INCLINATION. —
I. IN PHILOSOPHY
It is the orientation or disposition of an agent with respect to the object that is the purpose or the end of its operation: in this sense it can be said that inclination is the tendency or “appetite” that every agent and every form has for its ultimate perfection: “Res naturalis per formam qua perficitur in sua specie habet inclinationem in proprias operationes et proprium finem, quem per operationem consequitur” (C. Gent., IV, 19). Natural forms impress an inclination toward natural perfections, while supernatural forms give inclinations that move toward acts in the order of grace: in the physical-biological world, inclinations coincide with the drive expressed by physical laws and instincts (v.). In the life of the spirit, they are subject to freedom. According to St. Thomas, inclinations in the spiritual order are more active than those of physical nature, and those of the supernatural order, which follow infused virtues (especially the gifts of the Holy Spirit), operate in the soul “secundum quandam connaturalitatem” with divine things, moving the soul to follow the instinct of the Holy Spirit docilely (Sum. Theol., 1a-2ae, q. 68, a. 2).There is therefore a natural or unconscious inclination (appetitus naturalis), according to which every creature tends toward what is suitable, without any knowledge (ibid., 1a, q. 78, a. 1, ad 3), and is thus common to all nature and to every form and faculty. There is then a conscious inclination (appetitus elicitus: δραξις διανοητικη: Aristotle, Eth. Nic., VI, 2, 1139 b 5), which follows sensitive or intellectual knowledge; when it follows the deliberation of reason, it constitutes free inclination (Aristotle’s δραξις βουλευτικη: ibid., III, 5, 1113 a 10). Inclination is therefore an intrinsic principle of movement in nature, but it attains its foundation and the reason for its object and its end from the form and the degree of being to which it belongs. It is on this principle that education must be considered, as well as the problem of the morality of inclinations.
II. THE PEDAGOGY OF INCLINATION
In pedagogy, inclinations are considered as impulsive and innate tendencies, having as their object the preservation and development of psychological life; unlike proper appetites, which tend toward the preservation and development of physical life. Hence the difference between the two tendencies, because: a) while appetite refers to things, inclination extends also to persons (we have appetite for food, muscular action, rest; we have inclination toward a friend, family, country); b) appetite generates a sensation of pleasure or pain, inclination arouses a feeling of joy or sorrow, according to whether it is indulged or opposed; c) appetite is limited and periodic, ceases when satisfied, recurs at determined intervals, whereas inclination is permanent, never entirely satisfied (the more one knows, for example, the more one is curious to know), since psychological life is not confined within fixed boundaries; d) it may also be added that appetite is common to man as to animals, while inclinations are proper to man.1. Classification of inclinations
Lacking a classification conducted according to strictly scientific criteria, the most common one used by moralists may be followed, dividing inclinations into personal, social, and higher or impersonal.a) Personal inclinations. — In his psychological life, man tends first of all to the preservation and development of himself; personal will therefore be those inclinations that tend toward the realization of the individual’s good, which consequently imply self-love, from which no man can naturally escape, and correspond to various needs and faculties: a) sensibility (curiosity to feel, to experience, and to experiment, thirst for happiness, repugnance to suffering, desire for emotions, whence: viewing tragic scenes, reading moving and fascinating novels, risky games, perilous climbs, detective stories, vaporous fairy tales, etc.); b) intelligence (curiosity to know, to understand, to imagine, discomfort in the face of the unforeseen, the unknown, torment of doubt and uncertainty, anxiety to discover the future); c) will (curiosity to act, tendency to property to make oneself independent of men and circumstances, tendency to authority, whence: repugnance to subordination, desire to command, to impose one’s own ideas, to direct others, to be served; need for activity; tendency to reputation, to fame to feel superior to others, to impose oneself on all).
b) Social inclinations. — Since man is not closed within the narrow barriers of his own personality, but is naturally sociable, he feels drawn toward his fellow men; hence a second group of inclinations, called social, because they tend toward the realization of the good of others as well, felt as variously necessary to one’s own perfection; three different types of inclinations will thus be found: a) inclination to imitation, by which one adapts one’s “I” to the “I” of others and to the environment in which one lives. This explains the homogeneity of every human grouping, in which the same ideas and the same feelings are insensibly adopted; the power and consequent contagion of example, prejudice, opinion, conventions, fashion, which tend to create in two or more individuals analogous intellectual and affective dispositions; the psychology of dissenting or uncomprehending crowds, which abandon, so to speak, their personal soul to take on a collective soul; the psychology of “social I’s,” that is, those attitudes that the personal “I” tends to assume in relation to its social situation, its task, its profession, in short, the part it must play. b) Inclination to sympathy, either by sharing the feelings and dispositions of others (passive sympathy) or by going further and making others share one’s own feelings. It is an essential need to escape from one’s own circle, not to feel happy or unhappy alone, because when shared, happiness seems to multiply and unhappiness becomes more bearable. c) Inclination to benevolence, which leads one to will the good of others and to procure it for them, independently of one’s own advantage.
Social inclinations must also be considered according to the object toward which they tend; thus there will be: elective inclinations (friendship and love); domestic inclinations (family affections); corporate inclinations (esprit de corps); patriotic inclinations (love for one’s country); philanthropic or humanitarian inclinations (love for humanity in general).
Just as there are social inclinations, so there are others to be considered antisocial: antipathy; misanthropy; jealousy; hatred.
Crowning and synthesizing all inclinations is the religious one. God, even psychologically, appears as He who alone can satisfy all our personal aspirations and our complex and infinite needs. He is apprehended as absolute truth, goodness, and beauty.
2. The Education of the Instincts — Naturally, this must vary according to the different instincts, and also according to the many nuances that each of them assumes within the psychological makeup of every individual. Particular norms will be outlined under the individual entries; here, some general observations will suffice:
a) Since instincts are innate tendencies, their education should not so much consist in developing them (they are already all that they can be in themselves) as in disciplining them, subjecting their exercise to reason and will, guiding them toward balanced use that avoids excesses and deviations, which are always easy. Thus, for example, adaptation to the environment, which can lead to the leveling of personalities and the enervation of energies of resistance, can instead be transformed into the adaptation of the environment to our aspirations; imitation, which can become parroting and the negation of one’s own originality, can also be transformed into emulation and a struggle against every abulic and passive mediocrity; the curiosity to know and to see, which can lead to even precocious vices, can become a stimulus to study; sympathy, which can descend, among other things, into morbidness and vain self-display, can become amiable pity, a gentle and delicate understanding of the misfortunes of others, etc.;
b) Since instincts are not all of the same degree or strength in different individuals, but are variously distributed by provident nature—some being made preponderant and others less so—the education must aim to orient itself toward those instincts which, if fostered, give hope of better success, avoiding the danger of allowing them to fall into obscurity and of forming flat and almost amorphous characters, misfits who will not render to society all that they might have rendered;
c) Not all instincts lead to good; yet in the normal individual, all are capable of discipline, and the will can master them all. It is therefore necessary to orient the exercise of self-mastery toward those points that constitute in each person the greatest danger if neglected;
d) In this field, so varied and so difficult, education (parents, teachers, directors) must possess not only a sound pedagogical culture but also a spirit of constant vigilance, flexible adaptation, penetrating sensitivity, and above all, an intense love for its mission.