INSTRUMENTALISM. – This term defines the form of pragmatism (v.) characteristic of the North American philosopher J. DEWEY (b. at Burlington on 28 Oct. 1859, d. at New York on 1 June 1952; professor from 1905 at Columbia University, New York), for whom every idea and doctrine is a tool (tool) for action and the transformation of experience.
Dewey and the “Chicago School,” which he promoted, are distinguished by the so-called logical instrumentalism or “instrumental logic.” Dewey’s thought is developed in his principal works: *Psychology* (New York 1887); *Studies in logical theory* (Chicago 1903); *Democracy and education* (New York 1916); *Reconstruction in philosophy* (ibid. 1920); *Human nature and conduct* (ibid. 1922); *Experience and nature* (Chicago 1925); *Characters and events* (ibid. 1929); *Construction and criticism* (New York 1930); *Philosophy and civilization* (ibid. 1931).
As Dewey himself writes, “reflective knowledge is a means (instrumental) for mastering an abnormal situation,” just as it is also “a means of enriching the immediate significance (significance) of prior experiences” (*Essays in experimental logic*, 1917, p. 17). In his later years, Dewey devoted himself with great commitment to the study of logic (*Logic, the theory of inquiry*, New York 1939; Italian trans. Turin 1949). To avoid misunderstandings, he abandoned the word “pragmatism” (v.), yet his logical instrumentalism retained its essential character: the practical character of logic, a tool (like reason and science) for transforming the human condition and society. Hence the social character of his “humanistic naturalism,” which is a form of neo-empiricism according to which thought is a product of biological evolution, having a social purpose and establishing collaboration and communication among men. Thought arises from vital needs, and its function is to satisfy them (there are notable points of contact between Deweyism and Marxism); hence its essentially “instrumental” aim of transforming or resolving “real situations,” not individual but social. This clarification does not suffice to spare Dewey’s logical instrumentalism the label of pure utilitarianism, of pragmatism, and of radical relativism. Reduced to a “working tool,” to its practical function of transforming and resolving situations, it is evident that logic (and logical truths) are as changeable as the situations themselves, and their validity remains limited to this or that situation (whether subjective or social makes no difference). Logic is a discipline that evolves... As the methods of science are perfected, corresponding changes occur in logic. A change of enormous importance... occurred as a result of the development of mathematics and physics... When in the future the methods of inquiry are further altered, the logical theory will change as well... The idea that logic is susceptible of definitive formulation is nothing other than an *idolum theatri* (Logic, op. cit., Italian trans., p. 47). It should also be noted the distinction Dewey makes between “instrumental” and “operative”: “As a general term, ‘instrumental’ signifies the means-results relation as a fundamental category for the interpretation of logical forms, while ‘operative’ expresses the conditions under which the material is 1) rendered capable of serving as a means and 2) actually functions as a means in effecting the objective transformation that is the end of inquiry” (ibid., p. 48).