STRUMENTALISM. — This pragmatism (v.) characteristic of the North American philosopher J. Dewey (born in Burlington on 28 October 1859, died in New York on 1 June 1952; professor from 1905 at Columbia University in New York), for whom every idea and doctrine is a tool (tool) for action and the transformation of experience.
Dewey and the “Chicago School,” which he promoted, are characterized by what is called logical i., or “instrumental logic.” Dewey’s thought is developed in his principal works: Psychology (New York 1887); Studies in logical theory (Chicago 1903); Democracy and education (New York 1916); Reconstruction in philosophy (there 1920); Human nature and conduct (there 1922); Experience and nature (Chicago 1925); Characters and events (there 1929); Construction and criticism (New York 1930); Philosophy and civilization (there 1931).
As Dewey himself writes, “reflective knowledge is a means (instrumental) for mastering an anomalous situation,” just as it is “a means of enriching the immediate significance (significance) of earlier experiences” (Essays in experimental logic, 1917, p. 17). In old age Dewey returned, with great commitment, to the study of logic (Logic, the theory of inquiries, New York 1939; Italian trans. Turin 1949). To avoid misunderstandings, he abandons the word “pragmatism” (v.), but his logical i. remains unchanged: the practical character of logic, an instrument (like reason and science) for transforming the human condition and society. Hence the social character of his “humanistic naturalism,” which is a neo-empiricism according to which thought is a product of biological evolution, possessing a social purpose and establishing cooperation and communication among human beings. Thought arises from vital needs, and its function is to satisfy them (the points of contact between Deweyanism and Marxism are noteworthy); hence its essentially “instrumental” purpose of transforming or resolving real “situations,” not individual but social ones. This qualification does not suffice to spare Dewey’s logical i. the designation of pure utilitarianism, pragmatism, and radical relativism. Once logic has been reduced to a “working instrument,” to its practical function of transforming and resolving situations, it is evident that logic (and logical truths) are mutable like situations, and that their validity remains limited to this or that situation (whether subjective or social is immaterial). “Logic is a discipline that evolves... As the methods of the sciences are perfected, corresponding changes take place in logic. A change of enormous importance... occurred as a consequence of the development of mathematics and physics... When in the future the methods of inquiry are further altered, logical theory will change as well... The idea that logic is susceptible of definitive formulation is nothing other than an idolum theatri” (Logica, cited work, Italian trans., p. 47). One must also note the distinction Dewey draws between “instrumental” and “operative”: “As a general term, ‘instrumental’ signifies the means-results relation, as a fundamental category for interpreting logical forms, whereas ‘operative’ expresses the conditions by which matter is 1) rendered fit to serve as a means and 2) actually functions as a means in accomplishing the objective transformation that is the end of inquiry” (ibid., p. 48).