EMOZIONE

**EMOTION** —

I. Psychology

It is the reaction to a sensation or image that disturbs our organic or psychic equilibrium, a reaction constituted, as a whole, by a particular affective state corresponding to the awakening of certain instincts and by organic modifications.

Living beings naturally tend toward what their senses reveal as necessary or useful for the preservation of individual life and the species. This tendency manifests itself through various impulses of approach or withdrawal toward actions and things that, whether near or far, more or less easily attainable or avoidable, can satisfy or hinder these natural needs. These impulses of sensitive appetite, rooted in natural instincts, create a particular affective resonance generally accompanied by an organic resonance: when this occurs, one may speak of emotion. Here, however, we set aside the question—rejecting it insofar as it seeks to reduce the essential structure of emotion to an isolated element—regarding the precedence of the physical reaction (peripheral theory of feeling, W. James, K. Lange) or the affective reaction (classical James-Lange theory) and their consequent reciprocal causality. We carefully distinguish the psychic fact from its possible consciousness, which is logically subsequent.

It then becomes clear the distinction—more in degree than in kind—between so-called lower emotions, produced directly by an organic stimulus, which might be called affective sensations (hunger, sensible pleasure, etc.), and higher emotions, provoked only indirectly by an external stimulus that awakens a particular state of consciousness and is accompanied by a significant organic resonance (fear, antipathy, aesthetic, religious, etc.), which are truly human.

Emotion is therefore a natural and necessary factor in human life, serving a directive function in the subject’s actions, tending toward the realization of their good, ordering them to achieve a state of equilibrium in relation to the surrounding world and guiding them in the continuous process of adapting to the perpetual change and renewal of external stimuli. In this complex automatic mechanism, which is formed, consolidated, and multiplied with the passage of years, culture, and experience—also in relation to the subject’s character—it suffices to provoke one of its elements to elicit emotion. Just as an external sensation sets the mechanism in motion, so too can an intervention in the conative life—the physiological substratum of instinct—exert influence upon II. Reason and will can intervene both in the composition of the complex and, especially when it has become consolidated, in the self-provocation of emotion through an adequate idea or representation.

When stimuli appear sudden or excessive, the reaction likewise acquires a heightened tone, and one may then speak of violent emotion (which some call shock emotion, while others, such as A. Gemelli, propose reserving this term for it, using the simple designation of sensation or feeling for the preceding states). This is characterized by a more violent organic resonance, capable at times of causing harm—even irreparable harm—to physical health, and by a generally deleterious effect on the psyche, tending more to disrupt affective equilibrium than to direct the subject’s action toward its goal. Normally, one seeks to avoid this violent form of emotion, which tends to create abnormal situations often harmful to human life, by removing its causes from one’s own and others’ awareness as much as possible, particularly from that of children, in whose psyche it might leave indelible traces, and generally from that of the weak, whether by age or health. At times, however, it may play a providential role, both for the organism—by stimulating sluggish functions, correcting disordered activities, and beneficially influencing abnormal psychic complexes—and for spiritual life, as a spur to greater reflection and seriousness, or even to conversion and greater strength (the well-known episode that drove Luther to monastic life is a case in point). It should be noted, however, that while in the first case emotion may be cautiously provoked artificially for therapeutic purposes, particularly in cases of nervous disorders, in the second it should be limited—or at least ought to be limited—to serving as a starting point for the awakening of ethical or religious activity, which must then be founded on more solid and rational bases.

It should be noted that, strictly speaking, passion cannot simply be called a prolonged emotion; though belonging to the same order, the sudden origin of emotion gives it a more violent character, while its persistence imparts to passion an infusion and a more or less conscious approval from the intellectual part of man. While the Scholastics (e.g., St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I-II, q. 22, art. 1-3, and the *Commentary of Cajetan* on this article) referred to our emotion as *passio* and to our passion as *passio habitualis*, many moderns use the generic term *emotion* for every affective state (see PASSION for terminology, further psychological analysis, the classical division, and medical treatment).

