedom of will
Sermon LXXXI. Of the similarity and likeness of the soul to the Word, in respect of its identity of essence, its immortality of existence, and its freedom of will
It was not without good reason that the inquiry was made in the last discourse, what affinity there was between the human soul and the Word. For what can there be in common between a Majesty so great and a poverty so extreme, that a greatness which is so exalted and a lowliness so humble should be said to be associated, as if upon an equality, in the manner and with the love of a pair who are espoused to each other? For if we assert this with truth, then great is the reason for rejoicing and confidence; but if falsely, then ours is an audacity to be greatly punished. And therefore it was necessary to inquire what was the affinity between these two, which, indeed, we have already ascertained in many respects, but not altogether. For who is so undiscerning as not to see the correspondence between the image and that which is formed after the pattern of that image? We have shown in the sermon of yesterday, if you remember, both that the Word is the Image of God and that the soul is made in that image. And we have proved in that also the close relation between the soul and that Image of God, since not only is it made in that image, but also after the likeness of it. But we have not yet declared in every particular that in which this likeness principally consists. Let us now address ourselves to this task, so that the soul, recognising more fully what its origin is, may be filled with a noble shame to degenerate from it by an unworthy manner of living, or, rather, that it may study with earnest care what it shall recognise as being corrupted in itself by sin, and thus ruling itself by the help of God in a manner worthy of its origin, may be enabled to draw near with modest confidence to communion with the ord.
2. Let it recognise, then, that from this original Divine likeness it draws a natural simplicity of substance, by which to be is to it the same as to live, although not always to live well or happily; and in this it has a likeness to the Image of the Word, though not an equality with It. This is a degree of relationship, but only a degree. That to live should be synonymous with living in perfect goodness and happiness is the supreme height of moral greatness, and to this height it does not attain. If, then, the Word, because of His greatness, has this unique prerogative, and the soul, because of its likeness to the Word, has the attribute that for it to exist is to have life, though it does not attain to the lofty perfectness of the Word, yet the affinity of natures, and the privilege of the soul, are manifest herein. To express this more clearly: It is in God alone that * to live' is the same as * to live in perfect goodness and happiness,' and He is the Essence 3. There are two classes of beings which have life: those who are conscious of it, and those who are not conscious. The former rank above the latter, and above both the one and the other are those in whom life and thought are the same. Life, and that which lives, are not in the same degree; much less are life, and those which live not. Life is, indeed, the soul which is living; but it lives not other whence than from itself, and on this account we speak of it with propriety, not so much as living as being itself life. Thus it follows that the soul, when infused into a body, gives life to it; but that body does not, by the presence of life in it, become itself life, but living. From whence it clearly.appears that it is not the same thing even to a living body to exist and to live, since it may exist and yet not live. Much less shall those things which are without life rise into this rank. It does not even follow that everything which is said to have life, or which has it in fact, will be able forthwith to attain to this point There is a life of the lower animals, and a life of trees; the former has consciousness, the latter is without it. Yet in neither is it the same thing to exist and to live, since, according to the opinion of many persons, their life has been in the elements before it was in the limbs of the one class, or the branches of the other. And, according to this view, when their life ceases to animate them, they cease to live, but they do not cease to exist. They are equally unloosed and dissolved, as if they were not merely bound together, but intertwined. For the life of these things is not simple in its nature, but compounded out of many elements. And therefore it is not reduced to nothingness, but separated into parts, of which each returns to that whence it had its origin; for example, that which is of an airy nature to the air, that of a fiery nature to the fire, and the rest in like manner. To this kind of life, then, it is by no means the same thing to exist and to live, since when it does not live, it still exists.
4. Now, none of these things in which that is the case, can ever progress or rise into that higher life of goodness and blessedness, since they have not been able to attain even that grade which is below it. The soul of man alone can reach that higher life, inasmuch as it 1 Query, the followers of Empedocles.
