Relation

RELATION. - From referre, it means the reference of one thing to a term, and its formality consists precisely in this being-toward-another, which differentiates it from the absolute categories of being. The terms absolute (v.) and relative in truth carry various meanings, since sometimes by absolute is understood the being that does not depend on others, such as God (ens a se) in opposition to the creature that depends on him (ens ab alio) and is therefore something relative; or else substance (ens in se) in opposition to accident (ens in alio). But properly absolute is every reality (God-creature, substance-accident) and principle, constitutive or perfective of a substance, whereas relative in the strict sense does not of itself signify either substance or a perfection of substance, but formally only order or reference of one thing to another. Therefore relation in its concept does not even imply reality, since a relation can be only thought or constituted by the mind (relation of reason, e.g., identity), or exist in reality independently of our mind (real relation, e.g., paternity and filiation); and when it is real it can be substantial (relation subsisting in itself; v. TRINITÀ SANTISSIMA) or accidental, that is, inherent in a subject (every other real relation). Real inherent or accidental relations are also called "predicamental": because the predicament or category (v.) of relation refers to them, whereas the "transcendental" ones, improperly called relations, are relations existing among the constitutive principles of a being, such as matter and form (v.) and in general act (v.) and potency, and with these they are identified.

In ancient philosophy the concept of relation does not appear philosophically elaborated until Aristotle, who posits relation as the fourth predicament (after substance, quantity and quality) and clearly determines its nature (πρὸς τῷ) affirming its objective reality (Cat., 7; Met., V, 15). The real value of relation was, on the other hand, in ancient thought, denied by the skeptics (Sextus Empiricus, Adv. math., VIII, 463) and later by Plotinus (Enn., VI, 1, 6) and Boethius (De Trin., 6). In medieval philosophy the analysis of the concept of relation takes on particular importance because of its connections with the Trinitarian dogma. Not a few scholastics (besides the Arabs Avicenna and Averroes [v.]), such as Peter Aureol, William of Ockham (v.) and the "nominalists," admit only the reality of the divine relations, reducing the others to relations of reason ("dico quod relatio non est fundamentum sed tantum intentio vel conceptus in anima importans plura absoluta": Ockham, I Sent., dist. 30, q. 1). But in its principal representatives scholastic thought, both medieval and modern, is in agreement in affirming the existence of real predicamental or accidental relations, besides the divine relations. The proof is drawn from the existence, in the world, of an order independent of our thought (for which already the ancients called the world πένατος): such an order is a relation or rather a complex of relations that are themselves real if the order is real. Similarly, the dependence of the effect on the cause, of the finite and participated being on the infinite Being, is a real relation. It is true that only reason perceives the order of the world or the dependence of the effect on the cause (the animal does not formally perceive order as such), but it does not follow that the relation is necessarily posited in act by reason and that no real relations exist outside human thought. It is a question still discussed among scholastics whether the real predicamental relation entails a reality distinct not only from the subject and the term between which the relation holds, but also from the foundation that causes it (e.g., generation, the foundation of the relation of paternity and filiation existing between father and son). Not a few authors, especially of the Suarezian school (F. Suárez, Disp. Met., d. 47, s. 2), identify the relation with the foundation, while the term would be an extrinsic connotation, or else they identify it with the foundation and with the term. Others, with St. Thomas (De pot., q. 7, a. 9 and passim) and with Scotus (Oxon., II Sent., dist. 1, q. 4, n. 5), hold that the real predicamental relation entails an accidental reality distinct from the subject, foundation and term, and they deduce this from the very nature of relation, which is essentially something relative, whereas subject, foundation and term are absolute realities. This doctrine is indicated in the sixth of the 24 Thomistic theses: "Praeter absoluta accidentia est etiam relativum sive ad aliquid. Quamvis enim ad aliquid non significet secundum propriam rationem aliquid alicui inhaerens, saepe tamen causam in rebus habet et ideo realem entitatem distinctam a subiecto."

In modern philosophy the reality of relation is again denied and only the foundation is admitted as real; thus Gassendi (Philos. epic. synth., II, 30, § 4), Hume (Treat. on hum. nat., I, sec. 5), Wolff (Ontologia, § 857). For Kant relation has no objective reality, but is a subjective a priori form according to which the intellect necessarily judges, and precisely it is one of the four fundamental categories, which includes under itself those of substantiality, causality and reciprocity (Kritik der rein. Vern., II, 1). Relation conceived as a subjective a priori form assumes ever greater importance in post-Kantian subjectivistic philosophy, especially in absolute idealism (v.), which by reducing all reality to the a priori synthesis, outside of which the terms are pure abstractions, resolves reality into relation, which is the synthesis itself (O. Hamelin, Essai sur les élém. princ. de la représ., 2nd ed., Paris 1925, p. 2). But if the idealistic reduction of reality to relation is not acceptable, the opposite position that denies all reality to relation must also be rejected: between the opposite extremes scholastic thought represents the most consistent solution of equilibrium.

Paolo Dezza