ANIMATISM. — An expression introduced into ethnological and historical-religious discussions by R. R. Marett, intended to characterize a supposed stage chronologically preceding animism, that is, an initial stage of religious development in which humanity would have conceived all inanimate things as endowed with will and power, but not yet with a soul. More profound research has clarified the nonexistence of such a mode of thought among primitive peoples and has therefore shown it to be a mere apriorism. In fact, the psychological attitudes of primitive peoples toward things are fourfold: 1) the primitive sees and takes objects for what they are, that is, realistically: a mentality widespread and observable everywhere, as weapons, tools, etc., made for a specific purpose demonstrate, as does the entire complex of agriculture, hunting techniques, and livestock raising; 2) the primitive sometimes conceives things as pervaded by the spirit or soul of a dead person, that is, as animated; in this case, however, one must speak of a genuinely animistic attitude (v. ANIMISMO); 3) there is also the attribution of obscure, impersonal forces to various objects, forces that F. R. Lehmann calls “mana”; a complex that today, through the work of M. Mauss, H. Hubert, and, in part, K. Th. Preuss, is instead called “Magism”; 4) finally, there is the phenomenon of the personification of things without animistic or magical contamination, and this is found everywhere, but especially among the most ancient peoples.
Now, whereas the four attitudes mentioned above possess extensive documentation, a. continues even today to lack II. On the other hand, the few facts of alleged a. reported by researchers who visited the places concerned, such as E. W. Thalbitzer with reference to the reindeer-herding Eskimos and A. A. Popov concerning the Tawgisi tribe of the eastern Samoyeds, are in no way sufficient to document the existence of a., especially since it is not clear whether the elements isolated should not be attributed simply to animism or personification. It is therefore easy to understand why, in the up-to-date bibliography, it is difficult to encounter the word a. The only person to have continued to treat it thematically was the Swede N. Söderblom, but he too remains uncertain between a. and animism in attributing specific facts. In the ethnological field, however, a. now represents a completely superseded hypothetical phase.
The fact that Marett proposed and defended a. led many to regard him as the founder of that school which sought the origin of religion in magic. But this was mistaken, since several years before him J. H. King, proceeding from all the ethnological and psychological findings then known and engaging in vigorous polemic against Tylor’s animism, laid the foundations of pre-animistic magism, so that historical priority belongs solely to King. Nor has the opinion that magism, together with aprioristic a., gave rise to religion found any scientific confirmation, because the greatest development of magic is not found among the ethnologically most ancient peoples, but precisely among peoples with more specialized economies and societies; peoples who are culturally less specialized, in fact, acknowledge a creative and ethical Supreme Being and, at most, display only initial traces of magical beliefs.