1 Solvuntur et dissolvuntur: alligaiiC, colligata. The meaning of the sentence is not quite clear.—Ed.
5. But, farther, the soul is immortal; and in this respect also it is like unto the Word, but not equal to Him. For the immortality of the Divine Nature is so far above, and surpassing every other, that the Apostle says of God: Who only hath immortality (1 Tim. vi. 16). Which is spoken of Him, as I think, because He alone is unchangeable in and by His Nature who says I am the Lord; change not (Mai. iii. 6). For the immortality which is true and perfect is no more susceptible of change than it is of ending, since every change is a likeness of death, and an anticipation of it. Everything which changes, in passing from one state to another, necessarily dies, so to speak, to that which it is, in order to begin to be that which it is not If, then, there are as many deaths as there are changes, where is the immortality? And to this vanity everything created is made subject, not willingly, but by reason of Him who hath subjected the same in hope (Rom. viii. 20). And yet the soul is immortal, because its life is in itself, and as it cannot fall away from itself, so it cannot fall away from its life. But since it is plain that in thoughts and 6. But there is still another resemblance which occurs to me, and which I will by no means pass over, for it contributes no less than the other particulars to the greatness of the soul, and perhaps renders it even more like unto the Word. This is Freedom of the Will, a quality plainly Divine, and which shines forth in the soul like a jewel set in gold. It is by this that there is in the soul the power of distinguishing and the freedom of choosing between good and evil, that is, between life and death, between light and darkness, and other things similarly opposed, which present themselves before the consciousness of the soul. That eye of the soul is a close discerner and authoritative judge between opposed alternatives; as a clear-sighted observer it discerns, as a free and independent judge it decides. On this account its decision is said to be free, because it is open to be influenced by the determination of the will, and can carry out the decision when made, into action. Thence also is man capable of merit. For every action done by you, and which you were free to do or to leave undone, is rightly imputed to you for merit or demerit, according as it is good or evil. And as a person is rightly praised, both he who, having it in his power to do evil, has not done it, and he who, being free not to do good, has, nevertheless, done it; so also a person is justly blamed who, being able not to do evil actions, has done them, or to do good ones, has not done them. For where there is no liberty of action there is no merit. On this account it is that animals, which are without reason, have likewise no merit, because they are wanting both in freedom [of will and in the power of deliberation and judgment. They are directed by the leadings of their senses, carried away by their impulses, and are under dominion of their appetites. For they have not the power of judgment, by which to reflect upon their actions or control them; nor, indeed, have they the faculty of forming a judgment, that is, reason; and they are not judged, because they are not capable of forming a judgment. How can creatures who have not received the gift of reason be reasonably called to account for their actions?
7. Man alone is not put under a constraint by his nature, and therefore man alone among living beings is free. And yet he also, by the intervention of sin, suffers a kind of violent constraint; but this arises not from his nature, but from his own will, and he is not thereby deprived of the liberty which is natural to him. For that which is done voluntarily is done freely. And, indeed, it is by sin if is brought about that the corruptible body weighs upon the soul; but 8. Some one, perhaps, will thus reply to me: 4 Take heed of what you say. Do you call that voluntary, which it is plain to all the world is done under constraint? It is true that the will has rendered itself subject, but it does not remain in that state of subjection willingly; it is held captive in spite of itself.' Very good; you allow at least that it is held captive. But consider that it is the will of which you say this. Do you assert, then, that the will is not willing? But the will is not constrained against itself. It is not will at all unless it wills. The word expresses the action of one who exercises a power of determining, not of one who has no such power to exercise. If the will is constrained willingly it constrains itself. What, then, shall it answer, or what excuse shall it make to God, since its action is its own? What has it done? It has made itself a servant. Wherefore it is said: Whosoever eommitteth sin is the servant of sin (John viii. 34). On this account, when it has sinned (and it has sinned when it has determined to obey a sinful impulse) it has made itself a servant of sin. But it becomes free if it no longer does the bidding of sin. But while it chooses to abide in the same servitude it goes on following the temptation to sin. Yet it is not retained in 1 Is. xxxviii. 15. The Vulgate has fecerit% not fecerim. St Bernard takes notice of each of these varieties of reading in Sermon de £Hversisl iiL, nn. 5, 6.
