Emotion

EMOZIONE. -

I. PSICOLOGIA

It is the reaction to a sensation or image that disturbs our organic or psychic equilibrium, a reaction constituted, as a unified whole, by a particular affective state corresponding to the awakening of certain instincts and by organic modifications.

Animals naturally tend toward what their senses reveal to be necessary or useful for the preservation of the individual and the species. This tendency manifests itself through various impulses of approach or repulsion toward actions and things which, whether near or far, more or less easily pursued or avoided, may satisfy or may instead obstruct these natural needs. Such impulses of the sensitive appetite, founded on natural instincts, create a particular affective resonance generally joined to an organic resonance: when this occurs, one may speak of e. Here, however, we set aside the question—rejecting it insofar as it intends to exhaust the essential constitution of e. in one isolated element of it—whether the physical reaction (the peripheral theory of feeling, W. James, K. Lange) or the affective reaction (the classical intellectualist theory) comes first, together with the reciprocal causal consequence; and we carefully distinguish the psychic fact from any possible awareness of it, which is logically subsequent.

The distinction then becomes clear—more one of degree than of kind—between the so-called lower e., produced directly by an organic stimulus, which could be called affective sensations (of hunger, sensory pleasure, etc.), and the higher ones, caused only indirectly by an external stimulus that awakens a particular state of consciousness and is accompanied by a significant organic resonance (of fear, antipathy, aesthetic, religious feeling, etc.), which are true human e.

E. is therefore a natural and necessary factor of human life, and has a directive function with respect to the actions of the subject, which tend to realize his good, ordering them toward the attainment of a state of equilibrium in relation to the surrounding world and thus guiding them in the continuous movement of adaptation to the perpetual change and renewal of external stimuli. In this complex automatic mechanism, which is formed, consolidated, and multiplied with the growth of years, culture, and experience, also in relation to the character of the subject, it is enough to provoke one of its elements to arouse e.; and just as external sensation sets the mechanism in motion, so an intervention in endothymic life, the physiological substratum of instinct, may also influence II. Reason and will may intervene both in the composition of the complex and, especially once it has become consolidated, in its self-provocation through an adequate idea or representation.

When stimuli appear suddenly or excessively, the reaction will likewise acquire a marked intensity, and one may then speak of violent e. (which some call e. “sho,” while others, such as A. Gemelli, propose that, for reasons of clarity, this be reserved the name e., leaving the former simply with the designation of sensation and feeling), characterized both by a more violent organic resonance, at times capable of causing harm, even irreparable harm, to physical health, and by a generally deleterious effect on the psyche, since it is more apt to disrupt affective equilibrium than to direct the subject’s action toward its goal.

Under normal circumstances, one will seek to avoid this violent form of e., which is capable of creating abnormal situations, often harmful to human life, by removing its causes, insofar as possible, from one’s own and others’ existence; especially from that of children, in whose psyche it might leave indelible traces, and, in general, from that of persons weakened by age or health. At times it may accidentally assume a providential role, both for the organism, by stimulating sluggish functions, correcting disordered activities, and usefully influencing abnormal psychic complexes, and for spiritual life, as an impetus toward greater reflection and seriousness, conversion, and greater fervor (the episode that drove Lutero to monastic life is well known). It should nevertheless be noted that, whereas in the first case e. appears capable of being cautiously provoked artificially for therapeutic purposes, particularly in illnesses of nervous origin, in the second it is limited—or at least should be limited—to being a point of departure, the stimulation of an ethical or religious activity, which must subsequently be founded on more solid and rational bases.

It should be noted that, strictly speaking, passion cannot be called simply a prolonged e.; although it belongs to the same order, its sudden origin gives e. a character of greater violence, whereas its duration gives passion its infused quality and a more or less conscious approval on the part of the intellectual faculty of man. While the scholastics (e.g., s. Tommaso, Sum. Theol., 18-2ᵃp. q. 22, a. 1-3 and Gaetano’s Commentary, on art. 1) called “passio” our e. and “passio habitualia” our passion, not a few moderns give the generic name e. to every affective state (v. PASSION), for the terminology, a further psychological investigation, the classical division, and the medical treatment.

