CALIPH and CALIPHATE. – The Arabic title *khalīfah* means “successor,” “deputy,” and appears frequently in the Qur’ān, but never in the technical sense that it later acquired, namely, deputy of the Prophet (*khalīfat rasūl Allāh*). This title seems to have been first assumed by the Caliph ‘Umar, and from then on “caliph” signified the head of the Muslim theocratic state; it is therefore in no way parallel to the Catholic title of “pope,” and it would be erroneous to consider the caliph as the “pope of the Muslims.”
After the death of the Prophet (632), the leadership of the Muslim community passed to Abū Bakr (632–34), then to ‘Umar (634–44), ‘Uthmān (644–56), and ‘Alī (656–61). These are the four so-called “orthodox” (*rāshidūn*) caliphs. From their politico-religious policies, which followed the assassination of Caliph ‘Uthmān and the caliphate of ‘Alī, there arose the *Shī‘ah*, which divided and still divides the Muslim world: the Shi‘ites recognize ‘Alī and his descendants as the only legitimate caliphs or imāms.
This hereditary principle, contrary to the pure Arab-Bedouin traditions, nevertheless took root even among non-Shi‘ites, and after the four orthodox caliphs came the Umayyad dynasty (661–750), bitter enemies of the partisans of ‘Alī. Yet so strong was the Arab “democratic” tradition that the caliph who ascended to power had to receive a formal *bay‘ah* (official recognition) from the Muslim communities. Under the Umayyads, the capital of the Arab-Muslim empire was moved from Medina to Damascus; the Umayyads especially emphasized the political aspect of their functions.
Following the Umayyad dynasty came the ‘Abbāsid dynasty (750–1258), which transferred the capital to Baghdad. With the rise to power of the ‘Abbāsids (who obtained the throne even with the help of the Shi‘ites, whom they later persecuted), Persian monarchical traditions prevailed over the Bedouin democratic simplicity of the “orthodox” caliphs and the early Umayyads, when the caliph was still a *primus inter pares*. At the same time, the ‘Abbāsid caliphs gave greater importance to the religious aspect of their office, donned the mantle of the Prophet, and ostentatiously claimed kinship with the family of Muḥammad. During the reign of the ‘Abbāsids, various more or less independent Muslim principalities began to form, and by around 946 no effective political power remained in the hands of the Caliph of Baghdad, although he was still regarded by theorists, mindful of past grandeur, as the source of all authority in the Muslim world. Rival caliphates to that of Baghdad did, however, form, the most important of which were the Umayyad caliphate of Spain (the title of caliph was taken by ‘Abd al-Raḥmān III in 928) and the Shi‘ite caliphate of the Fāṭimids of Egypt (909–1171). When Hulagu, a grandson of Genghis Khan, occupied and devastated Baghdad, killing the last ‘Abbāsid caliph al-Musta‘ṣim (1258), for the first time the Muslim world lacked a leader.
The descendants of the ‘Abbāsid caliphs who held the title of caliph for many years afterward in Cairo (1261–1517) were mere puppets in the hands of the Mamluk sultans of Egypt and wielded no power, being ignored by the majority of Muslims. When the Ottoman sultan Selim made his triumphal entry into Cairo (1517) and transported al-Mutawakkil, the last shadow of an ‘Abbāsid caliph, to Constantinople, he had already assumed the title of caliph for himself, a title that was later sought to be legitimized (since according to Sunni doctrine the caliph must belong to the Quraysh tribe) by the legend of a supposed investiture of Selim by al-Mutawakkil.
From then on, the powers of the caliphate were held by the Ottoman sultans until 1922, when, with the abolition of the sultanate, the caliphate was artificially maintained as a mere religious office, which was also abolished in 1924.
As stated above, the caliph cannot in any way be compared, in terms of his functions, to a “pope.” The office of the caliph is purely that of uniting and politically governing the religious community that alone has the right to decide (through its scholars, *‘ulamā’*, *muftīs*, etc.) religious matters not already decided by the Qur’ān and the *sunnah* (q.v.). The caliph is a believer like any other and has no legislative power in religious matters. Moreover, if one considers that according to orthodox theory the caliphate must, as has been said, belong to the Quraysh tribe, one may conclude that the caliphate in its legitimate form actually ceased to exist in 1258, with the fall of Baghdad, and that the Muslim world has for centuries been unaccustomed to being governed by a caliph.
As for the Shi‘ite idea of the caliph, it should be noted that the concept of *imām* (q.v.) is fundamental in the *Shī‘ah*. The caliph or *imām* possesses superhuman qualities, and the *imāmah* is restricted not only to the Quraysh tribe but to the family of ‘Alī: the Shi‘ites, with few exceptions, reject the concept of the electability of the caliph and affirm that the superhuman qualities of ‘Alī are hereditary in all his successors.
According to the ultra-democratic concepts of the Khārijites (q.v.), on the other hand, the caliphate is not indispensable (the functions of caliph can be exercised by the community), and any believer may be elected caliph.