9. ' But you will not make me disbelieve' (says an objector) ' in the necessity under which I labour, which I experience in my own self, and against which I continually struggle.' Where, then, I ask, do you feel this constraint? Is it not in your will? You do ndt, then, will with too little strength what you will of necessity. You will strongly what you are unable not to will, whatever strength of resistance you exert. Now, where there is the power to will, there is liberty. And in saying this I refer to the liberty which is by nature, not that which is spiritual and by grace; namely, that liberty wherewith, as says the Apostle, Christ hath made us free (Gal. v. i). And the same Apostle, speaking of that liberty, says: Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty (2 Cor. iii. 17). It is thus that the soul is at the same time free, and enslaved by this necessity which, as unhappily as strangely, is voluntarily incurred; free, by the possession of the power of will, and enslaved, by the pressure of necessity. And farther, which is at once stranger and more deplorable, it is guilty because it is free, and a slave because it is guilty; and thus by a strange paradox is a slave because it is free. Unhappy man that I am, who shall deliver me from this servitude so shameful? Unhappy I am indeed; but I am free. Free, because I am a man; unhappy, because a slave. Free, because I am in the likeness of God; unhappy, because I am contrary to Him. O Thou Preserver of men why hast Thou set me as a mark against Thee? (Job vii. 20). For indeed Thou hast in a sense done that, the doing of which Thou hast not hindered. But, in other respects, it is I who have set myself where I am, so that I am a burden to myself {Ibid,). It is indeed most just and right that he who is Thy enemy should be mine also, and that he who opposes Thee should oppose me too. In truth, I have become contrary to Thee and to my own self also, and I find in my members a revolt against my own soul and against Thy law. Who shall set me free from my own hands? That which I would, that do I not; and it is not another person, but my own self, who hinders me. So also that which I hate, that do I; and it is no other person, but my own self, who obliges me to do it. I would that this prevention on the one hand, and this compulsion on the other, were so violent that my actions ceased to be voluntary, for then perhaps I might be excused; or that it were so far voluntary that it was not violent, for so perhaps I might be corrected. But now no opening for escape appears on either side for me unhappy, whom, on the one hand, the assent of my will renders, as I have said, inexcusable; and on the other, necessity renders incapable of being corrected. Who shall deliver me from the hands of a sinner, from the hand of the unrighteous and cruel man? (Ps. lxxi. 4).
1. Quaesitum est ante de affinitate animae ad Verbum, atque id quidem necessarie. Quae enim conventio tantae majestati et tantae paupertati, ut more et amore sponsorum, veluti ex aequo, sese complecti referantur sublimitas illa, et illa humilitas? Nam si vere id dicimus, valde laeta fiducia est; si falso, valde punienda audacia. Propterea ergo de convenientia horum quaerendum fuit: quae quidem jam multa inventa est, sed non omnis. Quis enim, vel nimis hebes, non videat quam se e vicino respiciant imago et quod ad imaginem est? Quorum utique unum uni, et alterum alteri sermo, si recolitis, assignavit hesternus. Nec de imagine tantum, sed etiam de similitudine demonstrata ibidem propinquitas est, nisi quod ipsa similitudo in quo vel in quibus potissimum constet necdum a nobis est declaratum. Age, jam intendamus declarationi huic, ut quo anima plenius suam agnoscet originem, eo amplius erubescat vitam habere degenerem; imo vero quod peccato vitiatum deprehenderit in natura, studeat reformare industria; ut digne suo genere, Dei quidem munere, sese regens, ad amplexus Verbi fidenter accedat.
