WRATH. - From the Latin ira, also called wrath, it is a deviation of the instinct that leads one to defend oneself, when attacked, by repelling force with force.
I. NOTION
It can be considered as a passion, and it consists in the need for reaction, determined by a physical or moral contrariety or by any suffering whatsoever, which arouse a violent emotion of all the forces tending to overcome the difficulty. Like all the passions, it has no morality of its own and can be directed toward good or toward evil.
Anger can also be considered as a feeling, and it is then the desire for vengeance, or rather the craving to repel and to punish the aggressor. The desire for vengeance considered in itself is not yet a ground for sin. The sin lies in disordered cupidity, that is, in not keeping the desire for vengeance within its just limits and in not directing it toward reasonable ends.
There is in fact a legitimate anger, which is the mainspring of virtuous acts, for example, the correction of others (as in the case of Jesus with the merchants of the Temple [Jo. 2:13-17]); and there is an illegitimate anger (which is one of the capital sins) and it entails a violent and immoderate desire to punish one's neighbor without taking into account the due conditions, and it is opposed to the virtue of meekness. Often, moreover, it is accompanied by hatred and is transformed into a more deliberate and lasting feeling, which does not stop at repelling the aggression, but proceeds to take vengeance for it with graver consequences.
II. MALICE
To determine the malice of i. [anger], one must first establish whether the disorder arises from the moral object itself or from excess in the manner.
If the disorder derives from the part of the object — whether one desires an unjust revenge, or desires revenge not according to the order of reason, or desires revenge not for the due end, which is the preservation of justice and the correction of fault — then there is of itself, that is, setting aside the other constitutive elements of sin, matter of grave sin, because one sets oneself against charity and justice. Nevertheless, most often the motions of i. [anger] are venially sinful, because they are imperfectly deliberated.
If the disorder concerns the manner of becoming agitated, there is a sin venial in itself, which on account of the circumstances can become mortal, as when someone through the vehemence of i. [anger] bursts forth into blasphemies, or causes grave harm to his own health.
III. EFFECTS
The effects are described effectively and vividly by the pagan philosophers themselves (Seneca, De ira, bk. I, no. 2), who attribute to i. the gravest crimes, from murder to civil strife, from family quarrels to war. But even without reaching such excesses, i. is the source of a great number of sins, because it makes one lose control of oneself. It is therefore also a great obstacle to spiritual perfection, disturbing interior recollection, relations with one's neighbor, and level-headedness.