DESIDERIO da SETTIGNANO. – Florentine sculptor, b. at Settignano ca. 1428–31, d. 16 Jan. 1464. Perhaps trained in the workshop of Bernardo Rossellino, he looked especially to Donatello, striving to translate the latter’s bold luminism into a pictorial sensitivity to the quality of material and singularly effective, so much so that he paved the way, on the plane of a lighter poetry, for Verrocchio and Leonardo.
Besides a few monumental works (tomb of Carlo Marsuppini in S. Croce [ca. 1455], tabernacle of the Sacrament in S. Lorenzo), he produced a long series of detached bas-reliefs depicting Madonnas (Berlin, Turin, Bargello, etc.) or saints (S. Giovanni in the Bargello, S. Cecilia in Toledo [U.S.A.]), busts of youths (Vienna, Washington, Bargello, etc.) and gentlewomen (Bargello, Louvre, Washington, Berlin, etc.), more often in marble, sometimes in polychrome stucco, inaugurating a pro-
desiderio cattivo: V. peccati interni.
DESIRE FOR GOD. – An age-old philosophical and theological problem, which has received through the centuries various and conflicting solutions and is still today the object of lively discussion. Nor is this surprising, if one considers that it involves the whole question of the relationship between the finite and the infinite, the contingent and the absolute, and the properly theological question of the point of insertion of the supernatural into human nature.
Outline:
I. Greek Philosophy
II. The Thought of the Fathers
III. The Scholastics
IV. St. Thomas and his Interpretation. – V. Modern Theology.I. GREEK PHILOSOPHY
Setting aside Stoicism, which in its most genuine form amounts to a pantheistic monism and therefore has no reason to pose a problem based on the relationship between man and divinity, the question of a more or less conscious tendency of the human spirit toward God is at least found in the three great philosophers: Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus.It is known that the Platonic God does not present true personal characteristics, but is merged with the noetic world of ideas, more probably with the idea of the Good. In any case, the theory of the pre-existence of the soul, before it informs the body, leads Plato to establish a relationship between it and the divine sphere of ideas, its place of origin. This relationship begins on the gnoseological level as a reminiscence of the ideas already contemplated and now reflected in the sensible world by way of participation (μετάστασις) or imitation (μίμησις); then it develops on the psychological level as a nostalgia or amorous tendency (ἔρως) of the soul to return to its ideal world. This nostalgia, which in the Symposium is personified as “ἔρως” (= “love”) and in the Phaedrus becomes frenzy (μανία), is the psychological expression of a metaphysical principle, namely, the subordination of man and the sensible world to the Absolute, in which alone lies the supreme reason for both. It is a fervent desire of the spirit, which tends to escape from matter toward the ideal world: in that desire the aesthetic moment and the religious moment coincide.
For Aristotle, God is the Unmoved Mover, a form transcending all matter and therefore pure thought in act, pure act, fullness of being subsisting in itself and by itself. The Aristotelian God is metaphysically more solid and more personal than the Platonic one. But the relationship between God and the world, emphasized by the master through the participation of ideas and the concept of the Good, is diminished by the disciple, who reduces divine influence to final causality, sufficient to found an ethics rather than a religion. The Unmoved Mover moves all things, including man, as the supreme end, by way of attraction, and the tendency of man toward God resolves itself into a movement, which is a passage from potency to act. Man naturally tends toward the divine (pure act) insofar as he strives to actualize his noblest faculties, the intellect and the will, more than this. Man’s perfection and happiness lie in the progressive conquest of truth: to the attraction of the thinking thought, which is God, man responds with the thirst for knowledge, which brings him closer to God.
But the desire for the divine reaches the heights of mysticism in Plotinus. Although he distinguishes the One, Intellect, and Soul informing the cosmos (“ἕν, νοῦς, ψυχή”), he overcomes pluralism with the concept of emanation, which is a descent (πρόοδος) of the One into lower grades and therefore its immanence in the intelligible world and in the cosmic world. The profound unity, despite apparent multiplicity, is the motive for the return (ἐπιστροφή) of all reality to the initial One. This return is accomplished principally in man by way of will and by way of intellect, so much so that an ethics and a gnoseology of salvation are constituted. The soul, through sensation, dialectic, and intuition, ascends to the νοῦς, in which it participates in life in the contemplation of the One, the supreme end of man, as Aristotle had already taught. But Plotinus goes further when he grants the soul, intolerant of the imperfection of the visible world, the faculty of rising to ecstasy (ἕνωσις, VI, 9), which is “the flight of the alone to the Alone,” no longer merely intellectual vision, but possession, the soul’s identification with its origin, which is God, first intuited, now experienced.