2. Advertat igitur ex hac divinae ingenuitate similitudinis inesse sibi illam suae substantiae naturalem simplicitatem, qua hoc est illi esse quod vivere, etsi non quod bene, quodve beate vivere, ut sit similitudo, non aequalitas. Gradus propinquus, gradus tamen. Neque enim unius excellentiae parisve fastigii sunt, hoc habere esse quod vivere, et item habere hoc esse quod beate vivere. Ergo si Verbi est illud propter sublimitatem, hoc animae propter similitudinem, salva quidem eminentia Verbi, palam est affinitas naturarum, palam animae praerogativa. Et ut quod dicitur planius fiat, soli Deo id est esse, quod beatum esse: atque hoc primum et purissimum simplex. Secundum autem simile est huic, id videlicet habere esse quod vivere; atque hoc animae est. Ex hoc, etsi inferiori gradu, ascendi potest, non modo ad bene, sed etiam ad beate vivendum: non quia vel tunc sit hoc esse, quod beatum esse illi qui eo pervenerit; quatenus ita glorietur pro similitudine, ut tamen pro disparitate habeat semper, unde omnia ossa ejus dicant: Domine, quis similis tibi?. Bonus tamen animae gradus, ex quo, et solo, ad beatam ascenditur vitam.
3. Sunt namque viventia, et horum genera duo, quae sentiunt, et quae non sentiunt. Porro insensibilibus sensibilia praeferuntur, atque utrisque vita, qua vivitur et sentitur. Non stabunt pariter in gradu uno vita et vivens; multo minus vita, et quae sunt sine vita. Vita anima est vivens quidem, sed non aliunde quam se ipsa; ac per hoc non tam vivens, quam vita, ut proprie de ea loquamur. Inde est quod infusa corpori vivificat illud, ut sit corpus de vitae praesentia, non vita, sed vivens. Unde liquet, ne vivo quidem corpori id vivere esse, quod esse, cum esse et minime vivere possit. Multo minus quae vitae expertia sunt, ad hunc gradum assurgent. Sed nec omne quod vita dicitur, vel est, continuo valebit pertingere huc. Est pecorum, est et arborum vita, sensu altera vigens, altera carens. At neutri tamen idem esse quod vivere est: cum, ut quidem multorum opinio est, ante in elementis, quam vel illa in membris, vel ista in ramis exstiterint, At secundum hoc cum desinunt vivificare, simul vivere cessant, sed non et esse. Solvuntur pariter et dissolvuntur, tanquam non alligatae tantum, sed et colligatae. Neque enim unum simplex est quaeque harum; sed ex pluribus constans. Et propterea non redigitur in nihilum, sed dissilit in partes, ut et ad suum quodque recurrat principium; verbi causa, aer ad aerem, ignis ad ignem, et reliqua in hunc modum. Nequaquam igitur tali vitae idem esse et vivere est, quae est et quando non vivit.
4. Porro nihil horum, quibus non hoc esse quod vivere sit, ad bene beateque vivendum quandoque proficiet vel emerget: quippe quod neque ad hunc inferiorem gradum potuit pervenire. Sola, quae in ipso stare cognoscitur anima hominis, in eo dignitatis creata est, vita a vita, simplex a simplici, immortalis ab immortali, ut non sit longe a summo gradu, ubi scilicet id esse quod beate vivere est, in quo solus stat beatus, et solus potens, Rex regum, et Dominus dominantium. Accepit [ alias, accipit] itaque in sui conditione anima, etsi non esse, posse tamen esse beata; summo proinde gradui, quantum licet, appropians, non pertingens tamen. Neque enim vel ipsi, ut supra diximus, hoc erit aliquando esse quod beatam esse, nec quando beata erit. Fatemur similitudinem, aequalitatem renuimus. Verbi causa, vita Deus, vita et anima est; similis quidem, sed dispar. Porro similis, quod vita, quod se ipsa vivens, quod non tantum vivens, sed et vivificans, sicut et ille haec omnia est. Dispar vero, quantum a creante creata. Dispar, quod, ut nisi creata ab illo non esset, sic nisi ab ipso vivificata non viveret. Non viveret dico, sed spirituali vita, non naturali. Nam naturali quidem, etiam quae non spiritualiter vivit, immortaliter vivat necesse est. At qualis vita, in qua satius foret non nasci, quam non ab ea mori! Mors potius est: et ideo gravior, quia peccati, non naturae Denique mors peccatorum pessima. Ita ergo quae secundum carnem vivit anima, vivens mortua est; quippe cui bonum erat omnino non vivere, quam sic vivere. A qua nimirum vitali quadam morte minime unquam resurget, nisi per verbum vitae, imo per Verbum vitam, viventem utique et vivificantem.
