Singular

SINGULAR. - In the metaphysical sense, a singular is the subsistent individual, that is, the "primary substance" (οὐσία πρώτη, as opposed to "secondary substance" (οὐσία δευτέρα), namely the species and genera of logic (cf. Aristotle, Cat., 5, 2 a 11, and Periherm., 7, 17 a 40); and it is therefore the individual (v.) that is incommunicable and expresses the reality that is numerically one (id., Met., III, 4, 999 b 33).

The constitutive principle of the singular (principle of individuation [v.] in material substances) is, according to St. Thomas, matter insofar as it exists under real dimensions ("materia corporalis sub determinatis dimensionibus contenta": Sup. I, II de anima, lect. 12; ed. Pirotta, Turin 1925, n. 377, p. 132 b). In this sense the material singular is directly accessible in itself to the senses, whereas the intellect apprehends the universal: τὸ μὲν γὰρ καθόλου κατὰ τὸν λόγον γνώριμον, τὸ δὲ καθ' ἕκαστον κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν (Aristotle, Phys., I, 5, 189 a 6; cf. Met., V, 11, 1018 b 33): hence the controversy, debated in the Middle Ages against the Arab philosophers (especially Averroes), over the possibility that God knows singulars directly, on which depends the meaning and indeed the reality of divine providence (cf. Sum. Theol., 1ª, q. 14, a. 11; J. Koch, Giles of Rome, Errores philosophorum, Milwaukee 1944; Errores Averrois, nn. 6, 8 and 9). In the social and religious sense, a singular is the single human person who is distinguished from the mass or multitude and stands in relation, according to rights and duties, to society and to God: in this sense Kierkegaard (v.) opposes the Christian principle of personality (the "single individual before God") to Hegelian pantheism.

Cornelio Fabro