Thus Greek metaphysics reaches the summit of religiosity, awaiting the incarnate Light.
II. THE THOUGHT OF THE FATHERS
The investigation into the thought of the Fathers of the Church regarding the present question is very difficult, both because of the sacredness of the material and because of the oscillation in terminology. The theme of the beatific vision, with which that of the desire for God is particularly connected, is little developed in patristics prior to St. Augustine, as indeed is the whole anthropological problem, owing to the prevalence of Trinitarian and Christological heresies. On the other hand, the thought of the Fathers moves entirely within the supernatural climate, and in their language reason and faith, nature and grace are fused into such a compact structure that it is difficult to discriminate the attribution of one element from that of another.Nevertheless, some doctrinal motifs can be disentangled from the field, discreetly cultivated, of the knowability of God. Already the apologists, in opposition to pagan polytheism, inspired by Sacred Scripture (Wis 13 and Rom 1), affirmed not only the possibility but also the ease of knowing the true God through creation (Aristides, Apol., 1; Tatian, Adv. Graecos, 4; Irenaeus, Adv. haer., II, 9, 1; Tertullian, Apolog., 17; and others). By this path one arrives at the assertion that the knowledge of God is innate, congenital in man (in the sense of spontaneous). But this natural knowledge is imperfect and cannot be compared with that envisaged by Christian Revelation (1 Cor 13; 1 Jn 3) in the blessed life. The beatific vision of God is soberly commented on by the early Fathers as the term and reward of the life lived in faith, hope, and charity in Christ. “For us,” writes St. Basil, echoing tradition (In Ps. 48), “the end for which we perform all our actions and toward which we yearn is the blessed life that awaits us in the other world.” It is the itinerary of Christian asceticism, on which mystical contemplation is based as an anticipation of the beatific vision. Pseudo-Dionysius, between the end of the 5th and the beginning of the 6th century, develops a copious doctrine around this itinerary, harmonizing with the data of Revelation the fruitful motifs of Neoplatonic speculation.
Truly Neoplatonism, especially that of Plotinus, exercised no small influence on the Eastern Fathers, particularly the Alexandrians. The Neoplatonic climate that matured between the 1st and 3rd centuries (from Philo to Plotinus) was so saturated with religiosity and mysticism that the Fathers easily found in it aspirations and language akin to the Christian conception. The soul’s longing for the divine world, which intensifies from Plato to Plotinus, as mentioned above, and takes concrete form in the concept and practice of ascent to God through ascetical purification, found ready acceptance among the Fathers, who meditated on the Lord’s words: “Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God.” They willingly adopted the well-known Platonic principles of the soul’s tendency to see God, of its kinship or affinity with Him, which makes such vision possible the more the inner eye is purified by detachment from the sensible world (ecstasy). Yet at the same time they moderated and corrected these principles in the light of faith. The soul is like God but distinct from Him as His created image (Irenaeus), and thus capable of seeing God and desiring Him; but for its eye (nous) to attain such heights it must not only be purified, as Plotinus holds, but also elevated and illumined by a supernatural light, which is God’s gift (Justin, Clement of Alexandria, more decisively Augustine, *Epist.* 205, 19 and elsewhere). Moreover, in place of the Neoplatonic physical and ontological account, the Fathers substituted the yearning of the will, kindled by the infused flame of charity (cf. St. Augustine, *De div. quaest.* 83, q. 46). The vision of God in this life is never perfect, not even in ecstasy; St. Gregory of Nyssa reduces it to the reflection of God in the purified soul (*De beatitudinibus*, hom. 6), or rather to the very desire that remains ever unsatisfied (*De vita Moysis*).
