ANTHROPOMORPHISM. — Anthropomorphism (from Gr. ἄνθρωπος “man,” and μορφή “form”) in general is the tendency of man to project himself onto the things surrounding him and to give the external world the features of his inner world. This tendency may also affect the conception of the divine. Hence the twofold aspect of anthropomorphism: one philosophical, the other religious.
Philosophical anthropomorphism, contained within its normal limits, finds its justification in the truth, supported by tradition and science, that man, from the material and physiological point of view, is a microcosm in which the elements and laws of the universe are summed up. Another foundation of this anthropomorphism is the natural harmony between knowing subject and knowable object, whereby, according to the soundest philosophy, the laws of thought are a reflection of the laws of being. But philosophical anthropomorphism may exceed its legitimate bounds if the analogy between man and the world and their relation of interdependence is exaggerated. A characteristic example of philosophical anthropomorphism is found in the bold theories of Telesio and Campanella, who attribute sense and spirit to all things (cosmic sensism and panpsychism), thus preparing the way for certain extravagant forms of modern dynamism, in which force is equated with spirit.
Religious anthropomorphism is that which touches the supernatural sphere. It manifests itself predominantly in pagan polytheism, which, beginning with animism (v.) or the attribution of spirit to things, creates a throng of gods as personifications of natural forces and phenomena, to which a realistically human psychology is attributed (Tylor). Some unprejudiced critic has wished to find this vulgar anthropomorphism even in the Jewish religion and consequently in the Old Testament. In Sacred Scripture, in fact, especially in the Old Testament, anthropomorphic expressions frequently occur when God is spoken of. Not only actions proper to the human spirit, such as thought, will, and feeling, are attributed to God, but also the forms of inner and outer sensory life (anger, joy, and other passions; sight, hearing, and other senses). Indeed, the Bible not infrequently speaks of God’s mouth, his hands, and other limbs, as though God had a body. It is therefore not entirely surprising that in the fourth century a certain Audius dared to propose a literal interpretation of these texts, attributing to God a genuine human form, including matter. This gross error found a few ingenuous followers in Syria and Egypt, who were objects of derision even among the Fathers of the Church (St Giovanni Chrysostom, St Augustine). In reality, these are passages that cannot be interpreted literally so as to derive from them the concept of a material God, all the more so since the Old Testament is full of splendid affirmations concerning God’s perfect spirituality and ineffable transcendence (v. A. BIBLICO).
One may also add a third kind of anthropomorphism, which could be called theological. It is connected with the important problem of the value of our concepts and of our language concerning God and his attributes. (v. ANALOGIA). Here it is enough to recall that, when speaking of God, we must necessarily make use of concepts and words relating to created nature, for the simple reason that our reason cannot rise to knowledge of God directly and immediately, but only through creatures, which bear the imprint of his power and stand in a relation of causality, and hence of resemblance, to him. But in this ascent the human intellect runs the risk either of accentuating the resemblance too much, to the point of univocity, or of exaggerating God’s transcendence and his difference from the creature to the point of equivocity. In the first case there is anthropomorphism, or the equating of God with man; in the second case there is agnosticism (v.), or distrust in grasping the divinity through human concepts. Christian theology, strengthened by divine revelation, avoids these two pitfalls through the doctrine of analogy, according to which our concepts concerning the divine attributes are true—that is, they correspond to the object (the divine nature)—but not adequately.