EPITTÈTO. – Greek Stoic philosopher, born ca. 50 A.D. at Hierapolis in Phrygia, died at Nicopolis (Epirus) ca. 138. As a boy he was the slave of Epaphroditus, a freedman of Nero, who later freed him. While still a slave, he attended the lectures of the Stoic C. Musonius Rufus of Bolsena, and, once free, himself undertook teaching. Forced to leave Rome in one of the expulsions of philosophers carried out by Domitian (88 or 92 A.D.), he withdrew to Nicopolis in Epirus, where he taught until his death. His lectures were committed to writing, perhaps in shorthand, by the historian Arrian, apparently his disciple, in two collections: the Δια-τριβαι (Dissertationes) in 8 books and the Ὀμιλίου in 12. Four books of the Dissertations and the Ἐγχειρίβιον, or Manual, compiled from excerpts from the former, have come down to us, together with a certain number of fragments. The form of the Dissertations is that of the Cynic diatribe; the style, popular and highly lively, often rises to tones of intimate and solemn emotion.
Between Seneca and Marcus Aurelius, E. is the penultimate representative of Stoicism; reacting against the eclectic tendency of Panaetius (185–199 B.C.) and Posidonius (135–51 B.C.), he recalled its doctrine to the original form of the earliest masters, and above all of Chrysippus. He nevertheless did not escape the influence of Cynicism and, like the Cynics, conceived the philosopher’s life as a mission, restricting his activity to the ethical sphere, which he centered upon the problem of freedom. Man is free because he is endowed with προχάρησις, that is, with the “faculty of using impressions,” from which impulses (ἀρχιὰ) derive their content and become specific (Diss., I, 1, 7; 12). Through προχάρησις man is defined (ibid., II, 10), and through it he is like the divinity (ibid., I, 12, 27). Man, however, uses it rightly and succeeds in realizing his freedom only if he limits it to the sphere of things that are in our power (ἀρχὴς ἦλός): our impressions, the movements of our soul, and our actions. All other things, beginning with the body, are in the power of others (Man., 1); and with regard to them, whoever wishes to be free and attain the end proposed to him by the author of the world-drama (ibid., 17) must renounce every desire, indeed must wish them to be as they are. “You must not seek to have things happen as you wish, but wish them to happen as they do happen, and your life will have an easy course” (ibid., 8). Against those things which common opinion regards as evils, there is only one word to use: ὀδὲν πρὸς ὑλὲ, “nihil ad me.” The motto in which all E.’s wisdom is concentrated is: ἀνέχου καὶ ἀνέχου, “sustine et abstine” (Gedlio, XVII, 19, 6). This does not mean that the sage must live the life of a hermit; rather, he will regard external things as the passenger regards the shells and roots that, during a halt of the ship, he gathers on the shore. “If the pilot calls you, run at once to the ship without turning back, and leave everything behind” (Man., 7). The negativity of this attitude is grounded less in recognition of human weakness than in the ultimate end, which for E. consists in imitation of God and in conforming all one’s actions to the order established by him. E.’s faith in providence is unshakable, and, despite the monistic premises of his system, God appears to him as a person and father (Diss., I, 3, 1–3). “Remember God and call upon him for help and defense, as sailors call upon the Dioscuri in a storm” (ibid., II, 18, 28). It is in the recognition that we are all children of that one father that he locates the source of the love that man owes to man (ibid., I, 13).
E. was highly esteemed by Christians, and the Byzantines even made excerpts from the Manual for use in moral edification. According to a notice reported by certain manuscripts, he was even believed to have been secretly a Christian. Some modern scholars have also conjectured a direct influence of the Gospel, but this has no foundation. Christians are mentioned once in Diss., IV, 7, 6, but in such a way as to exclude the possibility that E. had any very precise knowledge of them.
BIBLI: Editions: ed. principis, Venice 1535; Epictetene philosophiae monumenta, ed. J. Schweighauer, 5 vols., Leipzig 1799–1800; E. Dissertaciones... fragmenta, enchiridion, edited by H. Schmid, ed. marior, 2nd ed., ibid. 1916; E. The Discourse... the Manual and Fragments (complete and translated by W. A. Oldfather), London 1926; E. Entretiens, Texte établi et traduit par J. Souillis, I, Paris 1943. Translations: Manuale by G. Leopardi (cf. Opere di G. Leopardi, II, Florence 1855), reissued by N. Festa with a selection from the Dissertazioni, Milan 1914; another selection from the same work was made by D. Bossi (Florence 1915). “Fundamental for E. are the two works by A. Bonhöffer, E. und die Ston, Stuttgart 1890 and Die Ethik des Stothers E., ibid. 1894; Th. Colardeau, Etude sur E., Paris 1903; E. Bosshard, Epictère, in Revue de l'heft. et de philos., new series, 17 (1920), pp. 202–16; D. Peace, La morale de E., in Revista di filosofia, 30 (1920), pp. 250–64. “For the relations between E. and Christianity, cf. A. Bonhöffer, E. und das Neue Testament, Giessen 1911; M. J. Lazarene, La philosophie religieuse d'E. et le christianisme, in Res. bibl., new series, 9 (1912), pp. 5–21, 102–213; D. S. Sharp, E. and the New Testament, London 1914; G. Pepe, La filosofia religiosa d'E., in Revista di filosofia neo-scolastica, 8 (1916), pp. 2–20, 266–85.