Azione Romana

TopicsBook VI

Aristotle (384–322 BC) · Topica · Τοπικά · Bekker 100a–164b

Book VI, chapter 1 On Places connected with Definition.139a24–139b18

English

139a23The discussion of Definitions falls into five parts. For 139a25you have to show either (I) that it is not true at all to apply the expression as well to that to which the term is applied (for the definition of Man ought to be true of every man); or (2) that though the object has a genus, he has failed to put the object defined into the genus, or to put it into the appropriate genus (for the framer of a definition should first place the object in its genus, and then append 139a30its differences: for of all the elements of the definition the genus is usually supposed to be the principal mark of the essence of what is defined): or (3) that the expression is not peculiar to the object (for, as we said above as well,1 a definition ought to be peculiar)2: or else (4) see if, though he has observed all the aforesaid cautions, he has yet failed to define the object, that is, to express its essence. (5) It remains, apart from the foregoing, to see if he has defined it, 139a35but defined it incorrectly.

139a36Whether, then, the expression be not also true of that of which the term is true you should proceed to examine according to the commonplace rules that relate to Accident. For there too the question is always ‘Is so and so true or untrue?’: for whenever we argue that an accident 139bbelongs, we declare it to be true, while whenever we argue that it does not belong, we declare it to be untrue. If, again, he has failed to place the object in the appropriate genus, or if the expression be not peculiar to the object, we must go on to examine the case according to the commonplace 139b5rules that relate to genus and property.

139b6It remains, then, to prescribe how to investigate whether the object has been either not defined at all, or else defined incorrectly. First, then, we must proceed to examine if it has been defined incorrectly: for with anything it is easier to do it than to do it correctly. Clearly, then, more mistakes are made in the latter task on account of its greater difficulty. 139b10Accordingly the attack becomes easier in the latter case than in the former.

139b12Incorrectness falls into two branches: (I) first, the use of obscure language (for the language of a definition ought to be the very clearest possible, seeing that the whole purpose 139b15of rendering it is to make something known); (2) secondly, if the expression used be longer than is necessary: for all additional matter in a definition is superfluous. Again, each of the aforesaid branches is divided into a number of others.

Translator's notes
  1. 1 ror 10.
  2. 2 The bracket which begins at δεῖ yap... (1. 31) should be closed after εἴρηται (1. 32). 1-139a35. Read rov peradopay eindvra.

Book VI, chapter 2 Of Places relative to defining rightly.139b19–140a22

English

139b19One commonplace rule, then, in regard to obscurity is, 139b20See if the meaning intended by the definition involves an ambiguity with any other, e. ‘Becoming is a passage into being’, or ‘Health is the balance of hot and cold elements’. Here ‘passage’ and ‘balance’ are ambiguous terms: it is accordingly not clear which of the several possible senses of the term he intends to convey. Likewise also, if the term defined be used in different senses and he has spoken without 139b25distinguishing between them: for then it is not clear to which of them the definition rendered applies, and one can then bring a captious objection on the ground that the definition does not apply to all the things whose definition he has rendered: and this kind of thing is particularly easy in the case where the definer does not see the ambiguity of his terms. Or, again, the questioner may himself distinguish the various senses of the term rendered in the definition, 139b30and then institute his argument against each: for if the expression used be not adequate to the subject in any of its senses, it is clear that he cannot have defined it in any sense aright.

139b32Another rule is, See if he has used a metaphorical expression, as, for instance, if he has defined knowledge as ‘unsupplantable’, or the earth as a ‘nurse’, or temperance as a ‘harmony’. For a metaphorical expression is always 139b35obscure. It is possible, also, to argue sophistically against the user of a metaphorical expression’ as though he had used it in its literal sense: for the definition stated will not apply to the term defined, e.g. in the case of temperance: for harmony is always found between notes. Moreover, if harmony be the genus of temperance, then the same object 140awill occur in two genera of which neither contains the other: for harmony does not contain virtue, nor virtue harmony. Again, see if he uses terms that are unfamiliar, as when Plato describes1 the eye as ‘brow-shaded’, or a certain spider 140a5as ‘poison-fanged’, or the marrow as ‘bone-formed’. For an unusual phrase is always obscure.

140a6Sometimes a phrase is used neither ambiguously, nor yet metaphorically, nor yet literally, as when the law is said to be the ‘measure’ or ‘image’ of the things that are by nature just. Such phrases are worse than metaphor; for the latter does make its meaning to some extent clear because of the 140a10likeness involved; for those who use metaphors do so always in view of some likeness: whereas this kind of phrase makes nothing clear; for there is no likeness to justify the description ‘measure’ or ‘image’, as applied to the law, nor is the law ordinarily so called in a literal sense. So then, if a man says that the law is literally a ‘measure’ or an ‘image’, he 140a15speaks falsely: for an image is something produced by imitation, and this is not found in the case of the law. If, on the other hand, he does not mean the term literally, it is clear that he has used an unclear expression, and one that is worse than any sort of metaphorical expression.

140a18Moreover, see if from the expression used the definition of the contrary be not clear; for definitions that have been correctly rendered also indicate their contraries as well. 140a20Or, again, see if, when it is merely stated by itself, it is not evident what it defines: just as in the works of the old painters, unless there were an inscription, the figures used to be unrecognizable.

Translator's notes
  1. 1 Not in his extant works; perhaps in his early poems. Or the reference may be to Plato the comic poet.

Book VI, chapter 3 Of Superfluity in Definition.140a23–141a22

English

140a23If, then, the definition be not clear, you should proceed to examine on lines such as these. If, on the other hand, he has phrased the definition redundantly, first of all look 140a25and see whether he has used any attribute that belongs universally, either to real objects in general, or to all that fall under the same genus as the object defined: for the mention of this is sure to be redundant. For the genus ought to divide the object from things in general, and the differentia from any of the things contained in the same genus. Now any term that belongs to everything separates off the given object from absolutely nothing, while any that 140a30belongs to all the things that fall under the same genus does not separate it off from the things contained in the same genus. Any addition, then, of that kind will be pointless.

140a33Or see if, though the additional matter may be peculiar to the given term, yet even when it is struck out the rest of the expression too is peculiar and makes clear the essence 140a35of the term. Thus, in the definition of man, the addition ‘capable of receiving knowledge’ is superfluous; for strike it out, and still the expression is peculiar and makes clear 140bhis essence. Speaking generally, everything is superfluous upon whose removal the remainder still makes the term that is being defined clear. Such, for instance, would also be the definition of the soul, assuming it to be stated as a ‘self-moving number’;1 for the soul is just ‘the self-moving’, as Plato defined it.2 Or perhaps the expression used, though appropriate, yet does not declare the essence, 140b5if the word ‘number’ be eliminated. Which of the two is the real state of the case it is difficult to determine clearly: the right way to treat the matter in all cases is to be guided by convenience. Thus (e.g.) it is said that the definition of phlegm is the ‘undigested moisture that comes first off food’. Here the addition of the word ‘undigested’ is superfluous, seeing that ‘the first’ is one and not many, so that even when 140b10‘undigested’ is left out the definition will still be peculiar to the subject: for it is impossible that both phlegm and also something else should both be the first to arise from the food. Or perhaps the phlegm is not absolutely the first thing to come off the food, but only the first of the undigested matters, so that the addition ‘undigested’ is required; for stated the other way the definition would not 140b15be true unless the phlegm comes first of all.

140b16Moreover, see if anything contained in the definition fails to apply to everything that falls under the same species: for this sort of definition is worse than those which include an attribute belonging to all things universally. For in that case, if the remainder of the expression be peculiar, the whole too will be peculiar: for absolutely always, if to 140b20something peculiar anything whatever that is true be added, the whole too becomes peculiar. Whereas if any part of the expression do not apply to everything that falls under the same species, it is impossible that the expression as a whole should be peculiar: for it will not be predicated convertibly with the object; e.g. ‘a walking biped animal six feet high’: for an expression of that kind is not predicated 140b25convertibly with the term, because the attribute ‘six feet high’ does not belong to everything that falls under the same species.

