Discord

DISCORDIA. —

I. DEFINITION

Discord is not merely a divergence of opinions, nor simply a dispersion of efforts in the pursuit of common aims; properly speaking, it is the formal divergence of two or more wills concerning the same good. This good may be either free or obligatory.

A divergence of wills concerning the same free good is not yet a fault of discord, which requires the divergence of two or more wills obliged to love the same good. This obligation consists in the necessity of the same means for the same ends, which are common to many, and may present itself either in the form of charity toward God or toward one’s neighbor, or in the form of justice or another virtue. It should be noted, however, that the malice of discord does not lie in the simple fact that one of two wills departs from the other; rather, it lies in the fact that one of the wills refuses to love that necessary good which the other, on the contrary, accepts.

Although a divergence of opinions does not constitute discord, it may be its source; but the most frequent source is the desire to assert one’s own will against others, whether or not personal advantages are at stake. Discord almost always produces considerable dispersion and conflict in action; consequently, private and public harms may be grave, according to the words of Jesus Christ: « Omne regnum contra se divisum desolabitur » (Mt. 12, 25).

II. MORALITY

Discord offends that virtue by which the same good is obligatory for the wills involved; generally, charity. But it may also be justice, when discord arises between persons with common interests, or another virtue, such as piety, if discord operates among members of the same family. In practice, responsibility for discord easily escapes the culprit’s awareness, either because of the illusion that he is on the side of good and the others are not, or because the evil consequences of discord become significant only later, when they are by then intertwined with the influences of many extraneous factors. Therefore, in promoting the unity of the good, it is more helpful to insist on the advantages of peace and concord than on the responsibilities and harms of discord. This does not apply to the sowers of discord, in whom guilt is always present and is hardly ever not grave and unjust.