The claim of Eunomius (4th century) that an adequate, almost intuitive knowledge of God could be attained in this life through the concept of ἀγέννητος (“unbegotten”) forced the Fathers to greater caution, as is evident in this significant passage from St. Gregory Nazianzen (*Or. theol.* 2, 17): “What God is in His nature and essence, no man has ever found nor can find... For my part, I believe that he will find Him only when this divine and, as it were, deiform element in us—our mind and reason (nous, logos)—is reunited with its kindred Being, and the image has ascended to its exemplar, of which it now has a desire. And this, to my mind, is all philosophy: that then we shall know as much as we are known” (cf. 1 Cor 13). “But in this mortal life all that reaches us is but a rivulet, a faint ray of the great light.”
This Platonic influence, thus moderated, would converge in St. Augustine, while regaining ascendancy in the Pseudo-Dionysius, whose theology, steeped in the mysticism drawn from Plotinus through Proclus, touches the extreme limits of orthodoxy, if indeed it does not transgress them. Starting from the principle that man naturally seeks happiness and that there is no perfect happiness outside God, St. Augustine posits at the root of human being a tendency toward God. This tendency recalls the “return” spoken of by Plotinus, but the saintly Doctor departs from him and corrects him by substituting the Christian concept of creation for the Platonic notion of emanation and by inserting into the ascending dialectic of the spirit the light of faith and the flame of supernatural charity. God is the principle and supreme end of all creatures, but in a special way of man, made in His image and thus capable of knowing and loving Him. Intellect and will have as their object unconditional truth and goodness; and since all creatures are limited beings, pale reflections of the Supreme Being in whom truth and absolute good coincide, the spirit is continually stirred by a thirst that is quenched only in the possession of God: “Lord, You have made us for Yourself, and our heart is restless until it rests in You” (*Conf.* 1, 1). A dynamic and congenital impulse, natural yet animated by love, unfolding along the intellectual line of the search for truth. It is the metaphysical indigence of finite being becoming psychological tension and spiritual striving, described by Augustine in dramatic accents in *De vita beata*, in *De Civitate Dei*, but above all in the *Confessions*. The stimulus of intellect and will are the creatures, man himself who scrutinizes and knows himself; above all it is God who dwells within man and lifts him up to Himself with some gleam of His light: “For my hunger was within me and came from the interior food which You Yourself are, O my God” (*Conf.* 3, 1). The term of the ascent will be God possessed through intellectual vision as truth and through love as goodness; beatitude will be *gaudium de veritate*, i.e., the possession and fruition of God (*Deo frui*). Thus the desire for happiness is the attainment (consecutio) of God, which is not by absorption into Him but by a contact of knowledge and love (*De moribus Ecclesiae* 1, 18). This contact matures through the exercise of the virtues, which is progressive assimilation to God. It should be noted that in Augustine’s exposition the consideration of man in his historical concreteness predominates over abstract metaphysical speculation; hence, although he often warns that perfect beatitude and the means to attain it are a gift of God not owed to man, the two orders—natural and supernatural—are not yet sharply distinguished in the sense later understood by the Scholastics. The desire for God, according to Augustine, is a constitutive impulse of human being itself, which in the present order unfolds and reaches its term under the influence of grace; yet this does not exclude the possibility of another order of things in which that desire rooted in human nature might follow a different development with aids other than grace. In short, Augustine does not exclude the hypothesis of a pure nature, not elevated to the supernatural order, as is in fact the case now.
III. THE SCHOLASTICS
Heirs of the Fathers’ thought, they all agree in affirming a desire for God in the human soul, but when they attempt to deepen and define the nature of that desire they divide into so many opinions that it is difficult to follow and understand them. The difficulty arises from the complexity of the elements involved and, in part, from the terminology then in flux. One need only consider the terms “natural” and “supernatural,” whose history has recently been traced by de Lubac. The unclear distinction between nature and the supernatural, which underlies the Augustinian conception, persists at least until St. Thomas and circumvents the difficulty of the question of the ultimate end, intimately connected with the present one. Finally, the intertwining of the psychological line with the metaphysical, already emphasized in St. Augustine, gives rise to equivocation among the Scholastics and their readers. Under the influence of St. Augustine (*De Trinitate* 1, 13), the early Scholastics generally do not see the ultimate end of man and hence perfect beatitude outside the beatific vision, while acknowledging an imperfect happiness, such as that posited by philosophers as the end of human life. St. Anselm (*De casu diaboli* 12) calls the former *beatitudo iustitiae*, the latter *beatitudo commodi*. This concept remains more or less unchallenged until the 17th century, when Sylvester Mauro for the first time clearly distinguishes two equally perfect kinds of beatitude: one natural (proper to pure nature), the other supernatural (proper to the state of grace). Thus we read in his *Opus theologicum*, VI, 7: *De possibilitate naturae purae*.Even while insisting that the beatific vision is the only true happiness, the ancients did not draw from this a conclusion contrary to the gratuity of the supernatural order (grace-vision) or to the possibility of another order of things. William of Auvergne, for example, posits the dilemma: either the beatific vision or eternal pain; but he mitigates its force when (contrary to the opinion of St. Augustine) he exempts children who die without baptism from any punishment, granting them a natural happiness (De universo, II, 22); consequently, he excludes from the predestinating action of God any necessity, affirming only its suitability (loc. cit., 21).