140b27Again, see if he has said the same thing more than once, saying (e.g.) ‘desire’ is a ‘conation for the pleasant’. For ‘desire’ is always ‘for the pleasant’, so that what is the same as desire will also be ‘for the pleasant’. Accordingly 140b30our definition of desire becomes ‘conation-for-the-pleasant for the pleasant’: for the word ‘desire’ is the exact equivalent of the words ‘conation-for-the-pleasant’, so that both alike will be ‘for the pleasant’. Or perhaps there is no absurdity in this; for consider this instance:—‘Man is a biped’: therefore, what is the same as man is a biped: but ‘a walking biped animal’ is the same as man, and therefore 140b35‘a walking biped animal is a biped’. But this involves no real absurdity. For ‘biped’ is not a predicate of ‘walking animal’: if it were, then we should certainly have ‘biped’ predicated twice of the same thing; but as a matter of fact 141athe subject said to be a biped is ‘a walking biped animal’, so that the word ‘biped’ is only used as a predicate once. Likewise also in the case of ‘desire’ as well: for it is not ‘conation’ that is said to be ‘for the pleasant’, but rather the whole idea, so that there too the predication is only 141a5made once. Absurdity results, not when the same word is uttered twice, but when the same thing is more than once predicated of a subject; e.g. if he says, like Xenocrates,3 that wisdom defines and contemplates reality4 for definition is a certain type of contemplation, so that by adding the words ‘and contemplates’ over again he says the same thing twice over. Likewise, too, those fail who say that 141a10‘cooling’ is ‘the privation of natural heat’. For all privation is a privation of some natural attribute, so that the addition of the word ‘natural’ is superfluous: it would have been enough to say ‘privation of heat’, for the word ‘privation’ shows of itself that the heat meant is natural heat.

141a15Again, see if a universal have been mentioned and then a particular case of it be added as well, e. ‘Equity is a remission of what is expedient and just’; for what is just is a branch of what is expedient and is therefore included in the latter term: its mention is therefore redundant, an addition of the particular after the universal has been already stated. So also, if he defines ‘medicine’ as ‘knowledge of what makes for health in animals and men’, 141a20or ‘the law’ as ‘the image of what is by nature noble and just’; for what is just is a branch of what is noble, so that he says the same thing more than once.

Translator's notes
  1. 1 Xenocrates, fr. 60 Heinze.
  2. 2 Phaedr, 245 E.
  3. 3 141a6. Read οἷον ef ὡς Ξενοκράτης. 1 Fr.
  4. 4 Heinze.

Cited in the Summa: I, q. 97, a. 2

Book VI, chapter 4 As to whether the Definition contains what a thing is.141a23–142b19

English

141a22Whether, then, a man defines a thing correctly or incorrectly you should proceed to examine on these and similar lines. But whether he has mentioned and defined its essence 141a25or no, should be examined as follows :—

141a26First of all, see if he has failed to make the definition through terms that are prior and more intelligible. For the reason why the definition is rendered is to make known the term stated, and we make things known by taking not any random terms, but such as are prior and more intelligible, 141a30as is done in demonstrations (for so it is with all teaching and learning); accordingly, it is clear that a man who does not define through terms of this kind has not defined at all. Otherwise, there will be more than one definition of the same thing: for clearly he who defines through terms that are prior and more intelligible has also framed a definition, and a better one, so that both would then be definitions of the same object. This sort of view, 141a35however, does not generally find acceptance: for of each real object the essence is single: if, then, there are to be a number of definitions of the same thing, the essence of the object will be the same as it is represented to be in each of the definitions, and these representations are not 141bthe same, inasmuch as the definitions are different. Clearly, then, any one who has not defined a thing through terms that are prior and more intelligible has not defined it at all.

141b3The statement that a definition has not been made through more intelligible terms may be understood in two senses, either supposing that its terms are absolutely less intelligible, 141b5or supposing that they are less intelligible to us: for either sense is possible. Thus absolutely the prior is more intelligible than the posterior, a point, for instance, than a line, a line than a plane, and a plane than a solid; just as also a unit is more intelligible than a number; for it is the prius and starting-point of all number. Likewise, also, a letter is more intelligible than a syllable. Whereas to us it sometimes happens that the converse is the case: for 141b10the solid falls under perception most of all—more than a plane '-and1 a plane more than a line, and a line more than a point; for most people learn things like the former earlier than the latter; for any ordinary intelligence can grasp them, whereas the others require an exact and exceptional understanding.

141b15Absolutely, then, it is better to try to make what is posterior known through what is prior, inasmuch as such a way of procedure is more scientific. Of course, in dealing with persons who cannot recognize things through terms of that kind, it may perhaps be necessary to frame the expression through terms that are intelligible to them. Among definitions of this kind are those of a point, a line, 141b20and a plane, all of which explain the prior by the posterior; for they say that a point is the limit of a line, a line of a plane, a plane of a solid. One must, however, not fail to observe that those who define in this way cannot show the essential nature of the term they define, unless it so happens 141b25that the same thing is more intelligible both to us and also absolutely, since a correct definition must define a thing through its genus and its differentiae, and these belong to the order of things which are absolutely more intelligible than, and prior to, the species. For annul the genus and differentia, and the species too is annulled, so that these are prior to the species. They are also more intelligible; for 141b30if the species be known, the genus and differentia must of necessity be known as well (for any one who knows what a man is knows also what ‘animal’ and ‘walking’ arc), whereas if the genus or the differentia be known it does not follow of necessity that the species is known as well: thus the species is less intelligible. Moreover, those who 141b35say that such definitions, viz. those which proceed from what Is intelligible to this, that, or the other man, are really and truly definitions, will have to say that there are several definitions of one and the same thing. For, as it happens, different things are more intelligible to different people, not 142athe same things to all; and so a different definition would have to be rendered to each several person, if the definition is to be constructed from what is more intelligible to particular individuals. Moreover, to the same people different things are more intelligible at different times; first of all the objects of sense; then, as they become more sharp-witted, the converse; so that those who hold that a definition 142a5ought to be rendered through what is more intelligible to particular individuals would not have to render the same definition at all times even to the same person. It is clear, then, that the right way to define is not through terms of that kind, but through what is absolutely more intelligible: for only in this way could the definition come always to be one and the same. Perhaps, also, what is absolutely intelligible 142a10is what is intelligible, not to all, but to those who are in a sound state of understanding, just as what is absolutely healthy is what is healthy to those in a sound state of body. All such points as this ought to be made very precise, and made use of in the course of discussion as occasion requires. The demolition of a definition will most surely win a general 142a15approval if the definer happens to have framed his expression neither from what is absolutely more intelligible nor yet from what is so to us.

142a17One form, then, of the failure to work through more intelligible terms is the exhibition of the prior through the posterior, as we remarked before.2 Another form occurs if we find3 that the definition has been rendered of what is at 142a20rest and definite through what is indefinite and in motion: for what is still and definite is prior to what is indefinite and in motion.

142a22Of the failure to use terms that are prior there are three forms:

142a23(I) The first is when an opposite has been defined through its opposite, e. g. good through evil: for opposites are always simultaneous by nature. Some people think, also, that both 142a25are objects of the same science, so that the one is not even more intelligible than the other. One must, however, observe that it is perhaps not possible to define some things in any other way, e.g. the double without the half, and all the terms that are essentially relative: for in all such cases the essential being is the same as a certain relation to something, 142a30so that it is impossible to understand the one term without the other, and accordingly in the definition of the one the other too must be embraced. One ought to learn up all such points as these, and use them as occasion may seem to require.

