Distinction

DISTINCTION. - In its broadest meaning, distinction is the non-identity of something with respect to another: human life and knowledge, insofar as they involve a multiplicity of situations and objects and a process of development on the part of the subject, presuppose the existence of distinction and the possibility, on the part of human consciousness, of taking note of it.

Distinction thus presents itself in all the spheres of consciousness and knowledge: in perception, in scientific and philosophical knowledge, in moral reflection, in theology and in revealed faith. In each of these spheres distinction is determined within its own type of attribution, that is, according to the relations of identity and opposition characteristic of the object of that sphere itself. In this way one can simultaneously have, with respect to one and the same thing, a multiplicity of predications which under one aspect affirm identity and under another affirm distinction: this depends in part on our intellect, which in one thing can apprehend different aspects and can form a single comprehensive apprehension of many things above their particular differences. It is in this way that philosophical thought arose, which, starting from immediate knowledge of an empirical and pragmatic nature, proceeds to distinctions and oppositions in order to rise to considerations of a higher synthetic nature that lead back to the supreme Principle, both in the logical order (the principle of non-contradiction) and in the ontological order (God). Distinction is therefore not simply separation or absolute extraneousness, but rather indicates the presence of an opposition between objects which in another respect agree or find themselves in the same sphere of being and of knowing.

There is first of all distinction in the field of perception (sensory and spiritual), in which lived experience moves, and one can speak of distinction both of acts and of objects. The distinction of acts leads back in itself to the concrete objects to which such acts are applied. The distinction of objects, moreover, is a function of the unitary and total content that they present to consciousness, as the Ganzheitpsychologie (School of Krüger) and the Gestaltpsychologie (Wertheimer, Köhler, Koffka, Lewin, etc.) showed against associationist psychology.

Distinction in the metaphysical field is a function of the conception of reality proper to the various philosophical schools. In monist metaphysics, whether realist or idealist, unity represents the very form of reality in its ultimate condition, while distinction is reduced to mere appearance or phenomenon (Erscheinung). For Plato there is the formal distinction of the "genera" and of the separate forms; for Spinoza, that of the modes and attributes of the one Substance; for Hegel, that of the "forms of Spirit" (art, religion and philosophy) and of their stages of realization, etc. In dualist or pluralist metaphysics, distinction depends on the criterion adopted for isolating the different subjects of being and the different objects of knowing: thus one can have an atomistic pluralism (Democritus), a monadic one (Leibniz), a formal one (Platonism and Neoplatonism), from which derive the medieval positions with a formalist background, not only of Scotus, but of the Augustinians and even of authors close to Thomism such as Giles of Rome, who attributes an esse to every formality of the entity. In Thomist Aristotelianism, metaphysical distinction depends on the rigorous opposition of contradiction and is always a real distinction in its own order: the distinction of matter and form in corporeal essence, of essence and act of being in the finite entity, of creator and creature in the domain of the entity as such, of substance and accident in the sphere of existence, of cause and effect in that of becoming.

In the sphere of pure logical thought, distinction concerns the relation in which concepts stand to one another: it is governed by the doctrine of Porphyry's five "predicables" (genus, species, difference, property, accident). A logical distinction has value, for St. Thomas, insofar as it rests upon and corresponds to a real distinction: thus the distinction of genus and difference in the definition of a natural body has as its foundation the real distinction of matter and form in bodies, or at least that of essence and act of being common also to spiritual substances (cf. C. Gent., II, 95).

Distinction in the theological field has as its sole foundation divine Revelation: the real distinction of the divine Persons is grounded in the relations ("relaciones subsistentes") signified by the terms Father, Son and Holy Spirit (Sum. Theol., 1a, q. 29, a. 4); the distinction among the divine attributes, on the other hand, is only of reason, because they are identified with the formal fullness of the divine essence (ibid., q. 4, a. 2).

In general, moreover, in every field of human knowledge one can speak of distinction, but its meaning depends on the ultimate reference that can be given for it. Thus one can speak of spatial and temporal, real and intentional, natural and supernatural distinctions..., insofar as the being within which one moves belongs precisely to a well-determined sphere which has immanent, in its presenting itself, the criterion of that distinction itself (perceptual, metaphysical, logical, natural, supernatural or revealed).

Cornelio Fabro