TELESIO, BERNARDINO

TELESIO, BERNARDINO. — Philosopher, born at Cosenza in 1509, died there in 1588. In 1518 he went to Milan with his uncle Antonio, from whom he learned Latin and Greek. In 1521 or 1523 he followed his uncle to the Roman Gymnasium. Shortly afterward he went to Padua, where he formed his philosophical culture, enrolling in the Faculty of Arts and devoting himself to physica, medicine, and philosophy.

At the University, Galen dominated medicine, while in philosophy Alexandrist Aristotelianism prevailed, particularly concerned with the problems of concrete sensible nature, but hampered by the apriorism of the Aristotelian tradition. In 1535 he obtained his degree; but he remained dissatisfied: « non contentus Aristotelis doctrina; ... quem et ipse... multos annos colui », because of the philosopher’s abstract, aprioristic rationalism, which took no account of the senses, the primary source of knowledge (Prooemium to the De rerum natura of 1565). He then withdrew into meditation in a monastery (perhaps at the Grancia of Seminara), where he seems to have remained from 1536 to 1544–45; he then moved to Naples (1544–52), where he developed his philosophy in an environment fervent with Averroist Aristotelianism. In 1553 he married Diana Sersale, a widow with two children, who died in 1561, leaving him four more children. Inexperienced in administration, he became deeply immersed in debt, from which he was never again able to free himself. From 1561 he lived between Rome, Naples, and Cosenza. In 1562 he went to Brescia to discuss his philosophy with Vincenzo Maggio, a famous Aristotelian, who found nothing to criticize either in the principles or in the logic of the system. He enjoyed the benevolence of the popes Clement VIII, Paul III, Paul IV, and Pius IV, the last of whom offered him the archbishopric of Cosenza, which he declined in favor of his brother Tommaso. In 1565 the first two books of the De rerum natura appeared in Rome; they were reprinted in 1570 in Naples with some formal variants. In the same year, three treatises followed there: De his, quae in aere finut, et de terrae motibus; De colorum generatione; De mari. His philosophy was spreading: in 1573 Martelli published in Florence a translation of the two books of the De rerum natura and of two treatises; Gregory XIII (1572–85) invited him to Rome to explain his philosophy; he received an equal invitation from Naples; but he never actually taught, contenting himself with conversations. During those years, in addition to polemical activity and the composition of treatises, he prepared the complete edition of the De rerum natura, published in Naples in 1686.

A good man and sincere believer, he perceived no conflict between his philosophy and Christianity; others did perceive such conflicts, and in 1593 the De rerum natura, the De Somo, and the Quod animal universum ab unica animae substantia gubernatur were placed on the Index, « donec expurgentur » (they have since been removed).

All those who have hitherto studied nature have devoted immense efforts to it with meager results, as is demonstrated by the sea of contradictions among investigations that conflict both with one another and with reality. This is because philosophers claimed « mundi huius principia ratione inquirere; ... nos, humanae sapientiae amatores cultoresque », shall follow « sensum... et naturam aliud praeterea nihil », always excepting the absolute primacy of faith: if it contradicted them, « abnegandus omnino et ipse etiam est sensus » (Prooemium to the 1586 edition). The senses are the primary and radical source of knowledge, which essentially consists in contact. Sensation is a conscious movement of the spirit-heat: therefore all beings feel. Sense is the immediate perception of an object currently present, generated by mechanical motion. The intellect is the inference, from a known aspect of what is perceived, of an aspect not currently sensed but already grasped in previous experiences: ontologically, it is founded on the presupposition of the permanent continuity of beings, and psychologically on sensory memory; the intellect is therefore nothing more than sensory memory. Universal principles are merely generalizations of sensations, always in need of experimental confirmation (l. VIII). The senses show that fire and the heavens are made of heat, which is white, illuminates, warms, and causes motion; the earth is made of cold, immobile and antithetical to heat; both are sensible and sentient. The two active natures, heat and cold, being incorporeal,

(phot. Enc. Catt.)
TELESIO, BERNARDINO - Title page of De Natura iuxta propria principia, Rome, printed by A. Blado, 1565 - Copy in the Biblioteca nazionale - Rome.

require a common substratum in which to inhere, black passive matter. Thus there are the three universal physico-metaphysical principles of reality (Books I, II), operating in empty space and in the flow of time. The spherical earth stands immobile at the centre of the universe; the individual spatial movements observable within it are caused by the heat of the self-moving heavens, because they are constituted of heat. The immense variety of individual natural beings results from the mechanical encounter of variable quantities of heat and cold in matter, under the supreme guidance of Providence, which coordinates everything in a marvellous teleological order (Books III, IV).

Living beings are teleologically operating mechanisms, composed of matter and spirit-heat: the vital principle is simple corporeal heat, as is demonstrated by nutrition, by the mechanism of movement and that of cognition, and by death. This material heat is capable of explaining all the cognitive functions of sense and reason: « substantiam quae sentit in homine, ratiocinari et animalia reliqua ratiocinationis non prorsus expertia esse » (VIII, 14). This does not invalidate the explicit admission of another soul proper to man: « nihil propterea negantes aliam a spiritu e semine educto... substantiam homini inesse et vere eam divinam et ab ipso infusam Deo » (VIII, 8). This is proved by certain indications: man is not satisfied with earthly things; he is always restless; he esteems moral values, preferring them to material goods; the inequalities between merits and rewards, between faults and punishments in the present life require the restoration of justice in a future life. Faith establishes the existence of a spiritual and immortal soul (V, 2). The proof of God is analogous. All value is denied to the Aristotelian via motus, because movement is caused by heat: the heavens and animals move themselves, just as everything that is hot moves itself (IV,

(fol. Felici)