142a34(2) Another is—if he has used the term defined itself. This passes unobserved when the actual name of the object 142a35is not used, e. g. supposing any one had defined the sun as 142ba ‘star that appears by day’.4 For in bringing in ‘day’ he brings in the sun. To detect errors of this sort, exchange the word for its definition, e.g. the definition of ‘day’ as the ‘passage of the sun over the earth’. Clearly, whoever has said ‘the passage of the sun over the earth’ has said 142b5‘the sun’, so that in bringing in the ‘day’ he has brought in the sun.

142b6(3) Again, see if he has defined one co-ordinate member of a division by another, e.g. ‘an odd number’ as ‘that which is greater by one than an even number’. For the co-ordinate members of a division that are derived from the same genus are simultaneous by nature, and ‘odd’ and 142b10‘even’ are such terms: for both are differentiae of number.

142b11Likewise also, see if he has defined a superior through a subordinate term, e.g. ‘An “even number” is “a number divisible into halves”, or “the good” is a “state of virtue”. For ‘half’ is derived from ‘two’, and ‘two’ is an even number: virtue also is a kind of good, so that the 142b15latter terms are subordinate to the former. Moreover, in using the subordinate term one is bound to use the other as well: for whoever employs the term ‘virtue’ employs the term ‘good’, seeing that virtue is a certain kind of good: likewise, also, whoever employs the term ‘half’ employs the term ‘even’, for to be ‘divided in half’ means to be divided into two, and two is even.

Translator's notes
  1. 1 yarPi1. Read πίπτει ἐπιπέδου.
  2. 2 1419 26.
  3. 3 142a20, Read ἡμῖν after ὁ λόγος.
  4. 4 Cf. Pl. Def. 411 A.

Book VI, chapter 5 Topics connected with Definition, as to Genus.142b20–143a28

English

142b20Generally speaking, then, one commonplace rule relates to the failure to frame the expression by means of terms that are prior and more intelligible: and of this the subdivisions are those specified above. A second is, see whether, though the object is in a genus, it has not been placed in a genus. This sort of error is always found where the essence of the object does not stand first in the expression, e.g. the definition of ‘body’ as ‘that which has 142b25three dimensions’, or the definition of ‘man’, supposing any one to give it, as ‘that which knows how to count’: for it is not stated what it is that has three dimensions, or what it is that knows how to count: whereas the genus is meant to indicate just this, and is submitted first of the terms in the definition.

142b30Moreover, see if, while the term to be defined is used in relation to many things, he has failed to render it in relation to all of them; as (e.g.) if he define ‘grammar’ as the ‘knowledge how to write from dictation’: for he ought also to say that it is a knowledge how to read as well. For in rendering it as ‘knowledge of writing’ he has no more defined it than by rendering it as ‘knowledge of reading’: neither in fact has succeeded, but only he who mentions both these things, since it is impossible that there 142b35should be more than one definition of the same thing. It is 143aonly, however, in some cases that what has been said corresponds to the actual state of things: in some it does not, e.g. all those terms which are not used essentially in relation to both things: as medicine is said to deal with the production of disease and health; for it is said essentially to do the latter, but the former only by accident: for it is 143a5absolutely alien to medicine to produce disease. Here, then, the man who renders medicine as relative to both of these things has not defined it any better than he who mentions the one only. In fact he has done it perhaps worse, for any one else besides the doctor is capable of producing disease.

143a9Moreover, in a case where the term to be defined is used 143a10in relation to several things, see if he has rendered it as relative to the worse rather than to the better; for every form of knowledge and potentiality is generally thought to be relative to the best.

143a12Again, if the thing in question be not placed in its own proper genus, one must examine it according to the elementary rules in regard to genera, as has been said before.!

143a15Moreover, see if he uses language which transgresses1 the genera of the things he defines, defining, e.g., justice as a ‘state that produces equality’ or ‘distributes what is equal’: for by defining it so he passes outside the sphere of virtue, and so by leaving out the genus of justice he fails to express its essence: for the essence of a thing must in each case bring in its genus. It is the same thing if the 143a20object be not put into its nearest genus; for the man who puts it into the nearest one has stated all the higher genera, seeing that all the higher genera are predicated of the lower. Either, then, it ought to be put into its nearest genus, or else to the higher genus all the differentia ought to be appended whereby the nearest genus is defined. For then he would 143a25not have left out anything: but would merely have mentioned the subordinate genus by an expression instead of by name. On the other hand, he who mentions merely the higher genus by itself, does not state the subordinate genus as well: in saying ‘plant’ a man does not specify ‘a tree’.

Translator's notes
  1. 1 b 9 π᾿ ίνων.

Book VI, chapter 6 Of Difference, as to Genus, Species, etc.143a29–145b33

English

143a29Again, in regard to the differentiae, we must examine in 143a30like manner whether the differentiae, too, that he has stated be those of the genus. For if a man has not defined the object by the differentiae peculiar to it, or has mentioned something such as is utterly incapable of being a differentia of anything, e.g. ‘animal’ or ‘substance’, clearly he has not defined it at all: for the aforesaid terms do not differentiate anything at all. Further, we must see whether the differentia stated possesses anything that is co-ordinate 143a35with it in a division; for, if not, clearly the one stated could not be a differentia of the genus. For a genus is always divided by differentiae that are co-ordinate members of a 143bdivision, as, for instance, ‘animal’ by the terms ‘walking’, ‘flying’, ‘aquatic’, and ‘biped’. Or see if, though the contrasted differentia exists, it yet is not true of the genus; for then, clearly, neither of them could be a differentia of the genus; for differentiae that are co-ordinates in a division with the differentia of a thing are 143b5all true of the genus to which the thing belongs. Likewise, also, see if, though it be true, yet the addition of it to the genus fails to make a species. For then, clearly, this could not be a specific differentia of the genus: for a specific differentia, if added to the genus, always makes a species. If, however, this be no true differentia, no more is the one 143b10adduced, seeing that it is a co-ordinate member of a division with this.

143b12Moreover, see if he divides the genus by a negation, as those do who define a line as ‘length without breadth’: for this means simply that it has not any breadth. The genus will then be found to partake of its own species: for, 143b15since of everything either an affirmation or its negation is true, length must always either lack breadth or possess it, so that ‘length’ as well, i.e. the genus of ‘line’, will be either with or without breadth. But ‘length without breadth’ is the definition of a species, as also is ‘length with breadth’: for ‘without breadth’ and ‘with breadth’ are differentiae, and the genus and differentia constitute the 143b20definition of the species. Hence the genus would admit of the definition of its species. Likewise, also, it will admit of the definition of the differentia, seeing that one or the other of the aforesaid differentiae is of necessity predicated of the genus. The usefulness of this principle is found in meeting those who assert the existence of ‘Ideas’: for if 143b25absolute length exist, how will it be predicable of the genus that it has breadth or that it lacks it? For one assertion or the other will have to be true of ‘length’ universally, if it is to be true of the genus at all: and this is contrary to the fact: for there exist both lengths which have, and lengths which have not, breadth. Hence the only people against whom the rule can be employed are those who 143b30assert that a genus is always1 numerically one; and this is what is done by those who assert the real existence of the ‘Ideas’; for they allege that absolute length and absolute animal are the genus.

143b33It may be that in some cases the definer is obliged to employ a negation as well, e. g. in defining privations, For 143b35‘blind’ means a thing which cannot see when its nature is to see. There is no difference between dividing the genus by a negation, and dividing it by such an affirmation as is 144abound to have a negation as its co-ordinate in a division, e.g. supposing he had defined something as ‘length possessed of breadth’; for co-ordinate in the division with that which is possessed of breadth is that which possesses no breadth and that only, so that again the genus is divided by a negation.