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BIBL.:** For a general understanding: W. James, *Emotions*, French trans., Paris 1922; id., *The Principles of Psychology*, Italian trans., Milan 1920; F. M. Palmès, *Psicologia*, Barcelona 1928, pp. 181-190; F. Robbes, *Lehrbuch der experimentellen Psychologie*, 2nd ed., Brussels 1920, pp. 262-260; G. Dwelshauvers, *Psychologie*, Paris 1924; A. Gemelli-G. Zunini, *Introduzione alla psicologia*, Milan 1947, p. 227; S. E. Baudin, *Corso di psicologia*, Florence 1948, pp. 243-235.

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**II. PEDAGOGY.** — With regard to emotion, pedagogy establishes certain principles whose application is of the greatest utility for education.

1. Emotions can be utilized

Indeed, even the most reprehensible emotions, like pleasure and pain, have a purpose and can serve as guides, aids, or sanctions for our actions.

Fear, for example, preserves us from danger; boldness and strength gather and concentrate energies to overcome it when unavoidable; anxiety can serve as an alarm signal against it; shame can restrain dishonorable acts. Emotions, however, are not always proportionate to the needs of the moment; they often fail to maintain the proper mean and instead tend toward excess, becoming more harmful than useful. Fear can strengthen the legs but also paralyze them; boldness can turn into recklessness; anger can degenerate into madness; anxiety and sadness can crush all activity; shame can sap the courage to rise and change course. This is evident not only in different individuals but also in the same individual, depending on the predominant instinct at a given moment, of which one does not always have clear awareness. Indeed, one often hears, regarding bad news to be communicated, “Who knows what impression it will make on him?” or, regarding a reprimand, “Who knows how he will take it?” A joke can leave someone indifferent, provoke indignation, or even evoke satisfaction at having brought a little joy to another.

It follows, therefore, that emotions possess a certain dynamism that reverberates upon our organic forces, either stimulating them (tonic or sthenic emotions) or paralyzing them (asthenic or depressing emotions). A sthenic state (confidence, optimism, serenity) animates work; an asthenic state (distrust, doubt, hesitation, discouragement) compromises II. It is therefore necessary to seek the ideal in the utilization of emotions, which consists in acquiring mastery and free use of them—a task for education.

2. Emotions can be educated

The educator (parents, teachers, directors) must first of all gain an exact understanding, through careful and vigilant observation, of the various emotional reactions, the different intellectual and volitional nuances of the person being educated. Only with this rich collection of observations and verifications can he become master of the latter’s psychic life and guide it in its ever-changing attitudes.

