HUMANITARIANISM. - H. is a concept with an indefinable content, not to be confused with the sentiment of humanity and with humanism. The first is a spontaneous movement of the soul, which turns with compassion toward those who suffer or reacts against cruelties, and arises from the deep inclination of human nature toward solidarity. The second, on the other hand, is a conception of life, which tends to bring out the value of man and of the laws of his rational nature, for the constitution of a social order that corresponds in all things to his most universal needs and respects his dignity and his rights. H., instead, may be called a vague and elusive sentimentalism with a rather emotional foundation, without a systematic structure of its own or a doctrine, by virtue of which the humanitarian feels moved before the pain of all beings, to which he tends to bring remedy through his action. Therefore, as a generic sentiment, it is found mingled with various tendencies and currents, which have in common an attitude of opposition to whatever can be a cause of pain and suffering. Although h. is present in the movements and associations for the protection of animals and against vivisection, nevertheless, according to the very derivation of the term, it refers above all to man, both as subject who nurtures delicate sentiments, and principally as object, for whose protection against cruelties it aims, in order to lighten and possibly make disappear the causes of his sufferings.
the universe, Romanticism nourished by a vague naturalistic sentiment contributed not a little to its birth and its expansion, so as to make it almost fashionable in the 19th century, which was the period of its greatest flourishing. The countries in which it has taken root most firmly are those of the Anglo-Saxon world, perhaps because of the influence exercised by certain religious confessions, in which the cult of human life was one of the principal themes of propaganda.
Although, as has been said, h. has no doctrinal structure, nevertheless at its base certain guiding ideas can be intuited. The most general is naturalism with a rationalistic background; a little-reflected philosophy that prescinds from transcendental values, in order to concentrate its attention solely on man and on humanity, which it regards with a certain religious mysticism. This was in a particular way the attitude of Auguste Comte (v.), who, after having denied revealed religion and dogma as contrary to the canons of scientific research, proposed as a surrogate the so-called religion of humanity. With h. there is consequently joined an optimistic conception of human nature, of the type devised by Rousseau, and it does not lack a certain tendency to attribute a special value to whatever is spontaneous in man, whose perfection and happiness it makes consist in following his own impulses. These ideas, nevertheless, are mingled and interwoven in a confused manner, without acquiring distinct outlines, wrapped in a sentimental vaporousness that does not allow them to be distinguished with exactness.
H. has given rise to several philanthropic initiatives and to associations which, despite the different aim pursued by them, have had as their common tendency the relief of humanity. It was not extraneous, for example, to the movement that led to the abolition of slavery, to the measures adopted for the protection of women and children, particularly as regards their working conditions, to the improvement of the treatment of prisoners and to the more humane and rational organization and maintenance of penal institutions, to the creation of the International Red Cross, and so on. It reached the limits of utopia in the various pacifist movements, which, often exaggerating the horror of the slaughter of war, have proposed abstention from military service and civil disobedience (v. OREZIONE DI COSCIENZA) and upheld the necessity of making frontiers, fatherlands and religious divisions disappear, as the principal causes of conflicts among peoples.
On the whole, as a sentiment directed toward the lightening of sufferings and the condemnation of cruelties, it may be called a derivation of the deepest human impulse toward solidarity, and, prescinding from its naturalistic foundation and from the exaggerations to which sentimentalism not watched over by reason usually leads, an expression of goodness, lacking however the supernatural breath that sustains and stimulates Christian charity.
Bibliography2 works
Giordani, L'u. razionalistico e l'imperialismo romantico in Germania, Rome 1918; F. D'Antonio, La filosofia politica tedesca. Gli ideali cosmopolitici, Crema 1938.
Antonio Messineo