144a5Again, see if he rendered the species as a differentia, as do those who define ‘contumely’ as ‘insolence accompanied by jeering’; for jeering is a kind of insolence, i. e. it is a species and not a differentia.

144a9Moreover, see if he has stated the genus as the differentia, 144a10e.g. ‘Virtue is a good or noble state: for ‘good’ is the genus of ‘virtue’. Or possibly ‘good’ here is not the genus but the differentia, on the principle that the same thing cannot be in two genera of which neither contains the other: for ‘good’ does not include ‘state’, nor vice versa: for not every state is good nor every good a ‘state’. 144a15Both, then, could not be genera, and consequently, if ‘state’ is the genus of virtue, clearly ‘good’ cannot be its genus: it must rather be the differentia. Moreover, ‘a state’ indicates the essence of virtue, whereas ‘good’ indicates not the essence but a quality: and to indicate a quality is generally held to be the function of the differentia.

144a20See, further, whether the differentia rendered indicates an individual rather than a quality: for the general view is that the differentia always expresses a quality.

144a23Look and see, further, whether the differentia belongs only by accident to the object defined. For the differentia 144a25is never an accidental attribute, any more than the genus is: for the differentia of a thing cannot both belong and not belong to it.

144a27Moreover, if either the differentia or the species, or any of the things which are under the species, is predicable of the genus, then he could not have defined the term. For 144a30none of the aforesaid can possibly be predicated of the genus, seeing that the genus is the term with the widest range of all. Again, see if the genus be predicated of the differentia; for the general view is that the genus is predicated, not of the differentia, but of the objects of which the differentia is predicated. Animal (e.g.) is predicated 144a35of ‘man’ or ‘ox’ or other walking animals, not of the actual differentia itself which we predicate of the species. For if ‘animal’ is to be predicated of each of its differentiae, then ‘animal’ would be predicated of the species several 144btimes over; for the differentiae are predicates of the species. Moreover, the differentiae will be all either species or individuals, if they are animals; for every animal is either a species or an individual.

144b4Likewise you must inquire also if the species or any of the objects that come under it is predicated of the differentia: for this is impossible, seeing that the differentia is a term with a wider range than the various species. Moreover, if any of the species be predicated of it, the result will be that the differentia is a species: if, for instance, ‘man’ be predicated, the differentia is clearly the human race. Again, see if the differentia fails to be prior to the 144b10species: for the differentia ought to be posterior to the genus, but prior to the species.

144b12Look and see also if the differentia mentioned belongs to a different genus, neither contained in nor containing the genus in question. For the general view is that the same differentia cannot be used of two non-subaltern genera. 144b15Else the result will be that the same species as well will be in two non-subaltern genera: for each of the differentiae imports its own genus, e.g. ‘walking’ and ‘biped’ import with them the genus ‘animal’. If, then, each of the genera as well is true of that of which the differentia is true,2 it clearly follows that the species must be in two 144b20non-subaltern genera. Or perhaps it is not impossible for the same differentia to be used of two non-subaltern genera, and we ought to add the words ‘except they both be subordinate members of the same genus’. Thus ‘walking animal’ and ‘flying animal’ are non-subaltern genera, and ‘biped’ is the differentia of both. The words ‘except they 144b25both be subordinate members of the same genus’ ought therefore to be added; for both these are subordinate to ‘animal’. From this possibility, that the same differentia may be used of two non-subaltern genera, it is clear also that there is no necessity for the differentia to carry with it the whole of the genus to which it belongs, but only the one or the other of its limbs together with the genera that are higher than this, as ‘biped’ carries with it either ‘flying’ 144b30or ‘walking animal’.

144b31See, too, if he has rendered ‘existence in’ something as the differentia of a thing’s essence: for the general view is that locality cannot differentiate between one essence and another. Hence, too, people condemn those who divide animals by means of the terms ‘walking’ and ‘aquatic’, on the ground that ‘walking’ and ‘aquatic’ indicate mere locality. Or possibly in this case the censure is undeserved; 144b35for ‘aquatic’ does not mean ‘in’ anything; nor does it denote a locality, but a certain quality: for even if the thing be on the dry land, still it is aquatic: and likewise a land-animal, even though it be in the water, will still be 145aa land- and not an aquatic-animal. But all the same, if ever the differentia does denote existence in something, clearly he will have made a bad mistake.

145a3Again, see if he has rendered an affection as the differentia: for every affection, if intensified, subverts the essence of the thing, while the differentia is not of that kind: for 145a5the differentia is generally considered rather to preserve that which it differentiates; and it is absolutely impossible for a thing to exist without its own special differentia: for if there be no ‘walking’, there will be no ‘man’. In fact, we may lay down absolutely that a thing cannot have as its differentia anything in respect of which it is subject to alteration: for all things of that kind, if intensified, 145a10destroy its essence. If, then, a man has rendered any differentia of this kind, he has made a mistake: for we undergo absolutely no alteration in respect of our differentiae.

145a13Again, see if he has failed to render the differentia of a relative term relatively to something else; for the differentiae of relative terms are themselves relative, as in 145a15the case also of knowledge. This is classed as speculative, practical, and productive; and each of these denotes a relation: for it speculates upon something, and produces something and does something.

145a19Look and see also if the definer renders each relative 145a20term relatively to its natural purpose: for while in some cases the particular relative term can be used in relation to its natural purpose only and to nothing else, some can be used in relation to something else as well. Thus sight can only be used for seeing, but a strigil can also be used to dip up water. Still, if any one were to define a strigil as an instrument for dipping water, he has made a mistake: for 145a25that is not its natural function. The definition of a thing’s natural function is ‘that for which it would be used by the prudent man, acting as such, and by the science that deals specially with that thing’.

145a28Or see if, whenever a term happens to be used in a number of relations, he has failed to introduce it in its primary relation: e.g. by defining ‘wisdom’ as the virtue 145a30of ‘man’ or of the ‘soul’, rather than of the ‘reasoning faculty’: for ‘wisdom’ is the virtue primarily of the reasoning faculty: for it is in virtue of this that both the man and his soul are said to be wise.

145a32Moreover, if the thing of which the term defined has been stated to be an affection or disposition,3 or whatever it may be, be unable to admit it, the definer has made a mistake. For every disposition and every affection is 145a35formed naturally in that of which it is an affection or disposition, as knowledge, too, is formed in the soul, being a disposition of soul. Sometimes, however, people make bad mistakes in matters of this sort, e. g. all those who say that 145b‘sleep’ is a ‘failure of sensation’, or that ‘perplexity’ is a state of ‘equality between contrary reasonings’, or that ‘pain’ is a ‘violent disruption of parts that are naturally conjoined’. For sleep is not an attribute of sensation, whereas it ought to be, if it is a failure of sensation. Likewise, 145b5perplexity is not an attribute of opposite reasonings, nor pain of parts naturally conjoined: for then inanimate things will be in pain, since pain will be present in them. Similar in character, too, is the definition of ‘health’, say, as a ‘balance of hot and cold elements’: for then health will be necessarily exhibited by the hot and cold elements: for a 145b10balance of anything is an attribute inherent in those things of which it is the balance, so that health would be an attribute of them. Moreover, people who define in this way put effect for cause, or cause for effect. For the disruption of parts naturally conjoined is not pain, but only a cause of pain: nor again is a failure of sensation sleep, but the one is the Cause of the other: for either we go to sleep because sensation fails, or sensation fails because we go to sleep. Likewise also an equality between contrary reasonings would be generally considered to be a cause of perplexity: for it is when we reflect on both sides of a question and find everything alike to be in keeping with either course that we are 145b20perplexed which of the two we are to do.