BIBLI.: For a general knowledge: W. James, Emotions, French trans., Paris 1902; id., Principle di psicologia, Italian trans., Milan 1906; F. M. Palmés, Psicologia, Barcelona 1928, pp. 181-90; J. Probes, Lehrbuch der experimentellen Psychologie, II, 3rd ed., Freiburg im Br. 1929, pp. 262-90; G. Deschauers, Psicologia, Paris 1934; A. Gemelli-G. Zuni, Introduzione alla psicologia, Milan 1947, p. 227 ff.; E. Baudin, Corso di psicologia, Florence 1948, pp. 223-33.

II. PEDAGOGIA

With regard to e., pedagogy establishes certain principles whose application is of the greatest usefulness for education.

1. E. can be put to use. - They, in fact, even the most reprehensible, have, like pleasure and pain, their own purpose and can serve as a guide, an aid, and a sanction for our actions.

Fear, for example, prevents exposure to dangers; boldness and strength gather and concentrate energies to overcome them when they are unavoidable; anguish may be a warning signal against them; shame may serve to restrain dishonorable acts. E., however, are not always proportionate to the needs of the moment; they do not always maintain the proper mean, but rather tend to be defeated by exaggeration and thus become more harmful than useful: fear may give strength to the legs, but it may also paralyze them; boldness may reach rashness; anger may degenerate into madness; anguish and sadness cripple every activity; shame causes one to lose the courage to rise again and change course. This is observed not only in different individuals but also in the same individual, depending on the predominant instinct at that particular moment, of which one is not always clearly conscious. Indeed, when a piece of bad news is to be communicated, it is customary to say: “who knows what impression it will make on him”; or, regarding a reprimand: “who knows how he will take it”; a joke at someone’s expense may leave one indifferent, or arouse indignation, and even satisfaction at having contributed a little to another’s joy.

It follows, therefore, that e. possess a certain dynamogenic power, which is reflected in our organic forces, exciting them (tonic or sthenic e.) or paralyzing them (asthenic or depressing e.). A sthenic state (confidence, optimism, serenity) enlivens work; an asthenic state (distrust, doubt, hesitation, discouragement) compromises II. It will therefore be necessary to seek to attain the ideal in the use of e., which consists in acquiring mastery over them and freely employing them; and this is the task of education.

2. Emotions can be educated

The educator (parents, teachers, directors) must first of all acquire an exact understanding, through attentive and vigilant observation, of the various emotional reactions and the various intellectual and volitional nuances of the person being educated. Only with this ample body of observations and corroborating evidence will he be able to master the latter’s psychic life and direct it in its constantly changing attitudes.

Why is a different treatment required in education: a) according to the different individuals: an emotional or sthenic character tends to exalt his euphoric condition and hence toward presumption, vanity, and exhibitionism, and therefore must be restrained; an asthenic character, on the other hand, tends toward pessimism and distrust of his own strength, and therefore needs encouragement. The physician does this with depressed patients, inspiring, through confidence in his assistance, confidence in recovery as well; the educator must therefore do the same. To say to a pupil who is slow to learn, or who seems incorrigible, “It is useless; he will not succeed,” is equivalent to delivering the deathblow to energies which, if suitably stimulated, might have aroused a salutary reaction against slowness or incorrigibility. Likewise, one must never give in to the emotionality of the person being educated, because, even if some easy success can be obtained, in the long run serious dangers will be encountered. Whoever abuses authority, or goes too far in making the pupil feel that he is being watched in all his actions, or in wishing to guide him in every, even the slightest, act, ends by extinguishing all self-activity and forming a weak, uncertain, irresolute character, “also shut up within himself, awaiting the moment to rebel and act according to his inclinations in secret”; b) in the same individual, according to age. In childhood and adolescence emotional life predominates over intellectual and volitional life; in youth this predominance diminishes until, in maturity, the proper equilibrium and the supremacy of reason and will are reached; these, in old age, in turn yield to a recurrence of emotionality. Therefore, certain feelings which can be aroused in childhood (e.g., horror at the consequences of certain actions) should not instead be provoked in adolescence and youth, when they might generate despair or despondency and a stubborn rebellion. Conversely, an attitude which in childhood may arouse confusion and timidity produces in youth reflection, pliancy, and élan. A depressive emotion caused by a failure, for example, by an injustice, may in youth provoke a salutary reaction, impel one toward new paths and the search for new means of succeeding, and thus cause energies to unfold which otherwise might have remained latent and fruitless; c) according to the quality of the emotion. The prejudice that aesthetic emotions (provoked, that is, by painting, sculpture, literature, and music) are in themselves good and harmless, because the beautiful and the good cannot stand in opposition, is all too common and deplorable. But this, although true in theory, when the beautiful and the good are considered in the abstract and apart from the subject who undergoes their influence, is no longer true in practice when the influenced subject is taken into consideration. Common sense, in fact, knows how to distinguish between martial music, exciting one to valor, and soft, enervating music; between an art that elevates and an art that titillates the lower depths of corrupt nature; between literature that raises one heavenward and literature that crawls and makes one crawl along the ground, causing every barrier of modesty and horror to fall.