More difficult and delicate is the question of man’s tendency toward perfect beatitude. With St. Augustine, the scholastics recognized in man a natural desire for full happiness, whose object can only be God. But how is sin to be explained, by which so many men turn away from God? This objection forces one to make distinctions: all intuit and desire happiness, but they do not know where it truly is (Peter Lombard); one desires not life (= the vision of God) but that life be happy however it is lived (Propositions); there is a natural will, which tends toward true beatitude, and a derived will, which casts itself upon temporal goods in which it mistakenly places happiness (William of Auxerre); there is a natural desire to know and enjoy God, which reveals a reactive capacity of the spirit with regard to the beatific vision (= the human soul is beatifiable), but this desire cannot be realized except through faith and grace (William of Auvergne). Even in Hugh of St. Cher, one finds the distinction between two desires, one natural, the other elicited, free, with respect to beatitude.
The Franciscan school, which begins with Alexander of Hales, will arrive at the concept of an innate desire for beatitude, *per modum ponderis* (cf. Scotus, In IV Sent., dist. 49), by which the will inclines toward God without prior conjunction. St. Bonaventure insists on the natural, spontaneous desire for true beatitude (In IV Sent., dist. 49 and elsewhere), but does not exclude an innate intuition of the Supreme Good, which indeed excites that desire (De mysterio SS. Trinitatis, q. I, 1).
All the elements of the question, more or less developed, converge in the thought of St. Thomas, which deserves particular consideration.
IV. ST. THOMAS AND HIS INTERPRETATION. — The Angelic Doctor repeatedly speaks of beatitude as man’s ultimate end, which consists in the vision and enjoyment of God, beyond human powers (Sum. Theol., 1ª, q. 12, a. 4 and q. 62, a. 1; 1ª-2ª, q. 2, a. 8, q. 3 and q. 114, a. 2; 2ª-2ª, q. 2, a. 3; De veritate, q. 8, a. 3 and elsewhere). But there are not lacking texts in which mention is made of two beatitudes and thus of two ends, one natural and imperfect, the other perfect and supernatural (Sum. Theol., 1ª, q. 23, a. 1; De veritate, q. 14, a. 2 and q. 27, a. 2, etc.). Despite, however, the transcendence of the beatific vision, the holy Doctor repeatedly affirms the natural desire for it: “Since man’s ultimate beatitude consists in his highest operation, which is the operation of the intellect, if the created intellect can never see the essence of God, it will either never attain beatitude or its beatitude will consist in something other than God: which is alien to the faith... Man has a natural desire to know the cause when he contemplates the effect... If, therefore, the rational creature’s intellect cannot attain the first cause of things, the natural desire will remain inane” (Sum. Theol., 1ª, q. 12, a. 1; cf. also 1ª-2ª, q. 3, a. 8; C. Gent. 3, 50; Comp. theol., 104 and elsewhere).