145b21Moreover, with regard to all periods of time look and see whether there be any discrepancy between the differentia and the thing defined: e.g. supposing the ‘immortal’ to be defined as a ‘living thing immune at present from destruction’. For a living thing that is immune ‘at present’ from destruction will be immortal ‘at present’. Possibly, indeed, in this case this result does not follow, owing to the ambiguity of the words ‘immune at present from destruction’: for it 145b25may mean either that the thing has not been destroyed at present, or that it cannot be destroyed at present, or that at present it is such that it never can be destroyed. Whenever, then, we say that a living thing is at present immune from destruction, we mean that it is at present a living thing of such a kind as never to be destroyed: and this is equivalent to saying that it is immortal, so that it is not 145b30meant that it is immortal only at present. Still, if ever it does happen that what has been rendered according to the definition belongs in the present only or past, whereas what is meant by the word does not so belong, then the two could not be the same. So, then, this commonplace rule ought to be followed, as we have said.

Translator's notes
  1. 1 14330. Read πᾶν γένος.
  2. 2 144b19. Read a comma only, not a full-stop, at ἑκάτερον.
  3. 3 145a34. Read ἢ διάθεσις. 53 145b16. Read ὑπνώσσομεν.

Cited in the encyclopedia: Division

Book VI, chapter 7 Whether another Definition may be more explicit, etc.145b34–146a35

English

145b34You should look and see also whether the term being defined is applied in consideration of something other 145b35than the definition rendered. Suppose (e. g.) a definition of ‘justice’ as the ‘ability to distribute what is equal’. This would not be right, for ‘just’ describes rather the man who chooses, than the man who is able, to distribute what is 146aequal: so that justice could not be an ability to distribute what is equal: for then also the most just man would be the man with the most ability to distribute what is equal.

146a3Moreover, see if the thing admits of degrees, whereas what is rendered according to the definition does not, or, 146a5vice versa, what is rendered according to the definition admits of degrees while the thing does not. For either both must admit them or else neither, if indeed what is rendered according to the definition is the same as the thing. Moreover, see if, while both of them admit of degrees, they yet do not both become greater together: e.g. suppose sexual love to be the desire for intercourse: 146a10for he who is more intensely in love has not a more intense desire for intercourse, so that both do not become intensified at once: they certainly should, however, had they been the same thing.

146a13Moreover, suppose two things to be before you, see if the term to be defined applies more particularly to the one to which the content of the definition is less 146a15applicable. Take, for instance, the definition of ‘fire’ as the ‘body that consists of the most rarefied particles’. For ‘fire’ denotes flame rather than light, but flame? is less the body that consists of the most rarefied particles than is light: whereas both ought to be more applicable to the same thing, if they had been the same. Again, see if the one expression applies alike to both the objects before you, 146a20while the other does not apply to both alike, but more particularly to one of them.

146a21Moreover, see if he renders the definition relative to two things taken separately: thus, ‘the beautiful’ is ‘what is pleasant to the eyes or to the ears’1 or ‘the real’ is ‘what is capable of being acted upon or of acting’. For then the same thing will be both beautiful and not beautiful, and likewise will be both real and not real. For ‘pleasant to 146a25the ears’ will be the same as ‘beautiful’, so that ‘not pleasant to the ears’ will be the same as ‘not beautiful’: for of identical things the opposites, too, are identical, and the opposite of ‘beautiful’ is ‘not beautiful’, while of ‘pleasant to the ears’ the opposite is ‘not pleasant to the ears’: clearly, then, ‘not pleasant to the ears’ is the same thing as ‘not beautiful’. If, therefore, something be pleasant 146a30to the eyes but not to the ears, it will be both beautiful and not beautiful. In like manner we shall show also that the same thing is both real and unreal.

146a33Moreover, of both genera and differentiae and all the other terms rendered in definitions you should frame definitions 146a35in lieu of the terms, and then see if there be any discrepancy between them.

Translator's notes
  1. 1 Hipp.

Book VI, chapter 8 Of Definition as to Relation.146a36–147a11

English

146a37If the term defined be relative, either in itself or in respect of its genus, see whether the definition fails to mention that 146bto which the term, either in itself or in respect of its genus, is relative, e.g. if he has defined ‘knowledge’ as an ‘incontrovertible conception’ or ‘wishing’ as ‘painless conation’. For of everything relative the essence is relative to something else, seeing that the being of every relative term is identical with being in a certain relation to something. 146b5He ought, therefore, to have said that knowledge is ‘conception of a knowable’ and that wishing is ‘conation for a good’. Likewise, also, if he has defined ‘grammar’ as ‘knowledge of letters’: whereas in the definition there ought to be rendered either the thing to which the term itself is relative, or that, whatever it is, to which its genus is relative. Or see if a relative term has been described not 146b10in relation to its end, the end in anything being whatever is best in it or gives its purpose to the rest. Certainly it is what is best or final that should be stated, e.g. that desire is not for the pleasant but for pleasure: for this is our purpose in choosing what is pleasant as well.

146b14Look and see also if that in relation to which he has rendered the term be a process or an activity: for nothing 146b15of that kind is an end, for the completion of the activity or process is the end rather than the process or activity itself. Or perhaps this rule is not true in all cases, for almost everybody prefers the present experience of pleasure to its cessation, so that they would count the activity as the end rather than its completion.

146b20Again see in some cases if he has failed to distinguish the quantity or quality or place or other differentiae of an object; e.g. the quality and quantity of the honour the striving for which makes a man ambitious: for all men strive for honour, so that it is not enough to define the ambitious man as him who strives for honour, but the aforesaid differentiae must be added. Likewise, also, in 146b25defining the covetous man the quantity of money he aims at, or in the case of the incontinent man the quality of the pleasures, should be stated. For it is not the man who gives way to any sort of pleasure whatever who is called incontinent, but only he who gives way to a certain kind of pleasure. Or again, people sometimes define night as a ‘shadow on the earth’, or an earthquake as a ‘movement of the earth’, or a cloud as ‘condensation of the air’, or a wind as a ‘movement of the air’; whereas they ought to 146b30specify as well quantity, quality, place,1 and cause. Likewise, also, in other cases of the kind: for by omitting any differentiae whatever he fails to state the essence of the term. One should always attack deficiency. For a movement of the earth does not constitute an earthquake, nor a movement of the air a wind, irrespective of its manner 146b35and the amount involved.

146b36Moreover, in the case of conations, and in any other cases where it applies, see if the word ‘apparent’ is left out, 147ae.g. ‘wishing is a conation after the good’, or ‘desire is a conation after the pleasant’—instead of saying ‘the apparently good’, or ‘pleasant’. For often those who exhibit the conation do not perceive what is good or pleasant, so that their aim need not be really good or pleasant, but only apparently so. They ought, therefore, 147a5to have rendered the definition also accordingly. On the other hand, any one who maintains the existence of Ideas ought to be brought face to face with his Ideas, even though he does render the word in question: for there can be no Idea of anything merely apparent: the general view is that an Idea is always spoken of in relation to an Idea: thus absolute desire is for the absolutely pleasant, and absolute wishing is for the absolutely good; they therefore cannot be for an apparently good or an apparently pleasant: 147a10for the existence of an absolutely-apparently-good or pleasant would be an absurdity.

Translator's notes
  1. 1 146b30. Read καὶ ποῦ after καὶ ποίου.

Book VI, chapter 9 Of Definition as to Contraries, etc.147a12–148a9

English

147a12Moreover, if the definition be of the state of anything, look at what is in the state, while if it be of what is in the state, look at the state: and likewise also in other cases of the kind. Thus if the pleasant be identical with the 147a15beneficial, then, too, the man who is pleased is benefited. Speaking generally, in definitions of this sort it happens that what the definer defines is in a sense more than one thing: for in defining knowledge, a man in a sense defines ignorance as well, and likewise also what has knowledge and what lacks it, and what it is to know and to be 147a20ignorant. For if the first be made clear, the others become in a certain sense clear as well. We have, then, to be on our guard in all such cases against discrepancy, using the elementary principles drawn from consideration of contraries and of co-ordinates.