3. Emotions can be aroused or suspended by the will

This observation offers the best key for resolving the question of the educability of emotions. It is observed, in fact, that it is enough to determine a suitable physiological state in order to provide the appropriate ground for the emotions corresponding to that state. An actor, for example, by reproducing the external reactions of a particular feeling, becomes so immersed in it and identifies with it so completely that he ends by actually experiencing it; the same is true of one who reads a canto of Dante or plays the notes of a Dies irae. Conversely, the arising of a particular emotion can be prevented, or it can be driven away and made to vanish, by means of opposing emotions, preventing the reaction that should arouse it or cause it to produce its effect. Whoever manages not to tremble before a specter has prevented the emotion of fear. And this applies both to external and to internal emotions. This is why, in order to pluck up courage, one perhaps speaks aloud; to overcome trembling in the dark, one hums; to stifle the terror of an apparition, one attacks II. That is, one activity is substituted for the other which would have provoked the feared emotion.

Hence derives the insistence of pedagogy on enriching the mind with high and noble ideals which, so to speak, embrace the whole soul; thus one will more easily have recourse to them in order to arouse stimulating emotions or drive away and extinguish divergent emotions that have suddenly appeared on the horizon.

It is also customary to say, with regard to emotions, that one must let them “vent themselves,” “run their course,” and “allow free rein to the physiological reactions that derive from them.” Although in theory this principle may perhaps be considered more scientific, in practice it must be accepted with great caution. It is true that crying alleviates sorrow; shouting, stamping one’s feet, or breaking an object calms anger; laughter, so contagious in groups, eases burdens; but common sense also tells us that tears can be swallowed, anger can be extinguished, and laughter can be lightened. In a word, education and self-mastery, the pride of commanding oneself, and the satisfaction of overcoming oneself can assert themselves and divert, or even suppress, the course of physiological reactions. In some cases it will indeed be advisable to let the emotion run its course; in others, and these are the majority, this is not educational and may even be counterproductive. Hence the importance in Christian asceticism of small daily sacrifices and their highly pedagogical value, since to the value of a practice founded on natural and human motives there is added another value of a higher order, which makes them more useful both to oneself and to others, increasing their merit and efficacy. Only in this way does one conquer one’s own personality.

BIBLI: F. CAP-L. Cousin, Comment l'élève non enfant, 26ª ed., Parigi 1931, pp. 371-96; H. D. Noble, Les passions dans la vie morale, I: Psychologie de la passion, ivi 1931; A. Ermieu, Le gouvernement de soi-même, I, 61ª ed., ivi 1932, pp. 194-233; II, 48ª ed., ivi 1933, pp. 167-73; IV, 29ª ed., ivi 1934, pp. 110-25; L. Guarnero, Inisolazione alla psicologia scientifica e pedagogica, Torino 1946, pp. 192-200. Celestino Tostori