The immense literature that has flourished around this doctrine of St. Thomas demonstrates both its importance and its difficulty. The most controversial point lies in the apparent contradiction that seems to be implied by the affirmation of a natural desire for a supernatural end, such as the beatific vision. The Angelic Doctor’s earliest disciples, even if they do not share Scotus’s opinion, do not feel the discomfort of this apparent contradiction and continue to defend the natural desire for the beatific vision (Giles of Rome, Hervé Nédellec, Paludanus). But in the 16th century, when Lutheranism confusedly mingled nature and the supernatural, the Thomists became more cautious and rigid in their language. Cajetan then proposed an interpretation of St. Thomas that removed every difficulty: it is not a question of an innate desire, as the Scotists maintain, but of an elicited desire, which presupposes knowledge of the beatific vision through divine Revelation; such a desire, without the aid of grace, remains ineffective and is called natural only in the sense that it does not conflict with nature, which has the obediential potency for the supernatural order. This facile explanation, also accepted by Báñez, found ready assent among many theologians, especially after the condemnation of Baius, who posited in human nature a true exigency for grace and the beatific vision, compromising the freedom of God and the gratuity of the supernatural order. Thus there matured that opinion which would become common among Thomists from the 17th century onward and which would be attributed outright to St. Thomas: man, knowing of the beatific vision, desires it naturally with an elicited desire, but conditionally and ineffectually, if grace is set aside. It is no longer, evidently, a question of a natural desire, but of a supernatural one, and this interpretation is reinforced by the opinion of Sylvester of Prierio on the distinction between the two ends, of which one is the adequate term of the natural desire, the other of the supernatural desire. But already Sylvester of Ferrara had criticized Cajetan’s Thomistic exegesis, upholding his own, more faithful to the texts and to the spirit of the Angelic Doctor. In his commentary on the *Summa contra Gentiles* (III, 50 ff.), he critically observes that the desire of which St. Thomas speaks is truly natural, that is, arising from the constitutive principles of human nature, whose intellect, at the sight of any effect of God, tends spontaneously to know also the Cause in its essence, which implies the beatific vision, the only way to know the divine essence. From this natural tendency St. Thomas intends to prove not the existence or attainability of the beatific vision, but only its possibility, which presupposes a receptive capacity or potency of the soul’s faculties. The intellect and will tend of themselves to the possession of God, the supreme truth and supreme good, without knowing that this possession can be had only through the beatific vision, which transcends the powers of nature and hence is unattainable without supernatural aid. By this path, opened by Capreolus and Sylvester of Ferrara, it is easier to grasp the thought of St. Thomas, which may be summarized in these terms:
1) God, as He is the first principle, so is He the ultimate end of all creatures, especially of man, who is naturally ordered to God, in whom alone he can find his full happiness, the quiescence of every intellectual and volitional aspect: “It is impossible for man’s beatitude to consist in any created good; for beatitude is a perfect good, which totally quiets the appetite... Now the object of the will, which is the human appetite, is the universal good, just as the object of the intellect is the universal true; from which it is clear that nothing can quiet the will of man except the universal good, which is not found in any created thing, but only in God” (Sum. Theol., 1a-2ae, q. 2, a. 8; cf. 1a, q. 23, a. 1, 2a-2ae, q. 2, a. 3).
2) This supreme end may be considered from both metaphysical and psychological perspectives: in the first sense, it is the ontological subordination of man to God (the transcendental relation of contingent being to the Absolute); in the second sense, it is the tendency of the intellect and the will toward God as the supreme truth and the supreme good. This tendency constitutes the natural desire to know and possess God in Himself, and thus the desire of the intellect to seek and see the cause through the vision of effects; and the consequent desire of the will to tend toward the object apprehended by the intellect. The term of both is God, who, though transcendent, is not estranged from the adequate object of the intellect and the will, which is being, with which truth and good are identified: *“Nihil finitum desiderium intellectus quietare potest. Quod exinde ostenditur quod intellectus, quolibet finito dato, aliquid ultra molitur apprehendere... Non igitur intellectus substantiae separatae quiescit per hoc quod cognoscit substantias creatas quantumcumque eminentes, sed adhuc naturali desiderio tendit ad intelligendum substantiam quae est altitudinis infinita”* (C. Gent., 50; cf. also 54; Sum. Theol., 1a, q. 12, a. 1; 1a-2ae, q. 3, a. 8; Comp. theol., 104).