147a23Moreover, in the case of relative terms, see if the species is rendered as relative to a species of that to which the genus is rendered as relative, e.g. supposing belief to be 147a25relative to some object of belief, see whether a particular belief is made relative to some particular object of belief:}1 and, if a multiple be relative to a fraction, see whether a particular multiple be made relative to a particular fraction. For if it be not so rendered, clearly a mistake has been made.

147a29See, also, if the opposite of the term has the opposite 147a30definition, whether (e. g.) the definition of ‘half’ is the opposite of that of ‘double’: for if ‘double’ is ‘that which exceeds another by an equal amount to that other’, ‘half’ is ‘that which is exceeded by an amount equal to itself’. In the same way, too, with contraries. For to the contrary term will apply the definition that is contrary in some one of the ways in which contraries are conjoined. Thus (e.g.) if ‘useful’ ‘productive of good’, ‘injurious’ ‘productive 147a35of evil’ or ‘destructive of good’, for one or the other of 147bthese is bound to be contrary to the term originally used. Suppose, then, neither of these things to be the contrary of the term originally used, then clearly neither of the definitions rendered later could be the definition of the contrary of the term originally defined: and therefore the definition originally rendered of the original term has not been rightly rendered either. Seeing, moreover, that of contraries, the 147b5one is sometimes a word formed to denote the privation of the other, as (e.g.) inequality is generally held to be the privation of equality (for ‘unequal’ merely describes things that are not ‘equal’), it is therefore clear that2 that contrary whose form denotes the privation must of necessity be defined through the other; whereas the other cannot then be defined through the one whose form denotes the privation; for else we should find that each is being interpreted 147b10by the other. We must in the case of contrary terms keep an eye on this mistake, e.g. supposing any one were to define equality as the contrary of inequality: for then he is defining it through the term which denotes privation of it. Moreover, a man who so defines is bound to use in his definition the very term he is defining; and this becomes clear, if for the word we substitute its definition. For to say 147b15‘inequality’ is the same as to say ‘privation of equality’. Therefore equality so defined will be ‘the contrary of the privation of equality ', so that he would have used the very word to be defined. Suppose, however, that neither of the contraries be so formed as to denote privation, but yet the definition of it be rendered in a manner like the above, e. g. suppose ‘good’ to be defined as ‘the contrary of evil’, then, since it is clear that ‘evil’ too3 will be ‘the contrary of good’ (for the definition of things that are contrary in 147b20this way must be rendered in a like manner),4 the result again is that he uses the very term being defined: for ‘good’ is inherent in the definition of ‘evil’. If, then, ‘good’ be the contrary of evil, and evil be nothing other than the ‘contrary of good’, then ‘good’ will be the ‘contrary of the contrary of good’. Clearly, then, he has used the very 147b25word to be defined.

147b26Moreover, see if in rendering a term formed to denote privation, he has failed to render the term of which it is the privation, e.g. the state, or contrary, or whatever it nay be whose privation it is: also if he has omitted to add either any term at all in which the privation is naturally formed, or else that in which it is naturally formed primarily, 147b30e.g. whether in defining ‘ignorance’ as a privation he has failed to say that it is the privation of ‘knowledge’; or has failed to add in what it is naturally formed, or, though he has added this, has failed to render the thing in which it is primarily formed, placing it (e.g.) in ‘man’ or in ‘the soul’, and not in the ‘reasoning faculty’: for if in any of these respects he fails, he has made a mistake. Likewise, also, if he has failed to say that ‘blindness ’is the ‘privation of sight 147b35in an eye’: for a proper rendering of its essence must state 148aboth of what it is the privation and what it is that is deprived.

148a2Examine further whether he has defined by the expression ‘a privation’ a term that is not used to denote a privation: thus a mistake of this sort also would be 148a5generally thought to be incurred in the case of ‘error’ by any one who is not using it as a merely negative term. For what is generally thought to be in error is not that which has no knowledge, but rather that which has been deceived, and for this reason we do not talk of inanimate things or of children as ‘erring’. ‘Error’, then, is not used to denote a mere privation of knowledge.

Translator's notes
  1. 1 147a25. Read πρὸς τὸ τὶ ὑποληπτόν.
  2. 2 14γῦ 6. Read δῆλον οὖν ὅτι.
  3. 3 1475 10. Read δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι καὶ κακόν.
  4. 4 δ. 147Ρ20. For ἀποδοτέος, ὥστε read ἀποδοτέος ἐστί. The sentence τῶν γὰρ οὕτως... ἀποδοτέος ἐστί is parenthetic, and may be enclosed in brackets.

Book VI, chapter 10 As to the similarity of cases in the Definition and in the Noun.148a10–148b22

English

148a9Moreover, see whether the like inflexions in the definition 148a10apply to the like1 inflexions of the term; e.g. if ‘beneficial’ means ‘productive of health’, does ‘beneficially’ mean ‘productively of health’ and a ‘benefactor’ a ‘producer of health’?

148a13Look too and see whether the definition given will apply to the Idea as well. For in some cases it will not do so; 148a15e.g. in the Platonic definition where he adds the word ‘mortal’ in his definitions of living creatures: for the Idea (e.g. the absolute Man) is not mortal, so that the definition will not fit the Idea. So always wherever the words ‘capable of acting on’ or ‘capable of being acted upon’ are added, the definition and the Idea are absolutely bound to be 148a20discrepant: for those who assert the existence of Ideas hold that they are incapable of being acted upon, or of motion. In dealing with these people even arguments of this kind are useful.

148a23Further, see if he has rendered a single common definition of terms that are used ambiguously. For terms whose definition corresponding to their common name is one and the 148a25same, are synonymous; if, then, the definition applies in a like manner to the whole range of the ambiguous term, it is not true of any one of the objects described by the term. This is, moreover, what happens to Dionysius’ definition of ‘life’ when stated as ‘a movement of a creature sustained by nutriment, congenitally present with it’: for this is found in plants as much as in animals, whereas ‘life’ is generally 148a30understood to mean not one kind of thing only, but to be one thing in animals and another in plants. It is possible to hold the view that life is a synonymous term and is always used to describe one thing only, and therefore to render the definition in this way on purpose: or it may quite well happen that a man may see the ambiguous character of the word, and wish to render the definition of 148a35the one sense only, and yet fail to see that he has rendered a definition common to both senses instead of one peculiar to the sense he intends. In either case, whichever course he pursues, he is equally at fault. Since ambiguous terms sometimes pass unobserved, it is best in questioning to treat 148bsuch terms as though they were synonymous (for the definition of the one sense will not apply to the other, so that the answerer will be generally thought not to have defined it correctly, for to a synonymous term the definition should apply in its full range), whereas in answering you should yourself distinguish between the senses. Further, as some 148b5answerers call ‘ambiguous’ what is really synonymous, whenever the definition rendered fails to apply universally, and, vice versa, call synonymous what is really ambiguous supposing their definition applies to both senses of the term, one should secure a preliminary admission on such points, or else prove beforehand that so-and-so is ambiguous or synonymous, as the case may be: for people are more ready to agree when they do not foresee what the consequence 148b10will be. If, however, no admission has been made, and the man asserts that what is really synonymous is ambiguous because the definition he has rendered will not apply to the second sense as well, see if the definition of this second meaning applies also to the other meanings: for if so, this meaning must clearly be synonymous with those others. Otherwise, there will be more than one definition of those 148b15other meanings, for there are applicable to them two distinct definitions in explanation of the term, viz. the one previously rendered and also the later one. Again, if any one were to define a term used in several senses, and, finding that his definition does not apply to them all, were to con tend not that the term is ambiguous, but that even the term does not properly apply to all those senses, just because his definition will not do so either, then one may retort to such a man 148b20that though in some things one must not use the language of the people, yet in a question of terminology one is bound to employ the received and traditional usage and not to upset matters of that sort.