5. Alias autem immortalis est anima, et in hoc nihilominus Verbo similis quidem, sed non aequalis. Nam in tantum superexcellit immortalitas Deitatis, ut Apostolus dicat de Deo: Qui solus habet immortalitatem. Quod ego reor pro eo dictum, quod solus sit natura incommutabilis Deus, qui ait: Ego Dominus, et non mutor. Vera namque et integra immortalitas tam non recipit mutationem, quam nec finem, quod omnis mutatio quaedam mortis imitatio sit. Omne etenim quod mutatur, dum de uno ad aliud transit esse, quodam modo necesse est moriatur quod est, ut esse incipiat quod non est. Quod si tot mortes quot mutationes, ubi immortalitas? Et huic vanitati subjecta est ipsa creatura non volens, sed propter eum qui subjecit eam in spe. Attamen immortalis anima est; quoniam cum ipsa sibi vita sit; sicut non est quo cadat a se, sic non est quo cadat a vita. Verum cum constet suis affectibus mutari eam; agnoscat ita se Deo in immortalitate similem, ut sciat sibi deesse non modicam immortalitatis partem, soli cedens absolutam perfectamque immortalitatem, apud quem non est transmutatio, nec vicissitudinis obumbratio. Non mediocris tamen animae dignitas praesenti disputatione comperta est, quae gemina quadam vicinitate naturae Verbo appropiare videtur, simplicitate essentiae, et perpetuitate vitae.
6. Sed enim adhuc unum occurrit, quod minime praeteribo: nec enim minus insignem similemve minus Verbo animam facit, et forte etiam plus. Arbitrii libertas haec est, plane divinum quiddam praefulgens in anima, tanquam gemma in auro. Ex hac nempe inest illi inter bonum quidem et malum, nec non inter vitam et mortem, sed et nihilominus inter lucem et tenebras, et cognitio judicii, et optio eligendi; et si qua sunt alia, quae similiter circa animi habitum sese e regione respicere videantur. Nihilominus inter ipsa censorius quidam arbiter (is animae oculus) dijudicat et discernit, sicut arbiter in discernendo, ita in eligendo liber. Unde et liberum nominatur arbitrium, quod liceat versari in his pro arbitrio voluntatis. Inde homo ad promerendum potis. Omne etenim quod feceris bonum malumve, quod quidem non facere liberum fuit, merito ad meritum reputatur. Et, ut merito laudatur, non is tantum qui potuit facere mala, et non fecit, sed et qui potuit non facere bona, et fecit; ita malo non caret merito tam is qui potuit non facere mala, et fecit, quam is qui potuit facere bona, et non fecit. Ubi autem non est libertas, nec meritum. Propterea quae sunt carentia ratione animalia, nihil merentur; quia sicut deliberatione, ita et libertate carent. Sensu aguntur, feruntur impetu, rapiuntur appetitu. Neque enim judicium habent, quo se dijudicent sive regant, sed ne instrumentum quidem judicii, id est rationem. Inde est quod non judicantur, quia non judicant. Quanam quippe ratione ab his exigatur ratio, quam non acceperunt?