For this requires in the educator a different approach: a) according to different individuals: an emotional or sthenic character tends to exalt its euphoric state and thus to presumption, vanity, and exhibitionism, and must therefore be restrained; an asthenic character, on the other hand, tends toward pessimism and lack of confidence in its own strength, and thus needs stimulation. The physician does this with patients, inspiring, through trust in his care, confidence in their recovery; the educator must do the same. To tell an educatee who learns slowly and seems incorrigible, “It’s useless, you won’t succeed,” is to deal a blow to energies that, if properly stimulated, could have elicited a reaction against slowness or incorrigibility. Likewise, one must never exploit the educatee’s emotionality, for while some easy successes may be achieved, in the long run serious dangers arise. Whoever abuses authority, or goes too far in making the educatee feel that he is being watched in all his actions, or in wanting to guide even the smallest act, ends up extinguishing all authority, and perhaps is not a weak, uncertain, irresolute character; even if enclosed within himself, waiting to rebel and act according to his own inclinations in secret; b) in the same individual according to age. In childhood and adolescence emotional life predominates over intellectual and volitional life; in youth this predominance decreases until, in maturity, it reaches the proper balance and the supremacy of reason and will; which then, in old age, give way once more to a recurrence of emotionality. Therefore, certain feelings that can be aroused in childhood (e.g., horror at the consequences of certain actions) should not be provoked in adolescence and youth, when they could generate despair or persistent rebellious dejection. Conversely, an attitude that in childhood may cause confusion and timidity, in youth generates reflection, compliance, and enthusiasm. A depressive education due to a failure, for example an injustice, can in youth provoke a salutary reaction, push one toward new paths, the search for new means to succeed, and thus bring out energies that might otherwise have remained latent and unexpressed; c) according to the quality of the emotion. Too common and deplorable is the prejudice that aesthetic emotions (aroused, that is, by painting, sculpture, literature, and music) are in themselves good and harmless, because the beautiful and the good cannot be in opposition. But while this may be true in theory, when the beautiful and the good are considered in the abstract and divorced from the subject who is influenced by them, it is no longer true in practice, when one considers the subject who is influenced. Common sense, in fact, distinguishes between martial, exciting, and heroic music, and soft, nerve-wracking music; between an art that elevates and an art that stimulates the baser instincts of corrupted nature; between a literature that uplifts and a literature that crawls and makes one crawl in the dirt, destroying every barrier of modesty and horror.

3. Emotions can be aroused or suspended by the will

This observation offers the best key to resolving the question of the educability of emotions. It is observed, in fact, that it is enough to determine a suitable physiological state to provide the ground for the corresponding emotions. An actor, for example, reproducing the external reactions of a particular emotion, becomes so immersed and identified with it that he ends up actually feeling it; so too does one who reads a canto of Dante or strikes the notes of a Dies irae. Conversely, one can prevent a given emotion from arising or drive it away and make it vanish with opposing emotions, by preventing the reaction that would arouse it or produce its effect. Whoever succeeds in not trembling before a specter shows that he has prevented the emotion of fear. And this holds true both for external and for internal emotions. This is why, to bolster courage, one speaks loudly; to overcome the fear of the dark, one hums; to stifle the terror of a vision, one confronts II. One replaces, that is, one physiological activity with another, which would have provoked the emotion one feared.

Hence the insistence with which pedagogy urges that the mind be enriched with lofty, noble ideals that embrace, so to speak, the whole soul; for then one can more easily turn to them to arouse stimulating emotions or dispel and extinguish suddenly appearing, divergent ones.

It is also commonly said, with regard to emotions, that they must be allowed to “vent,” “exhaust themselves,” “be given free rein to the physiological reactions that follow.” While this principle may perhaps be considered more scientific in theory, in practice it must be received with great caution. It is true that crying intensifies pain; shouting is exhausting; stamping one’s feet or breaking an object calms anger; laughter, so contagious in groups, relaxes the nerves; but common sense also says that tears can be stilled, anger can be quelled, laughter can be made light; a word, education and self-mastery, the pride of commanding oneself, the satisfaction of overcoming oneself can impose themselves and divert or even suppress the course of physiological reactions. In some cases it may indeed be advisable to let the emotion run its course; in most cases, however, this is not educational but may be counterproductive. Hence the importance, in Christian upbringing, of small daily sacrifices and their highly pedagogical value, because to the value of a practice based on natural, human motives is added another value of a higher order, which makes them more useful to oneself and to others, increasing their merit and efficacy. Only thus is one’s own personality conquered.

Bibl.: F. Gay-L. Cousin, Comment j'élève mon enfant, 2e ed., Paris 1921, pp. 371-96; H. D. Noble, Les passions dans la vie morale, I: Psychologie de la passion, 1913; A. Eymieu, Le gouvernement de soi-même, I: 6e ed., 1913, pp. 194-231; II, 48e ed., 1913, pp. 167-73; IV, 29e ed., 1913, pp. 192-235; L. Guerrier, Introduzione alla psicologia scientifica e pedagogica, Turin 1946, pp. 192-200.