ANIMATISM. – A term introduced into ethnological and historical-religious discussions by R. R. Marett, intended to characterize a supposed stage chronologically prior to animism, i.e., an initial phase in religious development in which humanity was thought to have conceived all things as imbued with will and power, but not yet with a soul. Deeper research has clarified the non-existence of such a mode of thought among primitive peoples and has thus demonstrated that it is merely an a priori assumption. In fact, the psychological attitudes of primitive peoples toward things are four in number:
1) The primitive sees and uses objects for what they are, i.e., realistically: a mentality found everywhere, as evidenced by weapons, tools, etc., made for a specific purpose, as well as the entire complex of agriculture, hunting techniques, and animal husbandry;
2) The primitive sometimes conceives of things as pervaded by the spirit or soul of a deceased being, whether human or animal; in this case, however, one must speak of a genuine animistic attitude (see Soul, Animism);
3) There is also the attribution of impersonal, occult forces to various objects, forces which F. R. Lehmann termed “mana,” a complex which, thanks to the work of M. Mauss, H. Hubert, and, in part, K. Th. Preuss, is now instead called “magism”;
4) Finally, there is the phenomenon of the personification of things without animistic or magical contamination, and this is found everywhere, but especially among the most ancient peoples.
Now, whereas the four aforementioned attitudes are amply documented, the same cannot be said of animatism. Moreover, the few alleged instances of animatism cited by researchers in the field, such as E. W. Thalbitzer in reference to the reindeer-herding Eskimos and A. A. Popov for the Tawgisi tribe of the Eastern Samoyeds, are by no means sufficient to document its existence, especially since it is unclear whether the elements adduced should not rather be attributed to simple animism or personification. It is thus easy to understand why, in updated bibliographies, the term animatism is difficult to encounter. The only scholar to have treated it thematically still is the Swede N. Söderblom, though even he remains uncertain whether to attribute specific facts to animatism or to animism. In the field of ethnology, animatism has now become a completely hypothetical phase that has been surpassed.
The proposal and defense of animatism led many to regard Marett as the founder of that school of thought which sought to trace the origin of religion to magic. This is incorrect, however, since several years before him, J. H. King, drawing on all the then-known ethnological and psychological data and in strong opposition to Tylor’s animism, laid the foundations of pre-animistic magism, so that historical priority belongs solely to King. Nor has the view that magism and the a priori animatism gave rise to religion found any scientific confirmation, for the greatest development of magic is not found among the most ancient ethnological peoples, but precisely among those with the most specialized economies and societies; peoples with less specialized cultures, in fact, acknowledge a Supreme Being who is both creator and ethical, and, if anything, only display initial traces of magical beliefs.