7. Hanc vim a natura solus homo non patitur, et ideo solus inter animantia liber. Et tamen interveniente peccato patitur quamdam vim et ipse, sed a voluntate, non a natura, ut ne sic quidem ingenita libertate privetur. Quod enim voluntarium, et liberum. Et quidem peccato factum est ut corpus quod corrumpitur, aggravet animam; sed amore, non mole. Nam quod surgere anima per se jam non potest quae per se cadere potuit, voluntas in causa est, quae corrupti corporis vitiato ac vitioso amore languescens et jacens, amorem pariter justitiae non admittit. Ita nescio quo pravo et miro modo ipsa sibi voluntas, peccato quidem in deterius mutata, necessitatem facit: ut nec necessitas, cum voluntaria sit, excusare valeat voluntatem; nec voluntas cum sit illecta, excludere necessitatem. Est enim necessitas haec quodammodo voluntaria. Est favorabilis vis quaedam, premendo blandiens, et blandiendo premens: unde sese rea voluntas, ubi semel peccato consenserit, nec excutere jam per se, nec excusare tamen ullatenus de ratione queat. Inde querula illa vox veluti gementis sub onere necessitatis hujus: Domine, inquit, vim patior, responde pro me. Sed rursus sciens quod non juste causaretur adversus Dominum, cum voluntas sua ipsius potius in causa foret, attende quid secutus intulerit: Quid dicam, aut quid respondebit mihi, cum ipse fecerim? Premebatur jugo, non alio tamen, quam voluntariae cujusdam servitutis; et erat pro servitute quidem miserabilis, sed pro voluntate inexcusabilis. Voluntas enim est, quae se, cum esset libera, servam fecit peccati, peccato assentiendo: voluntas nihilominus est, quae se sub peccato tenet, voluntarie serviendo.
8. Vide quid dicas, ait aliquis mihi. Tune voluntarium dicis, quod jam necessarium constat esse? Verum quidem est, quod voluntas se ipsam addixerit: sed non ipsa se retinet; magis retinetur et nolens. Bene hoc saltem das, quia retinetur. Sed vigilanter retine voluntatem esse, quam retineri fateris. Itaque voluntatem nolentem dicis? Non utique voluntas retinetur non volens. Voluntas enim volenti est, non nolentis. Quod si volens retinetur, ipsa se retinet. Quid ergo dicet, aut quid respondebit ei, cum ipsa fecerit? Quid fecit? Servam se fecit: unde dicitur: Qui facit peccatum servus est peccati. Propterea, cum peccavit (peccavit autem cum peccato obedire decrevit), servam se fecit. Sed fit libera, si non adhuc facit. Facit autem, in eadem servitute se retinens. Neque enim non volens voluntas tenetur: voluntas enim est. Ergo quia volens, servam se ipsam non modo fecit, sed et facit. Merito proinde quod saepe memorandum est, quid respondebit illi, cum ipsa fecerit, ipsa et faciat.
9. Sed non me, inquis, decredere facies necessitatem quam patior, quam in memetipso experior, contra quam et assidue luctor. Ubinam, quaeso, hanc necessitatem sentis? Nonne in voluntate? Non ergo parum firmiter vis, quod et necessario vis. Multum vis quod nolle nequeas, nec multum obluctans. Porro ubi voluntas, et libertas. Quod tamen dico de naturali, non de spirituali, qua libertate, ut dicit Apostolus, Christus nos liberavit. Nam de illa idem ipse dicit: Ubi spiritus Domini, ibi libertas. Ita anima miro quodam et malo modo sub hac voluntaria quadam ac male libera necessitate, et ancilla tenetur, et libera: ancilla, propter necessitatem; libera, propter voluntatem: et quod magis mirum, magisque miserum est, eo rea quo libera, eoque ancilla quo rea, ac per hoc eo ancilla quo libera. Miser ego homo, quis me liberabit a calumnia hujus pudendae servitutis? Miser, sed liber. Liber, quia homo; miser, quia servus. Liber, quia similis Deo; miser, quia contrarius Deo. O custos hominum, quare posuisti me contrarium tibi? Posuisti enim, cum non prohibuisti. Alioquin ipse me posui, et factus sum mihimetipsi gravis. Justissime quidem, ut hostis tuus hostis sit et meus; et qui tibi repugnat, repugnet et mihi. Ego vero qui tibi, ego qui mihimet contrarius factus sum, atque in membris meis invenio quod contradicat, et menti meae, et legi tuae; quis me liberabit de manibus meis? Non enim quod volo, hoc ago, sed me, non alio prohibente, et quod odi, illud facio, sed me, non alio compellente. Atque utinam prohibitio haec, et haec compulsio, ita esset violenta, ut non esset voluntaria; forsitan enim sic possem excusari: aut certe ita esset voluntaria, ut non violenta; profecto enim sic possem corrigi. Nunc vero nusquam exitus misero patet, quem et voluntas, ut dixi, inexcusabilem, et incorrigibilem necessitas facit. Quis me eripiet de manu peccatoris, et de manu contra legem agentis et iniqui?
