INSTRUMENTALISM. - This term defines the form of pragmatism (v.) peculiar to the North American philosopher J. Dewey (b. at Burlington on 28 Oct. 1859, d. at New York on 1 June 1952; professor from 1905 at Columbia University in New York), for whom every idea and doctrine is a tool for action and for the transformation of experience.
Dewey and the "Chicago School," which he promoted, are characterized by so-called logical i., or "instrumental logic." Dewey's thought is developed in his principal works: Psychology (New York 1887); Studies in logical theory (Chicago 1903); Democracy and education (New York 1916); Reconstruction in philosophy (ibid. 1920); Human nature and conduct (ibid. 1922); Experience and nature (Chicago 1925); Characters and events (ibid. 1929); Construction and criticism (New York 1930); Philosophy and civilization (ibid. 1931).
As Dewey himself writes, "reflective knowledge is an instrument for mastering an anomalous situation," just as it is also "a means of enriching the immediate significance of prior experiences" (Essays in experimental logic, 1917, p. 17). In his later years Dewey returned with great commitment to the study of logic (Logic, the theory of inquiry, New York 1939; Italian trans. Turin 1949). To avoid misunderstandings he abandons the word "pragmatism" (v.), but his logical i. remains unchanged: the practical character of logic, an instrument (like reason and science) for transforming the human condition and society. Hence the social character of his "humanistic naturalism," which is a neo-empiricism according to which thought is a product of biological evolution, having a social purpose and establishing collaboration and communication among men. Thought arises from vital needs, and its function is to satisfy them (the points of contact between Deweyism and Marxism are noteworthy); hence its essentially "instrumental" aim of transforming or resolving real "situations," which are not individual but social. This clarification is not enough to spare Dewey's logical i. the label of pure utilitarianism, of pragmatism and of radical relativism. Once logic is reduced to a "tool of work," to its practical function of transforming and resolving situations, it is evident that logic (and logical truths) are as changeable as situations and that their validity remains limited to this or that situation (whether subjective or social makes no difference). "Logic is a discipline that evolves... As the methods of the sciences are progressively perfected, corresponding changes take place in logic. A change of enormous importance... came about as a consequence of the development of mathematics and physics... When in the future the methods of inquiry are further altered, logical theory will change as well... The idea that logic is susceptible of definitive formulation is nothing but an idolum theatri" (Logic, cit., Italian trans., p. 47). Also noteworthy is the distinction Dewey draws between "instrumental" and "operational": "As a general term, 'instrumental' signifies the means-results relation, as the fundamental category for the interpretation of logical forms, whereas 'operational' expresses the conditions thanks to which the material is 1) made fit to serve as a means and 2) actually functions as a means in accomplishing the objective transformation that is the end of inquiry" (ibid., p. 48).
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Michele Federico Sciacca