Translator's notes
  1. 1 148a10, Read εἰ ἐπὶ τῶν ὁμοίων.

Book VI, chapter 11 Of Composite and Singular Definition.148b23–149a28

English

148b23Suppose now that a definition has been rendered of some complex term, take away the definition of one of the 148b25elements in the complex, and see if also the rest of the definition defines the rest of it: if not, it is clear that neither does the whole definition define the whole complex. Suppose, e. g., that some one has defined a ‘finite straight line’ as ‘the limit of a finite plane, such that its centre is in a line with its extremes’; if now the definition of a ‘finite line’ be the 148b30‘limit of a finite plane’, the rest (viz. ‘such that its centre is in a line with its extremes’) ought to be a definition of ‘straight’. But an infinite straight line has neither centre nor extremes and yet is straight, so that this remainder does not define the remainder of the term.

148b33Moreover, if the term defined be a compound notion, see if the definition rendered be equimembral with the term defined. A definition is said to be equimembral with the 148b35term defined when the number of the elements compounded in the latter is the same as the number of nouns and verbs in the definition. For the exchange in such cases is bound to be merely one of term for term,1 in the case of some if 149anot of all, seeing that there are no more terms used now than formerly; whereas in a definition terms ought to be rendered by phrases, if possible in every case, or if not, in the majority. For at that rate, simple objects too could be defined by merely calling them by a different name, e.g. ‘cloak’ instead of ‘doublet’.

149a5The mistake is even worse, if actually a less well known term be substituted, e. ‘pellucid mortal’ for ‘white man’: for it is no definition, and moreover is less intelligible when put in that form.

149a8Look and see also whether, in the exchange of words, the sense fails still to be the same. Take, for instance, the explanation of ‘speculative knowledge’ as ‘speculative 149a10conception’: for conception is not the same as knowledge —as it certainly ought to be if the whole is to be the same too: for though the word ‘speculative’ is common to both expressions, yet the remainder is different.

149a14Moreover, see if in replacing one of the terms by something 149a15else he has exchanged the genus and not the differentia, as in the example just given: for ‘speculative’ is a less familiar term than knowledge; for the one is the genus and the other the differentia, and the genus is always the most familiar term of all; so that it is not this, but the differentia, that ought to have been changed, seeing that it is the less familiar. 149a20It might be held that this criticism is ridiculous: because there is no reason why the most familiar term should not describe the differentia, and not the genus; in which case, clearly, the term to be altered would also be that denoting the genus and not the differentia. If, however, a man is substituting for a term not merely another term but a 149a25phrase, clearly it is of the differentia rather than of the genus that a definition should be rendered, seeing that the object of rendering the definition is to make the subject familiar; for the differentia is less familiar than the genus. f2 he has rendered the definition of the differentia, see 149a30whether the definition rendered is common to it and something else as well: e.g. whenever he says that an odd number is a ‘number with a middle’, further definition is required of how it has a middle: for the word ‘number is common to both expressions, and it is the word ‘odd’ for which the phrase has been substituted. Now both a line and a body have a middle, yet they are not ‘odd’; so that 149a35this could not be a definition of ‘odd’. If, on the other hand, the phrase ‘with a middle’ be used in several senses, the sense here intended requires to be defined. So that this will either discredit the definition or prove that it is no definition at all.

Translator's notes
  1. 1 148b36. Read αὐτῶν τῶν ὀνομάτων. ; .
  2. 2 149a29. Bekker follows the older editions in marking this as the beginning of ch. 12.

Book VI, chapter 12 The same subject continued.149a29–149b39

English

149a39Again, see if the term of which he renders the definition is a reality, whereas what is contained in the definition is 149bnot. e. g. Suppose ‘white’ to be defined as ‘colour mingled with fire’: for what is bodiless cannot be mingled with body, so that ‘colour’ ‘mingled with fire’ could not exist, whereas ‘white’ does exist.

149b4Moreover, those who in the case of relative terms do not distinguish to what the object is related, but have 149b5described it only so as to include it among too large a number of things, are wrong either wholly or in part; e.g. suppose some one to have defined ‘medicine’ as a ‘science of Reality’. For if medicine be not a science of anything that is real, the definition is clearly altogether false; while if it be a science of some real thing, but not of another, it is partly false; for it ought to hold of all reality, if it is said to be of Reality essentially and not accidentally; 149b10as is the case with other relative terms: for every object of knowledge is a term relative to knowledge: likewise, also, with other relative terms, inasmuch as all such are convertible. Moreover, if the right way to render account of a thing be to render it as it is not in itself but accidentally, 149b15then each and every relative term would be used in relation not to one thing but to a number of things. For there is no reason why the same thing should not be both real and white and good, so that it would be a correct rendering to render the object in relation to any one whatsoever of these, if to render what it is accidentally be a correct way to render it. It is, moreover, impossible that a definition of this sort should be peculiar to the term rendered: for not 149b20only medicine, but the majority of the other sciences too, have for their object some real thing, so that each will be a science of reality. Clearly, then, such a definition does not define any science at all; for a definition ought to be peculiar to its own term, not general.

149b24Sometimes, again, people define not the thing but only 149b25the thing in a good or perfect condition. Such is the definition of a rhetorician as ‘one who can always see what will persuade in the given circumstances, and omit nothing’; or of a thief, as ‘one who pilfers in secret’: for clearly, if they each do this, then the one will bea good rhetorician, and the other a good thief: whereas it is not the actual pilfering 149b30in secret, but the wish to do it, that constitutes the thief. . Again, see if he has rendered what is desirable for its own sake as desirable for what it produces or does, or as in any way desirable because of something else, e. g. by saying that justice is ‘what preserves the laws’ or that wisdom is ‘what produces happiness’; for what produces or preserves something else is one of the things desirable for something else. 149b35It might be said that it is possible for what is desirable in itself to be desirable for something else as well: but still to define what is desirable in itself in such a way is none the less wrong: for the essence contains par excellence what is best in anything, and it is better for a thing to be desirable in itself than to be desirable for something else, so that this is rather what the definition too ought to have indicated.

Book VI, chapter 13 Of Distinctive Notions in Definition.150a1–151a19

English

150a1See also whether in defining anything a man has defined it as an ‘A and B’, or as a ‘product of A and B’ or as an ‘A+B’. If he defines it as ‘A and B’, the definition will be true of both and yet of neither of them; suppose, e. g., justice to be defined as ‘temperance and courage’. For 150a5if of two persons each has one of the two only, both and yet neither will be just: for both together have justice, and yet each singly fails to have it. Even if the situation here described does not so far appear very absurd because of the occurrence of this kind of thing in other cases also (for it is quite possible for two men to have a mina between them, though neither of them has it by himself), yet at least that 150a10they should have contrary attributes surely seems quite absurd; and yet this will follow if the one be temperate and yet a coward, and the other, though brave, be a profligate; for then both will exhibit both justice and injustice: for if justice be temperance and bravery, then injustice will 150a15be cowardice and profligacy. In general, too, all the ways of showing that the whole is not the same as the sum of its parts are useful in meeting the type just described; for a man who defines in this way seems to assert that the parts are the same as the whole. The arguments are particularly appropriate in cases where the process of putting the parts together is obvious, as in a house and other things 150a20of that sort: for there, clearly, you may have the parts and yet not have the whole, so that parts and whole cannot be the same.