10. Quaerit quis, de quo querar? De me. Ego ille peccator, ille exlex, ille iniquus. Peccator, quia peccavi; exlex, quia voluntate persisto agere contra legem. Nam mea voluntas ipsa est lex in membris meis, legi divinae recalcitrans. Et quoniam lex Domini lex mentis meae, sicut scriptum est: Lex Dei ejus in corde ipsius; per hoc et mihi ipsi mea ipsius voluntas contraria invenitur, quae est iniquitas maxima. Cui enim non iniquus, qui mihi sum? Qui sibi nequam, ait, cui bonus? Fateor, non sum bonus, quia non est in me bonum. Consolabor me tamen, quia et sanctorum vox ista est: Scio quia non est in me bonum, inquit. Discernit tamen quod dicit: In se. In carne sua interpretans, propter contradictoriam legem, quae in ea est. Nam habet legem et in mente, eaque melior. Annon lex Dei bona? Quod si malus propter legem malam, quomodo non propter bonam bonus? An mala sua est quae est in carne sua, et ideo de mala malus; et minime bonus de bona? Non est ita. Lex Dei ejus in mente ipsius, atque ita in mente, ut sit et mentis. Testis est ipse qui ait: Invenio aliam legem in membris meis, repugnantem legi mentis meae. Nunquid suum quod carnis suae est, et non suum quod mentis suae est? Ego dico et plus. Quidni dicam, quod idem ipse magister dicit? Nam mente quidem serviens legi Dei, carne autem legi peccati; quid magis suum fateatur evidenter ostendit, cum malum quod in carne est, ita a se alienum censet, ut dicat: Itaque jam non ego operor illud, sed quod habitat in me peccatum. Et ideo fortassis signanter aliam dixerit legem inventam in membris suis, quod alienam hanc, et quasi adventitiam reputaret. Unde et adhuc ego aliquid audeo amplius, haud temere quidem: Paulum videlicet non jam malum, propter malum quod in carne habet; magis autem bonum, propter bonum quod in mente habet. Annon bonus, qui consentit legi Dei, quoniam bona est? Nam, etsi se itidem fateatur servire legi peccati, carne hoc facit, non mente. Cum autem mente quidem serviat legi Dei, carne autem legi peccati; quidnam potissimum horum Paulo imputandum putes, tu videris. Nam mihi fateor facile persuasum, quod mentis quam quod carnis est, pluris esse, non solum mihi, sed et ipsi Paulo, ut jam dictum est, qui ait: Si autem quod nolo, illud facio, jam non ego operor illud, sed quod habitat in me peccatum.
11. Sed de libertate ista sufficiant. In libello, quem de Gratia et Libero Arbitrio scripsi, diversa fortassis de imagine et similitudine disputata leguntur; sed, ut arbitror, non adversa. Legistis illa, ista audistis: quaenam magis probetis, vestro judicio derelinquo; vel si quid melius utrisque sapitis, in hoc gaudeo et gaudebo. At quoquo modo illa se habeant, tria quaedam impraesentiarum praecipua commendata tenetis; simplicitatem, immortalitatem, libertatem. Et hoc vobis liquido apparere jam arbitror, animam pro ingenita atque ingenua similitudine, quae in his tam eximie claret, non parvam cum Verbo habere affinitatem, sponso Ecclesiae Jesu Christo Domino nostro, qui est super omnia Deus benedictus in saecula. Amen.