IMPRECATION. – A wish for some evil, whether material or spiritual, directed either against oneself or against others.
In pagan antiquity there was much abuse of i., especially inviting infernal deities to bring misfortune upon designated persons. One may recall the imprecatory prayers of Thyestes against Atreus, of Ateius against Crassus, and of Drusus against Tiberius.
Imprecations were also used to substitute legal sanctions or, in conjunction with these, to enforce more severely certain duties, such as respect for tombs, treaties, and testaments.
A particular form of written i. was the *defixio*, so called from its analogy with the piercing of a point, to which the evil was compared. It is found among almost all ancient peoples and consisted in a magical attempt to cause harm and torment to persons by means of written formulae (usually on a lead tablet), such as the following: “May Persephone never grant favor to...” The formulae of imprecation were often affixed to the house of those against whom harm was desired, or enclosed in tombs, or inscribed on sepulchral stones.
Christians also made use of such formulae to prevent violations, placing similar expressions such as: “May those who lie ill-disposed, unblamably lying, share with Judas if anyone violates this tomb” (Armellini, *V. BIBLICA.*). The only known Christian *defixio* is one discovered at Traù in Dalmatia in the 6th century: this, however, has no magical or harmful intent, but rather an anti-magical and almost exorcistic purpose against an unclean spirit called “spirete tartaruce.” A separate category comprises those imprecations that may be classified among rhetorical figures.
Even in the Bible, especially in the Psalms (e.g., Ps. 128:6), in the Prophets, and even in the Gospel (e.g., Lk. 6:24), there are expressions that at first glance appear to be imprecations. St. Thomas holds that such expressions have an indicative sense and are more prophetic threats than words of hatred and vengeance, while in other cases, the Angelic Doctor judges that the desire expressed is not directed toward evil but toward the fulfillment of God’s justice and the cessation of sin (*Sum. Theol.*, II-II, q. 25, a. 6, ad 3). In this he expresses the common conviction of the Fathers (cf., e.g., St. Hilary: “The word was not one of a wish” (*In Ps.*, 12, 8, 13; PL 9, 717), and St. Augustine: “He foretold these things as future not as wishing them to happen” (*In Ps.*, 34, 1, 9; PL 36, 328)).
**Moral Judgment:** An i. that does not contain blasphemous coloring is a sin against the love of neighbor or at least a sin of anger; and it is grave if the following conditions are met: 1) that the evil wished for is truly desired; 2) that it is grave or is regarded as such; 3) that it is wished with full deliberation.
The i. of a specific evil constitutes the moral species of a desired evil (*Sum. Theol.*, II-II, q. 76, a. 5, ad 2). Yet often the imprecations uttered in a fit of anger are not deliberately approved: for this reason, the i. is generally not gravely imputable. A particular gravity of malice attaches to the i. when it is directed against persons who are entitled to special respect, or against those toward whom there are special duties, such as parents or superiors: “He that curseth his father or mother, dying let him die” (Lev. 20:9).
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