CONGRUISMO

CONGRUISM. — The name of this theological system derives from St. Augustine, who in Book I of *De diversis quaestionibus ad Simplicianum*, explaining how efficacious grace is a special benefit of divine mercy, expresses himself thus: «Cuius autem (Deus) miseretur, sic eum vocat, quomodo scit ei congruere ut vocantem non respuat»: PL 40, 119. This name is often applied to Molinism (v.) in general. More commonly, however, c. is called that particular form of Molinism taught by St. Robert Bellarmine (1542–1621) and by Francisco Suárez (1548–1617), which in 1613 a now-abrogated decree of the Jesuit General Claudio Acquaviva proposed among the doctrines proper to the Society of Jesus.

Often for polemical reasons, attempts have been made either to exaggerate or to deny the differences between c. and Molinism. Recent publications of unpublished documents and impartial studies have made it possible to restore the truth. It is now commonly recognized that c., from its very origins, is truly Molinism, inasmuch as it preserves what has always been considered by both defenders and opponents as the essential core of Molinism: its explanation of efficacious grace. It differs, however, from pure Molinism, whose chief advocate was especially Leonardus Lessius (1554–1623), in its doctrine on predestination to glory.

Efficacious grace according to c. — Theologians call efficacious grace (v.) a motion of God by which the will is infallibly determined to elicit a salutary act, that is, one that has value in view of our supernatural end. Grace that is truly but merely sufficient (v.), on the other hand, is a motion of God that, while it truly renders the faculty capable of eliciting the salutary act, remains without effect because of man’s lack of correspondence. All Catholic theologians agree on these notions. There remains, however, among them controversy over how the intimate nature of the two types of grace is to be further explained. The congruists, agreeing in this with all Molinists, reject the opinion of those who affirm that there is an ontological difference between efficacious grace and merely sufficient grace, such that efficacious grace, by virtue of its very nature, determines man to consent, while merely sufficient grace is intrinsically incapable of producing such consent. To them it seems that this opinion, if it is to be consistent with itself, cannot safeguard the freedom of the will under the motion of efficacious grace, nor the true sufficiency of merely sufficient grace. For this reason, they place the difference between the two types of grace in an extrinsic element: namely, God’s foreknowledge of the consent or dissent of the will to which the grace will be granted. That grace is called efficacious which God grants already knowing that man will correspond to it; merely sufficient, on the other hand, is that grace with respect to which He foresees the opposite.

The congruists themselves differ, however, in explaining how God, antecedently to the decree of granting a particular grace to man, can foreknow his reaction. According to Bellarmine, God, by knowing each individual perfectly, his passions, his most secret inclinations, etc., can foreknow with certainty how he will act in certain circumstances under the motion of a certain grace. According to Suárez, agreeing in this with the majority of Molinists, the infallible certainty of God can only be explained by recourse to what is called His middle knowledge, which Bellarmine also admitted, by which He knows what free creatures would do in various possible circumstances. Thus, by the very fact that He decrees to place them in this or that circumstance, He knows what they will in fact do.

Predestination according to c. — Predestination (v.) is, in theological usage, the design conceived by God to lead the rational creature to eternal life. According to all Catholic theologians, considered in its entirety, it is a gratuitous gift of God, a manifestation of His special love toward those who in fact attain salvation. Moreover, according to all Catholic theologians, glory is given to the elect in reward for merits acquired by them. There is, however, no agreement regarding the proximate reason why God elects certain men to glory and to a particular degree of glory. According to pure Molinism, this reason must be sought, at least for the majority of men, in the merits they have acquired at the moment of their death and which God foresees from all eternity (predestination to glory after previous merits). According to the congruists, on the other hand, they owe their election solely to the free predilection of God, Who willed to save them in preference to others. By virtue of this predilection, God disposes their entire life in such a way that they attain salvation and accumulate all the merits necessary to obtain that place in His Kingdom which He has prepared for them (predestination to glory before previous merits). From this different way of conceiving the election to glory there follows also a different way of explaining how God willed the meritorious works that must lead man to salvation. According to pure Molinism, God, by decreeing to give to a certain man a grace that He knows will be efficacious, bestows upon him a special benefit. It cannot, however, be said that God gave it to him precisely in order to obtain from him the salutary act antecedently decreed (praedefinitio virtualis actuum salutarium). According to c., on the other hand, this is precisely what occurs, since all the individual salutary acts of the predestined are established by God in view of the degree of glory to which he has been elected (praedefinitio formalis actuum salutarium).

It is necessary to consult treatises on theology for an in-depth discussion of the value of the two systems. Neither of them, as is clear, resolves the mystery of predestination. C. brings more into relief the special love of God toward the elect of which the sources of Revelation speak. Pure Molinism, while not neglecting this element, leaves it rather in the shade. In compensation, however, it seems to accord better with what the same sources tell us about the salvific will of God that extends to all men without exception, preparing for each one truly sufficient graces to attain salvation.

BIBL.: F. Suárez, *De divina praedestinatione et reprobatione*, Paris 1856 (vol. I of the Opera omnia); id., *De gratia actuali*, ibid. 1856 (vol. VIII); id., *De vera intelligentia auxilii efficaciae, in concordia cum libertate voluntarii consensu*, ibid. 1857 (vol. X); S. R. Bellarmine, *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, ibid. 1873 (vol. V of the Opera omnia); Th. De Regnon, *Balze et Molina*, ibid. 1883; X. M. Le Bachelot, *Actuarium Bellarminianum*, ibid. 1917; id., *Predestinatio et gratiæ efficacis*, Louvain 1931; H. Quilliet, s.V. in *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, III, cols. 1120–38; Maurizio Flick.