3) The natural desire of the human intellect tends toward the vision of the divine essence, whose possibility is proven precisely by that desire: *“Non igitur naturale desiderium sciendi potest quietari in nobis, quousque primam causam cognoscamus non quocumque modo, sed per eius essentiam”* (Comp. theol., 104; C. Gent., III, 3, 51). Nevertheless, the beatific vision always remains a reality that surpasses the powers of human nature and its exigencies; it is *“ex sola divina liberalitate repromittitur”* (De veritate, q. 14, a. 2). But the supernatural character of the vision must be understood rather in relation to its attainment, to which nature is unequal, and does not prevent it from being considered in a certain sense connate to man, who is capable of it and aspires to it (Sum. Theol., 3a, q. 9, a. 2, ad 3).
4) More clearly, the natural desire has its formal object, which is beatitude, in which the thirst of the intellect and the will is quenched (“God Truth-Good”); but it also has a material object, which is the same beatitude concretized in this or that good. Formally, therefore, the soul tends, with the intellect and the will, toward the possession of the supreme truth and the supreme good (“God”); but since such possession cannot be realized except through the immediate vision of the divine essence, the soul tends toward this vision materially or implicitly: *“Quamvis divina visio sit ipsa beatitudo, non tamen sequitur quod quicumque appetit beatitudinem, appetat (explicite) divinam visionem: quia beatitudo inquantum huiusmodi importat per se actum voluntatis, non autem divina visio, sicut aliquis appetit dulce, qui non appetit mel”* (In IV Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 3, q. 1, ad 2; the entire question should be read).
5) The root of such a desire is the obediential potency, a receptive capacity of a metaphysical order, which psychologically resolves into a desire that tends toward the possession of God but cannot fully attain it (with the beatific vision) without grace: *“Quamvis intellectus noster sit factus ad hoc quod videat Deum, non tamen ut naturali sua virtute Deum videre possit, sed per lumen gloriae sibi infusum”* (De veritate, q. 10, a. 11, ad 7; In Boet. De Trinitate, q. 6, a. 4, ad 5 and elsewhere). This is a privilege of the rational creature, which tends not only toward the good that it can attain by its own powers, but also toward the good that it can receive from the Supreme Agent.
In conclusion, the desire spoken of by St. Thomas may be called innate because it is rooted in human nature itself as a potency or capacity, but it is properly elicited, that is, accompanied by the cognition that arises from the vision of any effect of God, and unfolds psychologically as a real tendency toward God, the formal term as supreme truth and supreme good, and the material term as the object of the beatific vision. In the order of intention, this desire is absolute and effective, but in the order of execution, it remains ineffectual and conditioned upon supernatural aid.
V. MODERN THEOLOGY
Today the question of the desire for God is more alive than ever. There is the negative attitude of conservative theologians, which, as has been said, was determined by the errors of Baius and is linked to Cajetan. But the psychological tendency of modern philosophy, largely immanentist, has also infiltrated among Catholics, bringing the problem of the supernatural in relation to human nature fully back into discussion. Apart from the modernist deviation, which moves along the heterodox track of immanentism and pragmatism, there is a persistent return to the concept of a more intimate connection between the natural order and the supernatural order, with the danger of eliminating that line of demarcation traced by St. Thomas and accepted with the condemnation of Baianism in the 16th century under Pius V. There is a tendency to exclude the hypothesis of pure nature (without grace), which sound theology deems necessary to defend the gratuitous nature of the supernatural, and preference is given to the position of the Augustinians (Noris, Berti, Bellelli), who consider the destination of man to the beatific vision as a necessity of fitness, by virtue of divine wisdom and goodness, as the only end established by God. In this climate, the opinion of Scotus regarding the innate desire for God and its full possession through vision is adapted, and there is also talk (Blondel) of a need, indeed an indigence, for the supernatural lost through original sin. Pius X, in the encyclical Pascendi, recalled the now traditional doctrine on the clear distinction between the two orders, condemning the opinion of a true and proper indigence for the supernatural.Keeping this grave document of the Church’s magisterium in view, one can separate the wheat from the chaff in these modern theological currents. The thought of St. Thomas, as interpreted above, once again proves useful in reconciling, without compromise, ancient and modern demands. It certainly moves more along the metaphysical line than the psychological, and not without reason, if one does not wish to build on sand. But the possibility of supplementing it with the (Augustinian) historical and psychological consideration, which sees man in his concrete reality, carrying in his wounded heart the nostalgia for lost riches, is not denied. This psychological unease is more than the innate desire or the transcendental relation to God. It is the restless heart of Augustine, which echoes all the religious motifs of pagan philosophy, the fervor of Christian asceticism, and even the Kierkegaardian anguish of much modern philosophy.