150a22If, however, he has said that the term being defined is not ‘A and B’ but the ‘product of A and B’, look and see in the first place if A and B cannot in the nature of things have a single product: for some things are so related to 150a25one another that nothing can come of them, e. g. a line and a number. Moreover, see if the term that has been defined is in the nature of things found primarily in some single subject, whereas the things which he has said produce it are not found primarily in any single subject, but each in a separate one. If so, clearly that term could not be the product of these things: for the whole is bound to be in the same things wherein its parts are, so that the whole will 150a30then be found primarily not in one subject only, but in a number of them. If, on the other hand, both parts and whole are found primarily in some single subject, see if that medium is not the same, but one thing in the case of the whole and another in that of the parts. Again, see whether the parts perish together with the whole: for it ought to happen, vice versa, that the whole perishes when the parts 150a35perish; when the whole perishes, there is no necessity that the parts should perish too. Or again, see if the whole be good or evil, and the parts neither, or, vice versa, if the parts be good or evil and the whole neither. For it is impossible either for a neutral thing to produce something 150bgood or bad, or for things good or bad to produce a neutral thing. Or again, see if the one thing is more distinctly good than the other is evil, and yet the product be no more good than evil, e.g. suppose shamelessness be defined as ‘the product of courage and false opinion’: here the goodness 150b5of courage exceeds the evil of false opinion; accordingly the product of these ought to have corresponded to this excess, and to be either good without qualification, or at least more good than evil. Or it may be that this does not necessarily follow, unless each be in itself good or bad; for many things that are productive are not good in themselves, but only in combination; or, per contra, they are good taken 150b10singly, and bad or neutral in combination. What has just been said is most clearly illustrated in the case of things that make for health or sickness; for some drugs are such that each taken alone is good, but if they are both administered in a mixture, bad.

150b14Again, see whether the whole, as produced from a better 150b15and worse, fails to be worse than the better and better than the worse element. This again, however, need not necessarily be the case, unless the elements compounded be in themselves good; if they are not, the whole may very well not be good, as in the cases just instanced.

150b19Moreover, see if the whole be synonymous with one of the elements: for it ought not to be, any more than in the 150b20case of syllables: for the syllable is not synonymous with any of the letters of which it is made up.

150b21Moreover, see if he has failed to state the manner of their composition: for the mere mention of its elements is not enough to make the thing intelligible. For the essence of any compound thing is not merely that it is a product of so-and-so, but that it is a product of them compounded in 150b25such and such a way, just as in the case of a house: for here the materials do not make a house irrespective of the way they are put together.

150b27If a man has defined an object as ‘A+B’, the first thing to be said is that ‘A +B’ means the same either as ‘A and B’, or as the ‘product of A and B’. For ‘honey water’ means either the honey and the water, or the ‘drink made of honey 150b30and water’. If, then, he admits that ‘A+B’ is the same as cither of these two things, the same criticisms will apply as have already been given for meeting each of them. Moreover, distinguish between the different senses in which one thing may be said to be ‘+’ another, and see if there is none of them in which A could be said to exist ‘+B’. Thus e.g. 150b35supposing the expression to mean that they exist either in some identical thing capable of containing them (as e.g. justice and courage are found in the soul), or else in the same place or in the same time, and if this be in no way true of the A and B in question, clearly the definition rendered could not hold of anything, as there is no possible 151away in which A can exist ‘+B’. If, however, among the various senses above distinguished, it be true that A and B are each found in the same time as the other, look and see if possibly the two are not used in the same relation. Thus e.g. suppose courage to have been defined as ‘daring with right reasoning’: here it is possible that the person exhibits 151a5daring in robbery, and right reasoning in regard to the means of health: but he may have ‘the former quality the latter’ at the same time, and not as yet be courageous! Moreover, even though both be used in the same relation as well, e.g. in relation to medical treatment (for a man may exhibit both daring and right reasoning in respect of medical treatment), still, none the less, not even this combination of ‘the one the other’ makes him ‘courageous’. For the two 151a10must not relate to any casual object that is the same, any more than each to a different object; rather, they must relate to the function of courage, e.g. meeting the perils of war, or whatever is more properly speaking its function than this.

151a14Some definitions rendered in this form fail to come under 151a15the aforesaid division at all, e.g. a definition of anger as ‘pain with a consciousness of being slighted’. For what this means to say is that it is because of a consciousness of this sort that the pain occurs; but to occur ‘because of’ a thing is not the same as to occur ‘+a thing’ in any of its aforesaid senses.

Book VI, chapter 14 On the Definition of the whole as a Composite, etc.151a20–151b23

English

151a20Again, if he have described the whole compounded as the ‘composition’ of these things (e. g. ‘a living creature’ as a ‘composition of soul and body’), first of all see whether he has omitted to state the kind of composition, as (e.g.) in a definition of ‘flesh’ or ‘bone’ as the ‘composition of fire, earth, and air’. For it is not enough to say it is a composition, but you should also go on to define the kind of 151a25composition: for these things do not form flesh irrespective of the manner of their composition, but when compounded in one way they form flesh, when in another, bone. It appears, moreover, that neither of the aforesaid substances is the same as a ‘composition’ at all: for a composition always has a decomposition as its contrary, whereas neither of the aforesaid has any contrary. Moreover, if it is equally probable that every compound is a composition or else that 151a30none is, and every kind of living creature, though a compound, is never a composition, then no other compound could be a composition either.

151a32Again, if in the nature of a thing two contraries are equally liable to occur, and the thing has been defined through the one, clearly it has not been defined; else there will be more than one definition of the same thing; for how 151a35is it any more a definition to define it through this one than through the other, seeing that both alike are naturally liable 151bto occur in it? Such is the definition of the soul, if defined as a substance capable of receiving knowledge: for it has a like capacity for receiving ignorance.

151b3Also, even when one cannot attack the definition as a whole for lack of acquaintance with the whole, one should 151b5attack some part of it, if one knows that part and sees it to be incorrectly rendered: for if the part be demolished, so too is the whole definition. Where, again, a definition is obscure, one should first of all correct and reshape it in order to make some part of it clear and get a handle for attack, and then proceed to examine it. For the answerer 151b10is bound cither to accept the sense as taken by the questioner, or else himself to explain clearly whatever it is that his definition means. Moreover, just as in the assemblies the ordinary practice is to move an emendation of the existing law and, if the emendation is better, they repeal the existing law, so one ought to do in the case of definitions as well: 151b15one ought oneself to propose a second definition: for if it is seen to be better, and more indicative of the object defined, clearly the definition already laid down will have been demolished, on the principle that there cannot be more than one definition of the same thing.

151b18In combating definitions it is always one of the chief elementary principles to take by oneself a happy shot at a definition of the object before one, or to adopt some 151b20correctly expressed definition. For one is bound, with the model (as it were) before one’s eyes, to discern both any shortcoming in any features that the definition ought to have, and also any superfluous addition, so that one is better supplied with lines of attack.

151b26As to definitions, then, let so much suffice.

Latin of Boethius: Boethius, Migne, Patrologia Latina 64 (Paris 1847), coll. 909–1008 (Corpus Corporum, University of Zurich). Public domain (1847). Digital text: Corpus Corporum.
English (Oxford, 1928): W. A. Pickard-Cambridge, The Works of Aristotle translated into English, ed. W. D. Ross, vol. I (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928) (archive.org, University of Toronto scan). Public domain in the United States (published 1928) and in Canada (translator died 1957). Our transcription of the scan.
English (Owen, 1853): Octavius Freire Owen, London: George Bell & Sons, 1908 (Bohn's Classical Library), vol. II, from the plates of the first edition (London: H. G. Bohn, 1853), same pagination (archive.org). Public domain. Our transcription of the scan.

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