PIETY (theology). — In biblical, theological, and common language, the term piety can have a broader meaning, including one of the gifts of the Holy Spirit (v.) and mercy (v.) toward the needy. Here it is considered specifically as the moral virtue by which due honor and proper reverence are paid to those united by blood or citizenship (Sum. Theol., 2a-2ae, q. 101, a. 1).
Man becomes indebted to others in various ways, according to the excellence of the person from whom he receives and the magnitude of the benefits he receives. In both respects, God holds first place, being in Himself perfectly good and the first principle of every existing being and its preservation; in the realm of grace, the claims upon us assume immeasurable proportions. But subordinate to God and by His dispensation, other creatures must also be considered as principles of our being. Man is not a mere biological entity, so that he owes his life only to those who physically begot him; he is also a social, spiritual, and moral entity, whose existence, formation, development, completion, perfection, and defense are furthered by others, whether by duty or by free will. It is justice, which acknowledges this, that fulfills the duty toward such persons through piety. The proper material object of piety consists of two acts that express love: respect (aid in various needs: illness, poverty, moral sufferings, and prayer [cf. Mt 15:4; Sir 7:29ff.]) and reverence (expressions of esteem, veneration, and awe).
I. OBJECTS OF PIETY
The primary objects of piety are parents; duties toward them can scarcely be repaid in equal measure, though in some cases a child may give more (saving a parent from a cruel death, converting them to the faith, etc.). Precisely because perfect equality cannot be spoken of and because there always remains an ontological dependence on parents, piety is distinguished from mere justice. In the second place come blood relatives, to the extent of their lesser degree of kinship and common proximate origin (and for obvious reasons, guardians and legal parents), and in the third place, other relatives.Piety also has as its object the fatherland; through it, concretized in the State, parents can provide children with a suitable social life, proper education, intellectual development, and defense, which would otherwise be impossible. Thus, while this relationship of principle of existence remains, piety toward the fatherland remains obligatory even in cases of emigration and exile.
Piety toward the fatherland secondarily includes the respect owed to one’s fellow citizens and friends of the fatherland, since the favor shown by these individuals to the fatherland is reflected in the individual.
Piety is also owed to one’s spouse (v. , also for property relations, spouses) and to children by parents (v. PROLE).
Of a similar, though not identical, order are the relations toward spiritual fathers (“Ecclesiae praesides et pastores et sacerdotes patres dicuntur: *Catechismus Romanus, De IV praecepto*, n. 8, ed. Benedetti, Rome 1918, n. 320).
II. LIMITS OF PIETY AND ITS VIOLATIONS
In its exercise, piety finds limits (beyond which it becomes a vice) in superior duties toward God and in duties toward third parties; thus, duties toward God cannot be omitted for an excessive or unfounded piety, nor should duties toward parents be neglected for an exaggerated love of country. Here falls the question of duty toward one’s relatives when someone feels called to the religious state (cf. in this regard CIC, can. 542; *Sum. Theol.*, 2a-2ae, q. 101, a. 4).Piety toward the fatherland is violated by excess through exaggerated nationalism (exclusion of juridical parity among other nations, economic selfishness to the detriment of the community, with excessive customs barriers and immigration restrictions, deification of the fatherland) and by defect through betrayals, defamations, and a cosmopolitanism that fails to recognize the goods of various national entities (cf. the pagan saying: “Ubi bene, ibi patria”).