For the thought of the Fathers: R. Arnou, *Platonisme des Pères*, in DThC, XII, cols. 2375–87; E. Portalié, *Augustin (Saint)*, in DThC, I, cols. 2432–43; E. Gilson, *Introduction à l'étude de St. Augustin*, Paris 1929; C. Boyer, *Essais sur la doctrine de St. Augustin*, 1932; id., *L'idée de la vérité dans la philosophie de St. Augustin*, 2nd ed., 1931.
For the Scholastics: H. Ligerard, *La théologie scolastique et la transcendance du surnaturel*, Paris 1908; M. De Wulf, *Histoire de la philosophie médiévale*, 5th ed., Louvain 1924; E. Elter, *De naturali hominis beatitudine ad mentem Scholae antiquioris*, in *Geronium*, 9 (1927), pp. 269 sq.; V. Doucet, *De naturali seu innato supernaturalis beatitudinis desiderio iuxta Theologos a sece. XIII usque ad saec. XX*, in *Antonianum*, 5 (1929), pp. 167-208; E. Gilson, *La philosophie au moyen âge*, 2nd ed., Paris 1947; V. De Broglie, *De fine ultimo humanae vitae*, 1934.
For St. Thomas: J. Sestili, *De naturali intelligenti animae capacitate atque appetitu intuendi divinam essentiam theologica disquisitio*, Naples-Rome 1896 (v. on this pamphlet A. Holder, *Le désir naturel de la vision béatifique*, in *Revue Augustinienne*, 16-17 (1910), pp. 5-26); G. Broglie, *De la place du surnaturel, dans la philosophie de St. Thomas*, in *Recherches de sciences religieuses*, 15 (1924), pp. 193-245, 481-97; J. Maréchal, *Le point de départ de la métaphysique*, V. Paris 1926; E. Brisbois, *Desir naturel et vision de Dieu*, in *Nouvelle revue théologique*, 59 (1927), pp. 81-97; R. Garrigou-Lagrange, *L'apéritif naturel et la philosophie obédientielle*, in *Revue thomiste*, 35 (1928), pp. 47-54; M. Cuervo, *El deseo natural de ver a Dios y los fundamentos de la apologética immanentista*, in *Ciencia tomista*, 20 (1928), pp. 332-38; J. E. O' Mahony, *The desire of God in the philosophy of St. Thomas*, in *Augustinus*, Dublin-Cork 1929 (skeptical interpretation); M. D. Roland Gosselin, *Béatitude et désir naturel d'après St. Thomas d' Aquin*, in *Revue de sciences philosophiques et théologiques*, 18 (1929), pp. 193-222 (in Thomistic sense); A. Fernandez, *Naturel desiderium viendi divinam essentiam apud Divum Thomam eiusque scholam*, in *Divus Thomas*, 33 (Piacenza 1930), pp. 5-28, 503-27 (in line with St. Thomas of Ferrara); S. Vallaro, *De naturali desiderio viendi essentiam Dei et de eius valore ad demonstrandam possibilitatem eiusdem visionis Dei quidditatis*, in *Angelicum*, 11 (1934), pp. 133-70; id., *De natura capacitatis intellectus creati ad videam divinam essentiam*, in *Angelicum*, 12 (1935), pp. 192-216 (in line with Fernandez and with greater clarity); B. M. Lemoer, *De desiderio naturali ad visionem beatificam*, Rome 1948 (speculative work of broad scope, highlighting the intellectual character of the desire spoken of by St. Thomas).
For modern thought: J. V. BAINVEL, VINCENT, *Nature et surnaturel*, 5th ed., Paris 1931 (bridging old and new currents); A. Verrièle, *Le surnaturel en nous et le péché originel*, 1932 (approach open to modern demands, though cautiously conceding); H. De Lubac, *Surnaturel*, 1936; work of abundant historical erudition but bold in its interpretations, even to the point of endangering some traditional doctrines; it has been criticized by De Broglie, op. cit., and by C. Boyer, *Nature pure et surnaturel, dans le «surnaturel» du père De Lubac*, in *Gregorianum*, 28 (1947), pp. 379-95.